MacKay
J.:—These
reasons
concern
judgment
reached
in
regard
to
the
four
actions
set
out
in
the
styles
of
cause
which,
at
the
request
and
on
consent
of
counsel
for
the
parties,
were
tried
on
common
evidence.
Each
action
is
an
appeal
from
a
decision
of
Goetz
J.
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada,
whereby
he
dismissed
the
appeal
of
each
taxpayer
against
an
assessment
of
income
tax
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue.
The
Tax
Court
decisions
in
relation
to
these
appeals
are
reported
(See:
Small
et
al.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1990]
2
C.T.C.
2286,
89
D.T.C.
663,
Zylstra
Estate
et
al.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1990]
1
C.T.C.
2035,
89
D.T.C.
657).
When
the
Tax
Court
considered
the
appeals
the
parties
relied
upon
testimony
of
each
of
the
taxpayers
McRae,
Small
and
Vandervennen,
and
that
of
Dr.
Zylstra’s
widow,
and
for
interpretation
of
the
Act,
they
relied
upon
its
terms,
jurisprudence
and
dictionary
definitions.
In
this
Court
in
these
actions
additional
evidence
of
expert
witnesses
was
adduced
by
each
of
the
parties,
concerning
the
meaning
within
religious
communities
of
a
number
of
the
terms
used
in
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-
72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
provision
here
in
issue,
paragraph
8(1
)(c).
That
evidence
was
provided
on
behalf
of
the
plaintiffs
by
testimony
from
Dr.
McRae,
one
of
the
plaintiffs,
now
chancellor
of
the
Ontario
Bible
College,
who
testified
as
an
expert
as
well
as
a
material
witness,
and
from
Dr.
Ian
S.
Rennie,
vice-president
and
academic
dean,
professor
of
church
history
of
Ontario
Theological
Seminary.
For
the
respondent
expert
testimony
was
adduced
from
Rev.
Francis
G.
Morrisey,
OMI,
professor
of
canon
law
at
Saint
Paul
University,
Ottawa,
and
a
judge
of
the
(Ecclesiastical)
Canadian
Appeal
Tribunal,
and
from
Professor
Donald
Wiebe,
professor
of
Trinity
College
and
former
associate
director
of
the
Centre
for
Religious
Studies,
School
of
Graduate
Studies,
in
the
University
of
Toronto.
Paragraph
8(1
)(c)
of
the
Act,
as
amended,
provides:
8(1)
In
computing
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
an
office
or
employment,
there
may
be
deducted
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
wholly
applicable
to
that
source
or
such
part
of
the
following
amounts
as
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
applicable
thereto:
(c)
where
the
taxpayer
is
a
member
of
the
clergy
or
of
a
religious
order
or
a
regular
minister
of
a
religious
denomination,
and
is
in
charge
of,
or
ministering
to
a
diocese,
parish
or
congregation,
or
engaged
exclusively
in
full-time
administrative
service
by
appointment
of
a
religious
order
or
religious
denomination,
an
amount
equal
to
(i)
the
value
of
the
residence
or
other
living
accommodation
occupied
by
him
in
the
course
of
or
by
virtue
of
his
office
or
employment
as
such
member
or
minister
so
in
charge
of
or
ministering
to
a
diocese,
parish
or
congregation,
or
so
engaged
in
such
administrative
service,
to
the
extent
that
such
value
is
included
in
computing
his
income
for
the
year
by
virtue
of
section
6,
or
(ii)
rent
paid
by
him
for
a
residence
or
other
living
accommodation
rented
and
occupied
by
him,
or
the
fair
rental
value
of
a
residence
or
other
living
accommodation
owned
and
occupied
by
him,
during
the
year
but
not,
in
either
case,
exceeding
his
remuneration
from
his
office
or
employment
as
described
in
subparagraph
(i).
There
is
no
issue
concerning
subparagraphs
(i)
and
(ii);
the
issues
in
each
case
concern
the
application
of
the
introductory
words
of
paragraph
(c)
which
sets
out
the
qualifications
for
the
deduction
here
claimed
in
each
case.
In
each
case
the
Minister’s
assessment,
from
which
the
appeal
is
taken,
had
disallowed
a
deduction
claimed
as
a
residence
allowance,
for
a
clergyman’s
residence,
under
paragraph
8(l)(c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
While
there
is
no
agreed
statement
of
facts
in
any
of
these
appeals
there
is
no
disagreement
about
the
basic
facts
of
each
case.
The
differences
between
the
parties
concern
the
application
of
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
in
each
case.
The
four
plaintiffs,
and
particulars
of
their
respective
claims,
are
as
follows.
(1)
The
estate
of
the
late
Bernard
Zylstra,
in
action
T-494-90,
claims
on
behalf
of
Bernard
Zylstra
who
was
president
of
the
Institute
for
Christian
Studies
("ICS")
in
the
year
1985,
a
year
for
which
his
claim
to
deduct
$7,000
as
a
residence
allowance
was
disallowed.
It
is
claimed
that
he
satisfied
the
requirements
of
paragraph
8(l)(c)
of
the
Act
because
he
was
a
member
of
a
religious
order,
the
Institute
for
Christian
Studies,
and
was
engaged
in
full-time
administrative
service
by
appointment
as
president
of
and
by
that
order.
Dr.
Zylstra
was
deceased
at
the
time
his
appeal
was
heard
by
the
Tax
Court.
His
widow
testified
at
the
hearing
of
his
appeal
in
that
Court,
as
to
his
use
of
the
residence
in
question
for
1985,
and
by
agreement
a
transcript
of
her
evidence
then
given
was
admitted
as
an
exhibit
in
the
trial
of
this
matter
before
me.
(2)
The
estate
of
the
late
Jacob
Small,
in
action
T-485-90,
claims
in
lieu
of
Jacob
Small,
who
died
after
this
appeal
was
initiated.
He
was
director
of
Alumni
of
Ontario
Bible
College
and
Ontario
Theological
Seminary
("OBC"),
an
office
he
held
in
1986
when
he
claimed
a
deduction
as
a
residence
allowance
in
an
amount
of
$9,000,
under
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
of
the
Act,
an
amount
disallowed
by
the
Minister’s
assessment.
An
ordained
minister
of
the
Associated
Gospel
Churches
of
Canada
who
was
committed
to
the
statement
of
faith
of
OBC,
his
claim
to
a
residential
allowance
was
based
on
his
claim
to
membership
in
a
religious
order
and
that
he
was
engaged
exclusively
in
full-time
administrative
service
by
appointment
of
that
religious
order,
1.e.,
the
OBC,
or
his
claim
to
be
a
member
of
a
religious
order
or
a
member
of
the
clergy
or
a
regular
minister
of
a
religious
denomination
ministering
to
a
congregation,
comprised
of
the
alumni
of
the
college.
A
transcript
of
his
testimony
before
the
Tax
Court
was
admitted
by
agreement,
as
an
exhibit,
at
trial
of
this
action.
(3)
William
J.
McRae,
the
plaintiff
in
action
T-496-90,
was
formerly
president
of
the
Ontario
Bible
College
and
Ontario
Theological
Seminary,
an
office
held
throughout
1986.
For
that
year
he
claimed
a
deduction
from
income
for
tax
purposes
as
a
residence
allowance
under
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
in
the
amount
of
$13,500
which
was
disallowed
by
the
Minister’s
assessment.
In
his
appeal
it
is
urged
that
as
a
senior
officer,
as
the
president,
who
signed
the
College’s
statement
of
faith,
he
was
a
member
of
a
religious
order,
the
OBC,
and
was
engaged
exclusively
in
full-time
administrative
service
by
appointment
of
the
order,
and
further
that
he
qualified
for
a
deduction
as
a
member
of
the
clergy
or
of
a
religious
order
or
as
a
regular
minister
ministering
to
a
congregation,
comprised
of
the
College
students,
faculty,
senior
officers
and
staff.
(4)
The
plaintiff
Robert
E.
Vandervennen,
in
action
T-497-90,
appeals
the
decision
disallowing
his
appeal
from
the
Minister’s
assessment
which
had
disallowed
his
claim
to
a
deduction
under
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
for
a
residential
allowance
in
an
amount
of
$7,200
for
1985.
In
that
year
he
was
director
of
educational
services
of
the
ICS,
an
office
in
which
he
was
engaged
in
full-time
administrative
service.
His
claim
is
that
the
members
of
the
ICS
comprise
a
religious
order
and
that
he
qualifies
for
the
residence
allowance
as
a
member
of
a
religious
order
engaged
exclusively
in
full-time
administrative
service
by
appointment
of
that
order.
Thus,
the
claims
concern
the
year
1985
in
the
cases
of
the
late
Bernard
Zylstra
and
Mr.
Vandervennen,
both
then
engaged
in
full-
time
service
of
the
ICS.
Their
claims
are
that
both
were
members
of
a
religious
order
and
both
were
engaged
in
full-time
administrative
service
by
appointment
of
that
order,
the
ICS.
In
the
cases
of
Dr.
McRae
and
the
late
Jacob
Small,
the
claims
concern
the
year
1986
and
the
deduction
claimed
is
on
the
basis
of
membership
in
a
religious
order,
1.e.,
the
OBC,
and
full-time
engagement
in
administrative
service
by
appointment
of
that
order,
and
also
that
each
was
a
member
of
the
clergy,
or
of
a
religious
order
or
a
regular
minister
of
a
religious
denomination,
in
charge
of
or
ministering
to
a
congregation,
comprised
of
the
OBC
students,
faculty,
and
staff
in
the
case
of
Dr.
McRae,
and
of
its
alumni
in
the
case
of
the
late
Jacob
Small.
The
defendant,
Her
Majesty
the
Queen,
does
not
agree
that
the
institutions
which
the
respective
plantiffs
served,
1.e.,
the
OBC
in
the
case
of
Dr.
McRae
and
the
late
Mr.
Small,
and
the
ICS
in
the
cases
of
the
late
Dr.
ZyIstra
and
Mr.
Vandervennen,
are,
in
either
case,
a
religious
order,
or
that
their
respective
members,
or
students,
staff
and
faculty
or
alumni
comprise
a
religious
order.
In
each
case,
the
defendant’s
position
is
that
the
taxpayer
concerned
was
not,
in
the
year
in
question,
a
member
of
a
religious
order,
or
engaged
exclusively
in
full-time
administrative
service
by
appointment
of
a
religious
order.
Moreover,
in
the
cases
of
Dr.
McRae
and
the
late
Mr.
Small,
while
it
is
agreed
that
the
late
Mr.
Small
was
a
member
of
the
clergy
that
status
is
not
accepted
for
Dr.
McRae,
and
it
is
not
agreed
that
either
was
a
regular
minister
of
a
religious
denomination
and
ministering
to
a
congregation.
In
the
application
of
paragraph
8(1)(c)
counsel
for
the
parties
agree
that
for
entitlement
to
a
deduction
under
that
provision
a
taxpayer
must
qualify
both
by
status
and
by
function.
For
the
plaintiffs
it
is
submitted
that
the
two
requirements
are
separate,
though
both
must
be
met.
For
the
defendant
it
is
submitted,
that
read
in
its
entirety,
paragraph
8(1)(c)
requires
both
a
status
or
office
and
the
performance
of
functions
that
are
to
be
performed
only
by
persons
recognized
as
qualified
by
reason
of
their
status.
The
distinction
is
said
to
have
significance
particularly
in
relation
to
certain
claims
advanced
on
behalf
of
Messrs.
McRae
and
Small.
In
these
cases,
for
the
late
Dr.
Zylstra
and
for
Mr.
Vandervennen
it
is
submitted
they
meet
the
status
or
office
requirement
by
being
members
of
a
religious
order,
1.e.,
ICS.
For
Dr.
McRae
and
Mr.
Small
it
is
urged
that
they
meet
the
status
test
as
members
of
a
religious
order,
1.e.,
OBC,
or
alternatively
as
a
member
of
the
clergy
or
as
a
regular
minister
of
a
religious
denomination.
For
all
four
plantiffs
it
is
said
they
qualify
by
function
for
each
was
appointed
by
a
religious
order
and
was
engaged
exclusively
in
full-
time
administrative
service,
and
in
the
alternative
for
Dr.
McRae
and
Mr.
Small
that
each
was
ministering
to
a
congregation.
I
turn
first
to
some
general
principles
of
interpretation
applicable
to
the
statutory
provision
here
in
question.
I
propose
then
to
describe
briefly
some
features
of
significance
of
the
institutions
concerned,
OBC
and
ICS,
and
whether
either
can
be
considered
a
"religious
order",
and
thus
whether
the
plaintiffs
can
be
considered
members
of
a
"religious
order"
within
the
meaning
of
that
term
in
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
of
the
Act.
In
regard
to
the
plaintiff
Dr.
McRae
and
the
late
Mr.
Small,
I
then
consider
the
alternative
basis
for
their
claims
to
a
deduction
that
each
was
a
"member
of
the
clergy"
or
"a
regular
minister
of
a
religious
denomination",
"ministering
to
a
congregation".
None
of
the
terms
here
quoted
is
defined
by
the
Act
itself
and
thus
the
Court’s
task
is
to
interpret
those
terms
as
used
in
the
statute
and
in
light
of
the
evidence
adduced
by
the
parties.
General
principles
of
interpretation
applicable
It
is
trite
law
that
the
words
of
the
Act
are
to
be
read
in
their
entire
context
and
in
their
grammatical
and
ordinary
sense
harmoniously
with
the
scheme
and
object
of
the
Act
and
the
intention
of
Parliament
(Stubart
Investments
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen,
[1984]
S.C.R.
536,
[1984]
C.T.C.
294,
84
D.T.C.
6305
(S.C.R.
576-78,
C.T.C.
315-16,
D.T.C.
6322-23).
The
history
of
the
statutory
provision
may
be
indicative
of
legislative
intent.
Here,
the
predecessor
provisions
to
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
were
dealt
with
by
Parliament
in
1949
and
1956
and
it
is
clear
that
the
Ministers
responsible
at
those
times
indicated
that
the
deduction
was
not
intended
to
be
applicable
in
the
case
of
all
clergymen
or
ministers,
that
orginally
it
was
to
apply
for
those
whose
regular
occupation
was
the
ministry
concerned
with
full-time
religious
or
pastoral
activities.
When
extended
to
include
those
engaged
exclusively
in
full-time
administrative
work
by
appointment
of
a
religious
order
or
denomination,
the
suggestion
that
it
be
extended
to
clergymen
teaching
on
the
staff
of
theological
colleges,
in
part
because
they
may
also
be
engaged
frequently
in
pastoral
work,
was
rejected.
(Hansard
(House
of
Commons),
November
10,
1949
pages
1633-34;
Id.,
July
31,
1956
pages
6775-77.)
The
general
scheme
of
the
Act
is
to
preclude
deductions
for
personal
and
living
expenses
except
for
those
specifically
provided.
Consistent
with
this,
the
provisions
for
deductions
tend
to
be
construed
narrowly.
In
light
of
that
tendency
I
am
persuaded
that
the
purpose
of
paragraph
8(1)(c)
is
to
provide
a
deduction
only
in
those
cases
where
the
taxpayer
qualifies
by
reason
of
his
status
or
office
and
discharges
responsibilities
as
defined,
which
are
ordinarily
associated
with
that
status
or
office.
The
institutions
concerned
as
"religious
orders
The
Ontario
Bible
College
and
Ontario
Theological
Seminary
(the
"College"
or
"OBC")
is
a
non-profit
corporation
established
by
special
act
of
the
Ontario
Legislature
(The
Ontario
Bible
College
and
Ontario
Theological
Seminary
Act,
S.O.
1982,
c.
79).
By
that
statute
its
objects
are
established,
as
follows.
3(1)
The
objects
of
the
College
are
(a)
to
train
men
and
women
for
Christian
service
at
home
and
abroad
in
the
knowledge
and
practical
use
of
the
Bible
on
an
interdenominational
basis;
and
(b)
to
develop
Christian
character
and
maturity
through
sound
biblical
and
theological
instruction,
and
through
the
practice
of
a
devotional
life,
both
personal
and
corporate,
through
Christian
service
opportunities
and
through
a
thorough
understanding
of
man
and
contemporary
issues
in
our
society
from
a
Christian
perspective.
The
act
of
incorporation
provides
for
governance
of
OBC
by
members,
a
board
of
governors,
officers,
a
president’s
cabinet
and
the
faculty.
The
Bible
College,
and
its
predecessors
by
other
names,
marks
the
centennial
year
of
its
founding
in
1994.
With
a
full-time
faculty
of
14
and
some
550
students,
undergraduate
certificate
programmes
are
offered
by
the
College,
as
are
bachelor’s
degrees
in
theology,
religious
education,
religious
studies,
and
in
sacred
music.
The
Ontario
Theological
Seminary,
with
a
full-time
faculty
of
15
and
more
than
500
students,
offers
graduate
programmes
primarily
at
the
masters’
degree
level,
though
the
College
is
authorized
by
statute
to
offer
doctoral
degrees
also.
OBC
is
accredited
by
the
American
Association
of
Bible
Colleges
and
authorized
by
the
Evangelical
Teacher
Training
Association
to
grant
its
diplomas
and
certificates
to
those
who
qualify.
Each
of
the
College
and
the
Seminary
have
a
mission
statement
which
sets
out
as
the
institution’s
own
description
of
the
purposes
of
its
undergraduate
college
and
its
graduate
seminary.
These
statements
are
Ontario
Bible
College
is
an
evangelical,
multi-denominational
Bible
College
committed
to
biblical
excellence
in
the
fulfillment
of
the
Great
Commission
of
our
Lord
and
Saviour,
Jesus
Christ,
by
establishing
and
educating
men
and
women
in
the
faith,
and
equipping
them
for
service
in
the
Kingdom
of
God.
and
Under
the
authority
of
Scripture
and
in
the
power
of
the
Holy
Spirit,
OTS
is
dedicated
to
the
graduate
theological
training
and
spiritual
development
of
men
and
women
committed
to
the
service
of
Jesus
Christ,
and
the
building
up
of
His
church,
to
the
glory
of
God.
OBC
in
its
undergraduate
and
graduate
programmes
serves
students
from
a
variety
of
church
denominations,
protestant
Christian
and
evangelical
in
orientation.
Students
and
faculty
are
expected
to
share
in
experience
of
the
OBC
community
and
its
religious
and
community
life
and
to
conduct
themselves
in
accord
with
a
code
of
conduct
based
on
a
concept
of
moderation.
Members
of
the
board
of
governors,
senior
officers,
and
faculty
of
OBC
are
expected
to
subscribe
to
a
doctrinal
statement,
that
is,
a
statement
of
faith
adopted
for
OBC,
based
upon
the
Bible
which
is
considered
as
absolutely
authoritative
and
which
is
the
basis
of
the
OBC
teaching
programme.
Faculty
members
are
expected
to
sign
this
statement
of
faith
yearly,
as
a
testament
of
their
personal
agreement,
just
as
they
also
sign
annually
a
faculty
contract.
The
other
institution
here
concerned,
ICS,
was
also
incorporated
by
special
act
of
the
Ontario
Legislature,
the
Institute
for
Christian
Studies
Act,
1983,
c.
25.
Its
objects
and
purposes
as
established
by
section
3
of
that
Act
are:
(a)
to
operate
and
maintain
an
institution
for
post-secondary
education
and
research
in
all
areas
of
learning
based
on
the
Scriptures
of
the
Old
and
New
Testaments
and
consistent
with
the
basis
and
educational
creed
of
the
Institute;
(b)
to
advance
scholarship
in
all
areas
of
learning
so
as
to
exhibit
the
coherence
of
all
reality
in
Christ
and
in
this
way
to
equip
people
to
direct
their
lives
by
the
Gospel;
and
(c)
to
sponsor
at
other
institutions
lectureships,
courses,
teaching
programs
and
research
projects.
The
incorporating
statute
provides
for
governance
of
the
ICS
by
a
board
of
trustees,
and
sets
out
its
powers;
it
provides
for
a
senate
and
its
powers,
for
a
president,
and
for
membership
in
the
Institute.
The
basis
and
educational
creed
of
the
ICS,
referred
to
in
the
statutory
purposes
of
the
Institute,
are
included
in
a
statement
to
be
subscribed
to
by
all
members,
including
the
board,
senior
officers
and
faculty,
which
statement
also
includes
a
preamble
and
a
stated
purpose.
The
latter,
the
stated
purpose,
is
set
out,
as
follows:
The
purpose
of
the
association
shall
be
to
undertake
or
promote
whatever
activities
it
shall
deem
conducive
to
the
development
of
scripturally
directed
learning
and
scholarly
enterprise,
and
particularly
to
establish,
control
and
develop
a
Christian
University,
and
in
these
ways
to
equip
men
and
women
to
bring
the
Word
of
God
in
all
its
power
to
bear
upon
the
whole
of
life.
ICS
offers
certificate,
masters’
and
doctoral
studies,
the
last
in
cooperation
with
other
institutions.
Though
there
are
no
formal
ties
with
the
Christian
Reform
Church,
members
of
that
church
are
the
majority
of
members
and
individual
supporters
of
ICS
and
some
local
congregations
within
that
church
provide
financial
support
for
the
Institute,
but
ICS
also
serves
other
denominations
and
has
support
from
other
protestant
denominations
and
their
members.
For
the
plaintiffs
it
is
urged
that
the
term
"religious
order"
within
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
is
not
intended
to
mean
a
religious
order,
congregation
or
society
conforming
to
those
known
in
the
Roman
Catholic
church
traditionally
until
1983.
In
that
year
changes
in
canon
law
abandoned
the
traditional
terminology
so
that
the
term
"religious
order",
admitted
even
by
the
plaintiffs’
expert
witnesses
to
have
originated
in
the
Roman
Catholic
church,
is
no
longer
used,
and
former
orders,
now
"institutes",
are
not
known
any
longer,
at
least
formally,
by
the
name
"orders"
even
in
the
Roman
Catholic
church.
Rather,
it
is
urged
by
the
plaintiffs
that
there
are
a
variety
of
criteria
for
identifying
a
religious
order
as
intended
within
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
and
a
group
may
constitute
such
an
order
if
it
meets
most
if
not
all
of
these
criteria.
It
is
submitted
that
the
institutions
here,
the
OBC
and
the
ICS,
do
so
qualify
in
light
of
the
following
criteria,
most
of
which
the
institutions
meet.
In
each
case
there
is
a
group
of
adult
persons
who
comprise
the
order;
in
the
case
of
the
OBC
the
group
is
made
up
of
the
board
of
governors,
the
senior
officers
and
the
faculty,
in
the
case
of
the
ICS
the
group
is
the
board
of
trustees,
the
senior
staff
and
the
faculty.
Within
each
of
those
groups
the
following
criteria
are
applicable.
A.
The
members
work
together
with
a
sense
of
religious
community,
many
on
a
full-time
basis,
to
achieve
one
or
more
predominantly
but
not
necessarily
exclusively
religious
purposes.
B.
The
members
make
vows
or
other
covenants
in
support
of
their
religious
work,
in
the
case
of
OBC
by
subscription
to
the
faculty
contract
and
the
statement
of
faith,
and
in
the
case
of
the
ICS
by
subscription
of
its
members
to
its
educational
creed.
C.
Both
groups
undertake
their
work
as
a
religious
calling.
D.
Members
of
both
groups
generally
expect
a
long-term
commitment
to
their
work
continuing
at
the
institution-at
least
in
the
case
of
the
faculty,
even
though
in
both
cases
their
contract
terms
are
reviewed,
annually
in
the
case
of
OBC
and
every
second
year
in
the
case
of
ICS.
E.
Certain
members
of
each
group,
faculty
and
senior
staff,
are
said
to
make
a
financial
sacrifice,
by
reason
of
salaries
which
are
substantially
lower
than
salaries
for
comparable
work
in
publicly-supported
post-secondary
educational
institutions.
F.
All
members
of
each
group
agree
to
basic
rules
of
moral
conduct,
in
the
case
of
OBC
those
rules
are
said
to
be
biblically
based,
including
chastity
outside
marriage,
and
in
the
case
of
the
ICS
the
rules
are
based
on
shared
expectations
of
moral
conduct.
G.
In
each
case
the
members
subscribe
to
a
written
statement
of
purpose
and
belief,
in
the
case
of
OBC
its
doctrinal
statement
and
in
the
case
of
ICS
its
educational
creed.
H.
Finally,
in
each
case
the
group
is
said
to
be
recognized
for
its
performance
of
religious
functions,
in
the
case
of
OBC
by
the
evangelical
Christian
community
in
regard
to
the
training
of
ministers
for
evangelical
churches,
and
in
the
case
of
ICS
by
the
Christian
Reformed
Church
community
in
regard
to
advanced
Christian
education
and
research.
The
plaintiffs
refer
to
Revenue
Canada
Interpretation
Bulletin
IT-
141,
dated
December
31,
1973,
with
reference
to
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
where
the
term
"religious
order"
is
defined
as
meaning
a
group
of
people
bound
by
the
same
religious,
moral
and
social
regulations
and
discipline,
such
as
an
order
of
monks.
That
is
said
to
be
consistent
with
the
general
terms
inferred
from
dictionary
definitions
of
the
words
"order"
and
"religious".
Thus,
for
example,
"order"
is
defined
in
the
Oxford
English
Dictionary
on
Historical
Principles,
Vol.
VII,
(Oxford:
the
Clarendon
Press
1909)
at
pages
181-82,
inter
alia,
as
A
body
or
society
of
persons
living
by
common
consent
under
the
same
religious,
moral,
or
social
regulations
and
discipline;
especially
a.
A
monastic
society
or
fraternity:
as
an
order
of
monks
or
friars,
the
Benedictine
or
Franciscan
order.
Sometimes
applied
to
the
rule
or
distinguishing
constitution
of
such
a
fraternity,
or
to
monasticism
as
an
institution.
"Religious”
is
defined
by
the
Oxford
English
Dictionary,
Vol.
1
(Oxford:
(Clarendon
Press,
1973))
page
1697,
as
an
adjective,
meaning
1.
Imbued
with
religion;
exhibiting
the
spiritual
or
practical
effects
of
religion;
pious,
godly.
2.
Of
persons:
Bound
by
monastic
vows;
belonging
to
a
religious
order.
ME.
b.
Of
things,
places,
etc:
Of,
belonging
to,
or
connected
with,
a
monastic
order.
ME,…
The
latter
definition
is
substantially
reflected
in
the
Canadian
Living
Webster
Encyclopedic
Dictionary
of
the
English
Language,
Vol.
II
(Chicago:
The
English
Language
Institute
of
America,
1974)
page
810.
In
my
view
these
definitions,
including
that
offered
by
the
interpretation
bulletin,
suggest
only
in
very
general
terms
the
criteria
for
determining
what
is
intended
by
"religious
order”
as
those
words
are
used
in
paragraph
8(1
)(c).
They
do
not,
for
example,
assist
in
determining
whether
the
criteria
suggested
by
the
plaintiff
are
appropriate.
The
evidence
offered
by
experts
at
trial
is
of
considerable
assistance.
All
four
expert
witnesses,
including
Dr.
McRae
and
Dr.
Rennie
for
the
plaintiffs,
were
agreed
that
the
term
"religious
order"
originally
was
understood,
within
the
Christian
religion,
to
refer
to
those
orders
established
under
canon
law
within
the
Roman
Catholic
church.
Father
Morrisey
discussed
the
nature
of
such
an
organization
and
its
key
characteristics,
though
the
term
no
longer
has
a
specific
meaning
under
canon
law,
since,
as
earlier
noted,
it.
was
replaced
in
1983.
In
a
somewhat
broader
context,
Professor
Wiebe
testified
that
the
phenomenon
of
"religious
orders"
is
found
not
only
in
the
Roman
Catholic
church
but
also
in
the
Eastern
Orthodox
church
and
in
modern
Anglican
and
even
protestant
(e.g.,
Lutheran
and
Reformed)
traditions.
That
phenomenon
is
marked
by
common
characteristics,
when
a
group
of
persons,
distinct
from
within
a
larger
religious
community,
live
under
a
set
of
rules,
bound
by
vows
to
observe
not
only
the
general
precepts
of
their
church,
but
also
vows
of
chastity,
poverty
and
obedience,
including
agreement
to
a
communal
life
unless
permitted
to
live
otherwise.
It
is
interesting
that
neither
Dr.
McRae
nor
Dr.
Rennie
testified
that
OBC,
the
institution
here
claimed
by
plaintiffs
McRae
and
Small
to
constitute
a
religious
order,
was
an
order
similar
to
traditional
orders
in
the
Roman
Catholic
church,
or
that
the
basic
characteristics
outlined
as
criteria
of
a
religious
order
by
Professor
Wiebe
and
Father
Morrisey
were
met
by
the
OBC.
While
counsel
for
the
plaintiffs
urged
that
it
was
inappropriate
to
adopt
the
concept
proposed
by
defendant’s
counsel,
that
is,
that
the
"template"
for
a
"religious
order"
should
be
that
term
as
formerly
used
in
the
Roman
Catholic
church,
nevertheless,
as
I
understood
their
evidence
Drs.
McRae
and
Rennie,
spoke
of
OBC,
and
by
inference
ICS,
as
the
counterparts
within
the
context
of
the
evangelical
protestant
church,
or
that
of
the
Christian
Reform
church
for
ICS,
of
the
traditional
Roman
Catholic
religious
order.
In
other
words,
even
the
experts
for
the
plaintiffs
used
the
former
religious
orders
of
the
Roman
Catholic
church
as
"the
template"
for
their
development
of
criteria
for
the
equivalents
in
their
religious
traditions.
The
doctrinal
statement
of
OBC
and
the
educational
creed
of
ICS,
to
which
their
respective
members
subscribe,
are
important
documents
in
the
relationship
of
individuals
to
each
of
the
institutions,
and
of
the
interrelations
of
individuals
within
the
life
of
each
institution.
Yet,
in
reliance
upon
the
expert
testimony
of
Father
Morrisey
and
Professor
Wiebe
I
conclude
that
these
declarations
are
not
in
substance
similar
to
the
vows
made
by
members
of
a
traditional
religious
order.
There
are
two
principal
considerations
which
lead
me
to
conclude
that
neither
OBC
nor
ICS
is
a
"religious
order"
within
the
intention
of
paragraph
8(1)(c).
The
first
is
that
there
is
no
expression
of
faith
or
of
religious
purpose
of
either
institution
apart
from
the
educational
purpose
of
each,
that
would
mark
the
institution,
and
its
members
as
distinct
from
the
churches
or
denominations
that
each
serves.
That
would
appear
to
me,
from
dictionary
definitions
and
from
the
testimony
particularly
of
Professor
Wiebe,
to
be
a
necessary
quality
of
a
"religious
order".
If
it
were
otherwise
the
order
would
not
be
easily
distinguishable
from
other
institutions
serving
the
general
religious
purposes
of
the
churches
concerned.
The
second
consideration
is
that
both
OBC
and
ICS
have
their
primary
purposes
in
education.
That
is
offered
with
a
particular
religious
emphasis
and
to
serve
the
denominations
which
are
supportive
of
them
by
education
and
training
of
persons
from
those
denominations
in
spiritual
and
religious
life,
and
for
leadership
through
teaching
and
example.
Those
are
noble
and
important
purposes,
but
in
my
view
they
are
oriented,
quite
properly
for
each
institution,
to
education.
They
are
not
religious
purposes
in
the
sense
pursued
by
a
religious
order,
though
some
religious
orders
may
also
pursue
educational
purposes
as
subordinate
to
their
primarily
religious
purpose
of
service
to
their
God
through
worship,
prayer
and
devotion.
It
was
for
generally
similar
reasons
that
Urie
J.
determined
a
Rutterite
community
could
not
be
considered
a
religious
order
(1.e.,
because
its
objects
and
purposes
were
not
exclusively
religious,
but
also
included
farming),
within
then
subsection
27(2)
of
the
Act
(now
subsection
110(2))
which
permits
a
member
of
a
religious
order
who
has
made
a
vow
of
perpetual
poverty
to
deduct
from
his
income
for
tax
purposes
the
amount
of
his
earned
income
if
it
was
paid
to
the
order.
(See:
Wipf
et
al.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1973]
C.T.C.
761,
73
D.T.C.
5558
at
5566
(F.C.T.D.);
reversed
on
other
grounds,
Wipf
et
al.
v.
The
Queen,
75
D.T.C.
5034
(F.C.A.).)
I
conclude
that
neither
OBC
nor
ICS
is
a
religious
order
within
that
term
as
it
is
used
in
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
of
the
Act.
Thus
none
of
the
plaintiffs
is
a
member
of
a
religious
order
by
reason
of
his
membership
in,
or
association
with
OBC
or
ICS,
and
none
of
them
can
be
said
to
be
"engaged
exclusively
in
full-time
administrative
service
by
appointment
of
a
religious
order",
a
basis
on
which
each
claimed
to
be
qualified
by
reason
of
his
functions
at
OBC
or
at
ICS.
Since
that
is
the
only
basis
advanced
for
the
appeal
by
the
action
taken
in
relation
to
Dr.
Zylstra
by
his
estate
and
by
the
action
of
Mr.
Vandervennen,
each
in
relation
to
the
assessment
of
income
for
tax
in
1985,
those
two
actions
will
be
dismissed.
I
note
that
the
Minister’s
assumptions
of
fact
underlying
the
tax
assessments,
as
set
out
in
each
of
the
statements
of
defence
in
the
actions
of
Dr.
McRae
and
Mr.
Small,
included
the
assumptions
that
OBC
was
not
a
"religious
denomination"
and
that
the
plaintiff
in
each
case
was
"not
engaged
in
full-time
administrative
service
by
appointment
of
a...religious
denomination".
That
position
was
supported
in
argument,
perhaps
for
completeness,
by
counsel
for
the
defendant,
but
no
claim
was
advanced
by
either
Dr.
McRae
or
on
behalf
of
Mr.
Small
that
would
contest
these
assumptions
of
the
Minister.
For
the
record
no
such
claim
was
raised
by
Mr.
Vandervennen
or
on
behalf
of
Dr.
Zylstra.
It
is
unnecessary
to
deal
with
this
issue
in
any
of
the
cases
here
considered.
In
their
respective
actions
Dr.
McRae
and
Mr.
Small
did
raise
other
grounds,
and
I
now
turn
to
those.
A
"member
of
the
clergy",
"a
regular
minister
of
a
religious
denomination
and
in
charge
of
or
ministering
to
a
congregation"
In
relation
to
each
of
Dr.
McRae
and
Jacob
Small,
the
defence
to
their
respective
actions
includes
assumptions
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
in
assessing
the
plaintiff.
These
include
the
assumption
that,
in
each
case,
"the
plaintiff
was
not
a
member
of
the
clergy
or
of
a
religious
order
or
a
regular
minister
of
a
religious
denomination
and
in
charge
of
or
administering
to
a
diocese,
parish
or
congregation...".
Those
words,
of
course
reflect
alternative
qualifying
bases
for
claiming
a
deduction
under
the
introductory
words
of
paragraph
8(l)(c)
of
the
Act.
Those
qualifications
are
said
to
be
met
by
both
Dr.
McRae
and
Mr.
Small,
claims
disputed
by
the
defendant
both
in
regard
to
the
status
requirement
and
the
functional
requirement
specified
in
the
paragraph.
Since,
as
I
have
already
determined
OBC
was
not
a
religious
order,
neither
of
these
taxpayers
could
be
considered
to
be
a
member
of
a
religious
order
by
reason
of
his
membership
or
association
with
OBC.
The
defendant
urges
that
Dr.
McRae
is
not
a
member
of
the
clergy
within
paragraph
8(1)(c)
since
he
was
not
ordained.
Within
his
church,
the
Brethren
Assembly,
he
was
acknowledged
and
had
status
as
a
commended
worker,
a
status
recognized
by
ceremony
and
by
unanimous
support
of
the
elders
of
three
congregations.
That
status
is
said
by
counsel
for
the
plaintiffs
to
be
a
clergyman
within
his
denomination,
his
church,
the
Brethren
Assembly.
Before
his
appointment
to
OBC
he
had
served
in
leadership
of
a
number
of
congregations
of
his
church.
There
is
no
dispute
that
the
Brethren
Assembly
is
a
denomination
within
paragraph
8(1
)(c),
as
determined
by
Goetz
J.
when
this
matter
was
heard
at
the
Tax
Court,
but
the
defendant,
relying
upon
dictionary
definitions
and
the
expert
testimony
of
Father
Morrisey
and
Professor
Wiebe,
urges
that
his
status
as
commended
worker
within
his
own
denomination
does
not
mean
he
is
a
member
of
the
clergy.
I
am
persuaded
that
the
words
"member
of
the
clergy"
as
used
in
the
provision
here
in
question
must
have
the
meaning
supported
by
dictionaries,
and
that
referred
to
even
by
counsel
for
the
plaintiffs,
as
one
ordained
and
set
apart
for
special
religious
functions,
a
position
generally
contrasted
with
that
of
the
laity,
that
1s,
the
general
church
membership.
In
the
case
of
the
Brethren
Assembly
there
is
no
ordination
and,
despite
the
recognized
position
of
"commended
worker",
all
members
are
of
equal
status.
In
a
formal
sense
no
one
has
a
position
of
greater
significance
than
others
and
Dr.
McRae
cannot
be
considered
a
"member
of
the
clergy".
In
the
case
of
Mr.
Small,
he
was
an
ordained
minister
of
the
Associated
Gospel
Churches
and
had
served
at
three
churches
before
joining
OBC.
In
my
view,
there
can
be
no
real
dispute
and
it
was
conceded
at
the
hearing
that
he
was
a
member
of
the
clergy.
That
requirement
of
status
was
met
and
the
Minister’s
assumption,
insofar
as
it
was
based
on
Mr.
Small
not
being
a
member
of
the
clergy,
was
simply
wrong.
For
both
Dr.
McRae
and
Mr.
Small
it
is
contended
that
each
is
a
"regular
minister
of
a
religious
denomination",
a
view
the
defendant
resists
on
the
ground
that
"regular
minister",
for
purposes
of
paragraph
8(1)(c)
of
the
Act,
means
a
person
recognized
as
having
a
distinct
status
for
spiritual
purposes
within
a
religious
denomination
whose
function
or
office
is
to
provide
that
spiritual
leadership.
In
my
view,
this
tends
to
fuse
the
status
and
functional
requirements
here
set
out
if
one
is
to
qualify
for
a
deduction
related
to
residence
costs.
It
is,
however,
unnecessary
to
determine
the
matter;
though
if
that
were
required,
in
my
view,
Dr.
McRae
would
qualify
by
status
as
a
"regular
minister
of
a
religious
denomination"
by
reason
of
his
status
as
a
commended
worker
of
the
Christian
Brethren
Assembly.
On
attaining
that
commendation
he
thereafter
worked
on
a
full-time
basis
with
successive
congregations
of
Christian
Brethren.
Within
that
denomination
voluntary
service
of
members
in
leadership
within
the
church
is
expected
and
encouraged,
but
a
commended
worker
committed
to
full-time
service
in
a
congregation
is
paid
for
his
work,
and
only
a
commended
worker
is
paid.
That
is
my
understanding
of
Dr.
McRae’s
evidence
and
I
accept
that
his
status
within
his
denomination,
for
purposes
of
paragraph
8(1
)(c),
is
that
of
a
"regular
minister",
whatever
the
theological
understanding
of
his
status
may
have
been.
I
have
noted
that
determination
of
that
issue
is
unnecessary.
That
is
because,
even
if
Dr.
McRae
is
considered
a
"regular
minister"
within
the
Christian
Brethren
Assembly
and
Mr.
Small
was
an
ordained
minister
of
the
Associated
Gospel
churches,
neither
met
the
functional
requirement,
"and...in
charge
of
or
ministering
to
a
diocese,
parish
or
congregation".
Counsel
made
reference
to
considerable
jurisprudence
concerning
the
terms
"minister",
"regular
minister".
Insofar
as
the
cases
referred
to
deal
with
those
terms
as
used
in
statutes
other
than
the
Income
Tax
Act,
though
these
were
of
general
interest,
they
are
not
directly
referable
to
the
interpretation
of
the
paragraph
here
in
issue.
There
are,
however,
five
decisions,
mainly
of
the
former
Tax
Appeal
Board,
other
than
the
decisions
of
the
Tax
Court
in
relation
to
the
cases
at
bar,
which
deal
with
paragraph
8(1)(c)
or
its
predecessors.
In
Guthrie
v.
M.N.R.
(1955),
14
Tax
A.B.C.
90,
55
D.T.C.
605
(T.A.B.)
the
Board
allowed
a
deduction
claimed
by
an
ordained
minister,
employed
and
teaching
in
a
theological
college,
under
a
predecessor
to
the
current
provision
which
at
the
time
required
only
a
status
test
to
be
met,
1.e.,
as
a
member
of
the
clergy
or
of
a
religious
order
or
a
regular
minister
of
a
religious
denomination.
The
Act
was
changed
thereafter
to
require
a
functional
test
be
met
also,
that
is
that
the
taxpayer,
qualified
by
status,
also
be
"in
charge
of
or
ministering
to
a
diocese,
parish
or
congregation
or
engaged
exclusively..."
as
the
paragraph
now
provides.
(Amended
by
S.C.
1956,
c.
39,
subsection
3(5).)
In
Bloom
v.
M.N.R.
(1963),
34
Tax
A.B.C.
206,
64
D.T.C.
39
(T.A.B.)
the
Board
compared
the
functions
of
the
taxpayer
as
ritual
director
of
a
synagogue
with
those
ordinarily
and
regularly
performed
by
the
rabbi.
It
determined
that
those
functions
did
not
compare
with
the
rabbi’s
and
that
the
taxpayer
did
not
have
any
special
and
recognized
status
within
the
Jewish
faith
that
would
be
universally
significant
in
any
Hebrew
congregation.
Thus,
he
was
not
a
regular
minister
of
a
religious
denomination
and
was
not
in
charge
of
or
ministering
to
a
congregation.
In
Attwell
v.
M.N.R.,
[1967]
Tax
A.B.C.
862,
67
D.T.C.
611
(T.A.B.),
a
member
of
the
clergy,
ordained
in
the
Anglican
church,
employed
as
the
chaplain
and
a
teacher
at
Ashbury
College,
a
private
boys
school
then
of
some
280
pupils,
was
held
to
be
entitled
to
claim
the
deduction.
His
duties
as
chaplain
included
leading
daily
morning
chapel
services
and
Sunday
services
for
students
and
visiting
parents,
preparation
of
students
for
confirmation
in
the
church
and
acting
as
spiritual
adviser.
In
dealing
with
that
appeal
the
then
assistant
chairman
of
the
Board,
R.S.W.
Fordham,
Q.C.
indicated
that
in
his
view
the
facts
were
unusual
and
the
decision
ought
not
to
be
considered
a
precedent.
Nevertheless,
it
was
followed
by
the
Tax
Review
Board
in
Adam
v.
M.N.R.,
[1974]
C.T.C.
2298,
74
D.T.C.
1220
(T.R.B.),
and
there
the
deduction
claimed
was
allowed
in
the
case
of
a
taxpayer
who
was
an
ordained
minister
employed
as
registrar
and
a
teacher
at
Briarcrest
Bible
Institute
in
Caronport,
Saskatchewan,
whose
duties
included
conduct
of
daily
chapel
sessions
and
shared
conduct
of
regular
Sunday
services
which
were
not
merely
for
the
institute
but
for
the
surrounding
community
as
well.
Finally,
in
the
most
recent
case,
Kolot
v.
The
Queen,
[1993]
1
C.T.C.
2047,
92
D.T.C.
2391
(T.C.C.),
Mr.
Justice
Beaubier,
relying
upon
the
decision
of
Goetz
J.
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
who
dealt
with
two
of
the
cases
at
bar,
in
regard
to
Messrs.
Small
and
McRae
in
his
decision
in
Small
et
al.
v.
M.N.R.,
supra,
([1990]
2
C.T.C.
2286,
89
D.T.C.
663),
found
that
the
taxpayer,
who
was
not
an
ordained
minister
of
the
United
church,
was
entitled
to
the
deduction
claimed.
On
the
evidence,
as
a
christian
education
staff
associate
within
her
denomination,
she
was
considered
a
spiritual
leader,
having
passed
required
tests
and
been
appointed
to
a
congregation
where
her
duties
involved
guiding
the
spiritual
life,
working
with
ordained
ministers
of
the
congregation.
In
that
case
the
taxpayer
was
found
to
be
a
’’regular
minister"
and
further
that
she
was
ministering
to
a
congregation
established
by
the
religious
denomination
of
which
she
was
a
member
and
spiritual
leader.
Three
of
these
decisions
refer
to
the
matter
of
"ministering
to
a
congregation",
the
functional
test
which,
in
my
view,
neither
Dr.
McRae
nor
Mr.
Small
in
the
cases
here
under
consideration
met.
Thus
in
Attwell,
supra,
Mr.
Fordham
for
the
Board
said
(at
page.
864
(D.T.C.
612-613)):
Counsel
for
the
Minister
argued
that
the
ejusdem
generis
rule
of
construction
should
be
applied
in
considering
the
words
‘diocese,
parish
or
congregation".
I
do
not
agree
as
each
of
these
words
has
a
clear
connotation;
the
first
two
are
descriptive
of
a
particular
territorial
area
ministered
by
the
church;
a
parish
is
altogether
different
from
a
diocese
as
it
is
only
a
small
part
of
the
latter.
Also,
there
may
be
a
congregation
irrespective
of
any
parish
or
other
boundaries.
In
Barnes
v.
Shore
(1846),
1
Rob.
Eccl.
382,
Sir
Herbert
Jenner
Furst
said:
What
is
necessary
to
constitute
a
congregation
has
not
been
very
strictly
defined:
but
it
has
been
commonly
considered
that
"where
two
or
three
are
gathered
there
together"
there
is
a
sufficient
number
to
constitute
a
congregation.
Furst
evidently
borrowed
from
the
well-known
prayer
of
St.
Chrysostom
found
in
the
forepart
of
the
Anglican
prayer
book
in
using
the
words
quoted
by
him.
In
the
much
later
case
of
Re
Hutchinson's
Trust
(1914),
1
LR.
271,
O’Connor
M.R.,
observed:
It
was
contended
that
the
three
ladies
and
one
other
person
do
not
constitute
a
congregation.
It
is
no
doubt
a
small
congregation,
but
I
am
unaware
of
any
authority
which
makes
a
large
multitude
of
persons
essential
to
the
constitution
of
a
congregation....
I
must
hold
that
there
is
still
a
congregation
of
Unitarians
in
Clonmel,
and
that
the
trust
has
not
so
far
failed.
As
may
be
seen,
in
order
to
constitute
a
congregation
the
number
of
individuals
need
not
be
large,
but
may
in
fact
even
be
exceedingly
small.
I
can
find
nothing
in
paragraph
(q)
that
in
any
way
enhances
the
meaning
of
"congregation.
In
Adam,
supra,
though
the
facts
differed
slightly,
the
Board
simply
followed
and
adopted
the
reasoning
in
Atwell.
In
Kolot,
supra,
the
principal
issue
concerned
whether
the
taxpayer
was
a
"regular
minister"
within
paragraph
9(1
)(c)
and
only
passing
reference
was
made
by
Beaubier
J.
to
her
as
"ministering
to
the
congregation
of
Wesley
United
church
in
Regina,
Saskatchewan,
in
the
manner
in
which
she
was
directed
by
presbytery".
For
the
plaintiff
Dr.
McRae
in
the
case
at
bar,
it
is
urged
that
the
faculty,
staff
and
students
of
OBC
constitute
a
congregation
to
which
he
ministers
by
performing
typical
pastoral
functions.
He
leads
religious
services
and
offers
communion,
on
a
regular
if
not
frequent
basis,
he
provides
leadership
in
preaching,
prayer
and
spiritual
life,
he
provides
spiritual
counselling
and
performs
marriage
ceremonies
under
provincial
law.
For
Mr.
Small
it
is
claimed
that
the
congregation
he
served
through
prayer
and
preaching
was
the
alumni
of
OBC,
who
meet
from
time
to
time,
at
least
annually
at
the
institution,
or
whom
he
met
on
his
travels
regularly
to
communities
where
they
settled.
Both
Dr.
McRae
and
Mr.
Small
also
provided
spiritual
leadership
in
visiting,
preaching
and
leadership
in
prayer,
at
congregations
of
their
respective
denominations
when
invited.
I
do
not
intend
to
diminish
the
importance
of
their
respective
roles
of
leadership
including
spiritual
leadership,
for
OBC,
its
alumni
and
its
supporters
within
church
congregations.
Nevertheless,
I
conclude
that
those
functions
were
not
"ministering
to
a
congregation"
within
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
because
neither
OBC
nor
its
alumni
constitute
a
congregation
as
that
word
is
used
in
the
statutory
provision.
For
the
plaintiffs,
it
is
argued
that
a
congregation
is
an
assembly
of
persons
meeting
for
the
worship
of
God
and
for
religious
instruction;
the
a
congregation
is
not
defined
by
territorial
boundaries
or
the
number
of
people
gathered
together
and,
relying
particularly
upon
Attwell
and
Adam,
supra,
that
a
body
of
students
and
staff
of
an
educational
institution
can
constitute
a
congregation
which
need
not
all
be
of
the
same
denomination.
I
note
that
in
Attwell,
Mr.
Fordham
for
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
expressly
rejected
reliance
upon
the
ejusdem
generis
rule
of
construction
of
the
words
"diocese,
parish
or
congregation"
in
part
because
each
of
the
words,
in
his
view,
"had
a
clear
connotation".
If
he
meant
by
that
that
each
word
has
a
clear
meaning
without
reference
to
the
context
in
which
it
is
used
then
I
must
disagree.
It
is
because
the
parties
do
not
agree
on
a
clear
meaning
here
that
they
disagree
on
the
meaning
of
the
word
"congregation".
The
word
must
be
read
in
the
context
of
the
paragraph
as
a
whole.
The
qualifying
words,
relating
to
the
deduction
here
claimed
are
these:
a
member
of
the
clergy
or
of
a
religious
order
or
a
regular
minister
of
a
religious
denomination,
and
is
in
charge
of,
or
ministering
to
a
diocese,
parish
or
congregation
or
engaged
exclusively
in
full-time
administrative
service
by
appointment
of
a
religious
order
or
religious
denomination....
It
is
my
opinion
that
in
this
broader
context
of
the
words
used
to
describe
the
qualifications
for
a
deduction,
the
words
"diocese,
parish
or
congregation"
are
intended
to
describe
different
organizational
or
institutional
structures
determined
by
religious
denominations
for
the
ongoing
organized
activities
of
their
members
on
a
regular
basis.
Thus,
a
gathering
of
persons
may
well
be
a
congregation
for
some
purposes,
but
unless
it
is
a
gathering
for
shared
religious
purposes
recognized
by
a
religious
denomination
for
its
regular
organizational
religious
activities,
it
does
not
qualify
as
a
"congregation"
within
the
meaning
of
that
word
in
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
of
the
Act.
OBC,
its
faculty,
staff
and
students,
and
its
alumni,
could
not
be
considered
to
constitute
a
congregation
as
I
interpret
the
word,
that
is
a
body
recognized
by
a
religious
denomination
for
its
regular
organizational
religious
activities
since
on
the
evidence
the
institution
was
seen
as
representative
of,
and
serving
several
denominations
through
its
educational
programs,
not
through
its
religious
services
and
workship
activities.
Moreover,
faculty,
staff
and
students,
and
clearly
alumni,
were
encouraged
or
would
rely
upon
their
own
denominational
church
congregations
for
their
primary
spiritual
life.
If
I
am
correct
in
my
interpretation,
OBC,
its
faculty,
staff
and
students,
and
its
alumni,
do
not
qualify
as
a
congregation
within
the
statutory
provision.
In
their
responsibilities
in
serving
at
OBC,
neither
Dr.
McRae
or
Mr.
Small
was
"in
charge
of
or
ministering
to
a
congregation",
within
the
meaning
of
those
words
as
used
in
paragraph
8(1)(c).
Conclusions
The
following
summarizes
my
conclusions
in
relation
to
each
of
these
actions.
In
the
action
T-494-90,
I
have
found
that
the
ICS
is
not
a
religious
order.
The
late
Bernard
Zylstra
thus
does
not
qualify
for
a
deduction
under
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
of
the
Act,
as
claimed
by
his
estate,
for
he
was
not,
by
reason
of
his
office
as
president
or
his
membership
in
ICS,
a
member
of
a
religious
order.
Thus,
in
his
office
as
president,
he
could
not
be
said
to
be
engaged
exclusively
in
full-time
administrative
service
by
appointment
of
a
religious
order.
The
appeal
by
his
estate
from
the
decision
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
in
this
action
is
thus
dismissed,
with
costs
as
asked
by
the
Crown.
In
action
T-495-90,
I
have
found
that
the
late
Jacob
Small
was
a
member
of
the
clergy,
but
he
was
not
in
charge
of,
or
ministering
to
a
congregation,
and
he
was
not
exclusively
engaged,
by
reason
of
his
appointment
or
office
or
membership
in
OBC,
in
full-time
administrative
service
by
appointment
of
a
religious
order,
since
OBC
was
not
a
religious
order,
within
the
meaning
of
those
various
terms
as
used
in
paragraph
8(1
)(c)
of
the
Act.
The
assumptions
of
fact
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
upon
which
assessment
of
tax
was
based
were
in
error
in
one
regard,
that
is,
concerning
his
status
as
a
"member
of
the
clergy",
but
since
I
find
he
was
not
in
charge
of
or
ministering
to
a
congregation,
the
last
Mr.
Small
did
not
meet
all
qualifications
necessary
to
claim
a
deduction
under
the
paragraph
in
question,
and
thus
the
assessment
by
the
Minister
was
not
in
error.
The
appeal,
initiated
by
the
late
Mr.
Small
and
carried
on
by
his
estate,
from
the
decision
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
in
action
T-495-90
is
thus
dismissed,
with
costs
as
asked
by
the
Crown.
In
action
T-496-90,
I
found
that
Dr.
William
McRae
was
not
a
member
of
the
clergy,
nor
was
he
a
member
of
a
religious
order
by
reason
of
his
office
and
his
membership
in
OBC
since
that
organization
was
not
a
religious
order,
within
the
meaning
of
those
terms
as
used
in
paragraph
8(1)(c)
of
the
Act.
Without
determining
whether
he
was
a
regular
minister
within
the
terms
of
that
provision,
but
assuming
for
purposes
of
this
case
that
he
was,
I
have
found
that
he
was
not
"a
regular
minister
in
charge
of
or
ministering
to
a
congregation".
I
have
also
found,
since
the
OBC
was
not
a
religious
order,
that
he
was
not
engaged,
by
reason
of
his
office
at
OBC,
in
full-time
administrative
service
by
appointment
of
a
religious
order.
Thus,
the
essential
assumptions
of
fact
upon
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
based
his
assessment
for
tax
for
1986
remain.
The
appeal
by
Dr.
McRae
from
the
decision
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
in
action
T-496-90
is
thus
dismissed,
with
costs
as
asked
by
the
Crown.
In
action
T-497-90,
I
have
found
the
ICS
is
not
a
religious
order.
Mr.
Vandervennen
thus
does
not
qualify
for
a
deduction
under
paragraph
8(1)(c)
of
the
Act
as
he
claimed,
for
he
was
not,
by
reason
of
his
office
or
his
membership
in
the
ICS
a
member
of
a
religious
order
nor
was
he
engaged
exclusively
in
full-time
administrative
service
by
appointment
of
a
religious
order.
The
essential
assumptions
of
fact
upon
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
based
his
assessment
for
tax
for
1985
remain.
The
appeal
by
Mr.
Vandervennen
from
the
decision
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
in
action
T-497-90
is
thus
dismissed,
with
costs
as
asked
by
the
Crown.
A
separate
judgment
relating
to
each
action
is
filed
and
I
direct
that
a
copy
of
these
reasons
be
filed
in
each
of
the
Court’s
files.
Actions
dismissed.