O'Connor
J.T.C.C.:—This
appeal
was
heard
pursuant
to
the
informal
procedure
of
this
Court,
in
Edmonton,
Alberta
on
September
2,
1994
and
relates
to
the
appellant’s
1992
taxation
year.
Issue
The
only
issue
is
whether
the
appellant
is
entitled
to
deduct
moving
expenses
of
$3,201
in
the
1992
taxation
year.
The
relevant
section
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
is
subsection
62(1)
which,
so
far
as
material,
reads
as
follows:
Where
a
taxpayer
has,
at
any
time,
commenced
(a)
to
carry
on
a
business
or
to
be
employed
at
a
location
in
Canada
(in
this
subsection
referred
to
as
his
"new
work
location”),
and
by
reason
thereof
has
moved
from
the
residence
in
Canada
at
which,
before
the
move,
he
ordinarily
resided
(in
this
section
referred
to
as
his
“old
residence")
to
a
residence
in
Canada
at
which,
after
the
move,
he
ordinarily
resided
(in
this
section
referred
to
as
his
"new
residence"),
so
that
the
distance
between
his
old
residence
and
his
new
work
location
is
not
less
than
40
kilometres
greater
than
the
distance
between
his
new
residence
and
his
new
work
location,
in
computing
his
income
for
the
taxation
year
in
which
he
moved
from
his
old
residence
to
his
new
residence
or
for
the
immediately
following
taxation
year,
there
may
be
deducted
amounts
paid
by
him
as
or
on
account
of
moving
expenses
incurred
in
the
course
of
moving
from
his
old
residence
to
his
new
residence,
to
the
extent
that.
The
appellant,
who
was
assisted
in
this
appeal
by
a
representative
of
H
&
R
Block,
who
had
prepared
the
appellant's
income
tax
return,
submitted
that
he
does
qualify
for
a
deduction
of
moving
expenses
under
said
subsection
62(1).
The
respondent,
after
establishing
through
cross-examination
that
the
appellant
worked
at
numerous
work
locations
both
before
and
after
the
move,
i.e.,
in
1991
and
1992,
submitted
that
the
Appellant
did
not
move
from
his
old
residence
to
his
new
residence
in
order
to
commence
to
be
employed
at
a
new
work
location.
The
appellant
was
a
member
of
the
Boilermakers
Local
146
(the
"Union")
which
is
located
in
Edmonton,
Alberta
and
his
work
at
various
job
sites
in
Alberta
was
secured
with
the
referral
assistance
of
the
Union.
Sometime
in
January
1992
he
moved
from
his
former
residence
in
Camrose,
Alberta
(the
old
residence)
to
a
new
residence
in
Edmonton,
Alberta
(the
new
residence).
The
appellant
testified
that
in
January
1992
he
was
unemployed
and
had
recently
been
divorced
from
his
wife.
He
stated
that
he
wanted
to
move
from
their
four-bedroom
home
which
was
no
longer
necessary.
After
the
move
to
Edmonton,
he
continued
to
be
unemployed
for
approximately
three
or
four
months.
The
appellant
submitted
that,
even
though
he
did
not
commence
to
work
shortly
after
the
move,
the
move
enabled
him
to
be
closer
to
his
source
of
employment,
i.e.,
the
Union.
The
appellant
submitted
various
certificates
indicating
that
he
had
taken
certain
courses
to
upgrade
his
skills
to
better
enable
him
to
find
work.
This
may
be
so
but
it
appears
that
these
courses
were
taken
and
certificates
issued
either
late
in
1993
or
in
1994,
i.e.,
not
in
1992
and
he
moved
in
January
1992.
In
any
event,
improvement
in
job
qualifications
is
not
the
same
as
commencing
to
work
and
I
do
not
believe
the
appellant
can
succeed
simply
on
the
basis
of
the
courses
taken
and
the
certificates
obtained.
The
respondent
submitted
that
the
present
case
was
very
similar
to
the
case
of
Crampton
v.
M.N.R.,
[1980]
C.T.C.
2269,
80
D.T.C.
1233.
In
that
case
an
itinerant
electrician
worked
for
many
years
on
a
job-by-job
basis
in
and
about
a
large
metropolitan
area.
He
worked
for
each
employer
for
brief
periods
of
time
before
moving
on
to
a
new
job.
In
1976
he
moved
and
sought
to
deduct
the
moving
expenses
from
his
income.
The
Tax
Review
Board,
in
dismissing
the
appeal,
found
that
there
was
no
real
difference
in
the
nature
of
the
taxpayer’s
employment
or
the
location
of
the
work
sites
before
or
after
the
move
and
accordingly
the
taxpayer
did
not
qualify
for
the
deduction
under
subsection
62(1).
The
decision
in
the
Crampton
case
was
based
on
facts
remarkably
similar
to
the
facts
of
the
present
case.
Based
on
all
of
the
testimony,
it
is
abundantly
clear
that,
although
the
taxpayer
moved
closer
to
his
source
of
employment,
he
did
not
fall
within
the
parameters
of
subsection
62(1),
i.e.,
he
did
not
move
for
the
purpose
of
commencing
to
be
employed
at
a
new
work
location.
Consequently,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.