Christie
A.C.J.T.C.:—
This
appeal
relates
to
the
appellant's
1992
taxation
year
and
is
governed
by
the
informal
procedure
prescribed
by
section
18
and
following
sections
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
Act.
In
computing
his
taxable
income
for
1992
the
appellant
deducted
$1,187.30
as
a
contribution
to
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan
("RRSP").
In
assessing
the
appellant
for
that
year
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
disallowed
the
deduction.
The
notice
of
appeal
reads:
The
writer
herewith
files
an
appeal
to
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada—"informal
procedure"
based
on
the
notification
of
confirmation
by
the
Minister
dated
at
Ottawa
January
24
1994
per
Mr.
S.
R.
G.
Harrison—Chief
of
Appeals.
Paragraphs
1
to
4
inclusive
of
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal
read:
1.
Except
for
the
appellant's
statement,
based
on
the
Notification
of
Confirmation
by
the
Minister
dated
January
24th,
1994,
per
S.R.G.
Harrison—Chief
of
Appeals,
he
denies
all
other
allegations
of
fact
contained
in
the
appellant’s
notice
of
appeal.
2.
In
computing
income
for
the
1992
taxation
year,
the
appellant
sought
to
deduct
the
amount
of
$1,187.30
in
respect
of
contribution
to
a
Registered
Retirement
Savings
Plan
("RRSP").
3.
In
assessing
the
appellant
for
the
1992
taxation
year,
by
notice
of
assessment
mailed
on
May
20,
1993,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
'Minister')
disallowed
the
deduction
of
the
RRSP
contribution
in
the
amount
of
$1,187.30.
4.
In
so
assessing
the
appellant,
the
Minister
made
the
following
assumptions
of
fact:
(a)
in
1991,
the
appellant’s
earned
income
for
the
purpose
of
calculating
the
RRSP
deduction
limit
for
the
1992
taxation
year
was
nil;
(b)
the
appellant's
RRSP
deduction
limit
for
the
1992
taxation
year
was
20
per
cent
of
1991
earned
income,
or
nil.
At
trial
the
appellant
admitted
that
his
employment
income
for
1990
was
$13,230.
He
also
stated
that
his
total
income
in
1991
consisted
of
$13,200
that
he
received
from
Metropolitan
Life
in
respect
of
a
deregistered
RRSP,
plus
$4,074
in
interest.
Exhibit
R-2
indicates
the
interest
income
was
received
from
the
Canadian
Imperial
Bank
of
Commerce.
The
argument
on
behalf
of
the
Crown
was
succinctly
and
ably
put
by
its
counsel.
I
agree
with
what
she
said
and
it
will
be
sufficient
for
the
purpose
of
these
reasons
to
reiterate
her
submissions.
Your
Honour,
in
reassessing
the
appellant
for
his
1992
taxation
year,
the
Minister
disallowed
the
deduction
of
his
RRSP
contribution
in
the
amount
of
$1,187.30
on
the
basis
that
the
appellant’s
income
for
1991
was
made
up
of
RRSP
income
and
interest
income.
Income
from
these
various
sources
is
not
included
in
“earned
income"
as
defined
by
paragraph
146(1)(c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act").
Subsection
146(5)
of
the
Act
allows
the
deduction
of
the
lesser
of
two
amounts
in
respect
of
premiums
under
an
RRSP.
The
second
of
these
amounts
is
the
taxpayer's
RRSP
deduction
limit
for
the
year.
Paragraph
146(1
)(g.i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
defines
the
“RRSP
deduction
limit”
as
a
formula
which
includes
determining
the
taxpayer’s
earned
income
for
a
specific
period.
Thedefinition
of
“earned
income”
in
paragraph
146(1)(c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
therefore
relevant
in
determining
the
amount
deductible
in
respect
of
premiums
under
an
RRSP
pursuant
to
subsection
146(5).
The
facts
before
us
are
that
in
1990
the
appellant’s
earned
income
was
$13,230.
In
1991,
he
had
no
earned
income
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
146(1)(c).
If
Your
Honour
will
refer
to
paragraph
146(1
)(l)(i),
it
says:
(I)
“unused
RRSP
deduction
room"
of
a
taxpayer
at
the
end
of
a
taxation
year
means,
(i)
for
taxation
years
ending
before
1991,
nil.
.
.
.
Therefore,
any
so-called
room
that
might
be
left
from
1990
or
prior
years
will
not
be
put
into
consideration.
Based
on
18
per
cent
of
the
appellant’s
1990
income,
he
was
allowed
the
full
$2,381
RRSP
deduction
in
1991.
Consequently,
there
was
no
deduction
room
left
from
1991.
HIS
HONOUR:
For
1992.
MS.
THORN:
For
consideration
in
1992.
HIS
HONOUR:
Right.
MS.
THORN:
The
appellant
was
not
in
receipt
of
earned
income
in
1991;
therefore,
no
amount
could
be
deducted
in
1992
in
respect
of
premiums
paid
under
an
RRSP
pursuant
to
the
Act.
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
Gerry
Power
v.
Her
Majesty
The
Queen
(informal
procedure)
[Indexed
as:
Power
(G.)
v.
Canada]
Tax
Court
of
Canada
(Teskey
J.T.C.C.),
August
24,
1994
(Court
File
No.
93-2555).
Income
tax—Federal—Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
The
appellant,
along
with
B
and
S,
were
the
only
three
shareholders
and
directors
of
B
Ltd.
Each
was
an
officer,
the
appellant
being
vice-president,
the
other
two
being
the
president
and
secretary-treasurer.
All
three
shareholders
loaned
money
to
B
Ltd.
and
personally
guaranteed
bank
loans
to
B
Ltd.
For
this,
they
received
monthly
interest
cheques.
In
both
1987
and
1988,
B
Ltd.
issued
TS’s
to
the
shareholders
showing
the
amount
of
interest
each
received
in
the
year
from
B
Ltd.
In
February
1990,
the
president,
on
behalf
of
the
shareholders,
instructed
Y,
B
Ltd.'s
controller,
not
to
issue
TS’s
to
the
shareholders
for
the
interest
they
received.
Y,
knowing
that
the
Act
provided
for
TS’s
to
be
issued,
hand
delivered
a
memo
to
each
shareholder
informing
them
of
their
obligation
to
report
the
interest.
The
appellant
did
not
report
the
interest
income
in
either
1989
or
1990.
By
way
of
assessment,
the
Minister
included
the
unreported
interest
income
in
the
appellant’s
income
for
1989
and
1990
and
also
levied
penalties
under
subsection
163(2).
The
sole
issue
was
whether
the
penalties
were
properly
levied.
HELD:
The
appellant
either
knowingly
omitted
to
declare
the
interest
income
or
was
wilfully
blind
in
his
obligations
and
duties.
Appeal
dismissed.
The
appellant
appeared
on
his
own
behalf.
Valerie
Miller
for
the
respondent.
Teskey
J.T.C.C.:—The
appellant
elected
to
have
these
appeals
from
assessment
of
income
tax
for
the
years
1989
and
1990
heard
pursuant
to
the
Informal
Procedure
Rules.
Issue
The
sole
issue
before
me
is
the
penalties
imposed
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
"Minister")
pursuant
to
subsection
163(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
on
unreported
income
for
these
two
years.
Facts
The
appellant,
at
all
relevant
times,
was
one
of
three
shareholders
of
Beothuk
Data
Systems
Ltd.
("Data"),
the
other
two
shareholders
being
H.G.
Benson
("Benson")
and
M.L.
Siegel
("Siegel").
Benson,
Siegel
and
the
appellant
were
the
only
directors
of
Data.
Each
was
an
officer,
the
appellant
being
vice-president,
the
other
two
being
the
president
and
secretary-treasurer.
All
three
shareholders
had
loaned
money
to
Data
and
personally
guaranteed
bank
loans
to
Data.
For
this,
they
received
monthly
interest
cheques
from
Data.
In
both
1987
and
1988,
Data
issued
TS’s
to
the
shareholders
showing
the
amount
of
interest
each
received
in
the
year
from
Data.
In
February
1990,
the
president,
on
behalf
of
the
shareholders,
instructed
Neil
Young
("Young"),
Data's
controller,
not
to
issue
TS’s
to
the
shareholders
for
the
interest
that
they
received.
Young,
knowing
that
the
Act
provided
for
T5's
to
be
issued,
prepared
a
memo
and
hand
delivered
the
memo
(R-1)
to
each
shareholder
(including
the
appellant).
This
memo
reads:
Subject:
Interest
paid
to
shareholders
in
1989
For
taxation
year
1989
you
will
not
receive
a
T-5
form
reporting
interest
paid
to
you
by
Beothuk
Data
Systems
Ltd.
You
are
reminded
that
you
must
report
this
income
for
tax
purposes
—
and
that
you
may
offset
this
income
with
interest
paid
by
you
in
taxation
year
1989.
The
appellant
says
he
read
all
memos,
and
I
especially
find
that
Young
handed
this
memo
(R-1)
to
the
appellant
who
read
the
same.
The
appellant
claims
he
must
had
misfiled
the
memo.
Young
was
not
challenged,
either
by
cross-examination
or
by
rebuttal
evidence,
that
the
instructions
not
to
prepare
T5
for
this
shareholder
interest
came
to
him
on
behalf
of
all
shareholders.
I
therefore
find
that
the
directors
decided
they
could
bury
this
extra
income
and
that
was
why
Young
received
these
instructions.
On
the
evidence
of
the
instruction
to
Young
and
Young's
memo,
I
am
satisfied
the
appellant
deliberately
did
not
declare
the
interest
income
from
Data
in
the
years
1989
and
1990.
I
must
say
that
even
if
acceptable
evidence
had
been
adduced
by
the
president,
that
the
appellant
did
not
know
or
have
any
part
in
the
decision
not
to
have
TS’s
issued,
the
appeal
would
still
fail.
The
memo
of
Young
brought
forcibly
to
the
appellant
that,
in
1989,
there
was
interest
paid
to
him
that
was
taxable.
The
appellant
over
1989
received
$9,748.25
in
monthly
cheques
as
the
interest
was
calculated
each
month.
Thus
he
received
a
cheque
of
approximately
$800.00
each
month
without
a
payroll
slip.
In
1990,
he
received
a
total
of
$8,393.96
or
approximately
$700.00
each
month
without
payroll
slips.
As
a
director
of
Data,
it
was
his
duty
to
know
what
was
going
on.
Even
if
over
the
year
1989
he
did
not
realize
these
amounts
were
taxable
or
would
not
be
included
in
a
T5
or
T4,
the
memo
from
Young
would
dispel
any
false
delusions
in
this
regard.
I
do
not
accept
the
appellant's
statement
that
he
believed
the
interest
income
was
included
with
his
employee
income
and
shown
on
the
T4
that
he
received.
The
interest
income
was
never
included
in
the
T4's
that
he
received
from
Data.
From
the
evidence
before
me,
I
can
only
conclude
that,
either
the
appellant
deliberately
took
part
as
a
shareholder,
a
director
and
an
officer
of
Data
to
arrange
that
Data
would
not
issue
T5's
for
the
interest
paid
out,
so
that
each
one
of
them
could
deliberately
and
knowingly
not
declare
this
interest
income
on
their
T1
income
tax
returns.
Or
that
the
appellant
was
so
negligent
and
wilfully
blind
in
his
obligations
and
duties,
both
as
a
director
of
Data
and
as
an
individual
when
signing
his
T1
income
tax
returns
in
both
years,
that
his
actions
and
lack
of
inquiry
constituted
gross
negligence.
If
I
had
to
make
only
one
determination
herein,
I
would
determine
that
the
appellant
knowingly
omitted
to
declare
the
interest
income.
The
appeals
are
dismissed.
Appeals
dismissed.