Hamlyn
J.T.C.C.:-These
appeals,
for
the
1987
taxation
year,
while
separately
constituted
were
heard
together
at
a
sitting
of
this
Court
at
Vancouver,
British
Columbia.
Each
appellant
reported
in
their
individual
income
tax
returns
business
losses
on
the
basis
that
they
incurred
expenses
(with
minimal
offsetting
income)
in
the
course
of
carrying
on
an
alleged
magazine
publishing
business:
Enjoy
Magazine
("Enjoy").
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
"Minister")
by
notices
of
assessment
disallowed
the
business
losses
claimed
by
the
appellants.
The
appellants
objected
to
the
assessments
by
notices
of
objection
and
the
Minister
confirmed
the
assessments
by
respective
notices
of
confirmation.
The
appellants’
respective
positions
are
that
the
expenses
were
incurred
by
the
payment
of
licence
fees,
professional
fees,
interest
and
advance
royalties
pertaining
to
the
publishing
of
Enjoy.
The
appellants
assert
the
expenses
were
paid
in
order
to
derive
income
from
the
publishing
of
Enjoy.
The
Minister
maintains
the
appellants,
for
the
relevant
taxation
years,
did
not
carry
on
a
business
of
publishing
and
distributing
magazines,
and
in
the
alternative,
if
there
were
a
business
it
did
not
have
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit.
Further,
if
the
appellants
are
found
to
have
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
from
the
alleged
business
the
amounts
were
unreasonable
in
the
circumstances
and
are
therefore
not
deductible.
Lastly,
the
Minister
pleaded
if
the
deductions
were
allowed
such
deductions
would
unduly
or
artificially
reduce
their
respective
incomes
because
the
transactions
giving
rise
to
the
claimed
deductions
were
shams
and
as
such
the
deductions
are
prohibited
by
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
’’Act”).
Facts
Both
appellants
bought
licences
through
H.N.
Thill
&
Associates
Inc.
("Thill")
from
Applied
Research
Ltd.
("Applied")
to
permit
them
to
publish,
distribute
and
market
Enjoy
within
a
licensed
territory
in
the
U.S.
Applied
owned
a
copyright
to
Enjoy.
Thill
acted
as
an
agent
for
Applied
for
the
purpose
of
promoting
the
sales
of
licences
to
publish
Enjoy.
Under
the
terms
of
the
agreement
between
each
appellant
and
Applied,
the
appellants
were
to
pay
to
Applied
for
each
territory
acquired
a
licence
fee
($500
U.S.)
and
an
advance
royalty
($15,000
U.S.).
Of
the
moneys
owing,
the
appellants
were
only
required
to
pay
the
$500
licence
fee
out
of
their
own
funds.
The
balance
of
the
funds
were
borrowed
from
Federated
Financial
Corporation
("Federated")
by
way
of
promissory
note.
Each
appellant
entered
into
an
operating
agreement
with
Plymouth
Publications
Inc.
("Plymouth")
to
publish,
distribute
and
market
Enjoy
in
the
territory.
Plymouth
agreed
to
pay
the
appellants
12.5¢
U.S.
per
copy
of
Enjoy
distributed
within
the
territory
during
the
term
of
the
agreement
(one
year
subject
to
renewal).
To
guarantee
the
contractual
performance,
Plymouth
executed
and
deposited
a
performance
bond
with
Federated
in
the
amount
of
the
promissory
note
to
Federated.
Thus,
in
the
marketing
scheme
of
things
in
the
event
of
non
performance,
the
performance
bond
would
offset
the
promissory
note
and
the
appellants
would
be
saved
harmless
(see
Exhibit
A-2).
The
net
result
of
the
transactions
for
the
appellants
was
they
contributed
$500
for
each
territory
acquired;
however,
in
the
view
of
Thill
for
the
taxation
year
in
question
each
appellant
was
entitled
to
deduct
as
business
expenses
the
licence
fee,
the
advance
royalty
payment
and
other
costs.
As
in
that
year
there
would
be
little
business
income
and
negligible
royalties
to
offset
the
acquisition
costs
a
loss
would
be
created
and
reported
by
each
appellant.
Thill,
as
well
as
the
preparer
of
the
income
tax
returns
for
the
appellants,
was
also
in
the
business
of
marketing
tax
shelters.
The
scheme
the
appellants
bought
was
developed
and
marketed
by
Thill.
The
appellants
bought
the
licences
in
March
1987
without
any
investigation
and
did
nothing
in
terms
of
business
activity
after
the
purchase
and
relied
on
Thill
to
look
after
the
matter.
Thill
created
a
corporate
circuit
and
transaction
structure
behind
the
tax
scheme
that
was
similar
to
Moloney
v.
Canada,
[1989]
1
C.T.C.
213,
89
D.T.C.
5099
(F.C.T.D.);
aff’d
by
[1992]
2
C.T.C.
227,
92
D.T.C.
6570
(F.C.A.),
at
page
C.T.C.
228,
D.T.C.
6571.
The
scheme
was
comprised
of
the
following
companies:
-Applied
(licensor
and
receiver
of
licence
fees
and
advanced
royalties)
-Plymouth
(publisher,
marketer,
distributor
of
Enjoy,
issuer
of
performance
bonds)
-Federated
(financial
vehicle-holding
of
deposits
of
performance
bonds,
receiver
of
promissory
notes
and
issuer
of
advanced
royalty
cheques
to
appellants
endorsed
to
Applied)
—Cawin
Financial
Corporation
("Cawin")
(financial
vehicle-conduit
of
funds)
-Thill
(promoter
and
marketer
of
tax
scheme)
The
book
entries
between
the
forgoing
companies
and
the
appellants
gave
an
appearance
of
a
large
circulation
of
funds
that
in
essence
was
a
recycling
of
funds.
The
Plymouth
deposits
with
Federated
of
performance
bonds
is
an
example
of
the
circuitous
flow
of
transfers
and
is
shown
in
Exhibit
R-l
1.
The
transfers
occurred
all
in
one
day
and
followed
this
pattern:
Plymouth
to
Federated,
Federated
to
Cawin,
Cawin
to
Plymouth
(Exhibit
R-l
1).
The
facts
are
further
that
Plymouth
did
develop
a
prototype
Enjoy,
bought
market
surveys,
established
offices
in
Burnaby,
San
Francisco,
Los
Angeles
and
New
York,
set
up
an
apparent
structure
to
sell
advertising
in
the
magazine
and
did
produce
and
partially
distribute
one
run
of
the
magazine.
In
actual
fact
for
the
one
issue
of
Enjoy
the
advertising
in
large
part
was
given
away
and
little
revenue
was
produced.
The
magazine
was
to
be
distributed
without
charge
to
selected
markets
that
Plymouth
thought
the
subject
matter
would
appeal
to
(recipes,
cooking
and
related
information).
The
plan
was
originally
to
distribute
in
one
selected
area
copies
of
the
magazine.
This
plan
during
the
development
changed
whereby
the
magazine
was
to
be
distributed
to
29
selected
markets
throughout
the
U.S.
with
a
proposed
annual
circulation
of
3,900,000
(650,000
homes
x
6
times-Exhibit
A-4).
While
this
circulation
number
results
from
Exhibit
A-4,
other
circulation
numbers
were
presented
to
the
Court
in
excess
of
this
amount.
The
magazine
was
printed
in
Vancouver
and
taken
to
a
post
office
in
Seattle
for
distribution.
After
the
initial
partial
distribution
(127,000
copies)
Thill
cut
off
the
funds
to
Plymouth
and
Plymouth
was
unable
to
continue.
The
appellants
received
credit
for
an
apparent
royalty
payment
and
an
advertising
payment
that
could
not
be
reconciled
with
the
print
copies
or
the
distributed
copies
of
Enjoy
and
the
income
the
appellants
purportedly
received
could
not
be
reconciled
with
the
stated
advertising
revenue
from
Enjoy;
these
calculations
were
prepared
by
Thill.
After
the
failure,
Thill
issued
a
form
letter
dated
May
11,
1989,
to
each
appellant
"Dear
client"
stating
Plymouth
released
all
claims
against
the
deposit
(performance
bond)
with
Federated
and
Federated
has
accepted
the
deposit
funds
as
full
and
final
settlement
of
the
promissory
notes
issued
by
the
appellants
to
Federated
(Exhibit
A-2).
Significant
evidence
Reginald
Watson
Mr.
Watson,
one
of
the
appellants,
purchased
his
licence
through
one
Ken
Holloway
of
Thill.
Thill
was
the
tax
return
preparer
for
Mr.
Watson.
His
understanding
of
the
licence
was
minimal.
He
stated
he
signed
the
documents
but
he
did
not
understand
what
was
in
them.
He
knew
it
was
a
magazine
proposal
that
he
could
invest
in,
that
he
felt
had
a
potential
to
provide
him
with
a
retirement
income,
and
that
had
present
tax
reduction
advantages.
His
total
cash
outlay
was
$500.
In
terms
of
business
activity,
before
and
after
signing
the
documents
he
did
nothing.
His
investigation
was
non
existent
save
he
thought
about
the
proposal
for
a
couple
of
days.
He
had
a
history
of
buying
other
proposed
"tax
shelters"
from
Thill
on
other
occasions.
Deborah
Madayag
Ms.
Deborah
Madayag,
the
other
appellant,
purchased
the
licence
in
similar
circumstances
as
Mr.
Watson.
However,
she
signed
on
when
it
was
proposed
to
her
without
an
intervening
review
period.
She
believed
the
proposal
was
primarily
in
her
words
a
"tax
deferral"
and
"it
was
good
for
my
taxes"
and
she
stated
it
would
provide
a
possible
future
income.
Ms.
Madayag
also
had
little
or
no
idea
what
was
really
happening
and
simply
followed
the
advice
of
Mr.
Holloway.
Henry
N.
Thill
Mr.
H.N.
Thill,
the
next
witness,
was
the
operating
mind
behind
this
scheme.
For
the
period
in
question,
he
was
a
director
with
Messrs.
Wilson,
Sinclair
and
Cop
of
Applied
and
held
the
power
of
attorney
for
Applied
in
Canada.
For
Thill
he
was
a
director
along
with
Messrs.
Wilson,
Sinclair
and
Cop.
For
Cawin,
he
was
an
initial
subscriber;
thereafter
the
sole
shareholder
of
Cawin
was
Applied
and
as
indicated
Mr.
Thill
held
the
power
of
attorney
for
Applied
in
Canada.
The
directors
of
Cawin
were
the
same
as
the
directors
of
Thill
save
Mr.
Thill.
For
Plymouth,
Mr.
Thill
was
a
director
as
well
as
others
including
Mr.
John
Frederickson.
For
Federated,
Mr.
Thill
was
a
director
as
well
as
Messrs.
Wilson,
Sinclair
and
Cop
and
others.
Mr.
Thill
styled
himself
as
a
business
executive
in
the
business
of
tax
practice
and
financial
planning.
He
outlined
to
the
Court
the
plan
he
developed
with
one
Gerry
Pionski
(the
major
shareholder
of
Applied)
to
develop
and
publish
a
magazine,
and
distribute
it
to
a
controlled
circulation
(selected
area—non-paid
circulation)
with
the
object
of
earning
revenue
from
advertising.
The
scheme
as
described
above
included
the
selling
of
a
licence
by
Thill
to
Thill
clients
by
having
the
clients
pay
a
fee
for
the
licence
and
executing
a
promissory
note
for
advance
royalties.
(Thill
was
to
receive
$100,000
per
month
as
a
retainer
fee
from
Applied.)
A
performance
bond
was
provided
by
the
magazine
publishing
and
marketing
vehicle
(Plymouth).
As
indicated
the
monies,
promissory
notes
and
performance
bonds
took
a
circuitous
route
through
the
myriad
of
companies.
Mr.
Thill
maintained
Plymouth
had
a
business
plan
and
carried
through
with
planning,
development,
marketing,
production
and
distribution
of
the
magazine.
According
to
Mr.
Thill,
the
enterprise
failed
because
of
development
cost
overruns,
managers
not
performing,
and
in
particular
the
failure
to
sell
advertising.
During
the
course
of
the
development
stage
as
indicated
the
plan
was
redeveloped
to
change
the
magazine
from
a
regional
market
(San
Francisco)
to
a
national
United
States
selected
areas
market.
Mr.
Thill
concluded
that
Plymouth
did
not
produce
as
expected.
Of
the
only
issue
of
Enjoy
650,000
copies
of
the
magazine
were
printed,
and
127,000
were
distributed
and
the
balance
stayed
in
a
warehouse
in
Seattle
until
destroyed.
Mr.
Thill
stated
that
Thill
took
the
decision
to
not
circulate
the
balance
of
the
magazine
as
they
considered
the
enterprise
had
failed
and
cut
Plymouth
off
from
the
source
of
funds.
As
one
of
the
principals
involved
in
the
Moloney,
supra,
"speed
reading"
case
Mr.
Thill
was
asked
what
was
the
difference
between
the
two
tax
schemes.
He
stated
that
in
this
case,
with
respect
to
Plymouth,
a
business
had
been
started
and
a
magazine
distributed.
In
response
to
the
allegation
that
the
transfers
through
the
separate
corporate
current
accounts
offset
one
another
and
that
none
of
the
companies
could
negotiate
large
cheques
without
receiving
a
deposit
for
a
similar
amount
on
the
same
day,
Mr.
Thill
stated
he
operated
on
the
"just
in
time"
principle
and
that
no
cheque
was
dishonoured.
Mr.
Thill
maintained
he
could
find
the
financing
throughout
from
his
several
sources
including
Applied,
"Eurobank
Grand
Cayman",
"Bank
of
Bermuda”
and
private
loans.
On
cross-examination,
Mr.
Thill’s
evidence
in
terms
of
his
involvement
in
the
actions
and
details
with
the
companies
within
the
Thill
tax
scheme
before
the
Court,
was
at
times
contradictory
with
documentary
evidence
and
his
responses
when
confronted
with
the
documentation
did
not
clarify
matters.
John
Frederickson
Mr.
Frederickson
was
hired
to
plan,
develop,
produce
and
market
Enjoy.
The
concept
plan
was
given
to
him
by
Mr.
Thill.
The
thrust
and
direction
of
Mr.
Thill
was
that
he
wished
to
create
a
tax
shelter
by
the
development
of
Enjoy.
Mr.
Frederickson
who
was
experienced
in
advertising
amongst
other
things,
followed
directions
and
developed
projections
to
produce
a
"deluxe”
magazine
product
that
would
cost
$3-4,000,000
in
the
first
year.
Mr.
Thill
assured
Mr.
Frederickson
that
financing
was
not
a
problem.
All
Mr.
Frederickson
had
to
do,
according
to
what
Mr.
Thill
said,
was
call
Thill
for
funds.
The
progress
continued
as
described
until
funds
were
cut
off
by
Thill.
Mr.
Frederickson’s
first
indication
of
this
was
when
he
was
advised
a
cheque
taken
to
Seattle
to
pay
for
postage
had
been
dishonoured.
Mr.
Thill
stated
that
the
enterprise
had
cost
Thill
$1,700,000;
however,
no
evidence
was
tendered
to
confirm
this.
When
Plymouth
ceased
operating
there
were
apparently
$500,000
in
unpaid
bills.
From
time
to
time
during
Mr.
Frederickson’s
employment,
his
services
were
used
in
relation
to
the
selling
of
licences.
Mr.
Frederickson
stated
at
no
time
was
there
an
expectation
that
the
first,
second
or
third
issue
of
the
magazine
would
break
even.
He
said
he
thought
it
might
break
even
by
the
fourth
issue.
He
never
got
the
chance
to
find
out.
Bill
Sulis
The
first
witness
for
the
respondent
was
an
auditor
with
Revenue
Canada,
Mr.
Sulis,
who
examined
the
corporate
books
and
records
of
the
companies
involved.
His
conclusions
on
the
corporate
fund
transfers
within
the
tax
scheme
remain
unassailed.
Firstly,
the
recorded
transaction
transfers
(e.g.,
funds
transferred
from
Plymouth
to
Federated
as
deposits
for
performance
bonds
were
transferred
to
Cawin
and
back
to
Plymouth
on
the
same
day)
among
the
corporations
in
the
tax
scheme
had
the
effect
of
giving
an
appearance
of
increased
assets
and
increased
liabilities
for
all
the
corporations.
Secondly,
the
cheques
from
Federated
endorsed
by
the
licensees
and
redeposited
to
Federated
on
the
same
day
showed
the
payment
of
prepaid
royalties
by
the
licensees
and
created
promissory
notes
receivable
on
the
books
of
Federated
without
the
expenditure
of
funds
by
either
party,
save
the
small
licence
fees
paid
by
the
clients.
Thirdly,
none
of
the
companies
involved
was
capable
of
negotiating
the
large
cheques
recorded
without
receiving
a
deposit
for
a
similar
amount
the
same
day.
Fourthly,
the
capitalization
in
relation
to
the
enterprise
purported
to
be
carried
on
was
not
sufficient.
Janet
Dulk
The
last
witness
was
Janet
Dulk,
an
appeals
officer
with
Revenue
Canada.
She
responded
to
an
advertisement
entitled
"Tax
Planning
Seminar-Tax
Shelters
are
not
Dead",
spoke
by
telephone
with
Mr.
Frederickson
and
found
herself
(December
1,
1986)
at
the
offices
of
Thill.
There
she
heard
a
lecture
from
Mr.
Thill
and
talked
with
Mr.
Holloway.
The
information
received
related
to
Enjoy,
the
projected
circulation
of
650,000
copies
and
how
the
licence
could
be
acquired
including
the
financing
of
the
advanced
royalties.
Legislation
and
jurisprudence
Computation
of
loss
from
a
business
Section
3
of
the
Act
sets
out
the
rules
to
determine
a
taxpayer’s
income.
A
business
loss
is
taken
into
account
by
virtue
of
paragraph
3(d)
which
states
that
any
positive
amount
determined
under
paragraph
3(c)
is
reduced
by
"the
aggregate
of
all
amounts
each
of
which
is
his
loss
for
the
year
from...business."
The
provisions
of
the
Act
that
apply
to
the
computation
of
a
loss
from
a
business
are
those
that
apply
to
the
computation
of
income
from
a
business,
or
in
the
words
of
subsection
9(2):
9(2)
a
taxpayer’s
loss
for
a
taxation
year
from
a
business
or
property
is
the
amount
of
his
loss,
if
any,
for
the
taxation
year
from
that
source
computed
by
applying
the
provisions
of
this
Act
respecting
computation
of
income
from
that
SOUICE....
The
general
provision
of
the
Act
for
calculating
business
income
(and
therefore
a
business
loss)
is
subsection
9(1)
which
states
that:
9(1)
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
a
business
or
property
is
his
profit
therefrom
for
the
year.
In
calculating
this
profit
(or
loss)
paragraph
18(1
)(a)
stipulates
that
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of:
18(1)(a)
an
outlay
or
expense
except
to
the
extent
that
it
was
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
business
or
property.
Even
if
an
outlay
or
expense
is
made
for
that
purpose,
it
still
is
subject
to
the
general
limitation
of
section
67
that:
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
an
outlay
or
expense
...
except
to
the
extent
that
the
outlay
or
expense
was
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
For
the
taxation
year
in
issue,
the
version
of
subsection
245(1)
that
applied
also
disallowed
deductions
made:
in
respect
of
a
disbursement
or
expense
made
or
incurred
in
respect
of
a
transaction
or
operation
that,
if
allowed,
would
unduly
or
artificially
reduce
the
income.
Meaning
of
business
In
any
event,
a
loss
from
a
business
presupposes
that
there
is
a
business.
Subsection
248(1)
gives
an
extended
definition
of
"business"
as
including
a
profession,
calling,
trade,
manufacture
or
undertaking
of
any
kind
whatever
and...an
adventure
or
concern
in
the
nature
of
trade....
However,
in
this
case,
it
is
the
ordinary
meaning
of
"business"
which
is
relevant.
In
Moloney,
supra,
it
was
noted
at
pages
C.T.C.
227-28,
D.T.C.
6570
that
for
an
activity
to
be
a
business
it
must
produce
income
in
its
own
right
and
not
merely
from
applying
the
Act:
While
it
is
trite
law
that
a
taxpayer
may
so
arrange
his
business
as
to
attract
the
least
possible
tax
,
it
is
equally
clear
in
our
view
that
the
reduction
of
his
own
tax
cannot
by
itself
be
a
taxpayer’s
business
for
the
purpose
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
To
put
the
matter
another
way,
for
an
activity
to
qualify
as
a
"business"
the
expenses
of
which
are
deductible
under
paragraph
18(1
)(a)
,
it
must
not
only
be
one
engaged
in
by
the
taxpayer
with
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit,
but
that
profit
must
be
anticipated
to
flow
from
the
activity
itself
rather
than
exclusively
from
the
provisions
of
the
taxing
statute.
More
recently,
in
Bendall
v.
Canada,
[1995]
2
C.T.C.
2172
(T.C.C.),
this
Court
addressed
the
meaning
of
business.
Judge
Bonner
wrote:
The
issue
here
is
whether
the
appellant
carried
on
a
"business"
within
the
meaning
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
That
word
is
to
be
given
its
ordinary
meaning
and
that
meaning
does
not
include
a
tax
avoidance
scheme
which
is
nothing
more
than
a
pale
imitation
of
a
business.
The
appellant
was
not
involved
in
a
commercial
activity
either
directly
or
through
Omni
as
his
agent.
The
objective
evidence
regarding
the
manner
in
which
the
scheme
operated
and
the
actions
and
inaction
of
the
parties
point
clearly
to
a
conclusion
that
both
the
appellant
and
the
promoters
of
the
scheme
were
indifferent
to
the
marketing
of
the
speed
reading
course
and
to
the
earning
of
profits
from
that
activity.
There
can
be
no
doubt
that
what
was
sought
was
a
tax
deduction
which
would
result
in
a
refund
part
of
which
was
to
go
to
enrich
the
promoters
of
this
scheme
and
the
remainder
of
which
was
to
go
to
the
appellant.
I
disbelieve
the
appellant’s
testimony
as
to
his
subjective
intention.
As
noted
in
Symes,
E.C.
v.
Canada,
[1993]
4
S.C.R.
695,
[1994]
1
C.T.C.
40,94
D.T.C.
6001,
per
lacobucci
J.,
at
page
736
(C.T.C.
58;
D.T.C.
6014):
As
in
other
areas
of
law
where
purpose
or
intention
behind
actions
is
to
be
ascertained,
it
must
not
be
supposed
that
in
responding
to
this
question,
courts
will
be
guided
only
by
a
taxpayer’s
statements,
ex
post
facto
or
otherwise,
as
to
the
subjective
purpose
of
a
particular
expenditure.
Courts
will,
instead,
look
for
objective
manifestations
of
purpose,
and
purpose
is
ultimately
a
question
of
fact
to
be
decided
with
due
regard
for
all
of
the
circumstances.
In
my
view
the
deduction
of
the
component
elements
of
the
"losses"
is
prohibited
by
paragraph
18(1
)(a)
of
the
Act.
The
ratio
of
the
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeal
in
Moloney
is
contained
in
the
following
passage
at
page
6571
:
In
our
view
the
judgment
under
appeal
is
based
on
the
trial
judge’s
findings
of
fact,
notably
that
the
appellant
never
intended
to
carry
on
the
business
of
marketing
the
speed
reading
course
himself
or
through
Omni,
that
neither
the
appellant
nor
Omni
had
the
means
or
the
ability
to
do
so,
and
that
the
sole
purpose
of
the
scheme
was
to
obtain
tax
refunds
and
nothing
else.
That
decision
is
none
the
less
applicable
despite
the
absence
in
this
case
of
evidence
showing
the
"circularity
and
simultaneity
of
the
transactions
between
the
related
companies".
The
essential
facts
in
this
case
and
in
Moloney
are
the
same.
I
will
therefore
dismiss
the
appeals
with
costs.
Analysis
The
appellants
primarily
bought
a
tax
reduction
scheme.
The
assertion
that
an
investment
of
$500
would
provide
retirement
or
future
income
does
not
stand
the
test
of
reality.
The
appellants
did
nothing
other
than
sign
documents
and
pay
the
licence
fee.
No
investigation
took
place
by
them,
no
research
was
conducted
by
them,
no
business
plan
was
developed
by
them
and
certainly
they
made
no
efforts
to
operate
a
business.
The
activities
of
Thill
and
Plymouth
beyond
the
limited
appellants’
efforts
necessitate
examination
because
of
the
operating
agreement
between
Plymouth
and
the
appellants.
I
conclude
that
the
operating
mind
behind
the
scheme
was
Mr.
Thill.
Because
of
his
interrelationships
with
the
corporations
and
the
individuals
involved,
this
fact
leads
to
a
conclusion
that
the
relationships
among
Applied,
Cawin,
Thill,
Federated
and
Plymouth
were
at
non-arm’s
length
and
Mr.
Thill
and
Thill
controlled
the
tax
scheme
throughout.
The
tax
scheme
is
essentially
the
same
as
that
before
the
Court
in
Moloney,
supra,
and
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
has
pronounced
on
that.
As
to
the
development,
production
and
distribution
of
Enjoy
by
Plymouth,
from
the
evidence,
I
conclude
there
was
insufficient
capitalization
to
undertake
the
business
proposal
that
was
outlined.
Moreover,
there
was
no
documentary
or
other
evidence
to
support
the
assertion
of
Mr.
Thill
that
sufficient
capital
was
always
available.
In
any
event,
either
way,
insufficient
capital
or
unlimited
funds,
the
control
actions
of
Thill
lead
to
a
conclusion
that
profit
was
not
the
objective
of
Plymouth.
The
activities
of
Plymouth
were
directed
to
enhance
the
marketing
activities
of
Thill
in
the
selling
of
licences
and
not
per
se
to
represent
the
appellants’
business
under
the
licences.
The
fact
that
Plymouth
forfeited
the
performance
bonds
and
that
Federated
forgave
the
promissory
notes
from
the
appellants
supports
a
conclusion
the
activity
was
that
of
a
tax
scheme
and
not
that
of
a
business
of
developing,
publishing
and
distributing
a
magazine.
The
paper
entries
on
the
books
created
an
aura
of
a
substantial
enterprise
without
any
real
substance
behind
it.
This
illusion
brings
into
doubt
the
veracity
of
the
amounts
alleged
to
have
been
expended
on
Plymouth
by
Thill.
The
continued
marketing
of
the
licences
and
the
renewal
of
the
licences
after
the
project
had
failed
(appellant
Madayag),
the
payment
of
royalties
far
in
excess
of
what
copies
of
Enjoy
had
been
printed
and
farther
still
in
excess
of
what
was
distributed,
the
payment
of
income
that
could
not
be
reconciled
with
the
advertising
revenue,
and
the
ceasing
of
funding
after
the
initial
issue
run
are
all
indicia
of
a
scheme
to
create
the
impression
of
a
business
rather
than
a
business.
Moreover,
I
conclude
the
actions
of
Thill
in
view
of
the
evidence
of
Mr.
Frederickson-that
he
told
Mr.
Thill
what
was
really
involved
and
the
costs
to
expect
($3—4,000,000)
and
Mr.
Thill’s
direction
to
carry
on
are
consistent
with
an
inference
the
enterprise
was
designed
and
destined
to
fail.
No
business
was
carried
on
by
Plymouth
or
Thill
that
enured
to
the
benefit
of
the
appellants.
Specifically,
I
conclude
that
the
fact
of
the
publication
of
one
issue
of
Enjoy
given
the
findings
herein
does
not
bring
this
case
outside
the
Moloney,
supra,
decision.
The
assumptions
of
the
Minister
have
not
been
dislodged.
I
therefore
conclude
the
alleged
expenses
reported
by
the
appellants
are
not
deductible
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
18(l)(a)
of
the
Act.
The
appeals
are
therefore
dismissed
with
costs.
Appeals
dismissed.