Beaubier,
J.T.C.C.:-These
matters
were
heard
together
on
common
evidence
by
the
consent
of
the
parties
at
Vancouver,
British
Columbia,
on
February
1,
1995.
They
are
appeals
pursuant
to
the
Informal
Procedure
of
this
Court.
Alan
Layton
was
the
only
witness.
The
facts
in
Mr.
Layton’s
case
adequately
describe
matters
respecting
the
appeal
in
the
Buchanan
case.
The
Minister’s
assumptions
respecting
Mr.
Layton
read:
8.
In
so
assessing
the
appellant,
the
Minister
made
the
following
assumptions
of
fact:
(a)
the
appellant
was
an
employee
of
Versatile
shipyards;
(b)
the
appellant
was
one
of
the
workers
who
were
made
redundant
by
Versatile
shipyards;
(c)
SWAP
was
set
up
in
order
to
assist
older
workers
who
were
unlikely
to
find
alternative
employment;
(d)
during
the
1993
taxation
year
the
appellant
received
payments
under
SWAP
for
the
period
covering
1990,
1991,
1992
and
1993.
The
appellant
and
Mr.
Buchanan
are
men
of
modest
means
and
had
originally
been
led
to
believe,
by
promises
of
Canadian
Government
officials,
that
the
money
would
be
paid
annually
in
1990,
1991,
1992
and
1993.
In
fact
all
of
it
was
paid
in
1993.
They
appealed
on
the
basis
that
the
money
should
have
been
allocated
over
four
years.
In
1993,
Mr.
Layton
received
$52,840.47
under
the
provisions
of
the
Shipbuilders’
Workers
Adjustment
Program
("SWAP").
This
was
assessed
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
as
taxable
income
in
1993.
This
amount
also
caused
the
appellant
to
repay
a
portion
of
his
Old
Age
Security
Pension
and
disentitled
him
to
the
Goods
and
Services
Tax
Credit
from
July
1,
1994
to
June
30,
1995
under
section
122.5
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
1
(5th
Supp.)
(the
"Act").
The
Minister
included
the
SWAP
payment
as
"other
income"
under
subparagraph
56(l)(a)(vi)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
which
reads:
56(1)
Without
restricting
the
generality
of
section
3,
there
shall
be
included
in
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year,
(a)
any
amount
received
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year
as,
on
account
or
in
lieu
of
payment
of,
or
in
satisfaction
of,
(vi)
except
to
the
extent
otherwiserequired
to
be
included
in
computing
the
taxpayer’s
income,
a
prescribed
benefit
under
a
government
assistance
program;
For
these
purposes,
"prescribed"
is
defined
in
subsection
248(1)
as
meaning:
(b)
in
any
other
case,
prescribed
by
regulation
or
determined
in
accordance
with
rules
prescribed
by
regulation.
Neither
Crown
counsel
nor
the
Court
was
able
to
find
any
regulations
under
the
Income
Tax
Act,
or
any
other
regulations,
respecting
the
SWAP
payments.
Thus
the
payment
or
benefit
was
not
"prescribed"
and
so
does
not
fall
within
subparagraph
56(l)(a)(vi).
The
payment
is
not
income
from
an
office,
employment,
business
or
property.
According
to
the
evidence,
it
is
a
grant
from
the
government
which
was
paid
to
the
taxpayer
after
Versatile
shipyards
was
closed.
While
it
is
alleged
that
government
officials
made
a
promise,
the
workers
did
not
give
any
reciprocal
promise
or
undertaking.
They
were
simply
laid
off
when
Versatile
shipyards
closed.
No
agreement
was
made
with
them
to
pay
them
for
that,
nor
did
any
regulations
specify
the
nature
of
the
payment
in
question.
The
Court
adopts
the
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Fries
v.
The
Queen,
[1990]
2
C.T.C.
439,
90
D.T.C.
6662,
which
states:
LAMER,
C.J.
(Orally):
The
judgment
of
the
Court
will
be
delivered
by
Mr.
Justice
Sopinka.
SOPINKA,
J.
(Orally,
for
the
Court):
We
are
not
satisfied
that
the
payments
by
way
of
strike
pay
in
this
case
come
within
the
definition
of
“income...from
a
source"
within
the
meaning
of
section
3
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
these
circumstances
the
benefit
of
the
doubt
must
go
to
the
taxpayers.
The
appeal
is
therefore
allowed
and
the
decision
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
is
restored.
The
appellants
are
to
have
their
costs
throughout.
The
appeals
are
allowed.
These
matters
are
referred
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
the
payment
of
$52,840.47
to
Alan
Layton
in
1993
is
not
income
and
that
the
payment
of
$39,110.72
to
Charles
Buchanan
in
1993
is
not
income.
Each
appellant
is
awarded
costs
which
are
fixed
at
$50.00
apiece
respecting
out
of
pocket
expenses
for
conducting
the
appeal.
Appeals
allowed.