1.
The
Appellant
is
a
British
Columbia
company
with
an
address
at
8363
128th
Street,
Surrey,
British
Columbia
and
appeals
from
Assessment
number
12582,
notice
of
which
was
dated
March
19,
1993,
in
respect
of
liability
for
tax
under
section
160(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(Canada)
(the
“Act”)
and
section
19
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(British
Columbia)
(the
“BC
Act”).
2.
The
Appellant
was
the
sole
shareholder
of
Mar-Tech
Municipal
Pipe
Services
Ltd.
(“MMPS”),
a
company
continued
under
the
Canada
Business
Corporations
Act
and
registered
as
an
extra-
provincial
company
under
the
British
Columbia
Company
Act.
3.
On
or
about
January
31,
1989,
MMPS
was
wound
up
into
the
Appellant.
Specific
liabilities
of
MMPS
were
assumed
by
the
Appellant
in
consideration
for
the
transfer
of
MMPS
assets
with
a
fair
market
value
equal
to
those
liabilities.
With
respect
to
the
balance
of
MMPS’s
assets,
the
Appellant
received
a
dividend
in
kind
paid
as
of
January
31,
1989.
4.
By
Notices
of
Reassessment
dated
March
22,
1990,
MMPS
was
reassessed
in
respect
of
its
1987
and
1988
taxation
years.
5.
MMPS
filed
a
Notice
of
Objection
to
the
reassessments,
but
did
not
file
a
Notice
of
Appeal
as
the
company
had
already
been
wound
up.
6.
By
Notice
of
Assessment
number
12582
dated
March
19,
1993,
the
Appellant
was
assessed
pursuant
to
subsection
160(1)
of
the
Act
and
section
19
of
the
BC
Act
as
being
jointly
and
severally
liable
for
taxes
and
interest
owing
by
MMPS.
The
basis
of
the
assessment
was
that
MMPS
on
or
about
January
19,
1989
transferred
a
dividend
to
the
Appellant.
7.
By
Notice
of
Objection
dated
May
20,
1993,
the
Appellant
objected
to
the
Assessment.
8.
By
Notice
of
Confirmation
dated
January
28,
1994,
the
Assessment
was
confirmed.
9.
The
Appellant
says
that
neither
the
declaration
nor
the
payment
of
a
dividend
constitutes
a
transfer
of
property,
with
the
result
that
subsection
160(1)
of
the
Act
has
no
application
in
the
circumstances.
10.
The
Appellant
says
in
the
alternative
that
if
either
the
declaration
or
the
payment
of
a
dividend
does
constitute
a
transfer
of
property,
the
Appellant
provided
MMPS
with
fair
market
value
consideration
for
both
the
declaration
and
payment
of
the
dividend.
11.
The
Appellant
says
that
its
appeal
should
be
allowed
with
costs
and
the
Assessment
should
be
vacated.
REPLY
TO
NOTICE
OF
APPEAL
The
Deputy
Attorney
General
of
Canada
on
behalf
of
Her
Majesty
the
Queen,
in
answer
to
the
Appellant’s
Notice
of
Appeal
received
by
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
on
March
24,
1994
and
by
the
Deputy
Attorney
General
of
Canada
on
April
5,
1994,
with
respect
to
Notice
of
Assessment
number
12582
dated
March
19,
1993,
says
as
follows:
A.
Statement
of
Facts
1.
Except
as
expressly
admitted
hereinafter,
he
denies
the
allegations
of
fact
and
law
contained
in
the
Notice
of
Appeal.
2.
He
admits
the
allegations
of
fact
contained
in
paragraphs
1,
2,
7
and
8
of
the
Notice
of
Appeal.
3.
He
denies
the
allegations
of
fact
and
law
contained
in
paragraphs
9,
10
and
11
of
the
Notice
of
Appeal.
4.
With
respect
to
paragraph
3
of
the
Notice
of
Appeal,
he
admits
only
that,
on
or
about
January
31,
1989,
Mar-Tech
Municipal
Pipe
Services
Ltd.
(“MMPS”)
was
effectively,
but
not
formally
wound
up
into
the
Appellant;
he
admits
that
certain
liabilities
of
MMPS
were
assumed
by
the
Appellant
in
consideration
for
the
transfer
of
assets
of
MMPS
and
that,
with
respect
to
the
balance
of
MMPS’s
assets,
the
Appellant
received
a
dividend
paid
as
of
January
31,
1989.
5.
He
admits
the
allegations
of
fact
in
paragraph
4
of
the
Notice
of
Appeal
except
that
he
says
that
Notices
of
Reassessment
of
both
the
1987
and
1988
taxation
years
of
MMPS
were
issued
on
March
22,
1990
and
again
on
April
22,
1991.
6.
He
admits
the
allegations
of
fact
contained
in
paragraph
5
of
the
Notice
of
Appeal
except
that
he
says
that
MMPS
was
never
formally
found
up.
7.
He
admits
the
allegations
of
fact
contained
in
paragraph
6
of
the
Notice
of
Appeal
except
that
he
says
that
the
assessment
states
that
it
was
in
respect
of
a
transfer
of
a
dividend
on
or
about
January
31,
not
January
19,
1989.
8.
He
says
that,
in
assessing
the
Appellant
for
$39,899.44
pursuant
to
subsection
160(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
in
respect
of
the
payment
of
a
dividend
from
MMPS,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
relied,
inter
alia,
upon
the
following
assumptions:
(a)
The
facts
as
stated
and
admitted
hereinbefore;
(b)
The
Appellant
was
incorporated
on
October
5,
1971;
(c)
MMPS
was
incorporated
on
January
19,
1979;
(d)
The
Appellant
was
the
sole
shareholder
of
MMPS:
(e)
The
Appellant
controlled
MMPS
and
was
related
to
MMPS
within
the
meaning
of
subpara.
251
(2)(b)(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act;
(f)
The
Appellant
changed
its
name
to
Mar-Tech
Enterprises
Ltd.,
Mar-Tech
Municipal
Pipe
Services
Ltd.,
Mar-
Tech
Holdings
Ltd.,
and
then
back
to
Mar-Tech
Pipe
Services
Ltd.;
(g)
In
about
July,
1988,
MMPS
went
out
of
business
and,
on
or
about
January
31,
1989,
was
effectively
wound
up
into
the
Appellant:
(i)
MMPS’s
final
tax
return
was
filed
for
its
taxation
year
ending
January
31,
1989;
(ii)
The
Appellant
assumed
certain
liabilities
of
MMPS
in
consideration
for
assets
of
MMPS
with
a
fair
market
value
equal
to
those
liabilities;
(iii)
The
balance
of
MMPS’s
assets
were
transferred
to
the
Appellant
by
way
of
a
dividend
in
the
amount
of
$87,340
paid
as
of
January
31,1989;
(iv)
MMPS
had
no
assets
with
which
to
satisfy
its
tax
liability
after
the
payment
of
the
dividend;
(v)
MMPS
was
struck
from
the
Register
of
Companies
on
October
19,
1990
for
failure
to
file
annual
reports;
(h)
The
Appellant
gave
no
consideration
to
MMPS
for
the
payment
of
the
dividend;
(i)
The
fair
market
value
of
the
Appellant’s
capital
investment
in
MMPS
was
reduced
by
the
outstanding
tax
liability
of
MMPS
for
its
1987
and
1988
taxation
years;
(j)
On
April
22,
1991,
MMPS
was
reassessed
for
the
amounts
of
$31,523.64
and
$1,181.38
for
its
1987
and
1988
taxation
years
respectively;
(k)
From
April
22,
1991
to
March
19,
1993,
the
date
of
the
assessment
of
the
Appellant,
interest
in
the
amount
of
$7,194.42
had
accrued
on
the
above
2
amounts.
B.
Issues
to
be
Decided
9.
The
issues
in
this
appeal
are:
(a)
Whether
the
payment
of
a
dividend
constitutes
a
transfer
of
property
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
160(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act;
and
(b)
If
the
payment
of
a
dividend
does
so
constitute
a
transfer
of
property,
whether
the
Appellant
gave
MMPS
consideration
equal
to
the
value
of
the
dividend.
The
argument
put
forward
for
the
Appellant
was
that
legally,
upon
declaration
of
a
dividend,
a
shareholder
has
a
right
to
sue
for
the
dividend.
Upon
payment
of
the
dividend
that
right
is
cancelled
and
satisfied.
The
right
to
sue
is
consideration
for
payment
of
the
dividend.
Therefore
consideration
passes
between
the
payee
and
the
payor
at
the
time
of
payment.
The
Appellant’s
counsel
did
not
refer
to
assumption
8(h)
in
his
argument.
However
that
assumption
constitutes
fact
in
evidence
before
the
Court
when
the
Appellant
has
elected
not
to
call
any
evidence
to
refute
it.
In
these
circumstances,
based
upon
the
decision
of
Rip
J.T.C.C.
in
Algoa
Trust
v.
R.
(sub
nom.
Algoa
Trust
v.
Canada),
[1993]
1
C.T.C.
2294,
93
D.T.C.
405
(T.C.C.),
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
The
Respondent
is
awarded
party
and
party
costs.