Décary J.A — The Minister of National Revenue has denied the appellant’s application for charitable tax status under sections 149.1 and 248(1) of the Income Tax Act in a decision-letter dated October 14, 1994.
The purposes of the Society, as appears from its amended constitution, are the following:
a. to provide educational forums, classes, workshops and seminars to immigrant women in order that they may be able to find or obtain employment or self employment; b. to carry on political activities provided such activities are incidental and ancillary to the above purposes and provided such activities do not include direct or indirect support of, or opposition to, any political party or candidate for public office; and c. to raise funds in order to carry out the above purposes by means of solicitations of funds from governments, corporations and individuals, d. (deleted) e. to provide services and to do all such things that are incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above stated objects, including the seeking of funds from governments and/or other sources for the implementation of the aforementioned objectives.
At issue, essentially, is whether the Society’s activities come within the conceptual ambit of the well-established divisions of charity as originally laid down by Lord Macnaghten in Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531, (sub nom. Special Commissioners of Income Tax v. Pemsel), [1891-94] All E.R. Rep. 28 (H.L.) or within the evaluation and development by common law courts of that conceptual ambit as a result of regarding the law of charity as a “moving subject” (see Native Communications Society of B.C. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1986] 2 C.T.C. 170, 86 D.T.C. 6353 (F.C.A.), and Every woman’s Health Centre Society (1988) v. R, (sub nom. Everywoman’s Health Centre Society (1988) v. Canada), [1991] 2 C.T.C. 320, 92 D.T.C. 6001 (F.C.A.). The divisions of charity with which we are concerned here are the second head of Lord Macnaghten’s definition, ie. advancement of education, and the fourth head, ie., whether the purpose is beneficial to the community in a way which the law regards as charitable.
The Minister’s decision reads as follows:
As you are aware, in order to be eligible for registration as a charity, an organization must be constituted exclusively for charitable purposes and must devote substantially all its resources to charitable activities. Your communication of May 20 does not alleviate the concerns discussed in our previous letter and it is therefore our decision to deny registration.
We have considered your analogy between aboriginal people and immigrant women as disadvantaged groups in society. We do not believe the Native Communications Society of B.C. case applies as the emphasis of that decision was placed on the special legal position in Canadian society occupied by the native people. The judge in that case stated his reasoning as follows: “...A cursory examination of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-6 as amended reveals the extent of state involvement.... From this elaborate set of provisions it may be seen that the state has assumed a special responsibility for the welfare of the Indian people.” Women do not meet this criteria; the courts have not considered women simply by virtue of their gender or racial origin to be in special need of charitable relief. Decisions in common law, upon which the law of charities evolves, originate in the courts; the Department only administers the law as it now stands.
With reference to the amended objects stated in the Society’s Certificate of Change in Constitution dated May 10, 1994, our letter of January 25, 1994 advised that Object 2.(a), to be charitable, must be achieved through activities that are considered to be advancing education within the meaning of charity law. The submission on the whole, however, has not demonstrated that the Society’s programs fall into the education category or that its method of operation and activities have been altered to pursue the revised objective.
Our January letter also advised that Object 2.(b) was not acceptable. In explanation, this is a political purpose and an organization created for political purposes, whether in whole or in part, cannot be charitable.
I refer also to the statement of Yasmin Jamal in her letter of May 4, 1994, on behalf of the Society, which explains that “advocacy” consists of “...assisting women in employment related activity - specifically giving information on community services, teaching job search techniques, assisting with resume writing, etc.” I would advise that although some of the activities carried on by the Society may appear to be charitable, the submission has not demonstrated that the organization devotes substantially all its resources to charitable activities. Activities such as networking, referral services, liaising for accreditation of credentials, soliciting job opportunities and maintaining a job skills directory as described in the Society’s May 1993 Report are not charitable activities.
Consequently, it is my determination that the objectives and activities of the Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women do not meet the requirements necessary for charitable status and registration as a charity is therefore denied.
As previously mentioned, the Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women might qualify for exemption from tax as a non- profit organization under paragraph 149 (1)(L) of the Act.
We find no reversible error in this decision in the circumstances of the present case and in view of the documentation that was made available to us.
With respect to the second head - advancement of education - purpose (a) as well as the activities of the Society described in the material are not sufficiently structured and articulated as to respond to the requirements set out by the jurisprudence.
With respect to the fourth head - benefit to the community - we are of the view that the comparison with aboriginal people simply does not withstand scrutiny: aboriginal people have a distinct constitutional status quite apart from the Charter, being referred to in subsection 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Charter arguments advanced at the hearing before us are not persuasive. It may well be that charitable organizations in assisting those in need will generally deal with persons specifically protected by the equality provisions of the Charter, but the focus when deciding whether or not to grant charitable status is not so much, to start with, on the answer to the question “who are those who are most likely to benefit?” as on the answer to the question “do the proposed purposes and activities constitute charitable activities within the ambit of the law of charities?” Providing a benefit to those who are in a position to invoke Charter rights will not in itself result in an activity falling within the fourth head.
The basic difficulty we find with the Society’s application for charitable tax status is that its purposes and activities are so indefinite and vague as to prevent the Minister, and this Court, from determining with some degree of certainty what the activities are, who are the true beneficiaries of the activities and whether these beneficiaries are persons in need of charity as opposed to merely being in need of help. The provision of services and workshops to the community, while laudable, is not necessarily charitable at law and activities and objects of general public utility are not always charitable in the legal sense. Lord Wilberforce, in D "Aguiar v. Guyana Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1970), T.R. 31 (Privy Council), cautioned the courts against granting charity status where the language used was “so vague as to permit the property to be used for non-charitable purposes” (at page 34) and where the purpose was not “sufficiently definite and specific” to enable the Court to be satisfied that the organization will be administered “in a manner recognized as charitable”.
The Society, in our view, in being too many things to too many people has opened the door to purposes beyond the legal definition of “charity”. It is sufficient in that regard to refer to the description of its membership: “About 300 members from all walks of life seeking employment opportunities and general support for integration into Canadian life”, to realize how difficult the control of the charitable nature of its activities would be.
In our view, therefore, the Minister has not erred in denying the appellant’s application and the appeal will be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
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