Date: 20001130
Docket: A-598-99
CORAM: DÉCARY J.A.
LÉTOURNEAU J.A.
NOËL J.A.
BETWEEN:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Appellant
and
DANIEL-MARTIN BELLEMARE
Respondent
and
OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF CANADA
Intervenor
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
NOËL J.A.
[1] This is an appeal from an interlocutory decision of Pinard J. allowing, in part, the appellant's motion to strike the respondent's application for judicial review made pursuant to section 41 of the Access to Information Act1 (the "Act"). The appellant maintains that Pinard J. erred in refusing to strike the application in its entirety.
[2] The intervenor ("The Information Commissioner") asks that the order under appeal be modified insofar as it authorizes proceedings which are improperly directed against his non-binding findings and recommendations.
[3] The procedural steps which lead to the decision under appeal pertain to two access to information requests. These steps are as follows:
| Access to Information Request A98-00009 |
| (i) On January 22, 1998, the respondent filed access to information request A-98-00009 (the first request) with the Department of Justice seeking inter alia access to a list of attorneys having participated in the Interchange Canada Program within Industry Canada Legal Services/Competition and Consumer Protection Law Division since June 19, 1986; |
| (ii) On January 28, 1998, the Department of Justice granted only in part the respondent's request on the basis that some of the documents requested had been destroyed in accordance with the applicable policy respecting the destruction of government documentation; |
| (iii) On February 4, 1998, the respondent filed a complaint (the first complaint) with the Information Commissioner claiming that all of the requested documents had not been disclosed; |
| (iv) On March 10, 1998, the Information Commissioner rendered decision 3100-10786/001 dismissing the respondent's complaint. |
| Access to Information Request A98-00243 |
| (i) On January 20, 1999, the respondent filed access to information request A98-00243 (the second request) with the Department of Justice requesting access to information pertaining to lawyers who had at some time worked for Industry Canada Legal Services; |
| (ii) On January 27, 1999, the Department of Justice transferred part of Request A98-00243 to the Department of Industry Canada pursuant to section 8 of the Act. This part of Request A98-00243 became Industry Canada's information request A-98-181 (also referred to as the second request); |
| (iii) On February 15 and 23, 1999, the two government institutions concerned responded to the second request and disclosed some of the information requested; |
| (iv) On March 1, 1999, the respondent filed another complaint (the second complaint) with the Information Commissioner alleging that the heads of the Department of Justice and the Department of Industry Canada had improperly refused to disclose some of the information sought by the second request; |
| (v) In this second complaint, the respondent also argued that some documents that were disclosed in response to the second request were documents that the Department of Justice had failed to disclose in response to the first request on the basis that they had been destroyed in conformity with the applicable policy. This, he claimed, constituted evidence that documents contemplated by his first request had been improperly withheld; |
| (vi) On May 28, 1999, the Information Commissioner rendered decision 3100-12478/001 dismissing the respondent's second complaint. |
[4] The application for judicial review which led to the decision under appeal was filed on June 21, 1999. In it, the respondent sought review of the following decisions:
| (i) the Information Commissioner's Decision 3100-10786/001, issued on March 10, 1998, denying applicant's complaint filed on February 4, 1998, against the Head of the Department of Justice Canada ("DJC") ... as to access to information request A98-00009, dated January 22, 1998; |
| (ii) the portion of the Information Commissioner's Decision 3100-12478/001, issued on May 28, 1999, denying the second complaint, dated March 1, 1999, against the Head of the DJC, as to access to information request A98-00009. |
[5] Before the application was heard, the appellant moved to have it struck on the basis that it had been filed beyond the time period contemplated by section 41 of the Act:
| Any person who has been refused access to a record requested under this Act or a part thereof may, if a complaint has been made to the Information Commissioner in respect of the refusal, apply to the Court for a review of the matter within forty-five days after the time the results of an investigation of the complaint by the Information Commissioner are reported to the complainant under subsection 37(2) or within such further time as the Court may, either before or after the expiration of those forty-five days, fix or allow.
|
La personne qui s'est vu refuser communication totale ou partielle d'un document demandé en vertu de la présente loi et qui a déposé ou fait déposer une plainte à ce sujet devant le Commissaire à l'information peut, dans un délai de quarante-cinq jours suivant le compte rendu du Commissaire prévu au paragraphe 37(2), exercer un recours en révision de la décision de refus devant la Cour. La Cour peut, avant ou après l'expiration du délai, le proroger ou en autoriser la prorogation.
|
[6] The motions Judge granted the motion in part. No reasons were given. The order reads:
| To the extent that this application for judicial review seeks judicial review of the Information Commissioner's decision 3100-10786/001, rendered March 10, 1998, it is dismissed on the ground that it was not filed within the 45-day time limit as prescribed by section 41 of the Access to Information Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1 and subsequent amendments). |
| To the extent, however, that the Information Commissioner's decision 3100-12478/001, rendered May 28, 1999, is concerned, this application for judicial review is allowed to continue and the motion made pursuant to paragraph 221(1)(a) of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, is dismissed. |
[7] The appellant appeals this decision insofar as it allows the application to proceed "to the extent ..., that the Information Commissioner's decision 3100-12478/001, rendered May 28, 1999, is concerned,". The appellant first argues that the motions Judge failed to appreciate that the respondent, in his application, claims no relief with respect to decision 3100-12478/001. The appellant is joined by the Information Commissioner in further arguing that in any event, it was not open to the motions Judge to allow the application to proceed as it was directed against the decisions of the Information Commissioner which are not open to judicial review pursuant to section 41 of the Act. This last argument was not raised before the motions Judge. However, as it goes to jurisdiction, the argument must nevertheless be considered on appeal.
[8] In response to the first ground of appeal, the respondent acknowledges that he is not attacking decision 3100-124281/001 insofar as it disposes of his second request. However, he reiterates the position which he advanced before the motions Judge:
| With respect to Decision 3100-12478/001 issued May 28, 1999 (i.e. second and final decision) the Applicant is seeking review only of the portion of that decision pertaining to Access to Information Request A98-00009.2 |
The respondent maintains that decision 3100-12478/001 also disposes of his first request and that the time period provided by section 41 should be computed from the date on which this decision was rendered.
[9] The link between the first complaint and decision 3100-12478/001 stems from the fact that the respondent took the position, before the Information Commissioner, that documents received in response to the second request demonstrated that the first request had not been complied with. The respondent submits that the Information Commissioner in decision 3100-12478/001 not only disposed of the second complaint but reconsidered his earlier decision in light of these new arguments, and concluded that the government institution was not at fault. The relevant portion of the decision reads:
| J'ai révisé les faits qui ont mené à la décision de mon prédécesseur, M. John Grace, concernant votre plainte antérieure à l'endroit du Ministère de la Justice. Ce dossier démontre que vous aviez alors demandé les noms de tous les avocats ayant participé au programme "Échange Canada" et certains autres renseignements concernant ces personnes. Une liste de trois noms vous a alors été fournie et on vous indiquait que les dossiers antérieurs à 1993 avaient été détruits en accord avec les directives touchant la politique sur les dossiers ministériels. Puisque le document concernant Janet A. Johnston est daté 1987, vous croyez que la réponse précédente était incomplète. Les explications à ce sujet sont les suivantes : |
| Lors de votre première demande, seuls les dossiers du programme en question, c'est-à-dire Échange Canada, ont été considérés puisque ceci était le seul critère dont on disposait pour effectuer la recherche. Par contre, votre deuxième demande était spécifique à certains avocats, dont vous avez fourni les noms, ayant occupé des fonctions au sein du service juridique ministériel d'Industrie Canada sans toutefois spécifier si leur emploi était lié au programme Échange Canada. À cette occasion, les Services Juridiques ont produit les documents répondant à votre demande. C'est ainsi que l'offre d'emploi adressée à Me Johnston a été jugée relative à votre demande de même que les documents concernant M. Rook et Houston. Vous avez sûrement remarqué que l'offre d'emploi adressée à Me Johnston ne fait aucunement mention du programme Échange Canada. À mon avis, les explications fournies par le ministère sont crédibles et acceptables. |
| L'enquête a également pris en considération le contenu contradictoire de la correspondance qui vous a été adressée. Ainsi, il appert qu'à la réception de votre demande la Coordonnatrice de l'Accès avait été informée que les documents relatifs à M. Rook et Houston, entre autres, étaient détenus par le Ministère de l'Industrie. Or, lors des recherches officielles, certains documents ont été retracés et vous ont été communiqués. Je dois donc conclure, et le ministère en convient, que la lettre du 27 janvier de Justice Canada était inexacte et, à mon avis, ce détail aurait du être corrigé dans la correspondance finale en date du 23 février. Ceci dit, je ne peux consentir à votre demande d'intenter un recours en révision en vertu de l'article 42 de la Loi. |
| Le ministère nous a également confirmé que le dossier Johnston n'avait pas été localisé lors du traitement de votre demande. Les documents dont vous avez reçu copie avaient été fournis par le bureau des Services Juridiques. L'enquêteur a demandé à voir le dossier personnel de Me Johnston. Il en a retiré copie du document en question signé par Me Johnston. Cette copie contient la même anomalie quant au caractère d'imprimerie. Il semble que ceci soit tout simplement attribuable à une erreur administrative survenue lors de sa préparation. L'institution a accepté de vous faire parvenir une nouvelle copie de ce document. À mon avis, l'authenticité de ce document n'est pas en doute. |
| À la suite de mon examen de toutes les circonstances concernant votre plainte, je suis d'avis que le ministère n'a pas agi de mauvaise foi. Étant donné que Justice Canada vous transmettra une nouvelle version du document concernant Me Johnston, je considère votre plainte résolue. |
[10] Although decision 3100-12478/001 refers by file number to the second request only, we are satisfied that it also reconsiders and purports to dispose anew of the respondent's first request having regard to the new arguments that were raised in the second request. To that extent, it was open to the motions Judge to hold that the application could continue against decision 3100-12478/001.
[11] That being said, we do not believe, having regard to the second ground of appeal, that the respondent can be allowed to continue with his application. The application is directed against the decisions of the Information Commissioner refusing to give effect to the complaint against the government institutions concerned. The Act as a whole and in particular sections 7, 19, 43, 48, 49 and 50 make it clear that it is the government institution concerned, not the Information Commissioner which, having refused to disclose information requested under the Act, is called upon to justify the refusal. As Stone J.A. stated in Rubin v. Canada (Clerk of the Privy Council), [1974] 2 F.C. 707 at 713:
| Nothing in this section appears to bind the head of a government institution to implement any recommendation of the Information Commissioner. The recourse left to a complainant is to apply to the Trial Division for review of the matter, pursuant to section 41 of the Act, whenever the head of a government institution persists in denying a request despite a recommendation made by the Information Commissioner to the contrary. |
Section 41 does not provide for a recourse against the Information Commissioner (Dale Wells v. The Minister of Transport et al., T-1729-92, April 19, 1993).
[12] In Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403 at 421, LaForest J., writing for the majority stated that: "Section 41 of the Access to Information Act provides for the review of a decision to refuse access to a record." In Canadian Council of Christian Charities v. Canada, [1999] 4 C.F. 245 at 255, Evans J. (then sitting in the Trial Division) considered the legal principles governing section 41 and held that the decision being reviewed thereunder was the decision of the head of the institution to refuse access, not the Information Commissioner's findings:
| . . . it is necessary to consider the standard of review applicable to the Minister's refusal to disclose the information in question. Unlike some analogous provincial statutes, the federal Access to Information Act does not give to the Information Commissioner of Canada the statutory authority to decide whether a particular document should be disclosed. Instead, if confers on the Information Commissioner the power to investigate refusals and to make recommendations to the head of the government institution . . . Since the Commissioner's recommendations are not legally binding the decision reviewed by the Federal Court under section 41 is the Minister's not the Information Commissioner's. |
[13] In short, the Court has no jurisdiction, pursuant to section 41, to conduct a judicial review of the Information Commissioner's findings and recommendations. It was therefore not open to the motions Judge to allow the application for judicial review to continue.
[14] For these reasons, I would allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the motions Judge and giving the judgment that the motions Judge should have given, I would strike the application for judicial review in its entirety with costs in favour of the appellant before both the Trial Division and the Appeal Division. In conformity with the order which allowed for his intervention, the Information Commissioner will bear his own costs as well as the disbursements of the respondent resulting from his intervention.
"Marc Noël"
J.A.
Montreal, Quebec
November 30, 2000
"I agree"
Robert Décary, J.A.
"I agree"
Gilles Létourneau, J.A.
__________________
1 R.S.C., 1985, c. A-1.
2 Appeal Book at 22.
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