Morgan et al. v. A.G. (P.E.I.) et al., [1976] 2 SCR 349

Supreme Court of Canada

Morgan et al. v. A.G. (P.E.I.) et al., [1976] 2 S.C.R. 349

Date: 1975-06-26

Richard Alan Morgan and Alan Max Jacobson Appellants;

and

The Attorney General for the Province of Prince Edward Island and Leo Blacquiere Respondents;

and

The Attorney General of Canada,

The Attorney General of Alberta,

The Attorney General of Saskatchewan,

The Attorney General of Manitoba,

The Attorney General of Ontario,

The Attorney General of Quebec,

The Attorney General of New Brunswick,

The Attorney General of Nova Scotia,

The Attorney General of Newfoundland,

The Attorney General of British Columbia Intervenants.

1975: February 10, 11, 12, 13; 1975: June 26.

Present: Laskin C.J. and Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Spence, Pigeon, Dickson, Beetz and de Grandpré JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND in banco

Constitutional law—Provincial legislation—Real property—Validity of provincial legislation limiting right of non-residents to hold land in Province—Whether legislation ultra vires—B.N.A. Act, 1867, ss. 91(25), 92(13)—Canadian Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-19, ss. 22, 24—The Real Property Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1951, c. 138, s. 3.

A declaratory action was taken by two U.S. citizens who were resident in the United States challenging the validity of s. 3 of The Real Property Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1951, c. 138. By order of Bell J. the question of the constitutionality of the provision was referred to the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island in banco. That Court took the view that s. 3 was legislation in relation to property and civil rights in the Province, did not invade the exclusive authority of Parliament in relation to naturalization and aliens, did not conflict with s.

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24(1) of the Canadian Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-19, and was not in conflict with the Real and Personal Property Convention, 1899, between Her Majesty and the United States, made applicable to Canada by a convention of October 21, 1921. The action for declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus was therefore dismissed.

Held: The appeal should be dismissed.

The challenged legislation limits the rights of non-residents of the Province to take, acquire, hold or receive title to land in Prince Edward Island. The residency requirement affects both aliens and Canadian citizens alike and is related to a competent provincial object, namely, the holding of land in the province and limitations on the size of the holdings of a limited resource. It cannot be regarded as a sterilisation of the general capacity of an alien or non-resident citizen especially where there is no attempt to seal off provincial borders against entry. Section 3 is intra vires the provincial legislature as being in relation to property and civil rights in the Province in terms of s. 92(13) of the British North America Act, 1867.

The federal power as exercised in ss. 22 and 24 of the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-19, or as it may be exercised beyond these provisions, cannot be invoked to give aliens, naturalized persons or natural-born citizens any immunity from provincial regulatory legislation, otherwise within its constitutional competence, simply because it may affect one class more than another or may affect all of them alike by what may be thought of as undue stringency.

Winner v. S.M.T. (Eastern) Ltd., [1951] S.C.R. 887; Union Colliery Co. of B.C., Ltd. v. Bryden, [1899] A.C. 580; Cunningham v. Tomey Homma, [1903] A.C. 151; Walter et al. v. A.‑G. Alta. et al. [1969] S.C.R. 383; Quong-Wing v. The King (1914), 49 S.C.R. 440; Brooks‑Bidlake & Whittall Ltd. v. A.-G.B.C., [1923] A.C. 450; A.-G.B.C. et al. v. A.-G. Can. et al, [1924] A.C. 203, referred to.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island in banco[1] dismissing an action for a declaratory judgment and for a

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writ of mandamus. Appeal dismissed.

Bernard Chernos, Q.C., Allan K. Scales, Q.C., and Richard N. Poole, for the appellants.

Maurice H. Fyfe, Q.C., and Wendell MacKay, Q.C., for the respondents.

G.W. Ainslie, Q.C., and Barbara Reed for the intervenant, the Attorney General of Canada.

M. Manning, for the intervenant, the Attorney General of Ontario.

Ross Goodwin, for the intervenant, the Attorney General of Quebec.

J.W. Kavanagh, Q.C., for the intervenant, the Attorney General of Nova Scotia.

David Norman and Richard P. Burns, for the intervenant, the Attorney General of New Brunswick.

Brian F. Squair, and Robert Houston, for the intervenant, the Attorney General of Manitoba.

D.H. Vickers and M.H. Smith, for the intervenant, the Attorney General of British Columbia.

K. Lysyk, Q.C., for the intervenant, the Attorney General of Saskatchewan.

William Henkel, Q.C., for the intervenant, the Attorney General of Alberta.

W.G. Burke-Robertson, Q.C., for the intervenant, the Attorney General of Newfoundland.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

THE CHIEF JUSTICE—This appeal arises out of a declaratory action by two citizens of the United States, who are also resident there, challenging the validity of s. 3 of the Real Property Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1951, c. 138, as enacted by 1972 (P.E.I.), c. 40, s. 1. By order of Bell J. the question of the constitutionality of this provision was referred to the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island in banco, and that Court, in reasons for judgment delivered by Trainor C.J. on November 19, 1973, rejected the attack on the re-enacted s. 3 on all the grounds urged against it. In substance, that Court’s view was that s. 3 was legislation in

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relation to property and civil rights in the Province, it did not invade the exclusive authority of Parliament in relation to naturalization and aliens, it did not conflict with s. 24(1) of the Canadian Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-19, and it was not in conflict with the Real and Personal Property Convention, 1899, between Her Majesty and the United States, made applicable to Canada by a convention of October 21, 1921.

This last point was not pressed on the appeal to this Court which proceeded on the other grounds taken by the Court below. On the appeal here the appellants were supported by the Attorney General of Canada as an intervenant, and the respondent Attorney General of Prince Edward Island was supported by the Attorneys General of all the other provinces as intervenants.

The challenged s. 3 reads as follows:

3. (1) Persons who are not Canadian citizens may take, acquire, hold, convey, transmit, or otherwise dispose of, real property in the Province of Prince Edward Island subject to the provisions of sub-section two (2) here next following.

(2) Unless he receives permission so to do from the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council, no person who is not a resident of the Province of Prince Edward Island shall take, acquire, hold or in any other manner receive, either himself, or through a trustee, corporation, or any such the like, title to any real property in the Province of Prince Edward Island the aggregate total of which exceeds ten (10) acres, nor to any real property in the Province of Prince Edward Island the aggregate total of which has a shore frontage in excess of five (5) chains.

(3) The grant of any such permission shall be at the discretion of the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council, who shall notify the applicant in writing by means of a certified copy of an Order-in-Council of his decision within a reasonable time.

(4) An application for any such permission shall be in the form prescribed, from time to time, by the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council.

(5)(a) For the purposes of this section, “Canadian citizen” means persons defined as Canadian citizens by the Canadian Citizenship Act (R.S.C. 1970, Vol. 1, Cap. C-19).

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(b) For the purposes of this section “resident of the Province of Prince Edward Island” means a bona fide resident, animus et factum of the Province of Prince Edward Island.

(c) For the purpose of this section “corporation” means any company, corporation or other body corporate and politic, and any association, syndicate or other body, and any such the like, and the heirs, executors, administrators and curators, or other legal representatives of such person, as such is defined and included by The Domiciled Companies Act (Laws of Prince Edward Island 1962).

It replaced pre-confederation legislation of 1859 (P.E.I.), c. 4 under which the common law disability of aliens to hold land was abolished but aliens, or persons holding for them, were limited to a maximum of two hundred acres. In 1939, this limitation to two hundred acres was qualified by the words “except with the consent of the Lieutenant Governor in Council”: see 1939 (P.E.I.), c. 44; and by 1964 (P.E.I.), c. 27, s. 1 the limitation to two hundred acres was reduced to ten acres. So the law stood in Prince Edward Island until the enactment in 1972 of the provision now under challenge.

Of the earlier legislation to which I have referred, the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island in banco said this:

There can be no doubt that the statute of 1859 and the amendment of 1939 were, in pith and substance, legislation respecting aliens. The former, being a pre-Confederation enactment was unquestionably valid legislation, while the latter as post-Confederation legislation was probably invalid as being beyond the powers of the Province under the British North America Act, 1867. However, its validity was never questioned in the Courts and it remained until 1972. As the national park was developed and numerous provincial parks were set up, the island’s beauty as a tourist resort gained such status that many non-residents were rapidly acquiring large portions of island lands, and so great was the alarm as to the possibility of the island once more falling under the control of absentee owners that in 1972 the Legislature repealed the 1939 legislation and enacted the impugned provisions above set forth.

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I take the Court below to have based the distinction between the former legislation and that now under review on the ground that the province had made residence rather than alienage per se the touchstone of the limitation on the holding of land in the province, and it followed in the view of that Court that federal power was not invaded by giving such a preference in the holding of land, as s. 3 provided in favour of residents.

Two questions arising out of the construction of s. 3 may be put out of the way before turning to the constitutional issues. Having regard to the definition of “resident of Prince Edward Island” in s. 3(5)(b) as meaning “a bona fide resident, animus et factum”, it was contended that corporations are excluded from the coverage of the legislation, and this was conceded in the argument of counsel for the Attorney General of Prince Edward Island. There was no mortmain legislation in force in the province at the time of action brought, but, in any event, whether the structures of s. 3 can be evaded by purchases of land in the name of a corporation, even a non-resident one, is not a question that need be answered here.

Nor need an answer be given as to who fall within and who fall outside the definition of “resident of Prince Edward Island”. Certainly, no doubt exists that the appellants herein are non-residents, and whether or not such persons as federal civil servants, members of the military forces and so on are residents can be left for determination when a question as to their residential qualification arises.

I view s. 3 as applying to Canadian citizens who reside outside of Prince Edward Island, whether elsewhere in Canada or outside of Canada and to aliens who reside outside of Prince Edward Island, whether elsewhere in Canada or, as here, outside of Canada. This being so, the attack on this provision was based initially on an allegedly unconstitutional discrimination between resident and non-resident Canadian citizens, at least those residing elsewhere in Canada. Citizenship, it was urged, involved being at home in every province, it was a

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status that was under exclusive federal definition and protection, and it followed that a residential qualification for holding land in any province offended against the equality of status and capacity that arose from citizenship and, indeed, inhered in it. This submission was fortified by reliance on s. 24 of the Canadian Citizenship Act which is in the following terms:

24. (1) Real and personal property of every description may be taken, acquired, held and disposed of by an alien in the same manner in all respects as by a natural-born Canadian citizen; and a title to real and personal property of every description may be derived through, from or in succession to an alien in the same manner in all respects as through, from or in succession to a natural-born Canadian citizen.

(2) This section does not operate so as to

(a) qualify an alien for any office or for any municipal, parliamentary or other franchise;

(b) qualify an alien to be the owner of a Canadian ship;

(c) entitle an alien to any right or privilege as a Canadian citizen except such rights and privileges in respect of property as are hereby expressly given to him; or

(d) affect an estate or interest in real or personal property to which any person has or may become entitled, either mediately or immediately, in possession or expectancy, in pursuance of any disposition made before the 4th day of July 1883, or in pursuance of any devolution by law on the death of any person dying before that day. R.S., c. 33, s. 24.

Section 3 which is under challenge here does not distinguish between natural-born and naturalized Canadian citizens in making provincial residence the relevant factor for holding land. If it did, a different question would be presented, and account would have to be taken of the effect of s. 22 of the Canadian Citizenship Act which prescribes equality of status and equality of rights and obligations for all citizens, whether natural-born or naturalized.

Although citizenship as such is not mentioned in the British North America Act, it was not doubted by anyone on this appeal that, whether by implication from s. 91 (25) thereof or under the opening

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words thereof, it was for Parliament alone to define citizenship and to define how it may be acquired and lost. How far beyond this Parliament may go in investing citizenship with attributes that carry against provincial legislation has not been much canvassed in this Court; nor, on the other hand, is there any large body of case law dwelling on the limitation on provincial legislative power arising from a grant of citizenship or the recognition thereof in a natural-born citizen or arising from federal power in relation to naturalization and aliens under s. 91(25) of the British North America Act.

The well-known dictum by Rand J. in Winner v. S.M.T. (Eastern) Ltd.[2], at p. 920 that “a province cannot prevent a Canadian from entering it except, conceivably, in temporary circumstances, for some local reason, as for example health”, was preceded by some observations upon which stress was laid by the appellants and by the Attorney General of Canada. These observations engaged the decisions of the Privy Council in Union Colliery Co. v. Bryden[3], and Cunningham v. Tomey Homma[4], and they are as follows (at pp. 918-920):

Citizenship is membership in a state; and in the citizen inhere those rights and duties, the correlatives of allegiance and protection, which are basic to that status.…

But incidents of status must be distinguished from elements or attributes necessarily involved in status itself. British subjects have never enjoyed an equality in all civil or political privileges or immunities as is illustrated in Cunningham v. Tomey Homma, in which the Judicial Committee maintained the right of British Columbia to exclude a naturalized person from the electoral franchise. On the other hand, in Bryden’s case, a statute of the same province that forbade the employment of Chinamen, aliens or naturalized, in underground mining operations, was found to be incompetent. As explained in Homma’s case, that decision is to be taken as determining,

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“that the regulations there impeached were not really aimed at the regulation of metal mines at all, but were in truth devised to deprive the Chinese, naturalized or not, of the ordinary rights of the inhabitants of British Columbia and, in effect, to prohibit their continued residence in that province, since it prohibited their earning their living in that province.”

What this implies is that a province cannot, by depriving a Canadian of the means of working, force him to leave it: it cannot divest him of his right or capacity to remain and to engage in work there: that capacity inhering as a constituent element of his citizenship status is beyond nullification by provincial action. The contrary view would involve the anomaly that although British Columbia could not by mere prohibition deprive a naturalized foreigner of his means of livelihood, it could do so to a native-born Canadian. He may, of course, disable himself from exercising his capacity or he may be regulated in it by valid provincial law in other aspects. But that attribute of citizenship lies outside of those civil rights committed to the province, and is analogous to the capacity of a Dominion corporation which the province cannot sterilize.

These passages from the reasons of Rand J. in the Winner case raise, by and large, the issues upon which the parties and the intervenants have made their various submissions, both in respect of the scope of the federal citizenship power and the federal power in relation to aliens. Rand J. recognized that even a native-born citizen (to use his words) “may… disable himself from exercising his capacity or he may be regulated in it by valid provincial law in other aspects”.

The power of a provincial legislature to regulate the way in which land in the province may be held, how it may be transferred, how it may be used (and this, whether the land be privately‑owned or be land held by the Crown in right of the province) is not contested. Nor, as I understand the submissions that were made, is it doubted that the provincial legislature may limit the amount of land that may be held by any person, assuming equal opportunity to anyone to purchase. The contention is, however, that as soon as the province moves to differentiate in this respect between classes of persons the legislation becomes suspect, and if it

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turns out that some citizens, and indeed some aliens, are disadvantaged as against others, that is as against those who are resident in the province, the legislation must be regarded as in pith and substance in relation to citizenship and in relation to aliens and hence ultra vires.

I do not agree with this characterization, and I do not think it is supportable either in principle or under any case law. No one is prevented by Prince Edward Island legislation from entering the province and from taking up residence there. Absentee ownership of land in a province is a matter of legitimate provincial concern and, in the case of Prince Edward Island, history adds force to this aspect of its authority over its territory. In Walter v. Attorney General of Alberta[5], this Court concluded that it was open to the Province of Alberta to control the extent to which groups of persons could hold land on a communal basis, and the legislation that was unsuccessfully challenged in that case flatly prohibited the acquisition of land in the province by “colonies” outside the province, without the consent of the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council. It is true that no differentiation was expressly made on the basis of residence or citizenship or alienage, and that all who fell within the regulated groups were treated alike. Yet, it is also clear that the definition of the regulated bodies of persons was for the province and if the province could determine who could hold or the extent to which land could be held according to whether a communal property regime was observed, it is difficult to see why the province could not equally determine the extent of permitted holdings on the basis of residence. In neither case is this Court concerned with the wisdom or utility of the provincial land policy but only with whether the province has transgressed the limits of its legislative authority. I recognize, of course, that there may be cases where the line between wisdom and validity may be difficult to draw, but I find no such difficulty here.

In the Walter case, Martland J. speaking for the Court put the matter squarely in the following words:

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It would seem to me to be clear that a provincial legislature can enact laws governing the ownership of land within the province and that legislation enacted in relation to that subject must fall within s. 92(13), and must be valid unless it can be said to be in relation to a class of subject specifically enumerated in s. 91 of the British North America Act or otherwise within exclusive Federal jurisdiction.

There is no suggestion in the present case that the Act relates to any class of subject specifically enumerated in s. 91.

In the present case, as I have already observed, there is very much the suggestion that there has been an invasion of federal legislative power.

The Naturalization and Aliens Act, 1881 (Can.), c. 13, s. 4 was the first federal provision removing the common law disability of aliens to hold land. It was preceded however by certain pre-confederation legislation such as that of 1859 in Prince Edward Island, already mentioned, and by earlier legislation such as that of the Province of Canada, being 1849 (Can.), c. 197, s. 12. It appears to me that it was open to a province after Confederation to remove the disability of an alien to hold land in the province without the need of prior or supporting federal legislation unless, of course, the Parliament of Canada, having legislative jurisdiction in relation to aliens, had expressly retained or imposed the disability. Legislation of a province dealing with the capacity of a person, whether alien or infant or other, to hold land in the province is legislation in an aspect open to the province because it is directly concerned with a matter in relation to which the province has competence. Simply because it is for Parliament to legislate in relation to aliens does not mean that it alone can give an alien capacity to buy or hold land in a province or take it by devise or by descent. No doubt, Parliament alone may withhold or deny capacity of an alien to hold land or deny capacity to an alien in any other respect, but if it does not, I see no ground upon which provincial legislation recognizing capacity in respect of the holding of land can be held invalid.

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It is urged, here, however, that the qualified recognition given to the capacity of a non-resident alien by s. 3(2) of the challenged legislation is in the teeth of the general and unqualified recognition of the capacity of an alien to hold land given by s. 24(1) of the Canadian Citizenship Act. I think the reference to “capacity” is not particularly apt in assessing the validity of the limitations in s. 3(2), whether it be non-resident aliens who are involved or non‑resident Canadian citizens, but I would not decide the issue on purely semantic considerations. Whatever be the proper characterization of the limitations in s. 3(2) the question is whether s. 24(1) of the Canadian Citizenship Act, as an affirmative exercise of the power of Parliament in relation to aliens, obliges a province to treat non-resident aliens (and citizens can surely be on no worse footing) on a basis of equality with resident aliens.

In approaching this question I make nothing of the fact that s. 3(2) speaks in terms of residency and non-residency as if these words carried some connotation that set aliens and citizens apart so that the legislation did not touch them. I am prepared to treat it by extrapolation as referring expressly to resident aliens and citizens and to non-resident aliens and citizens; there are certainly no other classes so distinguishable. On this view of s. 3(2), I turn to a consideration of Union Colliery Co. v. Bryden and of Cunningham v. Tomey Homma to which Rand J. referred in the passages of his reasons in the Winner case that I have quoted.

The Union Colliery Co. case involved a preliminary question of the construction of the challenged s. 4 of the British Columbia Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1890 in its reference to “Chinaman” in that provision, which was as follows:

No boy under the age of twelve years, and no woman or girl of any age, and no Chinaman, shall be employed in or allowed to be for the purpose of employment in any mine to which the Act applies, below ground.

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The Privy Council construed the term “Chinaman”, as embracing Chinese who were aliens or naturalized persons, and it went on from there to assess the scope of the exclusive federal power in relation to “naturalization and aliens” under s. 91(25) of the British North America Act. It said of this power that (1) “The subject of ‘naturalization’ seems prima facie to include the power of enacting what shall be the consequences of naturalization; or, in other words, what shall be the rights and privileges pertaining to residents of Canada after they have been naturalized” (at p. 586); and (2) it invested the Parliament of Canada “with exclusive authority in all matters which directly concern the rights, privileges and disabilities of the class of Chinamen who are resident in the provinces of Canada” (at p. 587). In the result, the challenged legislation which, in the words of the Privy Council, consisted in pith and substance “in establishing a statutory prohibition which affects aliens or naturalized subjects” was ultra vires as invading exclusive federal authority.

I am bound to say that this result, assessed only according to the words used in reaching it, appears to be very far-reaching, especially when the Privy Council also said in the Union Colliery Co. case that so far as natural-born Canadians were concerned, “it can hardly have been intended to give the Dominion Parliament the exclusive right to legislate for [this] class of persons resident in Canada” (at p. 586). It is plain to me that the Privy Council receded from the literal effect of its language in the Union Colliery Co. case when it decided Cunningham v. Tomey Homma. It was said flatly in this last-mentioned case that “the truth is that the language of [s. 91(25)] does not purport to deal with the consequences of either alienage or naturalization” (at p. 156), and hence it was open to a province to deny the provincial franchise to Japanese persons, whether naturalized or not, and this notwithstanding that so far as naturalized Japanese persons were concerned federal legislation put them on a basis of equality with natural-born persons. But even natural-born persons of Japanese descent were excluded from the franchise, and this too was held to be within provincial competence. The Privy Council stated

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that while it was for the Parliament of Canada to determine what constitutes alienage or naturalization, “the question as to what consequences shall follow from either is not touched. The right of protection and the obligations of allegiance are necessarily involved in the nationality conferred by naturalization but the privileges attached to it, where these depend upon residence, are quite independent of nationality” (at p. 157).

The Privy Council regarded the electoral legislation in Cunningham v. Tomey Homma as validly enacted under s. 92(1) of the British North America Act, which authorizes legislation in relation to “the amendment from time to time, notwithstanding anything in this Act, of the Constitution of the Province, except as regards the office of Lieutenant-Governor”. I am not concerned in the present case with the question whether the franchise, the right to vote, has such a special relationship to naturalization and to natural-born status as to preclude provincial discrimination against certain racial groups. The Privy Council obviously thought not. Its reasons suggested a distinction between a privilege, e.g., the franchise, which the province could grant or withhold from aliens or naturalized or even natural-born citizens, and what appeared to it to be the draconian prohibition involved in the Union Colliery Co. case. Of that case it said this (at p. 157):

This Board, dealing with the particular facts of that case, came to the conclusion that the regulations there impeached were not really aimed at the regulation of coal mines at all, but were in truth devised to deprive the Chinese, naturalized or not, of the ordinary rights of the inhabitants of British Columbia and, in effect, to prohibit their continued residence in that Province, since it prohibited their earning their living in that Province. It is obvious that such a decision can have no relation to the question whether any naturalized person has an inherent right to the suffrage within the Province in which he resides.

The view so taken of the Union Colliery Co. case is difficult indeed to discern from the reasons for judgment therein but, taking the interpretation put upon it in Cunningham v. Tomey Homma, it is a far different case from the present one, which

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does not involve any attempt, direct or indirect, either to exclude aliens from Prince Edward Island or to drive out any aliens now residing there. I would not myself have thought that the mere prohibition against employment of Chinese persons in underground mining could be taken to be a general prohibition against their earning a living in British Columbia and, however distasteful such legislation was, that it was beyond provincial competence. At any rate, what we have in the present case is not any attempt to regulate or control alien residents of Prince Edward Island in what they may do or not do therein, but rather a limitation on landholding by non-residents. I am not, in any event, prepared to read the Union Colliery Co. case in the broad terms supported by the appellants and by the Attorney General of Canada. It is proper to note, on this aspect of the matter, that in Quong-Wing v. The King[6] at p. 466 Duff J. declared that “in applying Bryden’s case we are not entitled to pass over the authoritative interpretation of that decision which was pronounced some years later by the Judicial Committee itself in Cunningham v. Tomey Homma …”. Duff J. went on to say that the construction of s. 91(25) in the Union Colliery Co. case “was distinctly and categorically rejected in the later case” (at p. 468).

It was contended by the Attorney General of Canada that the authority of the Union Colliery Co. case was restored by the Privy Council in Brooks-Bidlake & Whittall Ltd. v. Attorney General of British Columbia[7], where, at p. 457, Lord Cave said that “sect. 91(25) reserves to the Dominion Parliament the general right to legislate as to the rights and disabilities of aliens and naturalized persons.” He went on, however, in the context of the issues before the Privy Council in that case, to add that s. 91(25) did not empower the Dominion to regulate the management of the public property of the Province or to determine whether a grantee or licensee of that property shall or shall not be permitted to employ persons of a particular race. Moreover, Lord Cave took much

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the same view of the Union Colliery Co. case as did the Privy Council in Cunningham v. Tomey Homma, saying at p. 457 that the legislation in the Union Colliery Co. case was held ultra vires “on the ground that the enactment was not really applicable to coal mines only—still less to coal mines belonging to the Province—but was in truth devised to prevent Chinamen from earning their living in the Province”.

I do not regard the reference by Lord Cave to “general right” as going beyond what Lord Haldane in the later case of Attorney General of British Columbia et al. v. Attorney General of Canada et al.[8], at p. 208 referred to as “the general status of aliens”. This last-mentioned case, a follow-up of the Brooks-Bidlake case, turned ultimately on a s. 132 treaty and implementing legislation, and hence in itself is of no assistance on the points at issue here.

I do not think that federal power as exercised in ss. 22 and 24 of the Citizenship Act, or as it may be exercised beyond those provisions, may be invoked to give aliens, naturalized persons or natural-born citizens any immunity from provincial regulatory legislation, otherwise within its constitutional competence, simply because it may affect one class more than another or may affect all of them alike by what may be thought to be undue stringency. The question that would have to be answered is whether the provincial legislation, though apparently or avowedly related to an object within provincial competence, is not in truth directed to, say, aliens or naturalized persons so as to make it legislation striking at their general capacity or legislation so discriminatory against them as in effect to amount to the same thing.

The issue here is not unlike that which has governed the determination of the validity of provincial legislation embracing federally-incorporated companies. The case law, dependent so largely on the judicial appraisal of the thrust of the particular legislation, has established, in my view, that

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federally-incorporated companies are not constitutionally entitled, by virtue of their federal incorporation, to any advantage, as against provincial regulatory legislation, over provincial corporations or over extra-provincial or foreign corporations, so long as their capacity to establish themselves as viable corporate entities (beyond the mere fact of their incorporation), as by raising capital through issue of shares and debentures, is not precluded by the provincial legislation. Beyond this, they are subject to competent provincial regulations in respect of businesses or activities which fall within provincial legislative power.

In the present case, the residency requirement affecting both aliens and citizens alike and related to a competent provincial object, namely, the holding of land in the province and limitations on the size of the holdings (relating as it does to a limited resource), can in no way be regarded as a sterilization of the general capacity of an alien or citizen who is a non‑resident, especially when there is no attempt to seal off provincial borders against entry. Since, in my view, s. 3(2) is valid provincial legislation in its application to aliens or citizens who reside elsewhere in Canada than in Prince Edward Island, and hence is a fortiori valid in respect of persons resident outside of Canada I need not consider whether the appellants would be subject to the limitations of s. 3(2) even if persons resident elsewhere in Canada would constitutionally be free of them.

I would dismiss the appeal with costs, and would make no order as to costs by or against the intervenants.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Solicitors for the appellants: Feigman & Chernos, Toronto.

Solicitor for the respondents: Bertrand Plamondon, Charlottetown.