Attorney General of Quebec v. Blaikie et al., [1981] 1 SCR 312

Supreme Court of Canada

Attorney General of Quebec v. Blaikie et al., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 312

Date: 1981-04-06

The Attorney General of the Province of Quebec (Defendant) Appellant;

and

Peter M. Blaikie, Roland Durand and Yoine Goldstein (Plaintiffs) Respondents;

and

The Attorney General of Canada (Intervenor) Respondent;

and

The Attorney General of Manitoba, the Attorney General of New Brunswick and Georges Forest Intervenors.

The Attorney General of the Province of Quebec (Defendant) Appellant;

and

Henri Wilfrid Laurier (Plaintiff) Respondent;

and

The Attorney General of Canada (Intervenor) Respondent;

and

The Attorney General of Manitoba, the Attorney General of New Brunswick and Georges Forest Intervenors.

1980: November 26 and 27 (rehearing); 1981: April 6.

Present: Laskin C.J. and Martland, Ritchie, Dickson, Beetz, Estey and McIntyre JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR QUEBEC

Constitutional law—Application of s. 133 B.N.A. Act to regulations adopted by the government, municipal and school by-laws, regulations of the civil administration and of semi‑public agencies and to rules of practice of the courts—Charter of the French Language, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-11, ss. 7 to 13—B.N.A. Act, ss. 92(8), 93, 129, 133—Supreme Court Rules, rule 61.

Following the dismissal on December 13, 1979 of appellant’s appeal from two judgments of the Quebec Court of Appeal, affirming two judgments of the Supe-

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rior Court by which Deschênes C.J.S.C. held ultra vires the Legislature of Quebec ss. 7 to 13 of the Charter of the French Language, appellant requested a rehearing to obtain a declaration as to the scope of s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act regarding delegated legislation. The question presented is as follows: “Does s. 133 of the British North America Act apply to regulations or orders of statutory bodies or regulations or by-laws of municipalities and school boards … as distinct from orders in council and ministerial orders or regulations which were in issue in the appeal to this Court and which under the judgment of this Court of December 13, 1979 were held to be within the terms of s. 133?”

Held: Section 133 of the British North America Act applies to regulations which constitute delegated legislation and to rules of practice enacted by the courts and quasi‑judicial tribunals. It does not apply to municipal or school bodies by-laws.

(1) Regulations enacted by the government: legislative powers delegated by the Legislature to the proper constitutional body, the government of the province, must be viewed as an extension of the legislative power of the Legislature, and accordingly the enactments of the government under such delegation must be considered the enactments of the Legislature for the purposes of s. 133. A large and important part of the laws in force consists of regulations made by the Executive, and the requirements of s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act would be truncated should this section be construed so as not to govern such regulations. Regulations enacted by the government to alter regulations made by a subordinate body must also be included in this class.

(2) By-laws of municipal bodies: these are not covered by s. 133. Municipal corporations have been in existence since long before Confederation, and the language of municipal by-laws has been expressly regulated by the Legislature. Since Confederation, the Legislature has never entertained any doubt about its power to regulate this matter. Since the provinces were explicitly given the power to make laws relating to municipal institutions by s. 92(8) of the B.N.A. Act, the absence of any reference to them in s. 133 cannot be viewed as an oversight if the intent of the Fathers of Confederation is to be respected. Much the same can be said about regulations of school bodies, especially as in the area of education the safeguards provided by s. 93 are of a religious, not of a linguistic nature. The fact that the municipal by-laws may be subject to the approval or disallowance of the government does not alter their municipal character nor

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the constitutional intent to subtract them from the operation of s. 133.

(3) Other regulations: with regard to the regulations of the civil administration and of semi-public agencies contemplated by the Charter, it is the connection between the Legislature and delegated legislation which is the decisive factor in so far as their being subject to s. 133 is concerned, as is the case with government regulations. Whenever these regulations are made subject to the approval of the government, they are assimilated to the enactments of the government and so become subject to s. 133. Regulations which are subject to disallowance by the government are different: they have an independent life of their own and probably are fully effective for the period preceding their disallowance.

(4) Court rules of practice: they are subject to s. 133. Historically, since 1774, it seems clearly that court rules of practice have been published in both languages, and the draftsmen of the B.N.A. Act must have felt that they were subject to s. 133 by necessary intendment, the point being not so much that rules of practice partake of the legislative nature of the Code of Civil Procedure of which they are the complement, but by reason of the judicial character of their subject-matter.

Attorney General of Quebec v. Blaikie et al., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016; Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver General of New Brunswick, [1892] A.C. 437; Trustees of the Roman Catholic Separate Schools for the City of Ottawa v. Mackell, [1917] A.C. 62; Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for Canada, [1896] A.C. 348; North Coast Air Services Ltd. v. Canadian Transport Commission, [1968] S.C.R. 940; Wilson v. Esquimalt and Nanaimo Ry. Co., [1922] 1 A.C. 202, referred to.

DECLARATION on the scope of s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act regarding delegated legislation, following a judgment of this Court of December 13, 1979[1].

Henri Brun, Louis Crête and Odette Laverdière, for the appellant.

A. Ken Twaddle, Q.C., for the intervenor the Attorney General of Manitoba.

A. Brossard, Q.C., for the respondents Peter M. Blaikie et al.

David Wood, for the respondent Henri Wilfrid Laurier.

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Raynold Langlois, James Mabbutt and André Asselin, Q.C., for the respondent the Attorney General of Canada.

Alain J.J. Hogue and M.B. Nepon, for the intervenor Georges Forest.

THE COURT—On December 13, 1979, this Court[2] dismissed appellant’s appeal from two judgments of the Quebec Court of Appeal[3] affirming two judgments of the Superior Court whereby Deschênes C.J.S.C., granted to plaintiffs Blaikie, Durand and Goldstein in one case and to plaintiff Laurier in the other a declaration that Chapter III of Title I (ss. 7 to 13) of the Charter of the French Language, 1977 (Que.), c. 5, now R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-11, (the Charter), was wholly ultra vires of the Legislature of Quebec. Deschênes C.J.S.C., held that ss. 7 to 13 of the Charter violated s. 133 of the British North America Act, 1867, (the B.N.A. Act), which section he found to be beyond the competence of the Legislature to amend[4]. Section 133 reads:

133. Either the English or the French Language may be used by any Person in the Debates of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada and of the Houses of the Legislature of Quebec; and both those Languages shall be used in the respective Records and Journals of those Houses; and either of those Languages may be used by any Person or in any Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court of Canada established under this Act, and in or from all or any of the Courts of Quebec.

The Acts of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of Quebec shall be printed and published in both those Languages.

The provisions of the Charter declared ultra vires include the following:

7. French is the language of the legislature and the courts in Quebec.

9. Only the French text of the statutes and regulations is official.

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10. An English version of every legislative bill, statute and regulation shall be printed and published by the civil administration.

“Regulations” is not defined in the Charter.

Section 98 and the Annex of the Charter read as follows:

98. The various agencies of the civil administration, and the health services and social services, the public utility firms and the professional corporations referred to in this act are listed in the Schedule.

SCHEDULE

A. The civil administration.

1. The Government and the government departments.

2. The government agencies:

Agencies to which the Government or a minister appoints the majority of the members, to which, by law, the officers or employees are appointed or remunerated in accordance with the Civil Service Act (1965, 1st session, chapter 14), or at least half of whose capital stock or resources are derived from the consolidated revenue fund except, however, health services and social services, general and vocational colleges and the Université du Québec.

3. The municipal and school bodies:

(a) the urban communities:

The Quebec Urban Community, the Montreal Urban Community and the Outaouais Regional Community, the Quebec Urban Community Transit Commission, the Greater Québec Water Purification Board, the Montreal Urban Community Transit Commission, the Outaouais Regional Community Transit Commission, the Outaouais Development Corporation, the City of Laval Transit Commission and the Montreal South Shore Transit Commission;

(b) the municipalities:

The city, town, village, country and county corporations, whether incorporated under a general law or a special act, and the agencies under the jurisdiction of such corporations which participate in the administration of their territory;

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(c) the school bodies:

The regional school boards, the school boards and the corporations of school trustees governed by the Education Act (Revised Statutes, 1964, chapter 235), the School Council of the island of Montreal.

4. The health services and the social services:

Establishments within the meaning of the Act respecting health services and social services (1971, chapter 48).

B. Semipublic agencies

1. Public utility firms:

If they are not already government agencies, the telephone, telegraph and cable‑delivery companies, the air, ship, autobus and rail transport companies, the companies which produce, transport, distribute or sell gas, water or electricity, and business firms holding authorizations from the Transport Commission.

2. Professional corporations:

The professional corporations listed in Schedule I to the Professional Code (1973, chapter 43) under the designation «professional corporations», or established in accordance with that Code.

In holding that s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act applied to delegated legislation, Deschênes C.J.S.C., whose reasons for judgment were adopted by the Court of Appeal and by this Court, did not undertake to define the extent of the delegated legislation affected. But in his reasons for judgment, at p. 47, he explicitly mentioned the legislative power delegated by the Legislature to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council.

The subject of delegated legislation was barely touched upon in this Court during the first hearing. Severability was mentioned in general terms but no allusion was made, either in oral or written argument, to the possibility that orders of statutory bodies or by-laws of municipalities and school bodies might be considered as delegated legislation with respect to the application of s. 133. This Court did not attempt to define the expression either. However, at p. 1021 of its reasons, it indicated that it was concerned solely with the impugned provisions of the Charter.

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Appellant applied for a rehearing pursuant to rule 61 of this Court to obtain a pronouncement on the reach of s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act with respect to delegated legislation. On March 27, 1980, a rehearing was ordered in the following terms:

The appellant, the Attorney General of Quebec, having applied for a rehearing to resolve issues said to arise out of certain provisions in Chapter III of Title I of the Charter of the French Language, 1977 (Que.) ch. 5, although not raised on the hearing of the appeal, and the respondents Blaikie, Durand and Goldstein consenting as do the intervenors the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of New Brunswick, and the respondent Laurier and the intervenors the Attorney General of Manitoba and Georges Forest taking no position, it is ordered that a rehearing take place, limited to the following question:

Does s. 133 of the British North America Act apply to regulations or orders of statutory bodies or regulations or by-laws of municipalities and school boards (in so far as they come within ss. 9 and 10 of Chapter III of Title I of the Charter of the French Language), as distinct from orders in council and ministerial orders or regulations which were in issue in the appeal to this Court and which under the judgment of this Court of December 13, 1979 were held to be within the terms of s. 133?

The Attorney General of New Brunswick did not take part in the rehearing.

Respondents Blaikie, Durand and Goldstein did not file any factum but their counsel adopted the general position of the Attorney General of Manitoba and, alternatively, the position of the Attorney General of Canada.

In the course of the rehearing, members of the Court were provided with a tentatively exhaustive list of over one hundred provincial boards, councils, committees, commissions, tribunals, courts, corporations and other institutions or bodies and classes of institutions or bodies empowered by provincial statutes to enact regulations, rules, by-laws or other enactments of a legislative nature.

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Given the fact that some of these classes comprise several hundred institutions or bodies, such as town councils, there would appear to be just in the Province of Quebec well over two thousand lawmaking agencies other than the Legislature. These range from the provincial Government itself at one end to municipal councils and school boards at the other, with dozens of boards or other bodies in between.

The phenomenal growth of delegated legislation since 1867 is illustrated by some relatively recent figures: in 1975, 1976 and 1977, a yearly average of over 700 enactments of a legislative nature, other than statutes, have been published in the Quebec Official Gazette; these do not include innumerable by-laws enacted by municipal authorities: Gilles Pépin, “Le pouvoir réglementaire et la Charte de la langue française”, (1978) 13 R.J.T. 107, at p. 109.

It must be emphasized that regulations or orders in issue in the case at bar are regulations or orders which constitute delegated legislation properly so called and not rules or directives of internal management.

I Regulations enacted by the Government

Appellant and the Attorney General of Manitoba conceded, properly so in our view, that s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act applies to enactments of a legislative nature issued by the Government of the province, including enactments issued by a group of ministers being members of the Government, such as the “Conseil du Trésor” (Treasury Board) (Financial Administration Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. A-6, s. 18) or by a minister.

The provincial executive power is vested in the Queen (Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver General of New Brunswick[5]) represented by the Lieutenant-Governor (B.N.A. Act, s. 58) whose office is beyond the competence of the Legislature to modify (B.N.A. Act, s. 92(1)).

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The Lieutenant-Governor is part and parcel of the Legislature (B.N.A. Act, s. 71; Legislature Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. L-1, s. 1). He appoints members of the Executive Council and ministers (B.N.A. Act, s. 63; Executive Power Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. E-18, ss. 3 to 5) and these, according to constitutional principles of a customary nature referred to in the preamble of the B.N.A. Act as well as in some statutory provisions (Executive Power Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. E‑18, ss. 3 to 5, 7, 11(1); Legislature Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. L-1, s. 56(1)), must be or become members of the Legislature and are expected, individually and collectively, to enjoy the confidence of its elected branch. There is thus a considerable degree of integration between the Legislature and the Government.

The Government of the province is not a body of the Legislature’s own creation. It has a constitutional status and is not subordinate to the Legislature in the same sense as other provincial legislative agencies established by the Legislature. Indeed, it is the Government which, through its majority, does in practice control the operations of the elected branch of the Legislature on a day to day basis, allocates time, gives priority to its own measures and in most cases decides whether or not the legislative power is to be delegated and, if so, whether it is to hold it itself or to have it entrusted to some other body.

Legislative powers so delegated by the Legislature to a constitutional body which is part of itself must be viewed as an extension of the legislative power of the Legislature and the enactments of the Government under such delegation must clearly be considered as the enactments of the Legislature for the purposes of s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act.

It is true that the above-mentioned conventions of the Constitution were well-established in 1867 and the delegation of legislative powers to the Executive was not then unknown. But such delegation was used sparingly and almost by way of exception. The exception has now become the rule in some matters to the point where a large and important part of the laws in force in the Province

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consists of regulations made by the Executive[6]. The requirements of s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act would be truncated, as was said by this Court at p. 1027 of its reasons, should this section be construed so as not to govern such regulations.

Regulations enacted by the Government to alter regulations made by a subordinate body must also be included in this class. This was not conceded by the Attorney General of Quebec. But there is no valid reason for distinguishing such regulations from ordinary Government regulations. (There would appear to be very few regulations of this type under statutes now in force in Quebec.)

II Municipal and school bodies by-laws

It was submitted by the appellant and the Attorney General of Manitoba and, subject to certain reservations, conceded by the Attorney General of

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Canada but not by respondent Laurier and intervenor Forest, that s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act does not apply to municipal and school bodies by-laws.

In our opinion, this submission is well founded in history and in law and must be acceded to.

Municipal corporations have been in existence since long before Confederation, with power to make regulations of a local nature. Unlike the language of the Legislature, the language in which these regulations were to be made and published does not appear to have been the subject of controversy. But it could not escape being in the minds of the Fathers of Confederation since any linguistic issue was a sensitive one and the language of municipal by-laws in Lower Canada had been expressly regulated by the Legislature before Confederation.

For instance, An Act to incorporate the Town of Joliette (1863 (Can.), c. 23, s. 43) provided that by-laws be published only in French (see Claude-Armand Sheppard, The Law of Languages in Canada, 1971, 10th Study of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, at pp. 229 et reg.).

More importantly, the first subsection of s. 10 of An Act respecting Municipalities and Roads in Lower Canada (C.S.L.C. 1860, c. 24) provided for the publication of by-laws by municipal councils. Subsection 2 of s. 10 read in part as follows:

2. In parishes, the council shall also publish all by-laws, by causing them to be read in the English and French languages, unless the use of either of the said languages be dispensed with, and then in that one of the said languages which should be used …

Section 11 read as follows:

11. The Governor may, by order in council, declare that the publication to be made under this Act of any notice, by-law or resolution, shall be made in one language only, in any municipality the council whereof have shewn that such publication may be so made without detriment to any of the inhabitants thereof; the Provincial Secretary shall cause a copy of every such

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order in council to be inserted in The Canada Gazette, and from the date of such insertion the publication of all such notices, by-laws and resolutions may be legally made in the municipality referred to in such order in council, in that language only which is thereby prescribed.

These provisions were continued by s. 129 of the B.N.A. Act and, three years after Confederation, found their way in expanded form into the first Municipal Code of the Province of Quebec (1870 (Que.), c. 68) the fifth chapter of which is entitled “Of the Languages to be used in the Council and the Municipal Proceedings” and comprises these four sections:

241. In the sessions of council, whoever has a right to be heard, may use either the French or the English language.

242. The books, records and proceedings of every municipal council are kept, and all certificates of publication or service, and every other document produced or filed in the office of the council, are written in either the French or the English language.

243. In any municipality for which there is no order of the lieutenant-governor in council, in virtue of the tenth section of the consolidated municipal act of Lower Canada or of the following article, the publication of every notice, by-law, resolution or order of the council, by posting, reading aloud or insertion in the newspapers, must be made in the French and English language.

244. The lieutenant-governor by an order in council, upon a petition being made to him to that effect by any municipal council, may declare that the publication of any public notice, by-law, resolution or order of the council, in such municipality, except such as are required to be made in the official Gazette of the province, shall be made thereafter in one language only. Such language is determined by the said order in council.

The resolution under which the petition of the council is made, cannot be adopted until after a public notice to that effect has been given to the inhabitants of the municipality.

A copy of such order by the lieutenant-governor in council, is transmitted without delay to the secretary-treasurer of the municipality to which it applies.

However, up to this day, under the Cities and Towns Act, (R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-19), ss. 335, 345, 353, 362, all by-laws enacted by cities and towns

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must be published in both languages. No exception is contemplated.

Some municipal corporations must have been illegally enacting regulations in one language only for the Act to Validate the Publication of Certain Municipal Notices (R.S.Q. 1941, c. 229) was passed to legalize the situation for the period prior to April 11, 1935. (See Claude‑Armand Sheppard, supra, at p. 233.)

Thus, before as well as immediately after Confederation and later, official bilingualism was not necessarily the rule in practice with respect to municipal by-laws.

Furthermore, the Legislature never entertained any doubt about its power to regulate this matter. It simply assumed jurisdiction and occupied the field unchallenged.

Last but not least, municipal institutions constitute a distinct albeit subordinate order of government at the local level, the administration of which is usually in the hands of locally elected mayors and members of council. Their growth and the multiplication of their regulations were inherent in their nature and accordingly foreseeable. Since the provinces were explicitly given the power to make laws relating to those institutions in s. 92(8) of the B.N.A. Act, the absence of any reference to them in s. 133 cannot possibly be viewed as an oversight. It is a purposeful silence to which effect must be given if the intent of the Fathers of Confederation is to be respected.

Much the same can be said, a fortiori, about school bodies regulations. Education falls under provincial legislative authority subject to the denominational principles stated in s. 93 of the B.N.A. Act. It was quite foreseeable that school districts and school bodies would be organized along even more homogeneous linguistic lines than municipal corporations. Yet, the safeguards provided by s. 93 are of a religious, not of a linguistic nature. As was observed by Lord Buckmaster in Trustees of the Roman Catholic Separate Schools

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for the City of Ottawa v. Mackell[7], at p. 74.

… the only section in the British North America Act, 1867, which relates to the use of the English and French languages (s. 133) does not relate to education, and is directed to an entirely different subject-matter.

Since the B.N.A Act is explicit on the subject of religious safeguards with respect to education, its silence on the language of school by-laws is also a deliberate one. It is a silence which speaks and it speaks against the application of s. 133 to school by-laws.

In oral argument, counsel for the Attorney General of Canada submitted that municipal by-laws are governed by s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act whenever they are made subject either to approval or to disallowance by the Government[8].

In our view, no such extension is warranted.

Municipal by-laws constitute a separate and distinct class of regulations. As we have seen, they are the legislative enactments of a third level of government clearly contemplated by the B.N.A. Act and yet not mentioned in s. 133. The fact that they may be subject to the control or supervision of the Government by way of required approval or potential disallowance does not alter their municipal character nor the constitutional intent to subtract them from the operation of s. 133.

Counsel for respondent Laurier and intervenor Forest expressed reservations as to the appropriateness of a judgment couched in general terms in a case where municipal corporations are not represented and when cases concerning some of them might be pending before lower courts.

This comes close to submitting that we ought not to have ordered a rehearing. But as is noted in the order itself, neither respondent Laurier nor

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intervenor Forest objected to the rehearing. Furthermore, it is not unusual for a constitutional case pending before a lower court to be overriden by a judgment of this Court.

Counsel for respondent Laurier further represented that several aspects of the issue relating to municipal by-laws could not adequately be dealt with in this hearing. Thus, it was conceivable that some municipal charters did not find their source in post-Confederation provincial legislation. It was also arguable, in his submission, that language rights had ceased to be a merely local or provincial matter and, to paraphrase Lord Watson L.C., in Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for Canada[9], at p. 364, had attained such dimensions as to become a matter of national concern lying outside the purview of s. 92 of the B.N.A. Act. It was contended that the question whether the Legislature could validly impose the majority language of the Province upon the inhabitants of a municipality speaking another language might have to be reconsidered in that light.

It should be observed in this regard that the Court is solely concerned with the applicability of s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act to regulations passed pursuant to a delegation of legislative power by the Legislature of Quebec. The Court refrains from expressing any view as to other issues which might relate to language rights and arise in future cases.

III Other regulations

This residual class includes all regulations of the civil administration and of semi-public agencies contemplated by the Charter other than government, municipal and school bodies regulations. However, this class does not include court rules of practice which will be separately dealt with later.

Appellant’s counsel submitted that none of the regulations comprised in this class is governed by s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act. It was contended that the

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main reason why the reach of s. 133 had been extended by interpretation to cover regulations was the risk that the provisions of the section be circumvented by the use of regulations: this was the only reason which suggested a distinction between various classes of regulations; it could apply solely to regulations enacted by the Government since only the Government could possibly form the intent to circumvent s. 133 and exercise sufficient control or influence over the Legislature to carry it out.

In our opinion, this test is not the correct one.

The positions of the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Manitoba were practically the same on this issue. According to their submissions, regulations passed by agencies of the Government were subject to s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act; the correct test was the extent to which boards and other law-making bodies were controlled by the Government so that they could be said to be responsible through it to the Legislature. On the other hand, s. 133 did not govern the regulations of autonomous law-making agencies such as professional corporations. However, counsel for the Attorney General of Canada contended that even these were governed by s. 133 as long as they were subject to approval or disallowance by the Government.

Under the test proposed by the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Manitoba, the application of s. 133 would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In our view, this test is not the right one either. It is also most impractical. The residual class of regulations under consideration includes rules made by a large number of boards and other law-making agencies so diverse as to have little in common except their power to enact delegated legislation.

The number of members of such boards and bodies varies from one to more than two dozen. These members may be appointed by the Government with or without consultation of some other institution. They may be elected. The membership may also be partly elected and partly appointed.

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Some members but not necessarily all must sometime be chosen from limited groups including the judiciary. Appointments may be made during pleasure or for a fixed term. Salaries are fixed by the Legislature or by the Government if they come from the consolidated revenue fund, but they may come from other sources. The Government may or may not be given a power of supervision including the power to put a subordinate body under trusteeship in certain circumstances.

The Government may also be in a position to exercise some influence over subordinate agencies through the power of the purse. Given its overall control of the Legislature, it might be held responsible for practically every agency which, according to public opinion, may be thought not to be functioning properly. The responsibility of the Government is a matter of degree and varies infinitely and minutely from case to case. It cannot, without causing hopeless confusion and uncertainty, be retained as a criterion for our purposes.

In order to determine the proper test, one must keep two sets of considerations in mind.

First, the proliferation of these other regulations was at least as unforeseeable as that of Government regulations which, unlike municipal and school board by-laws could not have been originally intended to escape the operation of s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act.

Second, while the ordinary meaning of the words “Acts … of the Legislature” in s. 133 must be departed from to prevent the requirements of the section from being frustrated, it cannot be stretched beyond what is necessary to accomplish this purpose.

Inadequate as they may be, the two tests suggested by counsel for the Attorney General of Quebec, the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Manitoba nevertheless point in the right direction in that they both emphasize some connexion between the Legislature and delegated legislation, apart from the delegation itself. This connexion is the decisive factor in so far as

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the subjection of Government regulations to s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act is concerned. There is no reason to select a different element with respect to other regulations. It is because in our constitutional system the enactments of the Government should be assimilated with the enactments of the Legislature that they are governed by s. 133. Other regulations must in our opinion be viewed in the same light when they can also properly be said to be the enactments of the Government.

This happens whenever these other regulations are made subject to the approval of the Government.

The particular form of words used in this respect by various statutes matters little. Whether it be provided that some regulations “shall have no force and effect until approved and sanctioned by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council” or “shall not be carried into execution until approved by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council” or “shall not have force and effect until confirmed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council”, they can be assimilated with the enactments of the Government and therefore of the Legislature as long as positive action of the Government is required to breathe life into them. Without such approval or confirmation, they are a nullity (North Coast Air Services Ltd. v. Canadian Transport Commission[10]) or at least inoperative. The Government does legislate in approving them in the same way as one house legislates in a bicameral legislature when it passes a bill already passed by the other house, or the Lieutenant-Governor when he assents to a bill passed by the house of the now unicameral Legislature.

Regulations which are subject to disallowance by the Government are different. They have an independent life of their own. Their disallowance is a contingency. And even when they are disallowed, they probably are fully effective for the period

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preceding their disallowance. (See, by analogy, the effect of disallowance on provincial legislation under a similarly worded enactment: Wilson v. Esquimalt and Nanaimo Ry. Co.[11]).

Under the statutes now in force in Quebec, regulations which are subject to the approval of the Government and therefore to s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act seem to be almost as numerous as those of the Government itself[12].

IV Court rules of practice

The status of English and French in Quebec courts under s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act exhibits a continuous practice going back almost to the beginning of the British rule. Since 1774, either French or English was used in court and in court proceedings and court processes[13]. (However, a 1785 Ordinance provided for the serving of writs of summons in the language of the defendant in all suits of £10 or less and in some suits over £10 (1785, 25 Geo. III, c. 2). It was repealed in 1801 (1801, 41 Geo. III, c. 7)).

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The use of the French language did not go unchallenged. It was recognized by a four judge Court of King’s Bench in Rex v. Talon (this is an 1812 case the report of which comes from the private archives of one of the judges: Maréchal Nantel, “La langue française au Palais”, (1945) 5 R. du B. 201, at pp. 203-4) but there are single judge’s decisions to the contrary (Hamel v. Joseph, an 1827 case reported in 1847-48, 3 R. de L. 400; Maréchal Nantel, supra, at p. 205). The use of the English language was taken for granted.

Although French ceased to be recognized as an official statutory language from 1840 to 1846 under s. 41 of the Union Act, 1840 (1840 (U.K.), c. 35), it continued to be used in court on the same footing as English, as appears from the reported cases of the period, such as can be found in the Revue de Législation et de Jurisprudence.

A 1793 Ordinance denied Quebec courts the legislative power which French courts or “parlements” did exercise in decisions called “arrêts de règlement” (1793, 34 Geo. III, c. 6, s. 8), but some Quebec courts were empowered to adopt rules of practice from 1785 and 1787 (1785, 25 Geo. III, c. 2; 1787, 27 Geo. III, c. 4; see A.A. Bruneau J.S.C., “De la limite des pouvoirs des juges et des tribunaux”, (1924) 2 R. du D. 289), starting with the Court of Appeal

to regulate, effectuate and accelerate the proceedings in all causes of appeal, for the advancement of justice, and to prevent unnecessary delays and expense in the same.

From that early period to the present time, rules of practice appear to have been published in both languages except, oddly, the latest rules of the Court of Appeal, dated June 2, 1978, the English version of which is still unavailable.

When the B.N.A. Act came into force on July 1, 1867, the first Quebec Code of Civil Procedure had just been proclaimed three days previously, on June 28, 1867 (An Act respecting the Code of

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Civil Procedure of Lower Canada, 1866 (Can.), c. 25). Article 29 provided for the making by the judges of the Superior Court of

any rules of practice that may be necessary for regulating proceedings … in causes and matters before them … and all matters of procedure not regulated by the Code …

Article 1177 granted a similar power to the Court of Queen’s Bench. This Code was continued in force under s. 129 of the B.N.A. Act and replaced by another in 1897 (An Act respecting the Code of Civil Procedure of the Province of Quebec, 1897 (Que.), c. 48) and still another in 1965 (1965 (Que.), c. 80). The latest Code provides for the enactment of rules of practice by each court: Article 47.

Rules of practice are not expressly referred to in s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act. Given the circumstances described above, they are unlikely to have been overlooked but in our view the draftsmen must have thought that they were subject to the section by necessary intendment.

The point is not so much that rules of practice partake of the legislative nature of the Code of which they are the complement. A more compelling reason is the judicial character of their subject-matter for which s. 133 makes special provision. Rules of practice may regulate not only the proper manner to address the court orally and in writing, but all proceedings, processes, certificates, styles of cause and the form of court records, books, indexes, rolls, registers, each of which may under s. 133, be written in either language. Rules of practice may also prescribe and do prescribe specific forms for proceedings and processes, such for instance as the motion for authorization to institute a class action or a judgment in a class action (Rules of Practice of the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec in civil matters, November 10, 1978, ss. 49 to 56), a proceeding in the Superior Court, a process of the Superior Court. All litigants have the fundamental right to choose either French or English and would be deprived of this freedom of choice should such rules and compulsory forms be couched in one language only.

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Furthermore, and as was noted by Deschênes C.J.S.C., (at p. 49 of his reasons), this fundamental right is also guaranteed to judges who are at liberty to address themselves to litigants in the language of their choice. When they so address themselves collectively to litigants as they peremptorily do in rules of practice, they must necessarily use both languages if they wish to safeguard the freedom of each judge.

We accordingly reach the conclusion that, given the nature of their subject-matter, rules of court stand apart and are governed by s. 133 of the B.N.A. Act.

What was not contemplated in 1867 was the multiplication of non-curial adjudicative agencies. At p. 1029 of its reasons for judgment, this Court has already held that it could not ignore this modern development on overly-technical grounds and refuse to extend to proceedings before quasi-judicial tribunals the constitutional guarantee of the right to use either French or English by those subject to their jurisdiction. It would be equally overly‑technical to hold that the rules of practice made by such tribunals should remain beyond the reach of s. 133 because their subject-matter is quasi-judicial in nature, rather than judicial.

V Conclusion

The constitutional question on the rehearing is answered as follows:

Section 133 of the British North America Act applies to regulations enacted by the Government of Quebec, a minister or a group of ministers and to regulations of the civil administration and of semi-public agencies contemplated by the Charter of the French Language which, to come into force, are subject to the approval of that Government, a minister or a group of ministers. Such regulations are regulations or orders which constitute delegated legislation properly so called and not rules or directives of internal management.

Section 133 also applies to rules of practice enacted by courts and quasi-judicial tribunals.

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Section 133 does not apply to municipal or school bodies by-laws even when subject to the approval of the Government, a minister or a group of ministers.

No costs were asked for on the rehearing and there should be no order as to costs.

Judgment accordingly.

Solicitors for the appellant: Bilodeau, Flynn, Boissonneault & Roy, Montreal; Jean K. Samson, Quebec; Henri Brun, Quebec.

Solicitors for the respondents Blaikie, Durand and Goldstein: Chait, Salomon, Gelber, Reis, Bronstein, Litvack, Echenberg & Lipper, Montreal; Johnston, Heenan & Blaikie, Montreal; André Brossard, Montreal.

Solicitors for the respondent Laurier: Wood & Aaron, Montreal.

Solicitors for the respondent the Attorney General of Canada: Langlois, Drouin, Roy, Fréchette & Gaudreau, Montreal; James Mabbut, Ottawa.

Solicitor for the intervenor the Attorney General of Manitoba: Gordon E. Pilkey, Winnipeg.

Solicitor for the intervenor the Attorney General of New Brunswick: Gordon F. Gregory, Fredericton.

Solicitors for the intervenor Forest: Hogues, Nepon & Sharp, Winnipeg.