Supreme Court of Canada
Palmer
et al. v. Miron & Frères et al., [1959] S.C.R. 397
Date:
1959-02-26
Morris Robert Palmer And Nathan Palmer, carrying on
business under the name of Hull Pipe & Machinery Company (Plaintiffs)
Appellants ;
and
Miron & Frère, Miron & Frères and Miron
& Frères Limitée (Defendants) Respondents.
1959: January 29; 1959: February 26.
Present: Kerwin C.J. and Taschereau, Fauteux, Abbott and
Judson JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OP QUEEN'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE,
PROVINCE OP QUEBEC.
Damages—Land used by tenant expropriated by
Crown—Failure of tenant to remove chattels as requested—Contractor removing
same to commence excavation—Damages claimed from contractor—Liability of
mandatary for delict or quasi-delict—Civil Code, arts. 1053, 1716, 1727.
The plaintiffs used a certain piece of land, of which they
were tenants, as a scrap yard. The land was expropriated by the Crown in 1947
but the plaintiffs continued their occupation and, although requested to do so
several times, did not remove their scrap. When the defendants were granted the
contract by the Crown for the excavation work to be done on the site, they used
a bulldozer to push the scrap for a distance of 35 feet. The plaintiff's
action, claiming damages for alleged wrongful removal of the scrap, was
dismissed by the trial judge. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of
Appeal.
Held: The action should be dismissed.
In an action based on s. 1053 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff
has to show that a delict or a quasi-delict was committed, that it was
imputable to the defendant, and that it resulted in damages for the plaintiff.
The defendants, in this case, were not guilty of any fault. In any event, the
plaintiffs could not succeed as they have failed to discharge the burden placed
upon them of establishing that they sustained any damage. What was done to the
scrap did not in any way depreciate its value.
The proposition that because the defendants were acting under
the orders of the Crown, they could not be held liable, was not sound. If a
delict or a quasi-delict is committed, its authors cannot escape liability on
the mere ground that they acted under orders of their principals. Desrosiers
v. The King, 60 S.C.R. 105. Moreover, the defendants were not the
mandataries of the Crown.
Even if it were assumed that the plaintiffs were monthly
tenants of the Crown, which is not conceded, they would not be entitled to
claim from the defendants, who were not the lessors, damages which they have
not proven.
[Page 398]
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench,
Appeal Side, Province of Quebec, affirming a judgment of Fortier J. Appeal
dismissed.
R. Quain, Q.C., and H. Quoin, for the
plaintiffs, appellants.
Honourable R. Pinard, for the defendants,
respondents.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
Taschereau J.:—The
plaintiffs, who carry on business under the name of Hull Pipe and Machinery
Company, claim from the respondents the sum of $33,540. They allege that during
September 1949, the respondents wrongfully removed with the use of bulldozers,
some scrap steel, iron, airplane parts, brass fittings, etc., belonging to
them, from a certain piece of land situated in the City of Hull and caused them
the damages which they claim.
It appears that for some months previous to March 1947, the
appellants were the tenants of this land belonging to the City of Hull, and to
whom a monthly rental of $15 was paid. In March 1947, the Federal Government
started proceedings in expropriation, and acquired full ownership of these lots
for the purpose of erecting the Printing Bureau.
The appellants nevertheless continued their occupation of
the land, did not remove their scrap, although requested to do so several
times, and particularly by a letter addressed to them by the City of Hull on
April 2, 1948, by telegrams of the Chief Architect of the Department of Public
Works, and finally by a formal notice sent by the Secretary of the same
Department on August 23, 1949.
In the meantime, the Department of Public Works had asked
tenders for the excavation to be done on the site of the Printing Bureau, and
as the respondents' tender was accepted, they were authorized to proceed with
their work on August 30, 1949. As the appellants still persisted in not
removing their scrap, thus preventing the excavation work to be proceeded with,
it was decided after consultation between the Department and the respondents,
that the latter would remove it, which was done during the middle of September
with the use of a bulldozer. The operation
[Page 399]
merely consisted in pushing all the scrap metal for a
distance of 30 to 35 feet, and letting it lie on the ground, near a fence, so
that the excavation work could be started without delay.
It is because this cleaning operation was performed that the
plaintiffs claim $33,540. The action was dismissed by the learned trial judge
and his judgment was unanimously confirmed by the Court of Queen's Bench.
I agree with the conclusions of both Courts.
The action is based on s. 1053 of the Civil Code of the
Province of Quebec, and the plaintiffs have therefore to show that a delict or
a quasi-delict was committed, that it was imputable to the defendants and that
as a result of their wrongful act, the appellants suffered damages.
Respondents were not guilty of any fault, but in any event,
the appeal must be dismissed on the ground, that the appellants, whose burden
it was to do so, have not established that they sustained any damage. The mere
pushing of the metal, near the fence, for a distance of approximately 35 feet,
did not in any way depreciate the value of this scrap. The only possible claim,
if any exists, is for the cost of removing it, now that it is mixed with mud
and sand, but no evidence whatever has been adduced to show what that excess
cost would amount to.
The appellants tried to establish that at a later date, the
respondents have again removed this scrap metal, as a result of which
operation, they could not salvage any. They have totally failed on that point,
as found by the trial judge and. the Court of Queen's Bench1. In
fact the appellants admit that they could not hope to have this Court reverse
these concurrent findings.
I must state, however, that I do not agree with the
reasoning of the learned trial judge that as the respondents were acting under
the orders and instructions of the Crown, represented by the Chief Architect of
the Department of Public Works, when they removed the material, they cannot be
held liable. I do not think that this proposition
[Page 400]
is sound. If a delict or a quasi-delict is committed, its
authors cannot escape liability on the mere ground that they acted under the
orders of their principals.
The following "considérant" appears in the
judgment of the trial judge:
CONSIDERING that defendants, in executing their contract for
said excavation, became in a certain manner towards third parties mandatary of
the Crown in virtue of a tacit mandate, and as such if acting within limits of
their contract, in good faith, they could not be held responsible in place of
the Crown their mandator.
This sweeping proposition concerning the respective
liability of mandators and mandataries towards third parties does not state the
law as it exists in the Province of Quebec, and a careful reading of arts. 1716
and 1727 C.C., and of what has been said in this Court in Desrosiers v. The
King will show the inaccuracy of this
statement. Moreover, the trial judge errs, when he assumes that the respondents
in the present case were the mandataries of the Crown. There remains to be
noted that the trial judge referred to proceedings taken by the appellants
against Her Majesty the Queen in the Exchequer Court. This can have no bearing
on the issues in the present action.
Finally, the appellants argued that for the months of July,
August and September 1949, they paid the monthly rent of $15 to the Canadian
Government and that, therefore, having become monthly tenants of the Crown,
they could not be evicted in such a summary manner. Even assuming that they
were monthly tenants of the Crown, which is not conceded, this does not entitle
them to claim from the respondents, who were not the lessors, any amount for
damages which they have not proven.
The appeal fails and should be dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Attorneys for the plaintiffs, appellants: Quain
& Quain, Ottawa.
Attorneys for the defendants, respondents: Pinard,
Pare & Pigeon, Montreal.