Supreme Court of Canada
Moshos et al. v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration,
[1969] S.C.R. 886
Date: 1969-06-26
Smaro (Smaroula)
Moshos and minor children, Sultana and Panagiotis Appellants;
and
The Minister of
Manpower and Immigration Respondent.
1969: June 2, 26.
Present: Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Hall and
Spence JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE IMMIGRATION APPEAL BOARD
Immigration—Non-immigrant taking employment
without permission—Deportation order—Wife and children included in deportation
order—Wife not given opportunity to establish that she and her children should
not have been so included—Order not validly made with respect to wife and
children—Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 325, ss. 23, 37(1)—Immigration
Regulations, s. 34(3)(e)—Immigration Inquiries Regulations, s. 11.
The appellant’s husband entered Canada as a
non-immigrant, and, while his application for permanent admission was pending,
took employment without permission, contrary to the Immigration Regulations and
in spite of the following endorsement on his passport: “not
[Page 887]
permitted to take employment in Canada”. The
appellant and her two children entered Canada as non-immigrants some four
months after the husband had entered. She applied for permanent residence but
never received any advice as to the disposition of her application. At an
inquiry held by a special inquiry officer following a report made by an
immigration officer concerning her husband, the appellant was called as a
witness. Before her evidence was given, the special inquiry officer read the
provisions of s. 37(1) of the Immigration Act to her and told her
that should a deportation order be issued against her husband, she and her two
children could be included in that order. A deportation order was subsequently
made against the husband, the appellant and the two children. The Immigration
Appeal Board affirmed the deportation order. The appellant was granted leave to
appeal to this Court.
Held: The
appeal should be allowed and the deportation order, in so far as it relates to
the wife and children, should be set aside.
The deportation order, as against the
appellant and the two children, was not valid because of the failure of the
special inquiry officer to comply with s. 11 of the Immigration
Inquiries Regulations which provides that no person shall be included in a
deportation order unless the person has first been given an opportunity of
establishing to an immigration officer that she should not be so included. What
took place between the special inquiry officer and the appellant when she
appeared as a witness at the inquiry was not sufficient compliance with that
section. At no point was she told that she had the right to an opportunity to
establish that she should not be included in the order.
Immigration—Non-immigrant acceptant sans
permission un emploi—Ordonnance d’expulsion—Épouse et enfants inclus dans
l’ordonnance—Aucune occasion fournie à l’épouse de prouver qu’elle et ses
enfants ne doivent pas être inclus—Invalidité de l’ordonnance quant à l’épouse
et les enfants—Loi sur l’immigration, S.R.C. 1952, c. 325, art. 23,
37(1)—Règlements sur l’immigration, art. 34(3)(e)—Règlements sur les
enquêtes de l’immigration, art. 11.
Le mari de l’appelante est entré au Canada à
titre de non-immigrant, et, alors que sa demande pour y résider en permanence
était en suspens, il a accepté sans permission un emploi, contrairement aux Règlements
sur l’immigration et malgré que son passeport spécifiait qu’il ne lui était
pas permis d’accepter de l’emploi au Canada. Quelque quatre mois après l’entrée
du mari, l’appelante et ses deux enfants sont entrés au Canada à titre de non‑immigrants.
L’appelante a présenté une demande pour y résider en permanence mais n’a jamais
été avisée du résultat de cette demande. Au cours d’une enquête tenue par un
enquêteur spécial à la suite d’un rapport fait au sujet de son mari par un
fonctionnaire à l’immigration, l’appelante a été appelée comme témoin. Avant
d’entendre son témoignage, l’enquêteur spécial lui a lu les dispositions de
l’art. 37(1) de la Loi sur l’immigration et lui a dit que si une
ordonnance d’expulsion était rendue contre son mari, elle et ses deux enfants
pourraient être inclus dans cette ordonnance. Subséquemment une ordonnance
d’expulsion a été rendue contre le mari, l’appelante et les deux enfants. La
Commission d’appel de l’immigration a confirmé l’ordonnance. L’appelante a
obtenu la permission d’appeler à cette Cour.
[Page 888]
Arrêt: L’appel
doit être accueilli et l’ordonnance d’expulsion, dans la mesure où elle vise
l’épouse et les enfants, doit être mise de côté.
L’ordonnance d’expulsion contre l’appelante
et les deux enfants est invalide à cause du défaut de l’enquêteur spécial de se
conformer à l’art. 11 des Règlements sur les enquêtes de l’immigration qui
stipule que nulle personne ne sera incluse dans une ordonnance d’expulsion sans
avoir eu d’abord l’occasion de prouver à un fonctionnaire de l’immigration
qu’elle ne doit pas y être incluse. Ce qui s’est passé à l’enquête entre
l’enquêteur spécial et l’appelante lorsque celle-ci a témoigné ne peut pas être
considéré comme étant suffisamment en conformité avec les dispositions de cet
article. On ne lui a jamais dit qu’elle avait droit qu’on lui fournisse
l’occasion de prouver qu’elle ne devait pas être incluse dans l’ordonnance.
APPEL d’une décision de la Commission d’appel
de l’immigration confirmant une ordonnance d’expulsion. Appel accueilli.
APPEAL from a decision of the Immigration
Appeal Board affirming a deportation order. Appeal allowed.
N.A. Endicott, for the appellants.
A. Garneau, for the respondent.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
MARTLAND J.:—This is an appeal, with leave of
this Court, from a decision of the Immigration Appeal Board, which dismissed
the appeal of the appellant, and of her two children, from a deportation order
made by a Special Inquiry Officer, on December 6, 1968, which included them in
the order made against the appellant’s husband, John Moshos.
John Moshos, who was born in Greece on December
1, 1936, is a naturalized citizen of Australia, to which country he had
emigrated when he was eighteen years old. He married the appellant in Australia
in 1959. She was also born in Greece and is an Australian citizen. Their two
infant children were born in Australia.
Early in 1966 he returned to Greece, his wife having
preceded him, as her mother was not well. While in Greece he decided to travel
to Canada. He completed an application for permanent admission to Canada, while
he was in Greece, but says he did not receive a letter of refusal. He says that
he was advised by an immigration officer, in
[Page 889]
Athens, that, as a British subject and an
Australian citizen, he could go to Canada as a tourist, and apply, in Canada,
for permanent admission.
He entered Canada on November 22, 1967, as a
non-immigrant. He had about $1,500. He applied for permanent admission on
January 2, 1968. His passport was endorsed “not permitted to take employment in
Canada”.
The appellant and the two children entered
Canada on March 9, 1968, as non-immigrants. She applied on March 19 for
permanent residence and was interviewed by the immigration authorities on April
19. She has never received any advice as to the disposition of this
application. Her trade is that of a carpet weaver, at which she had worked for
five or six years in Australia, except for the times she could not work because
of her pregnancies.
The husband’s finances were not sufficient to
enable him to support his wife and children without earning an income. He says
that he applied to the immigration authorities for permission to work on three
occasions, but received no reply to his request. Finally, he had to take
employment, without permission.
On August 13, 1968, an immigration officer made
a report concerning the husband, pursuant to s. 23 of the Immigration
Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 325, and on December 6, 1968, an inquiry was held by a
Special Inquiry Officer, as required by the Act as a result of that report.
The appellant was called as a witness by the
Special Inquiry Officer. She was not present while her husband was testifying.
After being sworn, and before her evidence was given, the following occurred:
BY: Special Inquiry Officer to Witness:
Q. Mrs. Moshos, do you speak English
as well as your husband, or do you have difficulty?
A. I speak a little.
I would like to remind you that if you do
not understand any of the questions that I ask you, we have an interpreter
here, Mrs. Daskalakis, and will have her translate the questions into
Greek before you answer them if you are not absolutely sure.
Q. What is your correct name, in full?
A. Roula Moshos.
Q. What was your maiden name?
A. Chrisostomou.
Q. Are you the wife of John Moshos
concerning whom this Inquiry is being held?
A. Yes.
[Page 890]
Mrs. Moshos, subsection (1) of
section 37 of the Immigration Act reads as follows:
“Where a deportation order is made against
the head of the family, all dependent members of the family may be included in
such order and deported under it”.
BY: Counsel (who was Mr. Amourgis):
At this particular point I would like to
make a submission to you sir that it not be interpreted by you or anyone else
that I am appearing on behalf of this witness and I have come here only for the
purpose of defending the rights of Mr. John Moshos so as an amicus curiae
I would like to make the following submission that this particular lady might
want to retain a lawyer to protect her rights in the event some of the facts
used in this inquiry be used at a much later date against her. On her behalf I
take the liberty of asking the protection of the Canada Evidence Act for all
answers she might give in this inquiry that will tend to incriminate her or be
used against her at any later proceedings. If this witness is brought on behalf
of the Immigration Department, I, as counsel, to John Moshos reserve my right
to cross examine her on the evidence she might give pertaining to my client’s
inquiry. Thank you.
BY: Special Inquiry Officer to Witness:
In view of this section of the
Regulations, in the event a deportation order is issued against your husband it
may be necessary on the basis of the evidence that we wish you to give now to
include you and the children in such deportation order.
Q. Do you understand that?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. As your husband’s counsel has pointed
out, he is not prepared to act for you and you do have the right to be
represented by counsel yourself. Do you wish to secure counsel?
A. Yes, Mr. Amourgis.
Q. Mr. Amourgis is not prepared to
accept you as a client at this time?
A. Why, I have to get a lawyer.
Q. Do you wish to secure other counsel
before giving evidence?
A. No, I do not want a lawyer.
Q. In the event Mr. Amourgis is not
prepared to act as counsel, do you wish to proceed with the giving of evidence
without counsel?
A. Yes.
Following the inquiry, a deportation order was
made against the husband, the appellant and the two children. The basic ground
for the deportation order against the husband was that he had taken employment,
without the written approval of an officer of the Department, contrary to
s. 34(3) (e) of the Immigration Regulations.
Section 34(3) of the Regulations reads as
follows:
34. (3) Notwithstanding section 28, an
applicant in Canada who (a) if outside Canada would be an independent
applicant; and
[Page 891]
(b) is not in possession of
an immigrant visa or letter of pre-examination but, in the opinion of an
immigraton officer, would on application be issued a visa or letter of
pre-examination if outside Canada;
may be admitted to Canada for permanent
residence if
(c) he complies with the
requirements of the Act and these Regulations;
(d) he makes application in
the form prescribed by the Minister before the expiration of the period of
temporary stay in Canada authorized for him by an immigration officer;
(e) he has not taken employment in
Canada without the written approval of an officer of the Department; and
(f) in the opinion of an immigration
officer, he would have been admitted to Canada for permanent residence if he
had been examined outside Canada as an independent applicant and assessed in
accordance with the norms set out in Schedule A, except with respect to
arranged employment.
With respect to the appellant and the children
the deportation order was based upon s. 37(1) of the Act which provides:
37. (1) Where a deportation order is made
against the head of a family, all dependent members of the family may be
included in such order and deported under it.
Both the husband and the appellant appealed,
without success, to the Immigration Appeal Board. The appellant appeals to this
Court from the Board’s decision.
An appeal to this Court is limited, by
s. 23 of the Immigration Appeal Board Act, 1966-67 (Can.), c. 90,
to a question of law, including a question of jurisdiction. In my opinion the
deportation order, as against the appellant and the two children, was not valid
because of the failure of the Special Inquiry Officer to comply with s. 11
of the Immigration Inquiries Regulations. That section provides as
follows:
11. No person shall, pursuant to
subsection (1) of section 37 of the Act, be included in a deportation
order unless the person has first been given an opportunity of establishing to
an immigration officer that he should not be so included.
I have already quoted that which took place
between the Special Inquiry Officer and the appellant when she appeared as a
witness at the inquiry. In my opinion there was not a sufficient compliance
with this section. The appellant’s status at that inquiry was as a witness in
an inquiry concerning John Moshos. She was not there throughout the inquiry.
It is true that the Special Inquiry Officer read
the provisions of s. 37(1) to her and told her that “in view of this
[Page 892]
section of the Regulations (sic), in the
event a deportation order is issued against your husband it may be necessary on
the basis of the evidence that we wish you to give now to include you and the
children in such deportation order” He also asked her if she wished to secure
counsel “before giving evidence”. He then proceeded to question her.
However, at no point was she told that she had
the right to an opportunity to establish that she should not be included in the
order. I do not regard the mere reading of s. 37(1) to her, when she was
on the stand as a witness, followed by questioning by the Special Inquiry
Officer, as constituting the giving of such an opportunity.
In my opinion the deportation order was made
against the appellant and the children without complying with s. 11 of the
Immigration Inquiries Regulations. In view of this conclusion, it is
unnecessary to consider the other grounds of appeal submitted on behalf of the
appellants.
The appeal should, therefore, be allowed and the
deportation order, in so far as it relates to the appellant and the children,
should be set aside.
Appeal allowed.
Solicitors for the appellant: Endicott
& Rothman, Toronto.
Solicitor for the respondent: D.S.
Maxwell, Ottawa.