Supreme Court of Canada
Wood v. Minister of National Revenue, [1968] S.C.R.
957
Date: 1968-10-07
J. Harold Wood Petitioner;
and
The Minister of
National Revenue Respondent.
1968: October 4; 1968: October 7.
Present: Pigeon J. in Chambers.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
Appeals—Jurisdiction—Application for leave
to appeal—Desirability that application be brought promptly—Duty of respondent
to move to quash when application for leave not made—Costs denied—Exchequer
Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 98, ss. 82, 88.
Taxation—Income tax—Income or capital
gain—Mortgage acquired, at a discount—Whether amount of discount collected at
maturity income—Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 48, s. 8.
The applicant was assessed for income tax in
1962 on $700, being the amount of a discount he collected on a mortgage at
maturity. The Tax Appeal Board and the Exchequer Court upheld the assessment,
but the two tribunals did not agree as to the basis on which the $700 should be
considered as income. The applicant filed an appeal to this Court although the
amount in controversy, the tax on $700, was less than $500. The Minister did
not object. Subsequently, the applicant gave notice than an application for
leave to appeal would be made when the appeal came on for hearing. The
application for leave was argued in Chambers before the hearing of the appeal
and was opposed by the Minister.
Held: Leave to
appeal should be granted.
In view of the importance of the question of
law involved, it was desirable that it should be reviewed by this Court.
Although this Court sometimes under special
circumstances gives leave to appeal at the time an appeal is heard, it is very
inconvenient and highly undesirable that applications for leave should be made
at such a late date. Also, when a case is inscribed without jurisdiction, it is
the duty of the respondent to move to quash if the appellant does not move for
special leave. No costs allowed to either party on the
application.
Appel—Juridiction—Requête pour permission
d’appeler—Doit être présentée promptement—L’intimé a le devoir de demander le
rejet de l’appel si une requête pour permission d’appeler n’est pas
présentée—Dépens refusés—Loi sur la Cour de l’Échiquier, S.R.C. 1952, c. 98,
art. 82, 88.
Revenu—Impôt sur le revenu—Revenu ou gain en
capital—Hypothèque acquise à escompte—Le montant de l’escompte perçu à
l’échéance est-il un revenu—Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu, S.R.C. 1952, c. 48,
art. 3.
[Page 958]
Le Ministre a cotisé le requérant pour impôt sur
le revenu en 1962 sur $700, montant d’un escompte perçu lors de l’échéance
d’une hypothèque. La Commission d’appel de l’impôt et la Cour de l’Échiquier
ont maintenu la cotisation, mais les deux tribunaux n’ont pas été, d’accord
quant au motif de considérer comme revenu cette somme de $700. Le requérant en
a appelé à cette Cour quoique le montant en litige, l’impôt sur les $700, fût
moins de $500. Le Ministre n’a pas objecté. Subséquemment, le requérant a donné
avis qu’il présenterait une requête pour permission d’appeler le jour de
l’audition de l’appel. La requête pour permission d’appeler a été plaidée en
Chambre avant l’audition de l’appel et le Ministre a fait opposition.
Arrêt: La permission
d’appeler doit être accordée.
Vu l’importance de la question de droit qui se
présente dans cette cause, il est souhaitable qu’elle soit examinée par la
Cour.
Quoiqu’il arrive que cette Cour, dans des
circonstances spéciales, donne la permisison d’appeler à l’audition d’un appel,
la présentation d’une requête pour permission d’appeler à une date si tardive
cause de grands inconvénients et est à éviter. De plus, lorsqu’une cause est
inscrite sans juridiction, l’intimé a le devoir de demander le rejet de l’appel
si l’appelant ne demande pas la permission d’appeler. Les frais de la requête
sont refusés aux deux parties.
REQUÊTE pour permission d’appeler d’un jugement
du Juge Gibson de la Cour de l’Échiquier du Canada, en matière d’impôt sur le revenu. Requête accordée.
APPLICATION for leave to appeal a judgment of
Gibson J. of the Exchequer Court of Canada1, in an income tax matter.
Application granted.
S. Fisher, for the petitioner.
G.W. Ainslie, for the respondent.
The following judgment was delivered by
PIGEON J.:—The appellant is a solicitor who,
over a period of years, acquired some 13 mortgages, usually at a
substantial discount. He was assessed for income tax in 1962 on $700 being the
amount of a discount on one of these mortgages that he collected at maturity in
that year.
Before the Tax Appeal Board, the assessment was
upheld on the finding, not that it was profit from a “business”, but that “it
was a quasi-bonus” and therefore “interest per se”
[Page 959]
In the Exchequer Court, Gibson J. did not wish
to pass on the soundness of that conclusion and did not choose (those are his
words) to make a finding that this was profit from a “business”. He expressly
founded his decision in favour of the Minister on the basis that this “was
income from a source within the meaning of the opening words of section 3
of the Income Tax Act”, adding:
as far as I know, there is no decision of this
Court or of the Supreme Court of Canada in which a question of this kind has
been resolved by deciding that such a discount was income from a “source”
within the meaning of the opining words of s. 3 of the Act, without
deciding whether it was income from any of the particular sources detailed in
s. 3 or elsewhere in the Act.
From this judgment, appellant filed an
inscription in appeal to this Court as of right without apparently realizing
that, due to the rate of tax applicable, the actual amount in controversy was
less than $500. Respondent also appears to have overlooked the point and did
not move to quash but, on the contrary, signed an agreement as to contents of
case and did not object to the appeal being inscribed for hearing at the last
term. Being No. 17 on the Ontario list, the case was not called before the
vacation. In June, however, appellant became aware of the doubtful jurisdiction
and, on June 13, gave to respondent a notice of motion supported by affidavit
which was filed the following day. This notice was “that an application will be
made to this Honourable Court or to a Judge of this Honourable Court on the day
when this appeal comes on for hearing for leave to appeal to this Honourable
Court, if such leave should be necessary,…”
The parties have now appeared before me and
argued the application before the case will be called. Counsel for the
respondent agrees that the amount in controversy is under $500 and is a “sum of
money payable to Her Majesty” within the meaning of para. (b) of
s. 83 of the Exchequer Cour Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 98, but otherwise
he opposes the application.
In view of the importance of the question of law
involved in the decision sought to be appealed from, I consider it desirable
that it should be reviewed by this Court and accordingly grant leave to appeal.
In doing so, I must point out that, although
this Court sometimes under special circumstances gives leave to appeal
[Page 960]
at the time an appeal is heard, it is very
inconvenient and highly undesirable that applications for leave should be made
at such a late date. Especially is this so when, as in this case, the
jurisdiction for granting leave is conferred not on the Court but on a judge.
The orderly disposition of the business of the Court requires that applications
for leave be brought promptly. Also, when a case is inscribed without
jurisdiction, it is respondent’s duty to move to quash if applicant does not
move for special leave.
Under the circumstances, there will be no costs
of the application to either party.
Application granted.
Solicitors for the petitioner: MacKenzie,
Wood & Goodchild, Toronto.
Solicitor for the respondent: D.S.
Maxwell, Ottawa.