Supreme Court of
Canada
A.G. of Canada v.
Brent, [1956] S.C.R. 318
Date: 1956-02-09
The Attorney General of
Canada (Plaintiff) Appellant;
and
Shirley Kathleen Brent (Defendant)
Respondent.
1956: February 8, 9.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR
ONTARIO.
Immigration—Habeas
corpus—Certiorari—Alien—Deportation order—Whether quashable—Whether
order-in-council making regulations, invalid—Delegation of authority—Jurisdiction
to review case—Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 325, ss. 39, 61—Immigration
Regulation 20(4).
S. 61 of the Immigration
Act (R.S.C. 1952, c. 325) authorizes the Governor in Council to make
regulations respecting the prohibiting or limiting of admission of persons by
reason of an enumerated list of matters.
[Page 319]
By Regulation
20(4), the Governor in Council enacted that admission is prohibited “where in
the opinion of a Special Inquiry Officer such person should not be admitted by
reason of” the same enumerated list of matters that are found in s. 61 of the
Act.
The respondent, a
citizen of the United States of America and who did not have a Canadian
domicile, was ordered deported by a special immigration officer as unsuitable
under this regulation. The respondent applied for a writ of habeas corpus with
certiorari in aid and also for an order by way of certiorari quashing the
deportation.
The judge of first
instance ordered her discharged from custody. In view of the decision of this
Court in Masella v. Langlais ([1955] S.C.R. 263), the Court of Appeal
for Ontario struck out the direction for the respondent’s discharge but quashed
the deportation order.
Held: Upon
appeal by leave of the Court of Appeal its order should be confirmed.
Regulation 20(4) is
invalid because there is no power, under s. 61 of the Immigration Act, in
the Governor in Council to delegate, as was done by this regulation, his
authority to immigration officers. In view of this invalidity, s. 39 of the Act
does not prevent the Court from exercising its jurisdiction by way of
certiorari and quashing the deportation order.
APPEAL from the
judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, quashing a deportation order.
D.W. Mundell, Q.C., J.S. Pickup, Q.C. and
L.A. Couture for the appellant.
F.A. Brewin, Q.C., and J.F. McCallum for
the respondent.
The judgment of the
Court was delivered by:—
THE CHIEF JUSTICE:—At
the conclusion of the argument on behalf of the appellant, this appeal was
dismissed with costs.
The respondent is a
citizen of the United States of America and has not a Canadian domicile. She
applied at the Immigration Station in Toronto for admission to Canada for
permanent residence where she was examined by an Inspector and referred to a
Special Immigration Officer. The latter made an order for her deportation and
her appeal to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration was dismissed. She
then applied for a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid
to determine the validity of the deportation order and also made application
for an order by way of certiorari quashing that order. Mr. Justice
Wilson,
[Page 320]
before whom the matter
came in the first instance, ordered her discharge from custody. In view of the
decision of this Court in Masella v. Langlais, the Court of Appeal for Ontario, since the appellant was not in custody,
amended the order of Wilson J. by striking out the direction for her discharge
but quashed the deportation order. By leave of the Court of Appeal, the
Attorney General of Canada appealed to this Court. It is sufficient to refer to
one of the reasons for which the Court of Appeal quashed the deportation order.
By s. 61 of The
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1952, 325:—
61. The Governor
in Council may make regulations for carrying into effect the purposes and
provisions of this Act and, without restricting the generality of the
foregoing, may make regulations respecting...
(g) the prohibiting or limiting of admission
of persons by reason of
(i) nationality,
citizenship, ethnic group, occupation, class or geographical area of origin,
(ii) peculiar
customs, habits, modes of life or methods of holding property,
(iii)
unsuitability having regard to the climatic, economic, social, industrial,
educational, labour, health or other conditions or requirements existing,
temporarily or otherwise, in Canada or in the area or country from or through
which such persons come to Canada, or
(iv) probable
inability to become readily assimilated or to assume the duties and
responsibilities of Canadian citizenship within a reasonable time after their
admission.
The relevant part of
the Order-in-Council purportedly passed in pursuance of this section is
paragraph (4) of Clause 20 which reads:—
(4) Subject to
the provisions of the Act and to these regulations, the admission to Canada of
any person is prohibited where in the opinion of a Special Inquiry Officer such
person should not be admitted by reason of
(a) the
peculiar customs, habits, modes of life or methods of holding property in his
country of birth or citizenship or in the country or place where he resided
prior to coming to Canada;
(b) his
unsuitability, having regard to the economic, social, industrial, educational,
labour, health or other conditions or requirements existing, temporarily or
otherwise, in Canada or in the area or country from or through which such
person comes to Canada, or
(c) his
probable inability to become readily assimilated or to assume the duties and
responsibilities of Canadian citizenship within a reasonable time after his
admission.
I agree with Mr.
Justice Aylesworth, speaking an behalf of the Court of Appeal, that Parliament
had in contemplation the enactment of such regulations relevant to the named
subject matters, or some of them, as in His Excellency-in-Council’s own opinion
were advisable and not a wide divergence of rules and opinions, everchanging
according to the individual notions of Immigration Officers and Special Inquiry
Officers. There is no power in the Governor General-in-Council to delegate his
authority to such officers.
S. 39 of the Act was relied upon by the appellant:—
39. No court and
no judge or officer thereof has jurisdiction to review, quash, reverse,
restrain or otherwise interfere with any proceeding, decision or order of the
Minister, Deputy Minister, Director, Immigration Appeal Board, Special Inquiry
Officer or immigration officer had, made or given under the authority and in
accordance with the provisions of this Act relating to the detention or
deportation of any person, upon any ground whatsoever, unless such person is a
Canadian citizen or has Canadian domicile.
However, the order of
deportation of the Special Inquiry Officer was not “had, made or given under
the authority and in accordance with the provisions of this Act” because the
regulation relied upon is invalid and the section, therefore, does not prevent
the Court from exercising its jurisdiction by way of certiorari and
quashing the deportation order.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Solicitor for the appellant: F.P. Varcoe.
Solicitor for the respondent: F.A. Brewin.
[1955] O.R. 480; 3 D.L.R.
587.
[1955] O.R. 480; 3 D.L.R.
587.