Supreme Court of Canada
La Compagnie Electrique Dorchester v. Roy, (1914) 49
S.C.R. 344
Date: 1914-02-23
La Compagnie Electrique Dorchester (Dependants) Appellants;
and
Hesiode Roy
(Plaintiff) Respondent.
1913: November 13; 1914: February 23.
Present: Davies, Idington, Duff, Anglin and
Brodeur JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH,
APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.
Rivers and streams—Industrial
improvements—Penning back waters —Permanent works—Damages—Measure of
damages—Expertise —Arbitration—Reparation—Loss of water-power—Future
damages—Compensation once for all—Right of action—Practice— Statute, R.S.Q.,
1909, arts. 7295, 7296.
Per Davies,
Duff and Brodeur JJ., Idington and Anglin JJ. contra.— In an action for
damages occasioned by constructions in a stream for industrial purposes the
plaintiff is entitled, under the provisions of article 7295 of the Revised
Statutes of Quebec, 1909, to recover the full extent of damages which experts
acting under article 7296, R.S.Q., 1909, would have authority to award as
compensation, once for all, for the injuries sustained. Breakey v. Carter
(Cass. Dig. (2 ed.) 463) and Gale v. Bureau (44 Can. S.C.R.
312), referred to.
By the judgment appealed from it was held
that the plaintiff was entitled to reparation for loss incurred in respect of
the diminution in value of his water-power and the adjoining property on
account of the construction of the works in question.
Held, affirming
the judgment appealed from (Q.R. 22 K.B. 265), Idington and Anglin JJ.
dissenting, that the plaintiff was entitled to reparation for such injuries.
Per Idington
and Anglin JJ.—As it was apparent
that the defendants could operate their works in such a manner as to avoid, or
diminish, the inconveniences occasioned therebyj it would not be proper, in
such an action, to include possible future losses in assessing the damages to
be given as compensation for the injuries complained of. Montreal Street
Railway Co. v. Boudreau (36 Can. S.C.R. 329); Chanbly
Manufacturing Co. v. Willett (34 Can. S.C.R. 502); and Backhouse v.
Bonomi (9 H.L. Cas. 503), referred to.
[Page 345]
Per Davies,
Anglin and Brodeur JJ.—Where no effective steps have been taken by the party
from whom damages are claimed to have the damages resulting from improvements
constructed in a stream ascertained by an expertise, in the manner provided by
article 7296, R.S.Q., 1909, he cannot set up a mere proposal of such an
arbitration as an exception to an action against him to recover compensation.
Per Duff J.—The defendants not having taken steps
under the statute for several months, and not having shewn that they were in
fact ready and willing to proceed under the statute, the action lies.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of
King’s Bench, appeal side,
which varied the judgment of McCorkill J., in the Superior Court for the
District of Quebec,
by increasing the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff was the owner of a mill driven
by water-power, on the River Etchemin, near the site of which the company,
defendants, erected a dam in connection with a power-house which they were
constructing on the same stream a short distance below the plaintiff’s mill.
The dam was of a permanent character and had the effect of penning back the
water, raising its level and flooding the tail-race of plaintiff’s mill to such
an extent that his mill-wheels were drowned. Another effect of the dam was to
make still water where previously there had been a rapid, that ice formed in
the pond so created and, when it came out in freshets, the ice carried away the
plaintiff’s mill. For all these injuries the plaintiff sued to recover $6,000
damages and, at the trial, McCorkill J. assessed the damages at $1,070, being
for the actual losses incurred up to the time of action, less f 110 for some of
the machinery which had been saved, and recourse
[Page 346]
was reserved to the plaintiff to bring
further actions for any damages happening subsequently. Both parties appealed
and, by the judgment now appealed from, the Court of King’s Bench dismissed the
appeal taken by the company and allowed that of the plaintiff by increasing his
damages to $3,685 in consideration of the diminished value of the plaintiff’s
water-power and adjoining property.
The questions in issue on the present appeal
are stated in the judgments now reported.
L. A. Cannon K.C. for the appellants.
Eusèbe Belleau K.C. for the respondent.
Davies J.—The trial judge did not grant damages once for all because he
felt himself concluded from doing so by the decision of this court in Gale v.
Bureau.
I do not think, however, that that case decided that point absolutely. There
are obviously many cases in which future damages may or may not arise and which
may or may not be foreseen or capable of toeing estimated at the time action is
brought or proceedings begun under the statute to fix them. In all such cases
recourse may be reserved for future damages. But with respect to damages which
have been incurred and which are capable of being estimated when action is
brought or proceedings taken under the statute to estimate them I see no reason
whatever why they should not be estimated and determined.
With respect to the value of the water-power of
the plaintiff which the trial judge did not include in his
[Page 347]
judgment, because he thought it was a
subject-matter for future damages which the authorities prohibited him from
considering, I cannot see why such value may not now be estimated as well as
later.
It is found as a fact by both courts that the
plaintiff’s mill has been destroyed and his water-power had ceased to be a
water-power—as such it has been destroyed. The defendant does not plead that
the dam erected by him which caused this destruction was a temporary
construction or other than a permanency. In the absence of any such plea we
must hold it to be intended as a permanent work. If the plaintiff is not now
entitled to be compensated for the loss of this water-power, when will his
future right to such compensation arise? A reservation of future rights in such
a case would be an illusory one. He has, in my opinion, under the circumstances
a right to damages as well for the destruction of his water-power as for the
destruction of his mill. The assessment of damages made by the court of appeal,
on the basis of the plaintiff being entitled to such damages once for all, I
see no reason to quarrel with.
On the other question as to the right of the
plaintiff to take proceedings for the recovery of the damages in the courts,
without resorting to the method prescribed by the statute, I am of opinion that
we are bound by the authorities to hold that the statute does not take away the
common law right of the party damnified to sue unless at any rate proceedings
had been properly commenced and prosecuted under the statute for the assessment
of the damages.
I do not think the letter written to the
plaintiff in this case before suit began constituted such a valid commencement
of proceedings under the statute. It
[Page 348]
was, no doubt, an invitation to the plaintiff to
name an arbitrator under the statute, but that was all and such a mere
invitation without the naming of an arbitrator by the party himself making it
cannot be held to constitute a valid commencement of proceedings.
I would dismiss the appeal.
Idington J. (dissenting).—It seems to me that to allow damages based on the
supposition that the respondent’s water-power has been permanently taken away,
is contrary to the law as laid down in the judgment of this court in the case
of Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Boudreau, which I think should be
followed.
It was and is quite competent for the appellant
to so lower its dam as to avert future damages.
Of course, if the appellant chose to avail
himself of the statutory provisions for assessing damages what is allowed here
might well be proper measure of such.
But in an action even where the right to assess
damages is provided by arbitration under a statute that does not necessarily
determine same measure of damages in each case.
The appellant being liable for actions from day
to day we ought not in this case to depart from the law so laid down and add to
the confusion that prevailed before that case.
The appeal should be allowed with costs.
Duff J.—The respondent was the proprietor of a mill situate on the River
Etchemin worked by the
[Page 349]
direct application of water-power derived from
the river. The appellant company, at a place below the respondent’s mill,
erected a dam, for the purpose also of obtaining water-power for working its
plant. The respondent’s mill was carried away by a freshet in April, 1911, and
it was charged by the respondent and has been held by the courts below that
this was due to the presence of the appellant’s dam. It has also been found as
a fact that the effect of erecting the dam was to raise the level of the river
to such an extent as to submerge the respondent’s turbines and permanently to
diminish the head of water available for the working of his mill. The learned
trial judge held that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation in respect of
the injury proved to have been suffered by him down to the time of the
commencement of the action—such damages comprising the value of the mill swept
away and loss of profits arising, first from the diminished efficiency, and
afterwards from the destruction of the mill. The court of appeal held that the
plaintiff was entitled to reparation not only in respect to the damages
mentioned, but also for loss in respect of the diminution in the value of
respondent’s land by reason of interference with his water-power. Two questions
arise: First: Can compensation for such loss be awarded? and, Secondly:
Whether, by reason of certain proposals made by the appellant’s solicitors,
prior to the commencement of the action, the action ought to be entirely
dismissed?
The appellant’s dam was; erected and worked
under the authority of article 7295 of the Revised Statutes of Quebec of 1909.
That article and the succeeding article 7296 are as follows:—
[Page 350]
7295. Every proprietor of land may improve
any water-course bordering upon, running along or passing across his property,
and may turn the same to account by the construction of mills, manufactories,
works and machinery of all kinds, and for this purpose may erect and construct
in and about such water-course, all the works necessary for its efficient
working, such as flood-gates, flumes, embankments, dams, dykes and the like.
7296. (1) The proprietors or lessees of any
such works are liable for all damages resulting therefrom to any person,
whether by excessive elevation of the flood-gates or otherwise.
(2) Such damages shall be ascertained by
experts to be appointed by the parties interested in the ordinary manner.
(3) In default of either of the said
parties appointing an expert, experts selected by the warden of the county
shall act; and, in case of difference of opinion, the two experts appointed
shall choose a third.
(4) The experts shall be sworn before a
justice of the peace faithfully to perform their duty as such.
(5) In assessing the damages and fixing the
compensation to be paid, the experts may, whenever proper, set off against the
whole or any part of such damages, any increased value which the property of
the claimant has acquired by reason of the erection of such works, mills,
manufactories or machinery.
(6) In default of payment of the damages
and indemnity so awarded, within six months from the date of the report of the
experts, together with legal interest to be computed from the said date, the
party by whom the payment is due, shall demolish the works which he shall have
erected, or they shall be so demolished at his expense, upon judgment to that
effect rendered, the whole without prejudice, to the damages already incurred.
It was held by this court in Breakey v. Carter
(1), (I am quoting for convenience from my own judgment in Gale v. Bureau(2)):—
That the right given by article 7295, in so
far as it justified the penning back the waters of a stream upon the upper
riparian proprietors, is to be regarded as a right of servitude to which is
attached an obligation to indemnify the proprietor who is prejudiced by the
exercise of it.
It was also held in that case, and the decision on that
point was followed in Gale v. Bureau, that this statutory right
to reparation was one in respect
[Page 351]
of which the person damnified has recourse to
the courts as damage from time to time accrues notwithstanding the provisions
of article 7296. I think, moreover, that there is no satisfactory ground for
holding that (assuming an action to lie in the circumstances) the plaintiff
cannot recover in the action reparation once for all to the full extent to
which experts proceeding under the Act would be entitled to award him
compensation. I may add that I regard this action as a proceeding to recover
compensation under this statute; I decide nothing as to the rules of law by
which, apart from the statute, the measure of damages would be determined.
As to the second ground of appeal, I think that,
in the circumstances, the appellants were, at least, bound to shew that they
were in point of fact ready and willing to proceed under article 7296 and,
having regard to the delay that had already taken place, I agree with Mr.
Justice Cross that they have failed to do so.
Anglin J. (dissenting).—Two questions arise on this appeal—the first,
whether the plaintiff’s right of recourse to the courts is taken away by
article 7296, R.S.Q. 1909; the other, whether the plaintiff’s recovery should
be once for all, in respect of damages future as well as past, or should be
confined to damages already sustained.
No case was made for a review of the finding
that the appellants’ dam caused the injuries complained of. The quantum of the
damages awarded in the Superior Court, if they should be confined to injuries
already sustained, or of those awarded by the court of appeal,
[Page 352]
if they should be now allowed once for all, has
not been seriously attacked.
If the first of the two substantial questions
presented for determination, were res Integra, I should incline
to the view that the appellant’s contention upon it is well founded. By article
7295 certain works are authorized; by article 7296 the proprietor or lessee of
such works is required to pay “all damages resulting therefrom,” and it is
provided that “such damages shall be ascertained by experts, etc.” the
liability thus created would seem to be only for damages so ascertained. But it
has been held in a series of cases in the Province of Quebec (see Gale v.
Bureau,
at page 308), and by this court in Breakey v. Carter, followed in Gale v. Bureau,
that the jurisdiction of the courts is not ousted by these statutory
provisions. If, as Mr. Justice Cross appears to think, effective steps to
commence proceedings under article 7296, taken before action has been brought
in the courts, would oust the jurisdiction of the latter, I agree in his view that
it has not been established in the present case that such steps were so taken.
The appeal on this branch fails.
The second question presents a little more
difficulty. The decision of this court in Gale v. Bureau
does not appear to be decisive upon it. There is no suggestion made that the
structure of the defendants is not meant to be permanent or that the invasion
of the plaintiff’s rights was unintentional. In Gale v. Bureau
the defendant appears to have done what was complained of inadvertently (p.
311) and it was not his avowed intention to maintain the dam in such
[Page 353]
a way as to continue the flooding complained of
(p. 317). In the present case the appellants may so manage the gates of their
dam in future years that the water privileges of the respondents will not be
affected ] at all, or at least, not to the same extent as during the
period complained of.
I incline to think that the plaintiff did not in
his declaration claim to recover for permanent loss of his water-power. The
judgment awarding damages for that loss seems, therefore, to be ultra
petita, and, as such, in contravention of article 113, C.P.Q.
The case is not one of trespass. The appellants
were not wrong-doers in constructing the dam. They had statutory authority to
do so, subject to the condition that they should pay “all damages resulting
therefrom.” It is the resulting damages which constitute the cause of action
and they are recoverable when and as they occur. Chambly Mfg. Co. v. Willet; Montreal Street Railway
Company v. Boudreau.
The well-known principle of the decision in Backhouse v. Bonomi seems to be
applicable. Although the appellants have not exercised a right of
expropriation, yet it would appear to be within the purview of article 7296
that damages once for all may be awarded in the expertise for which it
provides. But I do not think that future damages are recoverable in an action
such as that now before us.
I would for these reasons allow this appeal to
the extent of restoring the judgment of the learned trial judge.
[Page 354]
Brodeur J.—Le demandeur intimé avait un moulin, sur la rivière Etchemin dans le
comté de Dorchester. Ce moulin était mû par un pouvoir d’eau et existait depuis
un grand nombre d’années. La compagnie appelante, en vertu de l’article 7295 des
Statutes Revisés de Québec, érigea dans l’automne de 1910 une digue à quelques
arpents plus bas de l’endroit où était le moulin en question.
Cette digue a eu pour effet de faire refluer l’eau
et de rendre absolument sans valeur le pouvoir d’eau qui alimentait le moulin
du demandeur.
De plus, la rivière, à cet endroit, ne gelait
presque jamais; mais, à raison de la construction de cette digue, l’eau est
devenue plus limpide, la glace s’est formée; et, au printemps de 1911, en se
dégageant, elle est venue frapper le moulin, l’a emporté et a causé de très
grands dommages. Le demandeur, à raison de cela, réclame une somme de $6,000
par son action instituée le 28 avril, 1911.
Vers le même temps où cette action était instituée,
mais avant qu’elle fût signifiée, la défenderesse appelante a, par lettres de
ses avocats, du 2 mai, 1911, invité le défendeur à faire évaluer ces dommages
par arbitres, suivant les dispositions des articles 7295 and 7296 des Statuts
Revisés de la province de Québec.
Le demandeur n’en a pas moins persisté dans son
action et, après enquête, la cour supérieure lui a accordé une somme de $1,070 pour les dommages jusqu’alors
encourus et lui a réservé sa réclamation pour les dommages futurs.
La première question qui se soulève est de savoir
si le demandeur pouvait procéder par action directe sans avoir ces dommages
déterminés par experts.
Cette question a déjà fait l’objet de nombreuses
[Page 355]
décisions devant les tribunaux et elle s’est
présentée devant cette cour dans une cause de Gale v. Bureau. II. a alors été décidé que
les dispositions de la loi statutaire n’empêchaient pas le recours par action
ordinaire.
La jurisprudence a d’abord hésité; mais elle est
maintenant bien établie. Il ne peut y avoir de doute que les personnes qui
souffrent à raison de l’érection de digues peuvent procéder par voie d’action
ordinaire. (1869) Biais v. Blais;
(1869) Nesbitt v. Bolduc;
Emond v. Gauthier;
(1879), Jean v. Gauthier;
(1878) Breakey v. Carter;
(1881) Proulx v. Tremblay;
(1898) Gie. de pulpe de Mégantic v. Village d’Agnes; (1906) Leclerc v. Dufault.
Quant aux dommages, je dois dire que la cour
d’appel a modifié le jugement de la cour supérieure et a condamné la compagnie
défenderesse à payer une somme de $3,685. L’appelante nous demande de rétablir
le jugement de la cour supérieure et de renverser celui de la cour d’appel.
Dans son action, le demandeur disait que la
construction de la digue avait eu pour effet de faire refluer l’eau sur sa
propriété, d’inonder son moulin, de noyer ses turbines et d’empêcher son
exploitation. Il ajoutait aussi que la crue des eaux occasionnée par la
chaussée et l’amas de glace qui en avait été la suite
[Page 356]
avaient détruit complètement la bâtisse où se
trouvait son moulin et il réclamait une somme de $6,000.
La cour supérieure a évalué les dommages, et a
accordé au demandeur la valeur du moulin détruit plus la perte que le demandeur
avait subie par le fait qu’il n’avait pas pu exploiter son moulin depuis
l’érection de la chaussée jusqu’au moment de l’institution de l’action; mais
elle ne lui a rien accordé pour la destruction de son pouvoir d’eau et pour
l’impossibilité où il va se trouver à l’avenir de pouvoir continuer son
exploitation.
La cour supérieure a réservé ces dommages pour
l’avenir; et l’honorable juge dans ses notes nous dit qu’il n’a pas accordé
tous ces dommages, vu la décision de Gale v.Bureau.
En lisant, en effet, la note qui se trouve en tête
de la décision on serait porté à croire qu’il a été décidé dans cette, cause
que les dommages qui seraient accordés ne devaient pas être des dommages
globaux mais des dommages annuels.
Dans cette action de Gale v. Bureau
le jugement avait accordé une somme annuelle et on disait que c’était là-une
illégalité. Le juge-en-chef de cette cour, se basant sur l’autorité de Sourdat,
décida que la cour avait parfaitement le droit d’accorder des annuités ou une
rente. Il n’a jamais été décidé dans cette cause que la cour ne pouvait pas
accorder une somme fixe une fois payée.
En effet, si nous consultons Sourdat, qui a été
mentionné dans le jugement de l’honorable juge-enrchef, vol. 1, No. 132 bis,
il dit ceci:—
Du principe que les tribunaux apprécient
souverainement le dommage et l’étendue de la réparation, il suit qu’ils peuvent
accorder soit une somme fixe une fois payée, soit une rente ou annuité.
[Page 357]
Et comme le dommage peut cesser ou se
restreindre dans un temps donné, ils peuvent également réduire Pindemnité dans
ces prévisions. Ainsi dans une affaire jugée par la Cour de Dijon, l’on a
maintenu la disposition d’un jugement qui allouait, à une femme dont le mari
avait été tué, une rente, avec condition que cette rente serait réduite de
moitié si la veuve convolait à un second mariage.
Ils peuvent encore limiter le service de la
rente à un certain temps, passé lequel il sera statué de nouveau, les droits du
plaignant étant ainsi réservés quant au préjudice qui se manifesterait
ultérieurement,
On a référé à la cause de Montréal Street
Railway v. Boudreau,
et on a dit que la décision dans cette cause ne justifie pas une indemnité
définitive.
Je crois que les deux cas ne sont pas analogues.
Dans la cause de Boudreau, le
caractère permanent des dommages ne pouvait pas être assumé par la manière dont
les travaux avaient été faits; au contraire, la cause de ces dommages pouvait
être facilement évitée. Et, à raison de cela, il n’a pas été jugé à propos
d’accorder des dommages globaux.
Il fait bon de mentionner le fait que la cour était
divisée sur cette question et que le juge-en-chef, Sir Elzéar Taschereau, et M.
le Juge Girouard étaient d’opinion qu’une indemnité définitive devait être
accordée, suivant en cela la décision de cette cour dans une cause de Gareau
v. Montreal Street Railway.
Nous sommes dans la présente cause en présence d’un
statut qui invite à régler définitivement cette question d’indemnité, vu qu’il
s’agit virtuellement de l’expropriation d’un droit dont jouissait le demandeur.
Or, en vertu de l’article 407 du Code Civil, l’exproprié a droit à une
indemnité juste et préalable. Cette indemnité doit couvrir tous les
dommages.
La compagnie défenderesse ne suggère pas dans ses
plaidoiries, ou dans ses prétentions, que la digue
[Page 358]
qu’elle a élevée n’est que temporaire. Au
contraire, cette digue a un caractère de permanence.
Le pouvoir d’eau dont le demandeur jouissait se
trouve détruit par le fait de cette digue. Le préjudice qu’il éprouve a donc un
caractère permanent et la suggestion que cet homme pourrait venir tous les ans
devant les tribunaux pour réclamer de la compagnie défenderesse le dommage
résultant du fait qu’il ne peut plus exploiter son moulin parait contraire à
l’idée que nous devons empêcher autant que possible la multiplicité des procès.
Mais on dit: Vous accordez alors des dommages
futurs.
Je ne crois pas que cela soit exact. Le dommage
peut être futur en ce sens qu’il se réalisera dans l’avenir par suite du fait
dommageable; mais à vrai dire le préjudice est actuel et il continuera à se
manifester. (Laurent, vol. 20, p. 570.)
Fuzier-Herman dans son code annoté sous l’art. 1382
nous rapporte aux nos. 116 et 117 un jugement de la cour de cassation au sujet
d’une mine dont les travaux d’exploitation avaient altéré les eaux d’une source
où il a été décidé
qu’il peut être alloué aux propriétaires
inférieurs à titre de dommages-intérêts au lieu d’une rente annuelle un capital
une fois payé, répondant à la fois à la perte déjà subie et à celle qui doit
être éprouvée.
L’appelante prétend que la cour d’appel a ajugé
au-delà des conclusions de l’action en indemnisant le demandeur intimé pour la
perte de son pouvoir d’eau.
Je vois au contraire dans la déclaration que le
demandeur allègue spécialement que la construction de la chaussée a eu pour
effet d’inonder ses moulins, de noyer ses turbines et l’a empêché de les
exploiter; et
[Page 359]
après avoir ensuite allégué la crue des eaux et
l’amas de glaces occasionnés par la chaussée, il demande une condamnation
contre l’appelante de $6,000 de
dommages. Ces allégations étaient certainement suffisantés pour justifier la
cour d’appel de faire l’évaluation de tous ces dommages et d’accorder $3,685.
Dans ces circonstances, je suis d’opinion que le
jugement de la cour d’appel est bien fondé et que l’appel doit être renvoyé
avec dépens.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Solicitors for the appellants: Taschereau,
Roy, Cannon & Fitzpatrick.
Solicitors for the respondent: Pelletier, Belleau, Bail largéon
& Belleau.
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