Montreal Tramways Co. v. Séguin, (1916) 52 SCR 644

Supreme Court of Canada

Montreal Tramways Co. v. Séguin, (1916) 52 S.C.R. 644

Date: 1916-02-01

The Montreal Tramways Company (Defendants) Appellants;

and

Mathilda Séguin (Plaintiff) Respondent.

1915: November 15; 1916: February 1.

Present: Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C.J. and Idington, Duff, Anglin and Brodeur JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT, SITTING IN REVIEW, AT MONTREAL.

Practice and procedure—Trial by jury—Personal wrongs—Appeal—Taking new objection—Art. 1056 C.C.—Arts. 421 et seq. C.P.Q.—"Lord Campbell's Act"—Charge to jury—Opinion on questions of fact.

Per curiam.—Where an order has been made for trial with a jury, according to the provisions of articles 422 et seq of the Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec, and both parties have acquiesced in that form of trial, objection to the right to trial by jury cannot be urged for the first time on an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

An action for damages, under article 1056 of the Civil Code, brought by dependents of a person whose death was caused in consequence of délit or quasi-délit is an action resulting from personal wrongs within the meaning of articles 421 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec in which there may be trial by jury. Fitzpatrick C.J. contra.

Per Fitzpatrick C.J., dissenting.—The right of action given to the dependents, under article 1056 of the Civil Code, is purely statutory, and not a representative right (see Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. ((1892) A.C. 481); consequently, the dependents, who have suffered no personal wrongs, are not entitled to trial by jury under the provisions of chapter 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec.

Per Idington, Duff and Anglin JJ.—In his charge to the jury, the judge is entitled to express his opinion on questions of fact if he does so in such a manner as will not lead the jury to think that they are being given a direction which it would be their duty to follow.

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APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court, sitting in review, at Montreal, affirming the judgment entered by Guerin J., upon the verdict of the jury at the trial in favour of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff brought the action, under article 1056 of the Civil Code, claiming damages on behalf of herself and as tutrix to her minor children, in consequence of the death of her husband, the father of the children, caused, as alleged, by the negligence of the defendants. By the judgment appealed from, on the verdict of the jury, damages were awarded for $3,100 to the widow and $1,000 to the children.

The questions in issue on the present appeal are stated in the judgments now reported.

Rinfret K.C. for the appellants.

Aylmer K.C. and Bissonnet K.C. for the respondent.

The Chief Justice (dissenting).—At first, I was inclined to think that the action might be said to be

for the recovery of damages resulting from the personal wrong done to the deceased.

But, on further consideration, I have come to the conclusion that the right of action in this case is purely statutory and, if so, the right to trial by jury would not exist.

The foundation of the right is article 1056 C.C., which gives an action for the damages occasioned by the death of the injured person to hie consort and his ascendant and descendant relations.

The "Quebec Act," 25 Geo. III., eh. 2, the provisions of which are now to be found in article 421 of the

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Code of Civil Procedure, gives the right to trial by jury only in certain enumerated cases amongst which are

actions for the recovery of damages resulting from personal wrongs.

By article 1056 of the Civil Code, where the person injured by the commission of an offence dies in consequence without having obtained indemnity or satisfaction, his consort has a right to recover from the person who committed the offence all damages occasioned by such death. The pecuniary loss caused by the death

is at once the basis of the action and the measure of damages.

The measure of damages is not the loss or suffering of the deceased, but the injury resulting from his death to the family, so that a jury, in assessing damages, cannot take into consideration the mental sufferings of the plaintiff in respect of bereavement. Blake v. Midland Railway Co. (1852)[1].

The Privy Council held in the case of Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co.[2], and in subsequent cases, that the right of action given by this article is an independent and personal and not, as under "Lord Campbell's Act," a representative right.

This right is a statutory one. No wrong has been done to one of those to whom the right of action is given for which any claim could be advanced were it not for the statute.

Speaking of "Lord Campbell's Act," Lord Selbourne said, in Seward v. The "Vera Cruz"[3] :—

The Act gives a new cause of action,

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and does not merely remove the operation of the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona, because the action is given in substance not to the person representing, in point of estate, the deceased man who would naturally represent him as to all his own rights of action which could survive, but to his wife and children, no doubt suing in point of person in the name of his executor. See also per Grive J. in Bradshaw v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. (1875)[4] ; Leggott v. Great Northern Railway Co. (1876)[5] ; Potter v. Metropolitan District Railway Co. (1874)[6] ; British Columbia Electric Railway Co. v. Gentile[7] ; British Columbia Electric Railway Co. v. Turner[8].

Such a statutory claim is not essentially dependent on any wrongdoing by the party made liable in damages. He may not have committed any wrong to the deceased or any wrong at all. As an instance of the latter, I may refer to section 298 of the "Railway Act," R.S.C. 1906, ch. 37.

The Privy Council in the case of Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Roy[9], held that the defendant having been guilty of no negligence, was not liable for setting a fire on lands adjoining the railway whilst exercising the rights conferred on it by the legislature.

Section 298 of the "Railway Act," however, expressly provides that notwithstanding a railway company may have been guilty of no negligence it shall

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be liable for any damages caused by a fire started by a railway locomotive to the extent of $5,000.

The provision in article 421 C.P.Q. does not include such cases of statutory actions and, however suitable we might consider it that such claims should be submitted to a jury, we cannot extend the privilege to a class of cases which is clearly beyond what the statute has authorized.

The damages which the deceased might have recovered during his life for the wrong done him, are different from those which his widow is entitled to recover under article 1056 C.C.; Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co,[10]. The legislature has provided by article 431 C.P.Q. for the assessment of the former by jury, but has made no similar provision for the latter.

There certainly has been a certain amount of practice in accordance with the course complained of; but that claims under article 1056 C.C. have frequently been tried with a jury is easily explained, when we remember that, until the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co.10, above referred to, it was thought that such actions were of a representative character and that the widow was authorized to sue in derogation of the legal maxim, "actio personalis moritur cum personâ."

Since the time when the nature of the action was established by the above decisions, it has not hitherto occurred to any one to notice that this difference removed the action out of the class of actions in which

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article 421 C.P.Q. gives an option of a trial by jury.

I would allow the appeal with costs.

Idington J.—I think the objections taken to the learned trial judge's charge, which it is to be observed were not taken at the trial, are untenable.

The objection that this is a case not triable by a jury comes rather late in view of the fact that appellants assented to that mode of trial, acquiesced in all that was done in that behalf, and only took the objections for the first time in the appellate court.

If there is in law anything in such objections, then in view of all that has transpired, it might well be urged that this is an appeal from a trial in and by a tribunal selected by the parties, and from whose judgment no appeal can lie to this court. See the cases of Attorney-General of Nova Scotia v. Gregory[11]; The Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Fleming[12]; Burgess v. Morton[13]; White v. Dnke of Buccleugh[14]; Craig v. Duffus[15]: Dudgeon and Martin v. Thomson and Patrick (1854)[16] ; Robin et al v. Hoby et al (1856)[17].

I am afraid the objection is rather late in another sense. The article of the Code as well as preceding legislation in same sense having been so long interpreted as giving the right of trial by jury in the class of cases to which this belongs makes it rather difficult for us now critically to examine the article and

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declare all that so done was the result of grave error of law. Besides we are asked to apply a mode of interpretation and construction which might have commended itself more readily to the courts of long ago when dealing in over refinements, than to us now.

The distinction counsel makes between the right of action a survivor passing through the ordeal of such an accident as in question would have and that given his representatives in case of his death, would have been looked on as very substantial at one time and is to be so yet in the proper application thereof; but, in these times when the point of view has changed so sadly to apply it as a necessary means of interpreting this article 422 C.P.Q. would be going far, and especially so under all the foregoing circumstances.

If, however, any one thinks the question worth raising, he should begin at the right stage and not try to do so after such acquiescence as exhibited herein.

I think the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Duff J.—There are two points argued by the appellants: First, that the learned trial judge misdirected the jury in expressing his opinion that the appellants' theory of the accident was not a reasonable one. The learned trial judge was entitled to express his opinion on the point so long as he did not lead the jury to think that he was giving them a direction it would be their duty to follow and it is quite clear that he did not err in this respect.

Secondly, it is argued that this was not a case for trial by jury under article 421 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 1056 of the Civil Code involves a

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declaration that the dependents entitled to compensation thereunder have an interest in the life of the member of their family standing to them in a relation entitling them to recover under that article. I can see no good reason for saying that this is not an action for damages arising from a personal wrong within the meaning of article 421 C.P.Q. If I had doubts upon the proper construction of article 421 C.P.Q. it would be too late now, I think, in view of the course of interpretation to adopt the construction proposed by the appellants.

Thirdly, an order directing trial by jury was made and the case was tried without objection. The objection comes too late. Pisani v. Attorney-General for Gibraltar[18].

Anglin J.—The appellant attacks the judgment against it on two grounds;—that there was misdirection by the learned trial judge, and that the right to trial by jury exists only in cases in which it has been specially provided for and that this is not such a case.

The alleged misdirection consisted in the expression by the learned trial judge in his charge to the jury of his own opinion upon the evidence on one point in the case. What is complained of the learned trial judge immediately followed by this statement:—

Now, I want you to remember that so far as any opinion of mine is concerned upon any of the facts I have mentioned, you are not bound to follow my opinion on any question of fact. You will determine those for yourselves, and if you find in the expression of my views anything with which you do not agree on a question of fact, you are not obliged to agree with me, but you can render a decision quite at variance with what I have said with reference to any question of fact.

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The course taken by the learned judge was, in my opinion, quite within his rights and affords the appellant no ground of complaint.

By article 421 C.P.Q. the right to trial by jury is conferred, inter alia,

in all actions for the recovery of damages, resulting from personal wrongs.

Giving to the words "personal wrongs" the most restricted meaning contended for by Mr. Rinfret, i.e., wrongs causing injury to person or reputation, as distinguished from injury to source of revenue, means of support, property or estate, I think this action is within the purview of article 421.

The plaintiff sues under article 1056 C.C. to recover damages occasioned by the death of one Couvrette, who was injured by a fault of the defendant. The damages sought to be recovered resulted from the personal wrong thus done by the defendant to the deceased Couvrette, although the plaintiff does not sue as representative of the deceased or upon the cause of action which he had. That the personal wrong caused to the deceased by an offence or quasi-offence of, or chargeable to, the defendant is the basis of the new cause of action given by article 1056 C.C. for the recovery of the damages resulting from it to the consort and relations is made still more clear by the fact that that right of action exists only if the deceased had not himself obtained satisfaction or indemnity. Had the deceased survived he would have been entitled to recover compensation for any loss of income and diminution in his earning capacity ascribable to the injury which he sustained. That he would have had the right under article 421 C.P.Q. to have

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his claim for these damages disposed of by a jury the appellants concede, and it seems to me indisputable that they would have resulted from the personal wrong done him. The failure of income and other elements of loss for which article 1056 gives the consort and relations a right to recover damages result just as surely and directly from the personal wrong done to the deceased as would his own loss of income and diminished earning capacity had he survived. They are not the same damages as the deceased would have sustained, and could have sued for. The right of action to recover them does not flow directly and immediately from the injury to the deceased. His death is the condition on which it arises and the statute itself is its source. But while it is the statute which confers the right to recover them, and the death of the deceased is the condition of that right coming into existence and is in one sense the immediate cause of the damages to the consort and family (yet the death is an effect rather than a cause—an effect from which further consequences flow), the damages themselves result from the personal wrong which caused the death entailing them as a consequence neither remote nor indirect. Article 421 C.P.Q. does not prescribe that the wrong resulting in the damages sued for should be to the person of the plaintiff or to the persons of those on whose behalf she sues. It suffices to bring the case within the letter of the article that the damage claimed should have resulted from a personal wrong whether the injury itself was to the person of the plaintiff or to that of another. I find nothing in the spirit of the article or in its history which requires that it should be given an application more restricted than is called for by its literal terms.

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I. express no opinion upon the question whether in the phrase "suits for the recovery of damages resulting from personal wrongs," now found in article 421 of the C.P.Q. of 1897, which replaced article 348 of the C.C.P. of 1867, which, in turn, was founded on the Consolidated Statutes of Lower Canada of 1860, ch. 83, sec. 26, continuing the right to trial by jury originally conferred by the 25 Geo. III. (L.C.), ch. 2, in the words

actions grounded * * * in personal wrongs proper to be compensated in damages,

the words "personal wrongs" are susceptible of a construction which would include the wrong or injury done to the consort and relations by the death of the victim of the defendant's fault.

Hundreds of actions brought under article 1056 C.C. and the earlier legislation (10 & 11 Vict. (Can.), ch. 6; Con. Stat. (Can.)., 1859, tit. 9, ch. 781), have been tried by juries, many of them having been carried on appeal to this court and to the Judicial Committee without any question of the competence of the trial tribunal having been raised. The statutory provision for jury trials thus interpreted and acted upon for many years has been at least three times re-enacted without alteration. Casgrain v. Atlantic and North-West Railway Co.[19], at p. 300. The weight of authority in the few cases in which the question has been raised in the provincial courts, also seems to support the right to have such actions as this submitted to a jury. Steele v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co.[20]; Robinson v. Montreal Tramways Co.[21].

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Moreover, I incline to think that the objection of the defendants, if otherwise good, having been taken for the first time in review and after acquiescence by them in all the proceedings leading up to the submission of the case to a jury, is probably too late.

I would dismiss the appeal.

Brodeur J.—La principâle question qui se présente dans cette cause est de savoir si une action en dommages-intérêts instituée par la veuve et les enfants de la victime d'un accident peut être soumise à un procès par jury.

Cette question a été soulevée pour la première fois devant les tribunaux il y a deux ans et a donné lieu à une divergence d'opinions sérieuse parmi les juges de la Cour Supérieure et de la cour d'appel dans les deux causes suivantes: Steele v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co.[22] ; Robinson v. Montreal Tramways Co.[23].

La dernière de ces causes est maintenant pendante devant le Conseil Privé.

Le droit d'action de la veuve et des enfants de la victime d'une accident est exercé sous les dispositions de Particle 1056 du Code Civil, au chapitre des délits et quasi-délits et se lit comme suit:—

Dans tous les cas où la partie contre qui le délit où le quasidélit a été commis décède en conséquence, sans avoir obtenu indemnité ou satisfaction, son conjoint, ses père, mère et enfants ont, pendant l'année seulement à compter du décès, droit de poursuivre celui qui en est l'auteur ou ses représentants pour les dommages-intérêts resultant de tel décès.

L'article du Code de Procédure Civile en vertu

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duquel la demanderesse a réclamé un procès par jury est l'article 421, qui se lit comme suit :—

Le procès par jury petit avoir lieu * * * dans toute poursuite en recouvrement de dommages résultant de torts personnels ou de délits et quasi-délits contre la propriété mobilière.

La demanderesse prétend que sa poursuite a pour objet de recouvrer des dommages "résultant de torts personnels" et que par conséquent elle a le droit de demander le procès par jury.

Que veulent dire les mots "torts personnels"?

Cette expression a eu sa source dans notre droit statutaire quand on a introduit, en 1785, le procès par jury. Cette loi avait été rédigée en anglais et la version française qui en est publiée dans les ordonnances de l'époque démontre qu'elle n'a été qu'une traduction de l'anglais. L'institution du jury, comme on le sait, est une institution anglaise et nous pouvons nous autoriser de tout cela pour rechercher dans les auteurs anglais l'interprétation de ces mots "torts personnels."

Je trouve que Bigelow, "On Torts," après avoir, dans son introduction assimilé le mot "wrong" au mot "tort," nous définit le "tort" comme étant la violation d'une obligation déterminée par la loi, breach of duty fixed by law, et il ajoute que "a tort" is distinguished from "a contract"

in which the duty to be performed is fixed by the parties themselves in the terms of the agreement.

Pollock, "On Torts," assimile les "torts" aux "civil wrongs."

Il s'ensuit donc que les "torts" ou "civil wrongs" du droit anglais comprennent les délits et les quasi-délits de la loi civile.

L'adjectif "personnels" ajouté au mot "torts"

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donne nécessairement une portée restreinte à ce dernier mot. Les "torts personnels" ne couvrent nécessairement qu'une partie des délits, c'est-à-dire les délits, ou torts concernant les personnes. Les délits concernant la propriété immobilière n'y sont pas compris. Il en est de même concernant les délits concernant la propriété mobilière puisqu'en 1829 la législature a été obligé d'adopter une loi spéciale pour permettre à ces derniers délits, d'être soumis à un jury. Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. 3, p. 119 dit:—

As to injuries which affect the personal security of individuals, they are either injuries against their lives, their limbs, their bodies, their health or their reputation.

Wharton définit les mots "personal rights" qui sont l'antithèse des mots "personal wrongs" ou "torts personnels" comme suit :—

The rights of personal security comprising those of life, limb, body, health, reputation and the right of personal liberty.

Ainsi le meutre, la blessure corporelle, la maladie, le libelle, la diffamation et l'emprisonnement peuvent entrer dans la catégorie de torts personnels.

Comme le disait si bien l'Honorable Juge Mathieu, dans la cause de Chouinard v. Raymond[24] :—

Les torts ne sont qu'une infraction ou violation des droits. Il s'ensuit que le système négatif des torts doit correspondre et cadrer avec le système positif des droits. Comme on divise tous les droits en droits des personnes et droits sur les choses, on doit diviser de même généralement les torts en ceux qui affectent les droits des personnes et en ceux qui affectent le droit de propriété.

Qu'avons-nous dans le cas actuel ?

Un homme a été blessé par incurie ou négligence. Il est incontestable que de son vivant il aurait eu le

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droit d'obtenir réparation pour ces blessures. On lui avait causé un tort personnel.

La loi dit, cependant, que, s'il vient à mourir de cet accident, sa femme et ses proches ont un droit d'action contre l'auteur du délit.

Est ce que ce droit d'action ne résulte pas des torts infligés à la personne du défunt? Je crois donc que le droit d'action des demandeurs est basé sur ces blessures infligées à la personne du défunt et tombe sous le coup de l'article 421 du Code de Procédure qui permet aux parties de soumettre leurs prétentions à un jury.

Si nous examinions la jurisprudence, nous voyons que toutes ces actions ont toujour été jugées susceptibles du procès par jury.

Le point n'a été soulevé, que je sache, avant la cause de Steele v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co.[25], que dans une cause, savoir celle de Bouissede v. Hamilton[26], jugée en 1898, où le juge Curran a décidé

that an action by a wife for damages resulting from the death of her husband is one for personal wrong and can be tried by jury.

Une multitude de causes semblables instituées par la femme ou les enfants de la victime sous l'article 1056 du Code Civil ont été soumises à des jurys, ont fait l'object de débats judiciaires très importants devant cette cour et devant la Conseil Privé et on n'a jamais songé à soulever le droit des parties de les soumettre à un jury. Voyez, par exemple, Miller v. Grand Trunk Railway Co.[27], jugée par le Conseil Privé en 1906 et qui a passé par la Cour Supérieure, la Cour de Revision, la cour d'appel et

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la Cour Suprême; Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co.[28]; Ravary v. Grand Trunk Railway Co.[29], en 1869 ; Curran v. Grand Trunk Railway Co.[30].

Une autre question qui se présente dans cette cause est de savoir si la défenderesse appelante peut maintenant prétendre que cette cause n'aurait pas du être soumise au jury.

La demanderesse avait par son action opté pour un procès par jury suivant les dispositions de Particle 423 du Code de Procédure Civile.

Si la défenderesse voulait s'objecter à cette action, elle aurait du alors le faire et faire rejeter cette option. Non, elle ne conteste pas le droit réclamé par la demanderesse d'avoir un procès par jury. La contestation est liée entre les parties. Plus tard le 18 janvier, 1913, motion est faite sous l'autorité de l'article 424 C.P.Q. pour définir les faits dont le jury doit s'enquérir. Les deux parties, y compris l'appelante, fournissent au juge un mémoire des faits qu'elles croient nécessaire de soumettre à l'appréciation du jury. Jugement est rendu sur cette motion et sur ces mémoires. Il y a donc chose jugée sur ce point. Il n'y a jamais eu d'appel ou d'exception au jugement. L'acquiescement qui y est fait par la défenderesse lie cette dernière et elle ne peut plus maintenant en appel nous demander de faire mettre de côté un jugement qu'elle a accepté et qui a force de chose jugée.

Le procès par jury est un mode d'instruction qui ne touche pas a la compétence ratione materiæ des tribunaux.

La cause soumise à un jury est toujours sous le

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contrôle du juge de la Cour Supérieure. Les tribunaux peuvent être un peu gênés dans l'appréciation des faits de la cause à cause du verdict; mais ils n'en restent pas moins maîtres de rejeter le verdict s'il est contraire au poids de la preuve (art. 498). Quant aux questions de droit qui se soulèvent dans la cause, elles demeurent, qu'il y ait procès par jury ou non, à l'entière discrétion des juges.

Thomine-Desmazures, au volume 1er, nos, 11, 12 et 13, discute longuement cette question de compétence absolue et compétence relative. Il nous dit qu'une affaire peut donner lieu à une poursuite devant différents tribunaux et cite le cas du créancier d'une obligation qualifiée de lettre de change qui pourrait être portée devant le tribunal civil parce qu'elle peut être regardée comme simple promesse de payer. Il n'est pas absolument nécessaire qu'elle soit soumise, vu son caractère commercial, au tribunal de commerce.

Si même, dit-il, on assigne devant un juge qui ne soit incompétent qu'à raison de la qualité des parties ou du domicile du défendeur ou de la situation des biens et que le défendeur ne demande pas à être renvoyé devant son juge naturel, l'action aura été régulière.

Au no. 200, il dit :—

Si un marchand est traduit pour une affaire de son commerce devant un tribunal civil, l'incompétence n'est pas absolue mais relative parce qu'elle résulte de la qualité de la personne du défendeur.

Et plus loin, il ajoute, après avoir cité plusieurs cas d'incompétence:—

Le défendeur ne sera plus recevable lui-même à opposer cette pièce d'incompétence s'il a reconnu ou est censé avoir reconnu la jurisdiction devant laquelle il est appelé.

Je relève dans nos rapports judiciaires la cause de Rivers v. Duncan[31], où il a été décidé:—

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That if a party moved for a jury, he cannot afterwards reject the verdict on the ground that the jury ought not to have been allowed because, he, the mover, was not a merchant or a trader.

Dans la cause actuelle la défenderesse n'a pas elle-même demandé le procès par jury mais elle n'a pas contesté l'option faite par la demanderesse et plus tard elle a participé et acquiescé au jugement qui a défini les faits à être soumis au jury.

Les parties ont toujours le droit de soumettre à certaines personnes qu'elles désigneront (persona designata) les conflits qui s'élèvent entre eux. La procédure dans la présente cause énonce l'intention mutuelle des parties de faire juger leurs différends par un jury. Il me semble qu'il s'est établi là un contrat judiciaire qu'elles ne sont plus libres de briser. D'autant plus que leur acquiescement a fait l'objet d'un jugement qui a la force de chose jugée.

Je suis donc d'opinion que la défenderesse ne peut pas en appel essayer de se faire relever de cet acquiescement et de ce jugement.

Pour ces raisons, l'appel doit être renvoyé avec dépens.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Solicitors for the appellants: Perron, Taschereau, Rinfret, Vallée & Genest.

Solicitors for the respondent : Bissonnet & Cordeau.