Supreme Court of Canada
Chagnon v. Normand, (1889) 16 SCR 661
Date: 1889-12-04
WILLIAM CHAGNON (DEFENDANT)
Appellant;
And
ALPHONSE NORMAND (PLAINTIFF)
Respondent.
1889: Dec 4
PRESENT:—Sir W. J.
Ritchie C.J. and Strong, Taschereau, Gwynne and. Patterson JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF
QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA (APPEAL SIDE).
Appeal—Province of Quebec—R. S. G. c.
135 s. 29 (b)—Future Rights— Fee of Office—Collateral Matter—Action for
penalties—Effect of judgment—Disqualification.
To give the Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear an appeal m a case from the Province of Quebec by virtue of sec. 29 (b) of
the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act (R. S. C. c. 135) the
matter relating to a fee of office where the rights in future might be bound
must be the matter really in controversy in the suit in which the appeal is
sought and not something merely collateral thereto.
This clause will not give jurisdiction in a case in which the
action was brought to recover penalties for bribery under the Quebec Election
Act (R. S. Q., Art. 429), even assuming that the effect of
the judgment may be to disqualify the appellant from holding office under the crown for seven years.
MOTION to quash appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen's
Bench, (Appeal Side) for Lower Canada, for want of jurisdiction.
The action in this case was brought to recover penalties for
bribery at an election in the Province of Quebec, and resulted in the Court of
Review ordering the defendant to pay $400. The defendant was not a candidate at
the election. The Court of Queen's Bench affirmed the judgment and the
defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, basing his right to appeal
on the ground: 1st. That the judgment had the effect of disqualifying him for
seven years from holding office under the Crown in Quebec and that his
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rights in future were, therefore,
bound. 2nd. That the matter related to a fee of office as a consequence of the
disability to hold office, as to which an appeal is granted by sec. 29 (b) of
the Supreme Court Act.
Gormully moved to quash the appeal.
Christopher Robinson Q.C. contra.
Sir W. J. RITCHIE
C.J.—We do not think this appeal can be entertained. The matter of
disqualification was not in question in the action for penalties, and if it had
been there are no words in the statute which would give this court jurisdiction
to hear the appeal. We think that an appeal, which is unknown to the common
law, must be given by statute in such clear and explicit language that the
right to appeal cannot be doubted.
We will not determine on this motion whether or not the
appellant is disqualified for seven years by the judgment rendered against him.
We will assume that this is so. But, even if that is so this does not make his
case appealable to this court. The fact that in the future, for seven years, he
may be incapable of holding any office does not render the case appealable. We
have already held that the words " where the rights in future might be
bound" in sec. 29 of the Supreme Court Act do not mean " all cases
where rights in future might be bound," but must be read in connection
with the words that precede "such like matters or things."
Neither is the case appealable as relating to a fee of office
where the rights in future might be bound. The appellant may be deprived of a fee
of office for seven years, but, if that be so, that is the consequence of the
judgment merely, but there is no controversy in the case relating to a fee of
office where the rights in
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future might be bound, as
required by said section 29th act.
Appeal quashed with costs.
Solicitor for appellant: A. E. Gervais.
Solicitor for respondent: C. Fitzpatrick.
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