Date: 19971215
Docket: IMM-1214-97
BETWEEN:
TSHILUMBA LUKUS KABWIKA
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
RICHARD J.:
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Division dated February 28, 1997, wherein it was decided that the applicant was not a Convention refugee.
[2] At the hearing before the Refugee Division, the applicant was represented by counsel. However, in the application for leave and for judicial review, the applicant was self-represented.
[3] The applicant's application for leave and for judicial review dated March 24, 1997, and filed on March 25, 1997, indicates the address of the applicant as being 345 Clarence Street, apartment # 311, Ottawa, Ontario, and also gives a telephone number at which he can be reached.
[4] By order dated May 21, 1997, I granted the applicant's motion for an extension of time to file and serve his application record.
[5] On May 30, 1997, the applicant filed his application record with proof of service on the respondent, giving the same street address and telephone number.
[6] The applicant's application record for leave and for judicial review was accompanied by the applicant's affidavit together with four exhibits, including the applicant's Personal Information Form, the Board's decision and the applicant's memorandum of argument.
[7] The respondent entered an appearance and opposed the granting of leave in its memorandum filed on June 30, 1997 and personally served on the applicant at the address given by the applicant.
[8] By order dated September 19, 1997, Mr. Justice Dubé granted the applicant leave to commence an application for judicial review and fixed the hearing of the application for judicial review for Monday, December 8, 1997, at 11:00 a.m. in the City of Ottawa.
[9] The Court record indicates that the order granting leave and setting down the matter for hearing was sent by registered mail to the applicant, at the address given by him, on September 22, 1997, and that it was not claimed by the applicant. The Registry officer could not reach him by telephone, his line being disconnected.
[10] Mr. Justice Dubé directed, on October 17, 1997, that personal service on the applicant by means of a bailiff be attempted as a last resort.
[11] Accordingly, a process server was retained by the Court Registry to serve the applicant with the order.
[12] The process server filed an affidavit of attempted service dated November 20, 1997. In that affidavit, the process server states that she attended at the address of the applicant and received no answer on October 23, 1997. At that time, she contacted the superintendent of the building and was informed that the applicant had moved some two or three months earlier and that the superintendent had no idea of the applicant's present whereabouts.
[13] The process server attempted to locate the defendant through the telephone book and directory assistance, but no listing could be found.
[14] The process server, in her affidavit, stated that she made all efforts to serve the applicant personally with the information provided, but had been unsuccessful in serving him.
[15] The applicant failed to inform the Court Registry, and, as confirmed by the Respondent's counsel, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration as well, of his change of address and of his current address as he was required to do.
[16] The applicant was granted leave to commence an application for judicial review on September 19, 1997. Section 82.1(7) of the Immigration Act and Rule 15 of the Federal Court Immigration Rules provide that an order granting an application for leave shall fix the day and place for the hearing of the application for judicial review for a day that is no sooner than 30 days and no later than 90 days after the date of the order granting leave.
[17] On November 21, 1997, I directed that the matter should proceed on December 8, 1997, in accordance with the order of Mr. Justice Dubé granting leave and setting down the hearing.
[18] On December 8, 1997, at 11:00 a.m. when the court convened, the applicant was not present. The respondent was represented by counsel.
[19] Counsel for the respondent submitted that the application for judicial review be dismissed pursuant to Rule 495(1)(b) of the Federal Court Rules. Counsel for the respondent drew to my attention the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chung1. Reference is made in that case to an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal where the applicant's section 28 application to have an exclusion order reviewed and set aside was dismissed pursuant to Rule 495(1)(b) because the applicant had failed to appear for the hearing.
[20] In the Chung case, the Court held that a dismissal under Rule 495(1)(b) is akin to dismissal for want of prosecution and cannot give rise to issue estoppel.
[21] Rather than proceed under Rule 495(1)(b), I advised counsel for the respondent that I would decide the application for judicial review based on the written record before the Court, which included the applicant's application record and the respondent's application record, both of which contained written memoranda of fact and law, and would hear counsel if he wished to make oral representations.
[22] Counsel for the respondent made brief representations to the Court, based on the memorandum of argument it filed with the Court on June 30, 1997, and limited his representations to the Board's finding of the availability of an Internal Flight Alternative.
[23] The record discloses that the availability of an Internal Flight Alternative was identified by the Refugee Division as one of the issues to be dealt with, at the opening of the hearing. Accordingly, the applicant and his counsel at the hearing were fully aware that the availability of an Internal Flight Alternative would be an issue in this matter.
[24] The Refugee Division found that there was more than a mere possibility of persecution in many regions of Zaïre by reason of the applicant's national origin. However, it found that there were two areas in Zaïre which offered an Internal Flight Alternative. They identified the province of Kasai and Kinshasa, the capital of Zaïre.
[25] The issue raised by the applicant in his application for judicial review was the following:
| Did the Board err in law in determining that the Applicant had an Internal Flight Alternative in Kasai province or Kinshasa; specifically by failing to properly consider the evidence shown before them which clearly demonstrate the fact that those places would not be a safer place for the Applicant. |
|
[26] One might establish a well-founded fear of persecution in one part of a country and still be denied status because of an Internal Flight Alternative2.
[27] The Refugee Division's analysis in this respect reads as follows:
| Le demandeur risque d'être persécuté dans beaucoup de régions du Zaïre en raison de son origine ethnique parce que "c'est précisément l'origine ethnique commune et les antécédents socio-économiques qui sont le fondement des établissements humains au Zaïre"3. Il y a deux endroits où les obstacles à la réinstallation ne tiendraient pas, selon ces critères, et où le demandeur ne risquerait pas d'être persécuté au motif de son origine ethnique : dans la province du Kasai oriental et à Kinshasa, capitale du Zaïre. Le Kasai oriental est la terre ancestrale des Lubas où des milliers de Lubas shabiens se sont enfuis ou ont été expulsés quand leurs voisins les ont attaqués au début des années 1990. La preuve documentaire remise aux commissaires établit que les Lubas et les Kanioks de naissance au Kasai oriental ont accueilli l'arrivée des Lubas shabiens avec indifférence, mais non pas avec hostilité, et que les organismes d'aide internationale se sont employés à fournir aux Lubas nouvellement arrivés une résidence permanente dans la région4. Quant à Kinshasa, c'est une grande ville cosmopolite qui regroupe des gens de presque tous les groupes ethniques du Zaïre, y compris des Lubas. Le demandeur a dit qu'il craignait d'être persécuté partout au Zaïre parce qu'il est un Luba, mais même si la preuve au sujet du Kasai oriental dit le contraire; par ailleurs, il n'y a rien dans toute la preuve dont nous sommes saisis qui appuie l'affirmation du demandeur selon laquelle il s'expose à une chance raisonnable de persécution à Kinshasa simplement parce qu'il est un Luba. |
|
. . .
| Ayant jugé qu'il existe moins qu'une simple possibilité que le demandeur soit persécuté dans la province du Kasai oriental ou à Kinshasa au motif de son origine ethnique, de ses opinions politiques ou de tout autre motif énuméré à la Convention, les commissaires doivent maintenant examiner s'il est raisonnable pour le demandeur de se rendre et de résider dans la région pouvant lui offrir une possibilité de refuge intérieur (PRI). |
|
| Le demandeur pourrait se rendre à Kinshasa directement par avion ou via le Congo et le transport fluvial. Même s'il existe des preuves que les arrivants sont interrogés par les autorités frontalières, il semble que le principal but de cette pratique est d'extorquer de l'argent ou des biens aux voyageurs qui reviennent de l'étranger. Comme nous avons déterminé que les craintes de persécution du demandeur découlant de divers motifs de la Convention ne sont pas fondées à Kinshasa, le demandeur n'aurait rien à craindre au point d'entrée ou dans la ville, sinon cette sorte de "chantage" que les Zaïrois subissent quotidiennement. Le demandeur pourrait se rendre à Kasai par la route à partir de divers points d'entrée au Zaïre. Il est plus compliqué de se rendre à Kasai qu'à Kinshasa, parce que le système routier au Zaïre en général et à Kasai en particulier est dans un piteux état, mais rien ne prouve qu'il est impossible de se déplacer. |
|
| Le demandeur est un jeune homme en bonne santé qui a subvenu à ses besoins au Zaïre et plus tard en Zambie, soit en enseignant les arts martiaux ou en exploitant un kiosque. Il n'y a pas de raison de croire qu'il ne pourrait reprendre l'un de ces emplois et en occuper beaucoup d'autres soit au Kasai oriental ou à Kinshasa. En outre, comme nous l'avons dit ci-dessus, l'origine ethnique du demandeur ne serait pas un obstacle à son établissement au Kasai oriental ou à Kinshasa. Cependant, comme l'avocat l'a signalé dans ses observations, il y a de la violence politique et à Kinshasa et au Kasai oriental, mais la preuve dont nous sommes saisis ne donne pas à penser que cette violence existe à un tel niveau qu'elle empêcherait une personne ordinaire de s'y installer. Enfin, les difficultés économiques auxquelles font face tous les Zaïrois et qui peuvent être en effet plus manifestes au Kasai oriental que dans certaines autres régions, ne sont pas telles qu'elles peuvent empêcher de trouver une possibilité de refuge intérieur. Nous jugeons donc que le demandeur a une possibilité de refuge intérieur au Zaïre, à Kinshasa et dans la province du Kasai oriental. |
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[28] In Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)5, Mr. Justice Linden, on behalf of the Court of Appeal stated:
| An IFA cannot be speculative or theoretical only; it must be a realistic, attainable option. Essentially, this means that the alternative place of safety must be realistically accessible to the claimant. Any barriers to getting there should be reasonably surmountable. The claimant cannot be required to encounter great physical danger or to undergo undue hardship in travelling there or in staying there. For example, claimants should not be required to cross battle lines where fighting is going on at great risk to their lives in order to reach a place of safety. Similarly, claimants should not be compelled to hide out in an isolated region of their country, like a cave in the mountains, or in a desert or a jungle, if those are the only areas of internal safety available. But neither is it enough for refugee claimants to say that they do not like the weather in a safe area, or that they have no friends or relatives there, or that they may not be able to find suitable work there. If it is objectively reasonable in these latter cases to live in these places, without fear of persecution, then IFA exists and the claimant is not a refugee. |
|
[29] Mr. Justice Linden also went on to say at page 599:
| Thus, the objective standard of reasonableness which I have suggested for an IFA is the one that best conforms to the definition of Convention refugee. That definition requires claimants to be unable or unwilling by reason of fear of persecution to claim the protection of their home country in any part of that country. The prerequisites of that definition can only be met if it is not reasonable for the claimant to seek and obtain safety from persecution elsewhere in the country. |
|
[30] While the applicant disagrees with the conclusion of the Refugee Division with respect to the availability of an Internal Flight Alternative, the Refugee Division did not misdirect itself in law and its finding is not patently unreasonable. In the circumstances, this Court can not intervene since there is no reviewable error.
[31] Accordingly, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
__________________________
Judge
Ottawa, Ontario
December 15, 1997
__________________
1 [1993] 2 F.C. 42 at 57-58.
2 per Linden J.A. in M.C.I. v. Mathiyabaranam, Docket: A-223-95, dated December 5, 1997.
3 Pièce D-3, à la page 76.
4 Pièce A-2 (ZAR22842.F).
5 [1994] 1 F.C. 589 at 598 (C.A.).
STYLE OF CAUSE: TSHILUMBA LUKUS KABWIKA v.
REASONS FOR ORDER OF THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RICHARD DATED: DECEMBER 15, 1997
DARRELL L. KLOEZE FOR THE RESPONDENT
Mr. George Thomson FOR THE RESPONDENT Deputy Attorney General of Canada
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