Date: 19990326
Docket: T-147-98
Ottawa, Ontario, March 26, 1999
Present: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DENAULT
Between:
COMPAGNIE GERVAIS DANONE
Appellant
- and -
ASTRO DAIRY PRODUCTS LIMITED
Respondent
JUDGMENT
The appeal is allowed with costs against the respondent.
PIERRE DENAULT
Judge
Certified true translation
Peter Douglas
Date: 19990326
Docket: T-148-98
Ottawa, Ontario, March 26, 1999
Present: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DENAULT
Between:
COMPAGNIE GERVAIS DANONE
Appellant
- and -
ASTRO DAIRY PRODUCTS LIMITED
Respondent
JUDGMENT
The appeal is allowed with costs against the respondent.
PIERRE DENAULT
Judge
Certified true translation
Peter Douglas
Date: 19990326
Docket: T-149-98
Ottawa, Ontario, March 26, 1999
Present: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DENAULT
Between:
COMPAGNIE GERVAIS DANONE
Appellant
- and -
ASTRO DAIRY PRODUCTS LIMITED
Respondent
JUDGMENT
The appeal is allowed with costs against the respondent.
PIERRE DENAULT
Judge
Certified true translation
Peter Douglas
Date: 19990326
Docket: T-147-98
T-148-98
T-149-98
Between:
COMPAGNIE GERVAIS DANONE
Appellant
- and -
ASTRO DAIRY PRODUCTS LIMITED
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
DENAULT J.
[1] These are three appeals under section 56 of the Trade-marks Act1 (the Act) against three decisions by the Registrar of Trade-marks upholding the respondent"s oppositions and refusing to register the appellant"s marks. In substance, the Court has to decide whether there is a reasonable likelihood of confusion between the appellant"s mark BIO DANONE and the respondent"s mark BIOBEST.
[2] The appellant Compagnie Gervais Danone S.A. is a limited company incorporated under the laws of France. On June 10, 1988, it filed two applications with the Registrar for registration of the marks BIO DANONE (No. 608,984) and BIO DANONE & Design (No. 609,006). The applications were based on the proposed use of the marks in association with the following products: "Milk and dairy products, namely: fresh milk, long-lasting milk, fermented milk, butter, yogurt, cream, cheese, white cheese". A few months later, a third application for registration was made for the mark BIO DANONE & Design (No. 616,615), again based on proposed use in connection with the same products. That mark is identical to the one in application No. 609,006, the only difference being its colouring.
[3] In response to the advertisement of the three marks in the Trade-marks Journal, the respondent Astro Dairy Products Limited opposed registration of the marks on a number of grounds, including paragraph 12(1)(d) of the Act. The respondent"s argument was that the appellant"s marks were not registrable because they were confusing with its registered trade-mark BIOBEST used in connection with biologically cultured dairy products, namely yogurt, cottage cheese and sour cream.
[4] On December 2, 1997, the Registrar simultaneously gave three decisions upholding the respondent"s oppositions and refusing to register the appellant"s marks. The Registrar found that the appellant had not shown that there was no reasonable likelihood of confusion between its marks and the respondent"s.
Confusion
[5] Under paragraph 12(1)(d) of the Act, a trade-mark is registrable if it is not confusing with a registered trade-mark:
| 12. (1) Subject to section 13, a trade-mark is registrable if it is not
. . .
(d) confusing with a registered trade-mark . . . .
|
12. (1) Sous réserve de l'article 13, une marque de commerce est enregistrable sauf dans l'un ou l'autre des cas suivants :
[...]
d) elle crée de la confusion avec une marque de commerce déposée [...]
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[6] Under subsection 6(2) of the Act, there is confusion between two trade-marks if their use in the same area would be likely to lead to the inference that the wares are manufactured or sold by the same person, whether or not the wares are of the same general class:
| 6. (2) The use of a trade-mark causes confusion with another trade-mark if the use of both trade-marks in the same area would be likely to lead to the inference that the wares or services associated with those trade-marks are manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by the same person, whether or not the wares or services are of the same general class.
|
6. (2) L'emploi d'une marque de commerce crée de la confusion avec une autre marque de commerce lorsque l'emploi des deux marques de commerce dans la même région serait susceptible de faire conclure que les marchandises liées à ces marques de commerce sont fabriquées, vendues, données à bail ou louées, ou que les services liés à ces marques sont loués ou exécutés, par la même personne, que ces marchandises ou ces services soient ou non de la même catégorie générale.
|
[7] The reasonable likelihood of confusion is assessed with regard to all the surrounding circumstances, including those listed in subsection 6(5):
| 6. (5) In determining whether trade-marks or trade-names are confusing, the court or the Registrar, as the case may be, shall
have regard to all the surrounding circumstances including
(a) the inherent distinctiveness of the trade-marks or trade-names and the extent to which they have become known;
(b) the length of time the trade-marks or trade-names have been in use;
(c) the nature of the wares, services or business;
(d) the nature of the trade; and
(e) the degree of resemblance between the trade-marks or trade-names in appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them.
|
6. (5) En décidant si des marques de commerce ou des noms commerciaux créent de la confusion, le tribunal ou le registraire, selon le cas, tient compte de toutes les circonstances de l'espèce, y compris :
a) le caractère distinctif inhérent des marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux, et la mesure dans laquelle ils sont devenus connus;
b) la période pendant laquelle les marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux ont été en usage;
c) le genre de marchandises, services ou entreprises;
d) la nature du commerce;
e) le degré de ressemblance entre les marques de commerce ou les noms commerciaux dans la présentation ou le son, ou dans les idées qu'ils suggèrent.
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[8] Where there is an issue of confusion between a trade-mark for which an application for registration has been made and a registered mark, it is for the applicant to establish that there is no reasonable likelihood of confusion, and if that person does not discharge that burden, the application should be refused.
Decision of the Registrar
[9] In the Registrar"s opinion, the appellant did not succeed in discharging its burden in the case at bar. Not only was there some degree of resemblance between the marks because of the prefix BIO, and an overlap between the designated products and the distribution channels, but also the respondent"s evidence showed that its mark BIOBEST had become known in Ontario and in the major metropolitan areas of Quebec, British Columbia, Manitoba and Newfoundland since 1988, unlike the BIO DANONE marks, whose registration was based on proposed use. In addition, evidence that four other registered trade-marks use the prefix BIO to designate yogurt was considered of little assistance to the appellant because there was no evidence on the use of those marks. The Registrar thus found that there was a reasonable likelihood of confusion.
Analysis
[10] On appeal, the Court cannot merely substitute its opinion for the Registrar"s. It must treat decisions of the Registrar of Trade-marks with deference, given the Registrar"s specialized knowledge and recognized expertise. Therefore, the Court cannot intervene unless it is satisfied that the Registrar came to the wrong conclusion on the facts or unless there is significant new evidence placed before the Court that was not before the Registrar and that would cast doubt on the Registrar"s decision.2
[11] In the case at bar, the appellant argues that the Registrar"s decision is based on mistaken considerations. According to the appellant, the Registrar: mistakenly dissected the trade-marks in question into their constituent parts, placing the emphasis on the BIO element instead of considering them as a whole as the case law requires; erred not only in deciding that the prefix BIO was suggestive, but also in finding that the trade-marks were likely to cause confusion because of that very prefix, with the perverse result of giving the respondent a monopoly on the use of the prefix BIO in connection with dairy products; and disregarded the evidence on the state of the register, failing to appreciate that the prefix BIO is a common feature of the general class of foodstuffs, some of which are registered for use in association with yogurt. In addition, in an attempt to remedy the deficiency the Registrar identified, the appellant filed two new affidavits introducing evidence on the commercial use of other marks"BIOGHURT and BIOGARDE"that use the prefix BIO in association with yogurt.
[12] I will now analyse each of these arguments in depth.
[13] It is well established that a trade-mark must be assessed in its totality. In his text The Canadian Law of Trade Marks and Unfair Competition,3 H.G. Fox identified the relevant principle to be considered:
| [TRADUCTION] Dans chaque cas, l"ensemble de chaque marque doit être évaluée [...] Bien que cette question doive toujours être considérée en tenant compte du fait qu"une partie donnée des deux marques, par exemple, un préfixe ou un suffixe, est commune au commerce, ce fait ne peut pas être concluant et ne fait pas qu"étayer la proposition que les parties de la marque qui se ressemblent ne sont pas susceptibles d"appropriation exclusive et que, ainsi évaluées, les marques, prises comme un tout, ne sont pas en concurrence.4 |
|
In Sealy Sleep Products Limited v. Simpson"s-Sears Limited,5 Mr. Justice Thorson of the Exchequer Court had already stated the same principle in these words:
| |
[TRADUCTION] Lorsqu"il s"agit de déterminer si une marque de commerce crée de la confusion avec une autre, il n"est pas approprié de les décomposer en leurs éléments constitutifs, de faire porter l"attention sur les éléments qui sont semblables et de conclure qu"en raison de l"existence de ressemblances dans les marques de commerce, les marques de commerce dans leur ensemble créent de la confusion entre elles. Les marques de commerces peuvent être différentes les unes des autres et donc ne pas créer de confusion entre elles lorsqu"on les examine dans leur ensemble, même si certains éléments examinés séparément contiennent des ressemblances. C"est la combinaison des éléments qui constitue la marque de commerce, et c"est l"effet de l"ensemble de la marque de commerce, et non l"effet d"une partie particulière de celle-ci, qu"il faut considérer. |
|
[14] In the case at bar, I am of the view that the Registrar did not consider the marks in their totality. It is important to point out that to begin with, in analysing the inherent distinctiveness of the trade-marks at issue, the Registrar noted the suggestive character of the prefix BIO, the laudatory but non-distinctive sense of the BEST element, and that the word DANONE was a coined term. From this, the Registrar concluded that considered as a whole, the trade-mark BIO DANONE was inherently more distinctive than the opponent-respondent"s mark. However, when dealing with the assessment of the degree of resemblance between the marks at issue, the Registrar placed the emphasis on the initial BIO element alone and decided that because of that element, the marks BIO DANONE and BIOBEST exhibited "some minor degree of similarity in appearance and in sounding", and a "biological aspect" to the ideas suggested by them. In so doing, the Registrar disregarded the DANONE component of the appellant"s trade-mark, an element that in my view truly serves to distinguish the two marks, especially because according to the evidence the word DANONE is well known the world over, having first been used in Spain around 1880. Since then, DANONE has been used in association with yogurt in several countries, including Canada.
[15] Furthermore, the registered mark BIOBEST has not in my view become sufficiently well known in Canada to be given a monopoly on the use of the prefix BIO in association with yogurt; that, I might add, is the practical result of the Registrar"s decision: giving the respondent a monopoly on the use of the word BIO in association with dairy products. The evidence before the Registrar shows that over a seven-year period, from 1988 to 1994, the respondent reportedly sold 7 million containers of its yogurt. Although the Registrar was correct to say that the test clearly favoured the respondent"given that the appellant"s mark is based on proposed use"the figures do not support the conclusion that it is a widely known mark that accordingly deserves very strong protection. Additional figures were filed on appeal for the 1994 to 1997 period. Although they show a 25% increase in sales each year, representing a total of 46 million containers sold, that is still not significant enough for the respondent to be given a monopoly on the prefix BIO.
[16] I will now deal with the evidence on the state of the register.
[17] In general, a party files evidence of the registration of several trade-marks having a common element in order to show the common use of that element in the market or industry in question. The inference to be drawn from that evidence is that consumers of those products are familiar with the feature and can more easily distinguish between marks. However, as H.G. Fox6 points out, the inference cannot be drawn unless the registered marks are commonly used in the market in question:
| [TRADUCTION] Lorsqu"il s"agit d"examiner la possibilité de confusion entre deux marques de commerce, c"est un principe généralement reconnu que, si les deux marques en question comportent un élément commun qui figure également dans plusieurs autres marques utilisées sur le même marché, cette utilisation courante sur le marché tend à inciter les acheteurs à porter davantage leur attention sur les autres éléments, non communs, des différentes marques et à faire ainsi la distinction entre elles. Toutefois, ce principe demande que les marques comportant les éléments communs soient largement utilisées sur le marché dans lequel les marques à l"étude sont utilisées ou seront utilisées.7 |
|
[18] The case law shows that the courts are also of the view that evidence of the state of the register is insufficient in itself to establish that a feature is common throughout the industry. It must generally be supported by evidence of its common use. In Del Monte Corp. v. Welch Foods Inc.,8 when reviewing the leading decisions on the issue, Mr. Justice Strayer noted:
| J"ai attentivement examiné l"incidence de la récente décision de la Cour d"appel fédérale dans l"affaire Kellogg Salada Canada Inc. c. Registraire des marques de commerce et Maximum Nutrition Limited [29 juin 1992, A-140-87, non publiée.] [...] La Cour d"appel [...] a jugé que la preuve de l"état du registre était tout à fait pertinente et a conclu (si je comprends bien) que, combinée avec d"autres éléments de preuve directs d"emploi, celle-ci ne démontrait aucune probabilité de confusion découlant de la marque de commerce de l"appelante. J"ai aussi noté la récente décision de la Cour d"appel dans l"affaire Park Avenue Furniture Corp. c. Wickes/Simmons Bedding Ltd. et autres [(1991) 37 C.P.R. (3d) 413], où elle a aussi tenu compte de la preuve de l"état du registre. |
|
| [...] Dans l"affaire Park Avenue , à mon sens, il y avait d"autres preuves d"emploi par les propriétaires de marques de commerce déposées. Le juge Desjardins, J.C.A. déclare que ces marques, " suivant la preuve, (avaient) été utilisées par les propriétaires en question ".9 |
|
[19] In the case at bar, the respondent itself referred in support of its opposition to 29 registered trade-marks that use the prefix BIO to designate either dairy products or other food and dietary products. Four of those marks, used in connection with yogurt, were brought to the Registrar"s attention. Absent evidence on the use of the marks, the Registrar concluded that the evidence was of little assistance to the appellant. The Registrar also noted that in his affidavit, the vice-president of the opponent had said that to his knowledge, no other yogurt was sold in Canada under a trade-mark using the BIO element.
[20] On appeal, the evidence told quite another story. First, the appellant filed new affidavits with the Court evidencing the use of the marks BIOGARDE and BIOGHURT in association with yogurt for the products of Liberty Inc. of Candiac, Quebec, and the sale of those products in at least the Montréal area, Toronto, Ottawa and Aylmer. Furthermore, during cross-examination on his second affidavit, Jack Marshall acknowledged that the marks BIOGARDE and BIOGHURT had been used in the market for several years. He even confirmed that he had been aware of the use of those marks since before filing his first affidavit on June 30, 1994. However, he did not indicate that fact in his affidavit because he did not believe that consumers perceived them as trade-marks:
| Q. Et quand avez-vous vu pour la première fois [BIOGHURT et BIOGARDE] employés au Canada, d"après ce que vous vous rappelez? |
| R. Je dirais il y a plusieurs années, Liberty a commencé à employer la désignation, bien que je ne sois pas certain de la date exact. |
|
| Q. Y a-t-il une autre société qui l"a employée? |
|
| A. Pas que je sache au Canada. |
|
| Q. Ces désignations étaient-elles employées par Liberty, je parle de Biogarde à présent et de Bioghurt au moins avant que vous ayez signé l"affidavit dans la présente affaire? |
|
| Q. Et au moins avant que vous ayez signé l"affidavit que vous avez signé dans la procédure d"opposition, et laissez-moi vous en indiquer la date. Vous avez signé un autre affidavit en juin 1994 dans la procédure d"opposition. |
|
| Vous en rappelez vous? Voulez-vous le lire? |
|
| Étiez-vous au courant à l"époque de l"emploi de la marque de commerce Biogarde/Bioghurt par Liberty? |
[21] In my view, this new evidence is significant enough to reverse the Registrar"s decision on that point. It goes to show that at the relevant time, yogurt was being sold in Canada under trade-marks using the BIO element.
[22] In conclusion, I am of the opinion that the appellant has discharged its burden of proof and shown that there was no reasonable likelihood of confusion between its proposed mark and the respondent"s registered mark. Despite their identical products and the overlap in the distribution channels, considered in their totality, the marks BIOBEST and BIO DANONE do not sufficiently resemble each other for it to be held that there is a reasonable likelihood of their confusion.
[23] For these reasons, the appeal is allowed with costs against the respondent.
PIERRE DENAULT
Judge
Ottawa, Ontario
March 26, 1999
Certified true translation
Peter Douglas
__________________
1 R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13.
2 Glen-Warren Productions Ltd. v. Gertex Hosiery Ltd. (1990), 29 C.P.R. (3d) 7 at 11 (F.C.T.D.); Molson Companies Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks et al. (1985), 3 C.P.R. (3d) 216 at 219 (F.C.T.D.); Kellogg Salada Canada Inc. v. Maximum Nutrition Ltd. et al. (1987), 14 C.P.R. (3d) 133 (F.C.T.D.).
3 3rd ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1972.
4 Supra, at p. 379.
5 (1960), 20 Fox Pat. C. 76, at page 82.
6 Supra, note 3.
7 Ibid. at p. 351.
8 (1992), 44 C.P.R. (3d) 205 (F.C.T.D.).
9 Ibid.
10 Appellant"s record, pp. 069 and 070.
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