Date: 19990127
Docket: T-1258-90/T-1259-90
Between:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Applicant
And:
ROSE-MARIE CHAMPEVAL
Respondent
And:
JEAN-PIERRE CHAMPEVAL
Respondent
JUDGMENT
ROULEAU J.
[1] The application is dismissed. The applicant shall pay the respondents" solicitor his fees and disbursements in the amount of $7,500.
Certified true translation
Bernard Olivier
Date: 19990127
Docket: T-1258-90/T-1259-90
Between:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Applicant
And:
ROSE-MARIE CHAMPEVAL
Respondent
And:
JEAN-PIERRE CHAMPEVAL
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ROULEAU J.
[1] This appeal was heard in Montréal on January 19 and 20, 1999. It is an appeal from a decision of the Tax Court of Canada, issued on January 10, 1990, in which Couture C.J.T.C.C. exempted Mr. and Ms. Champeval of any liability to the Department of National Revenue for "[Translation ] failure to remit source deductions on employees" wages", a common proceeding arising out of assessments issued by the Department pursuant to subsection 227.1(1) of the Income Tax Act . Mr. and Ms. Champeval, together with a third person, were the shareholders of a company incorporated under the laws of Quebec under the corporate name "Tradition 5 Inc."; the third shareholder is not a party to the proceeding, as he declared bankruptcy in 1987. Also, Rose-Marie Champeval was a shareholder and nominal director because the Quebec legislation then in force required three shareholders. It was clear to me, after hearing the evidence, that Ms. Champeval exercised no control within the company.
[2] Chief Judge Couture"s decision was issued on January 10, 1990 and on the 120th day, as allowed, the Department filed its statement of claim with the Federal Court seeking a trial de novo. In July 1998, Madam Justice Reed, pursuant to Rule 380 of the Federal Court Rules, which deals with case management, sent a notice to the Department that more than 360 days had elapsed since the issuance of the statement of claim in 1990 and that the delay should be justified. Shortly afterwards, on July 21, the solicitor for the Department filed a requisition for a pre-trial conference to propose a requisition for a hearing. After this document was filed, the Court Registry office in Montréal sent a memorandum asking for instructions as to whether the pre-trial conference should proceed without the Department having shown cause for the delay of over eight years. This justification was never demanded owing to an administrative error allowing the holding of the pre-trial conference and the matter was therefore subsequently set down for hearing.
[3] At the opening of the hearing, counsel for the respondents, a legal aid lawyer from the city of Granby, explained that he was not fully cognizant of the Federal Court Rules or of the procedure. Although he had not raised an issue as to the delay incurred at the pre-trial conference, I asked counsel for the Department to justify the delay. She was unable to comply with my request, as she was not acquainted with the case prior to 1997.
[4] At the hearing, the respondents and the manager of the Cowansville branch of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce in 1983 and 1984 testified. Mr. Desruisseaux, an employee of the Department of Revenue, now retired, testified for the applicant. He had never personally conducted an on-site investigation. He was in the Sherbrooke office and reviewed the reports of the field auditors; that was how he managed the case on behalf of the Department.
[5] The factor that triggered the audit and legal proceeding occurred in late March or early April 1984, when a cheque dated March 15, 1983 for source deductions on employees" salary was rejected by the bank for insufficient funds.
[6] The trial in the Tax Court of Canada took place in November 1989 and the decision, amply documented with facts and case law, was issued to the parties on January 10, 1990. Obviously, testimony given 10 years later cannot be as accurate and valid, given the time elapsed since the relevant events.
[7] I therefore adopt the reasons and the decision of Couture C.J.T.C.C., rendered on January 10, 1990, a copy of which I attach to these reasons as Appendix A. I dismiss Revenue Canada"s notice of assessment and this action.
[8] At the hearing I informed counsel for the Department that she had to persuade me that there were deficiencies in the reasons and the decision of Couture C.J.T.C.C.; she has not managed to do so.
[9] She did argue, however, that Ms. Champeval, who did not testify at the Tax Court of Canada hearing, had not acted with care, diligence and skill to prevent the failure. She noted that Ms. Champeval had not issued any cheque in mid-April for the March deductions. It is obvious to me, from the record, that the March 15 cheque was returned for insufficient funds on March 30, that the auditors" investigation had already been initiated, and that an agreement between the company, the bank and the Department was reached by May 1984. I am not persuaded that a nominal director, knowing that the bank branch had no intention of honouring the cheques, failed to act with care and diligence, given the circumstances.
[10] I would like to add a few thoughts based on the evidence presented at this hearing. It is clear that although Mr. Bertrand, the manager of the local branch of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, undertook to honour the company"s cheques after he had reached an agreement in the presence of the Department"s auditors, he did not have the final authorization. The regional office of the bank in Sherbrooke had the last word.
[11] The most disturbing evidence that emerged at the hearing was that in September or October 1984, a few days after the suspension of the company"s operations, Mr. Champeval went to Sherbrooke to meet with Mr. Desruisseaux, the Department"s representative. It was on record that the bank held a commercial pledge on some but not all of the machinery. Mr. Champeval urged the Department to take possession of this machinery free of pledge; to seize and resell it for the purpose of liquidating the debt of about $13,000 caused by the failure to remit the source deductions. The answer he was apparently given was that the Department was not in the business of seizure and sale of equipment or machinery.
[12] The Department failed to obtain a nulla bona from the bailiff on the assets of Tradition 5 Inc. until February 1986. Obviously, it delayed too long, since the company divested itself of its assets in December 1984.
[13] The evidence further disclosed that Mr. and Mrs. Champeval were divorced several years ago; that Ms. Champeval is occupying the former family residence, which she had to mortgage when the company resumed operations after the 1983 fire; and that she has no steady employment and must still make mortgage payments. Mr. Champeval, for his part, appears to be getting by on social assistance. I must therefore conclude that even if the Department were to prevail, there is no possibility of recovery of a debt that amounted to $17,000 in December 1989 and that must now come, with annual compound interest, to about $40,000.
[14] In its recital of the facts, the Department had nothing new to add to the debate since the decision of Couture C.J.T.C.C. in January 1990. I conclude, therefore, that this whole exercise is not an action at law so much as harassment of taxpayers; a useless exercise the costs of which will no doubt land on the backs of the Canadian taxpayers.
[15] The respondents" solicitor, acting on behalf of legal aid in Granby, had to come to Montréal for the pre-trial conference and again for the trial in this Court, which lasted two days. Having dismissed the applicant"s case, I order her to pay the fees and disbursements of the respondents" solicitor in the amount of $7,500.
P. ROULEAU
J.
OTTAWA, Ontario
January 27, 1999
Certified true translation
Bernard Olivier
Appendix A
87-632(IT)
JEAN-PIERRE CHAMPEVAL,
Appellant,
v.
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
AND
87-633(IT)
ROSE-MARIE CHAMPEVAL,
Appellant,
v.
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Couture, C.J.T.C.C.
These appeals were heard on common evidence and are in opposition to assessments issued by the respondent pursuant to subsection 227.1(1) of the Income Tax Act (the Act).
Only Jean-Pierre Champeval testified at the hearing, and his testimony disclosed the following facts:
He and his wife were the shareholders in a company constituted under the Laws of Quebec under the name of Tradition 5 Inc. (the company). The two appellants were also directors and officers of the company. The company was in the business of manufacturing shoes, from what I could understand of the testimony. It had been operating since around 1973.
The events that were generally behind the issuance of the assessments began in 1983, that is, on June 3, when the company"s plant was completely destroyed by a fire. Between June and December 1983 the appellants and their employees worked without pay, initially in the appellants" home and later in rented premises, in which they manufactured some samples that were to be used in sales. Three days after the company had received its leather inventory, around August 1983, it was broken into and its inventory was stolen. Notwithstanding all of these disastrous events, production resumed at the plant in December 1983, not to mention with some increased financial difficulties.
On December 10, 1980, the company had made a general assignment of its accounts receivable in favour of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. The appellants had also personally guaranteed the company in favour of the bank.
The male appellant explained that the problems with source deductions on the employees" wages had begun prior to the fire, that is, at a time when the bank had refused him a line of credit concerning one of his accounts, so that by the end of December, 1982 the company was about $25,000 behind on its remittances of source deductions. Between January and June 3, 1983, the company had operated smoothly and the deductions at source had been made and remitted to the respondent. The company had also managed to make some payments on the arrears of its $25,000 debt. After the fire, a portion of the proceeds from the insurance was intercepted by the respondent pursuant to a garnishee order on the insurance company, which helped to eliminate the company"s entire debt to the respondent.
The January 1984 deductions at source were made and remitted to the respondent. However, in February, although a cheque for such remittances was received by the respondent, it was returned by the bank for lack of sufficient funds. In May 1984, an audit of the company"s books was performed by an officer of the respondent and at his request the appellant remitted four company cheques in the amount of $2,220 each, dated May 30, June 10, June 17 and June 25 to cover the arrears on the deductions for February and the subsequent months that had not been remitted. Three of these cheques were once again returned by the bank for insufficient funds.
On a subsequent audit, in August 1984, the appellant remitted 24 cheques for $500 each to the respondent"s representative, again to cover arrears on source deductions. These cheques were dated at one per week. The reasoning behind the remittance of these cheques was that it would be easier to convince the bank to accept a cheque for $500 rather than an appreciably greater amount. It is conceded that only three of these cheques were honoured by the bank.
In the subsequent months " May, June and July " the company did not remit source deductions, on the grounds, the witness testified, that the line of credit granted by the bank was exceeded and that experience demonstrated that the cheques would not have been honoured by the bank in any event.
The witness stated that he contacted his bank manager every day to try to convince him to honour the company"s cheques, and that he never notified him or suggested to him that the bank should honour suppliers" cheques rather than those in favour of the respondent.
The evidence also showed that the company owed about $102,000 to the bank in March 1984, and that this amount was reduced to $16,670 by the end of November, and the witness"s explanation was that during this period the bank had refused to honour a major portion of the company"s cheques.
The second witness who testified was the manager of the Cowansville branch of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. He explained that he had been in this position since August 1983, that is, shortly after the fire that closed the plant. He generally confirmed the appellant"s testimony.
In August 1983, the company had no accounts receivable, but had been given a secured loan by the Quebec government in the amount of $60,000 to help it start up again.
In December 1980 the bank had obtained a general assignment of debts (the assignment), a copy of which was produced by the witness. He explained that the bank had an account in the company"s name called "transactions" and that all the money received by the company on its sales was deposited in this account under the provisions of the assignment. These deposits were used the same day to reduce the company"s debt to the bank, a debt that had been established in accordance with the credit line the bank had granted it. The amount of this debt varied each day, therefore, according to the deposits. The bank also had a "disbursements" account in the company"s name against which the cheques it issued were debited. There was also a "salaries" account against which the employees" pay cheques were debited. The "disbursements" account and the "salaries" account were supplied from the "transactions" account, and as long as the company did not exceed the credit line granted by the bank the cheques it drew were honoured by the bank, whether to pay suppliers or employees or any other account including the Receiver General of Canada. If the "transactions" account was in deficit, the bank made up the difference from the line of credit. If the line of credit was exceeded, the bank could finance the difference at its discretion, and, to use the words of the witness, "if I want".
At first, that is, in August 1983, with the government loan, when the company had a line of credit of about $100,000, the business had no financial problems with the bank. This line of credit was based on 75% of the value of the accounts receivable under 90 days and 50% of the value of the inventory.
The appellant"s counsel tried to get the witness to admit that when the available funds under the credit line were almost used up, he made a choice as to which cheques would be honoured by the bank. Although his replies were somewhat evasive on this point, suggesting that the appellant was consulted on which cheques should be returned, he did not say that the appellant had the final decision. Moreover, in reply to some questions by counsel, the witness said: "[Translation ] I pay some cheques that are important, that are important to the business, the suppliers" (page 126 of the transcript). Asked the difference between a cheque in favour of the government and a pay cheque in favour of the employees, he admitted without hesitation: "[Translation ] I have to choose the pay, for example" (page 130). He added: "[Translation ] It may be more important to keep a supplier current and of course the wages and Hydro and the cheques that are really... the rent."
The witness stated that the bank had changed its policy a few years ago and now had to ensure that a firm"s deductions on employees" salaries were paid, and that today the cheques in favour of the Receiver General, in the company"s situation in 1984, would be honoured by the bank. He confirmed that the appellant had been very cooperative with the bank and that he was in daily contact with him in an effort to bail out the company. The company"s account was ultimately referred to the bank"s head office in the course of 1984.
Finally, on September 24, 1984, the bank sent a letter to the appellants by registered mail officially demanding a settlement on the company"s account, which was owing $124,251 as of that date, in addition to $1,865.70 in interest. This amount was also claimed against the appellants as guarantors of the company.
On October 30, 1984, the company made a giving in payment of its property in favour of the bank. A copy of the document to this effect was produced at the hearing.
A third witness was called by the respondent"s counsel. This was Mr. Gilles Desruisseaux, a collection officer with the respondent who was responsible for the file on the appellants and the company. He confirmed what the appellant had said concerning the company"s difficulties with the respondent in relation to the source deductions " the fact that the arrears of $25,000 had finally been settled toward the end of September 1983, and the difficulties that had occurred in 1984. He referred to the audit performed in May and the agreement that had been negotiated with the appellant for and on behalf of the company concerning the four cheques for $2,220 for the February, March and April arrears. He also referred to the agreement of August 20, 1984 under which the appellant had delivered the 24 cheques for $500 each to the respondent"s representatives, three of which had been honoured by the bank.
He said that on November 8, 1984, a new audit by the respondent"s representatives had assessed the company"s arrears on deductions at source for income tax and employees" unemployment insurance contributions, as well as interest and penalties on these deductions, at $9,250, which covered the period from May to September. A final audit on March 27, 1985 assessed the arrears at $25,981.77, again including tax, unemployment insurance, penalties and interest.
Under cross-examination by the appellant"s counsel, he conceded that during the audit of November 8, 1984, the respondent"s representatives had noted that the company had ceased its operations, that is, since September, although it had made a giving in payment of its property. Here are some of his replies to the questions by counsel:
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Q. But you admit that Mr. Champeval did contact you to give you some... he was prepared to give you some assets, some information on the assets the company had, out of which the government could have arranged to pay itself. |
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A. But... A while ago you asked me also why we had waited a while, in the end. We did get some writs issued, and we sent a bailiff on site to verify whether there was still some property. O.K. I agree with you... |
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A. There was a delay, but still we, that"s how we proceed. You can"t come in overnight and say: We"re seizing. We do have to follow some procedures. |
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A. I fully agree. Except that you admit that you were getting Mr. Champeval"s cooperation at that time. |
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A. Yes, but... what someone thinks and what is feasible, sometimes are two (2) different things. |
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A. No, no, I understand that the Department may have had some problems in executing the things that the gentleman was prepared to remit to you, but I mean, it was still collaboration that he was offering to you at that point. |
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What is striking about this exchange between the respondent"s witness and the appellant"s counsel is that the respondent"s representatives knew in November 1984 that the company had ceased its operations, and that it was not until May 14, 1986 that the assessments were issued against the appellants, and March 30, 1987 that the Notification of Confirmation was likewise issued, although the Notice of Objection to the assessments was dated August 13, 1986. It should also be noted that the respondent"s witness admitted that the appellant cooperated with its representatives at all times throughout this difficult period for the company.
This appeal rests on the application of section 227.1 of the Act, which provides:
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227.1(1) Where a corporation has failed to deduct or withhold an amount as required by subsection 135(3) or section 153 or 215, has failed to remit such an amount or has failed to pay an amount of tax for a taxation year as required under Part VII or VIII, the directors of the corporation at the time the corporation was required to deduct, withhold, remit or pay the amount are jointly and severally liable, together with the corporation, to pay that amount and any interest or penalties relating thereto. |
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(2) A director is not liable under subsection (1), unless |
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(a) a certificate for the amount of the corporation"s liability referred to in that subsection has been registered in the Federal Court of Canada under subsection 223(2) and execution for such amount has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; |
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(b) the corporation has commenced liquidation or dissolution proceedings or has been dissolved and a claim for the amount of the corporation"s liability referred to in that subsection has been proved within six months after the earlier of the date of commencement of the proceedings and the date of dissolution; or |
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(c) the corporation has made an assignment or a receiving order has been made against it under the Bankruptcy Act and a claim for the amount of the corporation"s liability referred to in that subsection has been proved within six months after the date of the assignment or receiving order. |
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(3) A director is not liable for a failure under subsection (1) where he exercised the degree of care, diligence and skill to prevent the failure that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in comparable circumstances. |
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The liability of a director of a company as established by subsection 227.1(1) is not absolute. It is contingent, that is, the director is discharged when he has acted with the degree of care, diligence and skill that a reasonable person would have exercised in comparable circumstances. In order to determine whether a director has exercised the degree of care, diligence or skill required under subsection 227.1(3), the director must have full discretion to exercise it. If he lacked this discretion owing to factors completely outside his control, he cannot be subject to the provisions of subsection 227.1(1) because subsection (3) exonerates him of any personal liability, as in the circumstances a reasonable person would not have been able to act otherwise. Addy J. of the Federal Court of Canada, in a recent (unreported) judgment, Lucette Robitaille v. Her Majesty the Queen [since reported at 90 DTC 6059 " Translator], had the following to say about a director"s liability under subsection 227.1(1) in a situation in which the management of a company had been taken over by a bank:
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Furthermore, where the effective control of the corporation has been taken over by a bank such as in the case under appeal, without the bank being requested or invited to do so by the directors, and where the decisions as to what cheques will or will not be issued without consultation with the Board of Directors, are exclusively those of the bank, then from that time the actions of the corporation regarding the payment or withholding of monies are essentially those of the bank and I would be prepared to hold that, even without considering section 227.1(3), there would be no liability on the directors under section 227. 1(1) because the latter obviously contemplates that the corporation is freely acting through its Board of Directors. The exercise of freedom of choice on the part of the director is essential in order to establish personal liability. |
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In the situation that interests us in this appeal, it must be kept in mind that in 1980 the company had made a general assignment of its receivables under subsection 173(1) of the Bank Act. At the time, this was not a measure that would release it of its obligations to its creditors, but rather an undertaking, common in the business community, that enabled it to finance and continue its operations using bank advances. This undertaking to the bank is contained in a document, as follows:
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FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION the receipt of which it acknowledges, the undersigned |
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hereby sells, assigns and conveys to the CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE (hereinafter referred to as the "Bank") all of the accounts, debts, claims and monies that are currently or will become at any time hereafter owing to the undersigned or payable to the undersigned or the property of the undersigned and all of the securities, bills of exchange, promissory notes and other documents that currently or will at any time hereafter be taken, held or acquired by the undersigned in relation to the said accounts, debts, claims and monies or any part thereof and all of the books and documents pertaining thereto evidencing or concerning the said accounts, debts, claims and monies or any part thereof (hereinafter referred to as the "assigned interests"), and it is agreed that: |
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1. The Bank may collect, realize on or otherwise use the assigned interests in such manner and at such time as it sees fit and all sums received by the undersigned shall be in trust for the Bank. Once the Bank has received some assigned interests in partial payment, the Bank undertakes to apply an amount equal to the sum received against such part of the debts and obligations of the undersigned in such manner as the Bank considers appropriate without prejudicing its claims against the undersigned for any failure to do so. The Bank may grant postponements, take and deliver securities, accept arrangements, grant reprieves and discharges, and act in any other way with the debtors of the assigned interests and with third parties and with the assigned interests in such manner as the Bank considers appropriate without diminishing the debts and obligations of the undersigned to the Bank. |
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2. The Bank shall not be liable or obligated to take account of any failure to collect, realize on or obtain payment of the assigned interests or any part thereof, nor to undertake legal proceedings for this purpose as a means of maintaining the Bank"s rights or the benefits of the undersigned or of any other person in relation to the assigned interests. The Bank may request on its own behalf and pay to other persons reasonable amounts for services rendered and expenses incurred in collecting, realizing on or demanding payment of the assigned interests or any part thereof and the Bank may add these amounts to the debt of the undersigned. |
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3. The undersigned shall, from time to time when required by the Bank, supply the Bank in writing with any information it requests pertaining to the assigned interests and the Bank shall be entitled from time to time to examine all of the accounts, securities, bills of exchange, promissory notes, books, correspondence, papers and documents pertaining to the assigned interests and to make copies thereof and for this purpose the Bank shall have access to any premises occupied by the undersigned. At the Bank"s request, all of the said contracts, securities, bills of exchange, promissory notes, books, correspondence and documents shall be delivered forthwith to the Bank. |
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EXECUTED in Cowansville, Province of Quebec, |
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this 18th day of December, 1980. |
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(SEAL)
CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE
by
[Signatures illegible]
In view of this agreement, it is obvious that the company had consigned to the bank the effective control of all inputs of money it would be collecting in the future and that its role in relation to these funds was that of a trustee who was acting for and on behalf of the bank. In law the bank was the owner of these monies. In return, the bank had undertaken to grant the company a line of credit established in accordance with some very specific standards, as was explained by the bank"s representative in the course of his testimony.
The scenario that followed is quite explicable. As long as the financial advances made by the bank to the company remained within the limits of the line of credit, as determined by its accounts receivable and inventory, the appellant, as an officer of the company, was fulfilling for it the trustee functions it had assumed on behalf of the bank in December 1980. As such, and obviously with the implicit authorization of the bank, he could dispose of the money collected by the company, and which legally belonged to the bank, to balance his transactions. Unfortunately, in the wake of the disastrous events in 1983 the company"s operations collapsed and ultimately ceased in September.
From February 1984 on, the bank exercised its rights under the December 1980 assignment and honoured those cheques of the company which, as the bank manager conceded, would benefit its operations. In these circumstances, it was laughable for him, in his testimony, to suggest, as he attempted to do, that the appellant was actively participating in the final decision as to which cheques would be honoured by the bank. The terms of the assignment gave the bank unfettered control over all of the money collected by the company and the goal it pursued was in the first place to protect its own interests out of the securities it held, an attitude that was completely legitimate on its part. That is why the accounts that in its opinion were indispensable to the continuity of the company"s operations were paid and the others were postponed.
It should also be noted that on two occasions the appellant tried to settle the company"s problems with the Department: in May 1984, when he deposited four cheques for $2,220 each, one of which was honoured by the bank, and in August of the same year when he delivered 24 cheques of $500 each and three were honoured by the bank. Furthermore, as Mr. Gilles Desruisseaux, the respondent"s witness, admitted, the appellant cooperated fully with the bank"s representatives. These considerations concerning the appellant"s attitude toward the Department, and the efforts he made to try to resolve the problems of deductions on the wages of the company"s employees, taken as a whole, clearly show, first, that he was aware of the situation and, second, that he at least tried to rectify it, in so far as this was possible in the circumstances. Unfortunately, he had no freedom of choice as to the final decision. In Lucette Robitaille , supra, Addy J. defines the application of this subsection very well when he states:
. . . there would be no liability on the directors under section 227. 1(1) because the latter obviously contemplates that the corporation is freely acting through its Board of Directors. The exercise of freedom of choice on the part of the director is essential in order to establish personal liability.
In Perri et al v. M.N.R., 89 DTC 723, a case in which the facts were appreciably similar to those in this case, the associate chief judge of this Court acknowledged that in this situation the authority or powers of the appellants as directors of the company in question had been relegated to a receiver, court-appointed or otherwise, appointed for the purposes of administering its operations.
In the appellants" situation, the company had waived this freedom of choice in the administration of its operations in favour of the bank in 1980 for purely business reasons that did not and should not have had any repercussions on its obligations under the Act. When the bank exercised its rights under the assignment, it had full and unfettered discretion, which is referred to in the recent cases and is essential for the application of subsection 227.1(1).
For these reasons, the appeals shall be allowed, with costs, although the fees of only one solicitor shall be allowed for the hearing of the appeals.
OTTAWA, Canada
January 10, 1990
Certified true translation
Bernard Olivier
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
| FILE NO: T-1258-90/T-1259-90 |
| STYLE: Her Majesty the Queen |
| - and - Rose-Marie Champeval |
| - and - Jean-Pierre Champeval |
| PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec |
| DATE OF HEARING: January 19 and 20, 1999 |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF ROULEAU J.:
APPEARANCES:
| Valérie Tardif FOR THE APPLICANT |
| Jean-Marc Savoie FOR THE RESPONDENTS |
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
| Morris A. Rosenberg FOR THE APPLICANT |
Deputy Attorney General
of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario
| Savoie, Lacasse, Barbant & Sévigny FOR THE RESPONDENTS |
Advocates
Granby, Quebec
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