Date: 20020524
Docket: IMM-2560-01
Neutral Citation: 2002 FCT 588
BETWEEN:
HARJIT SINGH and
SATINDER BIR KAUR
Applicants,
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent.
REASONS FOR ORDER
KELEN J.:
[1] This is an application pursuant to section 18.1 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.F-7 for judicial review of the decision of Immigration Officer Ron Legault, dated May 9, 2001, wherein the application for landing was refused on the grounds that the applicant, Harjit Singh, is within the class of inadmissible persons defined in paragraph 19(1)(c.1) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-2 ("the Act") in that he had committed an offence outside of Canada which if committed in Canada would be an indictable offence punishable by 10 or more years in prison, and therefore the applicant, and by extension the co-applicant, his wife, are not permitted to obtain an immigrant visa.
[2] This case raises two main issues:
- i. is the applicant, as part of the duty of fairness, entitled to an oral hearing before the immigration officer when the applicant challenges the veracity of facts relied upon by the Immigration Department; and,
- ii. does the duty of procedural fairness require the provision of reasons regarding the immigration officer's findings of credibility with respect to evidence submitted by the applicant?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[3] On March 5, 1988, the main applicant Harjit Singh, and his wife Satinder Bir Kaur, entered Canada and were granted visitor status until June 5, 1988. On May 6, 1988, the applicants made a claim for Convention refugee status. Their three children, all minors at that time, entered Canada between 1989 and 1991.
[4] The applicants made four applications pursuant to subsection 114(2) of the Act for admission to Canada owing to the existence of humanitarian and compassionate considerations (H & C application). The first two H & C applications, on February 22, 1989, and March 6, 1991, were unsuccessful.
[5] On June 8, 1992, the applicants were found not to be Convention refugees. A deportation order was issued against them. In July 1992, a third H & C application was decided against the applicants. In September 1994, the applicants then-minor children were found to be Convention refugees.
[6] The applicants again applied for landing under s.114(2) of the Immigration Act. This H & C application was approved in principle on November 18, 1994 because their children would be in Canada. However, the processing of the landing application from within Canada was delayed due to an investigation with respect to Mr. Singh's alleged criminal activities.
[7] In February 2001, Immigration Officer Ron Legault, responsible for investigating immigration matters related to individuals incarcerated at Maplehurst Detention Center in Milton, Ontario was contacted by Sargeant Branden Baron of the Peel Regional Police. The police officer reported the presence of an inmate Harjit Singh, the main applicant, who was facing charges. Sgt. Baron provided information alleging that the main applicant had been convicted of offences in India in 1995. Officer Legault then initiated an investigation of the main applicant under subsection 19(1)(c.1)(i) of the Act.
[8] On March 27, 2001, at the Maplehurst Detention Center, the main applicant was served by Immigration Officer Legault with written notification dated March 26, 2001, that his application for landing may be refused on the grounds that he was inadmissible under subsection 19(1)(c.1)(i) of the Act. Attached to the letter from Officer Legault was the evidence supporting the allegation that the main applicant had been convicted of a criminal offence in India in 1995. The evidence consisted of:
- iii. an affidavit from an R.C.M.P. officer who attended the police offices in New Delhi and obtained the fingerprints and photograph of Lakhbir Singh who was arrested in India on August 31, 1995 and convicted of certain criminal offences on March 19, 1996. This evidence showed that the main applicant Harjit Singh was in fact Lakhbir Singh, the person convicted in India; and,
- iv. a statement from two Canadian police officers with the Forensic Identification Service of the Peel Regional Police, that the ten (10) fingerprints received from the R.C.M.P. Interpol in India, are the fingerprints of the main applicant.
[9] In response to the letter dated March 26, 2001, counsel for the main applicant sent a letter to the immigration officer dated March 30, 2001 requesting a thirty (30) day extension of time to make representations on behalf of the main applicant. This letter explained that it was necessary to gather evidence both in India and in Canada.
[10] On April 23, 2001 Immigration Officer Legault wrote to counsel for the main applicant granting an extension of time until May 4, 2001, providing counsel with access to the Immigration Department file, and allowing counsel to contact and question the police officer with the police information regarding the main applicant.
[11] On April 30, 2001 counsel for the main applicant filed submissions including evidence in the form of six statutory declarations from family and friends testifying that the main applicant did not leave Canada or travel to India at time in 1995. The statutory declaration of the main applicant also stated:
I have no explanation as to why the police has a dossier with someone else's name but with my fingerprints. I can only assume that this is part of an effort made by certain persons to frame me for crimes that I did not commit. I am completely innocent of these charges.
[12] As well, counsel for the main applicant enclosed a letter from the applicant's religious congregation confirming that he attends the temple "every weekend without missing one". At the time the letter was written, the applicant had been incarcerated for months so that the letter was clearly wrong.
IMMIGRATION OFFICER DECISION
[13] On May 8, 2001, the officer found the applicants to be inadmissible to Canada under subsection 19(1)(c.1)(i) of the Act, and therefore the February 1994 H & C application for landing, which had been approved in principle, must be refused. The applicants were notified of this decision by letter dated May 9, 2001, hand delivered on May 17, 2001 to Mr. Singh while incarcerated at the Maplehurst Detention Centre in Milton, Ontario.
[14] The officer's decision is evident from the following documents on the record:
- i. the letter to Mr. Singh dated May 9, 2001 referred to above;
- ii. the officer's "ASSESSMENT OF A114(2) APPLICATION BY HARJIT SINGH AND FAMILY" dated May 8, 2001;
- iii. the REPORT UNDER SECTION 27 OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION dated May 7, 2001;
- iv. the "ASSESSMENT OF ALLEGATIONS OF FOREIGN CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS AGAINST HARJIT SINGH" dated May 7, 2001; and,
- v. the "CASE SYNOPSIS: HARJIT SINGH" dated March 21, 2001
- i. The Letter
[15] The letter dated May 9, 2001, reads, in part:
Your written submissions related to this matter have been received and carefully reviewed. In considering your submissions and all information on file, it appears that you are person [sic] described in paragraph 19(1)(c.1) of the Immigration Act, in that you were convicted of criminal offences in India.
As such, permanent residence in Canada cannot be granted to you nor your wife, and your applications for permanent residence must be refused. This means that the exemption from the requirement to obtain an immigrant visa originally granted in your case has no further effect. [Emphasis in original document.]
[16] The document titled "ASSESSMENT OF A114(2) APPLICATION BY HARJIT SINGH AND FAMILY", dated May 8, 2001, found at page 7 of the Tribunal Record, reads in part:
Today, I have conducted an assessment of the application. In assessing the application, I have considered the following information/facts:
[17] The officer then lists all documentation relevant to the various applications and submissions detailed above, before concluding:
After assessing the foregoing, the writer must conclude that the subject is inadmissible to Canada pursuant to A19(1)(c.1)(I), and concludes that the application for subject and his wife must be refused.
[...]
It is noted that subject is still facing multiple fraud-related charges before Brampton Provincial Court, and will not be removable until charges are disposed of. Insufficient evidence exists that subject, his wife, or his children would suffer undue hardship should subject and his wife be removed from Canada. The writer notes that subject's adult children, as Convention refugees, cannot be removed from Canada, and have submitted their own, separate application for landing. Separate processing was initiated at the request of subject in a letter dated 04 February 1997.
[18] The document titled "REPORT UNDER SECTION 27 OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT", dated May 7, 2001, found at page 8 of the tribunal Record, reads in part:
THIS REPORT IS BASED ON INFORMATION IN MY POSSESSION AS FOLLOWS:
THAT HARJIT SINGH:
IS NOT A CANADIAN CITIZEN OR PERMANENT RESIDENT;
WAS CONVICTED ON 19 MARCH 1996 AT NEW DELHI, INDIA OF ‘CHEATING' CONTRARY TO SECTION 420 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, AN OFFENCE WHICH, IF COMMITTED IN CANADA, WOULD EQUATE TO THE OFFENCE OF FORGERY OF, OR UTTERING FORGED PASSPORT, SECTION 57(1) OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA;
WAS CONVICTED ON 19 MARCH 1996 AT NEW DELHI, INDIA OF ‘CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY' CONTRARY TO SECTION 120B OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, AN OFFENCE WHICH, IF COMMITTED IN CANADA, WOULD EQUATE TO THE OFFENCE OF FORGERY OF CONSPIRE TO COMMIT INDICTABLE OFFENCE, 465(1)(B)(I), OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA;
THE OFFENCE OF UTTERING FORGED PASSPORT CARRIES A MAXIMUM SENTENCE OF FOURTEEN YEARS IMPRISONMENT;
THE OFFENCE OF CONSPIRE TO COMMIT INDICTABLE OFFENCE CARRIES A MAXIMUM SENTENCE OF TEN YEARS IMPRISONMENT;
iv. The Allegations of Foreign Criminal Convictions
[19] The document titled "ASSESSMENT OF ALLEGATIONS OF FOREIGN CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS AGAINST HARJIT SINGH", found at page 9 of the Tribunal Record, reads in part:
In March 2001, I received evidence from Sgt. Branden Baron, Peel Regional Police, that gave the writer grounds to believe that subject was inadmissible to Canada as he was described in subsection 19(1)(c.1)(I) of the Immigration Act.
The evidence received supported that subject had been convicted in New Delhi, India, on 19 March 1996 under sections 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code under the alias of Lakhbir SINGH. Subject was arrested and charged on 31Aug95 by Delhi Police stationed at India Ghandi International Airport when is was [sic] alleged that he had attempted to illegally escort a child out of India using a passport containing a forged arrival stamp. As a result of the conviction, subject was fined 10,000 rupees [approximately CAN$320.00] or sentenced, in default, to three months imprisonment.
Pursuant to a criminal investigation being carried out in Canada, Peel Regional Police contacted the RCMP liaison officer at the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi, India. In response to their query, the liaison officer met with the above noted Delhi Police staff, and obtained information, including photo, fingerprint and footprint information from that constabulary, and forwarded evidence and an affidavit to Peel Regional Police.
[...]
On 27Mar01, the writer hand-delivered written notification to subject that we were in possession of evidence giving grounds to believe that he was described in subsection 19(1)(c.1)(I) of the Act for criminal offences in India in 1995. To that letter the writer attached copies of documents which had led to the allegation. He was given 15 days to prepare written submissions to this office concerning the allegations. In response to a request by counsel, subject was granted an extension to 05May01 in order to prepare written submissions. At request of counsel, the writer provided the telephone number of the investigating officer with Peel Regional Police.
In a submission dated 30Apr01, counsel requested access to the RCMP officer involved in the investigation in New Delhi: counsel was again referred to the investigating officer with Peel Regional Police. Counsel also requested that arrangements be made for the writer to conduct a personal interview with subject at Maplehurst Detention Centre: this request was denied per IP5 guidelines, in that writer concluded that no such interview was required in order to properly assess the case. (Underlining added for emphasis.)
In a statutory declaration dated 26 April 2001, subject affirms that he was not in India on 31 August 1995 and that he was never charged or convicted by the Indian authorities of any offence. He also states that he has no explanation as to why the police had a dossier with someone else's name but with his fingerprints. He states that he assumes that it is an effort made by certain persons to frame him.
[...]
CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
The writer has reviewed the evidence provided by Peel Regional Police, as well as submission by counsel for subject. The writer concludes that subject is reportable pursuant to subsection 19(1)(c.1)(I) of the Act. A report pursuant to section 27 of the Act has been completed, and is included below. No direction to Inquiry is recommended, as a deportation order was issued against subject at Inquiry held in Toronto on 08June92 and it remains unexecuted. As assessment of subject's wife's A114(2) applications, dated 14Feb94, will be conducted forthwith.
LEGISLATION
Definition of Inadmissible Person
[20] Paragraph 19(1)(c.1)(i) of the Immigration Act reads:
Inadmissible Classes
Inadmissible persons
19. (1) No person shall be granted admission who is a member of any of the following classes:
[...]
(c.1) persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe
i) have been convicted outside Canada of an offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence that may be punishable under any Act of Parliament by a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more, or
Catégories non admissibles
Personnes non admissibles
19. (1) Les personnes suivantes appartiennent à une catégorie non admissible:
[...]
(c.1) celles dont il y a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu'elles ont, à l'étranger:
(i) soit été déclarées coupables d'une infraction qui, si elle était commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction qui pourrait être punissable, aux termes d'unde loi fédérale, d'un emprisonnement maximal égal ou supérieur à dix ans, sauf si elles peuvent justifier auprès
du ministre de leur rédaptation et du fait qu'au moins cinq ans se sont écoulés depuis l'expiration de toute peine leur ayant étéinfligée pour l'infraction,
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[21] It is settled law that the standard of review applicable to H & C decisions made under subsection 114(2) of the Act is reasonableness simplicter. Under this standard of review, a decision should be set aside if it is unreasonable, which means that it is not supported by reasons that can
stand up to a somewhat probing examination. See Kim v. Canada (Minister Citizenship of Immigration), [2000] FCJ No. 43 per Dawson J. at paragraphs 11 and 12. And Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at paragraphs 62 and 63.
[22] The Court will also review the decision to ensure that the decision is not based on an error of law, or the decision was not made in accordance with procedural fairness or the rules of natural justice. On these latter grounds, the standard of review is correctness.
ANALYSIS
[23] Mr. Singh has been in Canada since 1988. He made three H & C applications which were unsuccessful and an unsuccessful claim for Convention refugee status. His fourth H & C application in 1994 was successful because his three then-minor children were found to be Convention refugees in 1994. Mr. Singh's "Assessment for Landing Summary of Immigration File Information" as of May, 1997 shows that he was being investigated with respect to many criminal activities. In fact, Mr. Singh swore a statutory declaration on May 18, 1995 denying his involvement in criminal activities specifically the illegal transportation of individuals out of India, the falsification of passport documents, the making of death threats and the smuggling of individuals and passports out of India. Accordingly, Mr. Singh had knowledge that he was under investigation by the R.C.M.P. as long ago as May 18, 1995. For that reason, Mr. Singh's application for landing was under review for some time.
ReasonablenessSimpliciter
[24] The immigration officer's decision that Mr. Singh is within the class of inadmissable persons defined in paragraph 19(1)(c.1) of the Act is reasonable in that the R.C.M.P. based in India have provided the criminal record from India with extensive fingerprint, footprint, and handprint evidence, and photographs. The immigration officer weighed this clear, forensic evidence about Mr. Singh's 1995 arrest and 1996 conviction against the statutory declarations from Mr. Singh, his children and his friends that Mr. Singh never left Canada during that time frame, and accepted the forensic evidence as credible.
[25] Accordingly, on the standard of review of reasonableness simpliciter, the immigration officer's decision is reasonable, and will not be set aside on this basis.
Duty of Procedural Fairness and the Right to an Oral Hearing
[26] In this case, the immigration officer had six statutory declarations and a letter from Mr. Singh's temple all stating that Mr. Singh was in Canada, and not in India, during the material time period. On the other hand, there was police evidence that Mr. Singh was convicted of a criminal offence in India on March 19, 1996. This evidence was supported with an affidavit from an R.C.M.P. officer based in India. The file from the New Delhi Police with respect to Mr. Singh using an alias, Lakhbir Singh, has extensive fingerprint evidence, footprint evidence, handprint evidence which identified the applicant herein as the person convicted in India to the immigration officer's satisfaction. As well there is a photograph taken by the New Delhi Police of "Lakhbir Singh" at the time of his arrest, which has not been denied by the main applicant to be his photograph. Moreover, the extensive finger-print evidence, which has been carefully analyzed by Canadian police and compared with Mr. Singh's finger-prints, conclusively identifies Mr. Singh as the person convicted in India.
[27] The applicants' main submission is that the immigration officer breached the duty of procedural fairness by denying the applicants an oral hearing before deciding whether to accept police evidence, and dismiss the evidence submitted by Mr. Singh that he was not in India at the material time.
[28] The Supreme Court of Canada in Baker, supra., stated at paragraph 34 that immigration officer decisions are "very different from judicial decisions". The Supreme Court recognized that the Immigration Act provides the Minister with flexibility on practice and procedure, and that immigration officers do not conduct interviews in many cases. This Court held that an oral hearing is not always necessary to ensure a fair hearing. However, the applicant must be provided with a full opportunity to know the case he has to meet and to respond before the decision is made. The applicant must have a meaningful opportunity to present the various types of evidence relevant to his or her case and have it fully and fairly considered. See Baker, supra., paragraphs 31 to 34.
[29] I am satisfied that the applicants had the "meaningful opportunity", and acted on that opportunity, to produce full and complete written documentation submissions in relation to their case. In this sense the immigration officer satisfied the requirements of "participatory rights" required by the duty of fairness in this case.
[30] The immigration officer decided that no personal interview was necessary implicitly because the evidence of the criminal conviction was clear and credible. In the document titled "ASSESSMENT OF ALLEGATIONS OF FOREIGN CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS AGAINST HARJIT SINGH", the immigration officer wrote:
"Counsel also requested that arrangements be made for the writer to conduct a personal interview with subject at Maplehurst Detention Center: this request was denied per I.P.5 Guidelines, in that writer concluded that no such interview was required in order to properly assess the case. (Underlining added for emphasis.)
Just because Mr. Singh denied that he was convicted of a criminal offence in India does not mean that the immigration officer must conduct an oral hearing on the subject. Mr. Singh has known since 1995 that the Immigration Department was investigating his criminal record. If Mr. Singh had evidence that this criminal record was wrong, he had years to gather that information and present it. The evidence presented by Mr. Singh was obviously found by the immigration officer to deserve no weight or credibility in view of the clear police evidence of Mr. Singh's criminal conviction in India. Accordingly, if the immigration officer does not consider an oral hearing necessary to assess the credibility of the evidence, and if that decision is reasonable, which in this case it is, then an oral hearing is not required in accordance with the duty of procedural fairness.
[31] Counsel for the respondent provided the case of Kim, supra., where Dawson J. observed at paragraphs 21 and 22 that an oral hearing is not always required to ensure a fair hearing where the immigration officer rejected the evidence of the applicants without an interview. Madam Justice Dawson reiterated that:
"What is required is meaningful participation in the decision-making process."
[32] As in the Kim case, it is difficult in this case to see what new information Mr. Singh could have presented about the criminal conviction in India if an interview had been granted. Accordingly, the absence of an interview does not constitute a breach of the duty of fairness.
[33] The applicants refer to two cases: Kaberuka v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 3 F.C. 252 (T.D), and Tehrankari v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 1420, (T.D), which held that an oral hearing is necessary where credibility is an essential issue to the case. Both cases are distinguishable. In the case at bar, the immigration officer concluded that no personal interview was required in order to properly assess the credibility of the police evidence which conclusively proved that Mr. Singh was convicted of the criminal offence in 1996. Accordingly, the immigration officer did not consider that there was a bona fide credibility issue to be assessed.
The Duty of Fairness and the Requirement for Reasons
[34] The applicants submit that the duty of fairness in this case requires that the immigration officer provide reasons for the decision, and that the failure to provide reasons is a breach of the principles of fairness. In Baker, supra. at paragraph 43, the Supreme Court recognized that the duty of procedural fairness will require the provision of a written explanation for a decision. However, the requirement for reasons can be fulfilled if the applicants are provided with notes of the immigration officer on the file which explain the reasons for the decision. The Supreme Court spoke of the requirements of the duty of fairness with a recognition of the "day-to-day realities of administrative agencies". In this case I am of the view that the immigration officer provided extensive reasons for the decision in four documents on the file:
- i. The ASSESSMENT OF A114(2) APPLICATION BY HARJIT SINGH dated May 8, 2001;
ii. The REPORT UNDER SECTION 27 OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT dated May 7, 2001;
iii. The ASSESSMENT OF ALLEGATIONS OF FOREIGN CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS AGAINST HARJIT SINGH, dated May 7, 2001;
iv. The letter to Mr. Singh dated May 9, 2002
[35] The applicants submit that the reasons did not contain specific credibility findings with respect to the statutory declarations affirming that Mr. Singh was not in India on August 31, 1995, the date of the charge which led to his conviction. The immigration officer references this evidence in the "ASSESSMENT OF ALLEGATIONS OF FOREIGN CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS AGAINST HARJIT SINGH". It is clear that the immigration officer considered the evidence on
both sides and concluded that Mr. Singh is the subject of a criminal conviction. While the immigration officer did not specifically reject as not credible the statutory declarations and letter from the temple that Mr. Singh was at all material times in Canada, this is the obvious conclusion. The immigration officer was faced with comprehensive and certain forensic evidence that Mr. Singh is the person convicted of the criminal offence under the Indian Penal Code. In Baker, supra. the Supreme Court of Canada held that individuals are entitled to fair procedures and open-decision
making, but in the administrative context, "this transparency may take place in various ways". The Court concluded that the notes of the immigration officer satisfy the requirements for reasons under the duty of procedural fairness and that they will be taken to be the reasons for the decision. It is not necessary for the immigration officer to operate as a judicial or quasi judicial tribunal which hears evidence, and makes specific findings with respect to the evidence. In this case, it is abundantly clear that the immigration officer, after considering the evidence presented by the applicants, dismissed the evidence as not credible in the face of clear police evidence, including finger-prints and photographic evidence, that Mr. Singh was convicted of the criminal offence. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the reasons for the decision are evident from the file.
Certified Question
[36] The applicants request that the Court certify that a serious question of general importance is involved in this case. The proposed question is: "Is an H & C officer required to give an oral interview in all cases where credibility is an issue, notwithstanding an applicant being given an opportunity to submit written representations on the contentious issue?"
[37] The respondent submits that this question has already been answered by the Supreme Court in Baker, supra., and that the answer to the question turns on the facts of each case. In this case, the immigration officer decided that the declaration by Mr. Singh that he was in Canada, not India, at the material times, does not raise a substantive credibility issue in the face of conclusive, comprehensive forensic evidence to the contrary. If the case raised a serious credibility issue then I would agree that a personal interview or oral hearing is required before the immigration officer decides the issue.
[38] In my view, the proposed certified question has already been answered in the negative by the Supreme Court of Canada in Baker, supra. An oral hearing is not required in all cases. I do not think that an immigration officer is under a strict duty to grant an oral hearing because the applicant blatantly denies a clear and certain fact. Accordingly, I am of the view that this case does not raise a serious question of general importance which was not answered in Baker, supra. In any event, I am of the view that the statutory declarations of Mr. Singh, his daughter, his son and two of his friends, do not raise a serious credibility issue in the face of the clear, certain, forensic evidence establishing Mr. Singh's conviction under the India Penal Code. Accordingly, I decline to certify a question pursuant to subsection 83(1) of the Act.
[39] For these reasons, this application for judicial review is denied.
(signed) Michael A. Kelen
_____________________________
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
May 24, 2002
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-2560-01
STYLE OF CAUSE: HARJIT SINGH and
SATINDER BIR KAUR
Applicants
- and -
M.C.I.
Respondent
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: May 14, 2002
REASONS FOR ORDER OF THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KELEN
DATED: May 24, 2002
APPEARANCES:
Mr. Lorne Waldman FOR THE APPLICANTS
Ms. Aminda Riaz and
Ms. Pamela Larmondin FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Jackman, Waldman & Associates FOR THE APPLICANTS
Toronto, Ontario
Mr. Morris Rosenberg FOR THE RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
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