Date: 20010524
Docket: IMM-3589-99
Neutral Citation: 2001 FCT 520
BETWEEN:
MILOSAVA LECIC
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
MacKAY J.
[1] The applicant seeks judicial review of, and an order setting aside, a decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division (the "tribunal"), dated July 6, 1999, whereby it was determined that the applicant was not a Convention refugee.
[2] Ms. Lecic, the applicant, was born in Serbia, then part of Yugoslavia, in 1947. In 1952 she moved with her family to Sarajevo where she attended school and university, was married and subsequently divorced. When war broke out in Bosnia in 1992, she and her family, (i.e. her father and sister), moved to Serbia where they were accorded status as refugees. It is her evidence that they were treated as refugees, living in refugee accommodation, with the minimal support by the state but no right to vote or to move freely.
[3] In 1996 under UNHCR auspices she returned to Sarajevo hoping to reacquire the family's former apartment but that was impossible and she returned to Serbia where she remained until 1998.
[4] In that year her father, for whom she had provided care for sometime, died of cancer. A month after his death, in April 1998 she obtained a Serbian passport and a visitor's visa to visit Canada. Her evidence is that she obtained the passport through connections with a sympathetic official. On arrival in Canada on June 2, 1998 she immediately claimed refugee status.
[5] While the tribunal found her evidence credible and trustworthy in the main, it did not accept her evidence concerning the obtaining of her passport as the sole explanation of that acquisition. While it accepted that a Serbian official may have been sympathetic to her situation, it also found, on documentary evidence, that as of December 1997 Serbia authorized the grant of Serbian citizenship to Bosnian citizens without requiring that they give up Bosnian citizenship. The applicant was considered by the tribunal as one who benefited from the agreement between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the resulting change in Serbian citizenship law.
[6] The tribunal also accepted, on her evidence and from substantial documentary evidence, that refugees in Serbia had faced considerable difficulties in the past. Yet it concluded that she had not established that her status in Serbia would continue to be that of a refugee, given that she had obtained Serbian citizenship and a Serbian passport. Moreover, with the passport it was not established on a balance of probabilities that she would be treated as a refugee in Serbia, but even if she were so treated the tribunal did not accept that if she returned to Serbia she would face persecution.
[7] For the applicant it is urged that the tribunal ignored the sworn evidence of the applicant and substantial documentary evidence, in particular with reference to the applicant's status as a refugee in Serbia, and Serbian treatment of refugees, even if she and others like her were citizens of Serbia. I am not persuaded that the tribunal ignored that evidence, indeed some of it is specifically referred to in its decision. In my opinion the tribunal was acting within its discretion, and its conclusions were supportable on the evidence before it. Those conclusions, of facts, cannot be said to be capricious or without regard to the evidence.
[8] For the applicant it is also urged that the tribunal erred in finding that there was not a well-founded fear of persecution if she were to return to Serbia. Yet the finding was based upon the fact that she had been issued a Serbian passport, she was entitled to Serbian citizenship and even if she were still to be considered a refugee in Serbia, and her movement might be restricted, her employment limited and her allocated residence not what she would wish, she would still not be facing persecution for a Convention reason within Serbia.
[9] Finally, it was also urged that the tribunal did not fully and carefully consider the evidence presented by and on behalf of the applicant. At the commencement of the decision, which was rendered orally at the conclusion of the hearing, the presiding officer stated:
"...my colleague and I had an opportunity to speak with each other briefly over the last approximately half-hour and in an earlier break, just after submissions were taken. We have had an opportunity to consider all of the evidence in the case. ..."
[10] It is urged this demonstrates the tribunal made a hasty decision without careful consideration of the case. Nevertheless, as the Court of Appeal affirmed by dismissal of an appeal from Wetston J. in Isiaku v. M.C.I., (September 20, 1999, A-403-98 (F.C.A.)), there is no error in rendering oral reasons at the conclusion of the hearing and later reducing those to writing, as was here done. In Badurdeen v. M.C.I. (March 17, 1999, file IMM-1312-98) (F.C.T.D.)), Mr. Justice Evans, then of the Trial Division, noting the CRDD's responsibility to render a decision without delay, upheld the practice of rendering a negative oral decision promptly after the applicant was heard.
[11] In my opinion the rendering of a decision at the end of a hearing does not in itself lead to any inference that the tribunal failed to consider the relevant evidence before it. It must be shown that the tribunal erred by overlooking or seriously misconstruing evidence that might have led it to reach a different conclusion. That is not apparent in this case. In my opinion the tribunal's conclusions, and its ultimate decision, were supportable on the evidence submitted.
[12] In the circumstances, the application for judicial review is dismissed. A separate order to that effect, now issues.
[13] Counsel for both parties indicated that no question is raised for certification under s-s. 83(1) of the Immigration Act. No question is certified.
(signed) W. Andrew MacKay
JUDGE
OTTAWA, Ontario
May 24, 2001
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