Date: 19980212
Docket: IMM-377-97
BETWEEN:
SEYYED FARSHID-GHAZI
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
RICHARD J.:
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
[1] The applicant seeks judicial review of the opinion of the Minister issued under subsection 70(5) of the Immigration Act.
[2] The opinion of the Minister reads as follows:
| On the basis of information considered by me, I am of the opinion, pursuant to subsection 70(5) of the Immigration Act, that |
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Seyyed FARSHID GHAZI; 20DEC64; IRAN (STATELESS)
constitutes a danger to the public in Canada.
| Signed this 15th day of April 1996, at Ottawa in the Province of Ontario. |
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________________________
Delegate of the Minister
[3] I observe that a danger to the public opinion was also issued by the Minister's delegate under paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Immigration Act.
[4] An extension of time to commence this application for judicial review of the opinion of the Minister, made pursuant to subsection 70(5) of the Act, and leave to commence this application for judicial review of the opinion of the Minister, made pursuant to subsection 70(5) of the Act, was granted by Mr. Justice Cullen on November 5, 1997.
DANGER OPINIONS
[5] There are three sections in the Act which deal with a "danger" opinion, each having different consequences.
[6] A person found to be a danger pursuant to section 46.01, loses his/her right to have his/her Convention refugee claim heard. A person found to be a danger pursuant to subsection 53(1) may, in spite of being recognized as a Convention refugee and a permanent resident of Canada, be deported back to the country of his/her nationality. A person found to be a danger, pursuant to subsection 70(5), loses his/her opportunity to pursue an appeal of his/her deportation order before the Appeal Division, but is granted the right to seek to challenge the deportation order before the Trial Division, by way of a leave application, and if leave be granted, by way of a judicial review application1.
BACKGROUND
[7] The applicant is a male, born on December 20, 1964 in Iran. On January 29, 1988, the applicant became a permanent resident of Canada. He is not a Canadian citizen. He is presently stateless.
[8] In 1990, the applicant was charged with possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking and trafficking in narcotics contrary to the Narcotics Control Act less than one and a half years after having been granted permanent resident status in Canada.
[9] The court imposed the applicant a sentence of nine years for each of the counts.
[10] On November 21, 1994, the applicant's Immigration Inquiry was held at Millhaven Institution. At the conclusion of the Inquiry, the applicant was ordered deported pursuant to subsection 32(2) of the Act on the basis that he was a person described in subparagraph 27(1)(d)(i) of the Act.
[11] After his Immigration Inquiry, the applicant commenced an appeal of his Deportation Order to the Immigration Appeal Division (Appeal Division).
[12] On November 1, 1995, the applicant was advised by the respondent that the applicant may be considered to constitute a danger to the public, pursuant to subsection 70(5) of the Act.
[13] The letter enclosed copies of documents which would be presented to the Minister for his consideration of the applicant's case and invited the applicant to comment upon the documents by submitting representations, information or evidence regarding his being a danger to the public, any humanitarian and compassionate factors in his favour or risk upon return to the country from which he sought refuge, which may outweigh any danger he presents. The list reads:
| - Immigration Visa and Record of Landing |
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| - Report under Section 27 |
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| - Narrative Report Pursuant to Act 27(1) |
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| - RCMP Summary of Criminal Convictions |
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| - Warrant of Committal on Conviction |
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| - Criminal Profile Report - Millhaven Assessment Unit |
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| - Oral Reasons for Sentence |
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| - Record of Arrest & Supplementary |
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| - Page 6 of the Penitentiary Placement Report |
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| It should also be noted that the following sources may be considered in assessing any risk upon return: |
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| - Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994 and other publicly available documentary material |
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[14] On November 20, 1995, the applicant made submissions by way of a letter. Further, on January 31, 1996, the applicant's counsel sent written submissions including an affidavit of the applicant and a number of documents.
[15] In his affidavit, the applicant said that he served in the Iranian army for seven months and fled to Turkey in December 1985. He was recognized as a Refugee by the UNHCR on December 11, 1986. He remained in Turkey until 1988 when arrangements were made to resettle him in Canada. He arrived in Canada on January 29, 1988 and was granted permanent resident status in Canada.
[16] Upon receipt of the applicant's submissions, an immigration officer employed by the Criminal Backlog Review Task Force reviewed both the applicant's materials and those materials which the Case Management Branch had provided to the applicant.
[17] The reviewing officer prepared a report which summarized these materials.
[18] The officer concluded the report by recommending to the Manager that an opinion be sought from the Minister that the applicant constitutes a danger to the public in Canada pursuant to section 70 and subsection 53(1) of the Act.
[19] The Manager of the "Criminal Backlog Review Task Force" reviewed the report, concurred in the opinion that a danger opinion should be sought and forwarded all of the applicant's and the Department's documentation, along with the summary report, to the Minister's delegate for his review. Both concluded that he would not be at risk if he returned to Iran.
[20] The minister's delegate, upon review of all of these materials, rendered an opinion dated April 15, 1996, that the applicant constitutes a danger to the public in Canada.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[21] Subsection 32(2) of the Act reads as follows:
| 32(2) Where an adjudicator decides that a person who is the subject of inquiry is a permanent resident described in subsection 27(1), the adjudicator shall, subject to subsections (2.1) and 32.1(2), make a deportation order against that person. |
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[22] Paragraph 27(1)(d) of the Act reads as follows:
| 27.(1) An immigration officer or a peace officer shall forward a written report to the Deputy Minister setting out the details of any information in the possession of the immigration officer or peace officer indicating that a permanent resident is a person who |
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. . .
| (d) has been convicted of an offence under any Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of |
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| (i) more than six months has been imposed, or |
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| (ii) five years or more may be imposed, |
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[23] Subsection 70(1) of the Act reads as follows:
| 70.(1) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), where a removal order or conditional removal order is made against a permanent resident or against a person lawfully in possession of a valid returning resident permit issued to that person pursuant to the regulations, that person may appeal to the Appeal Division on either or both of the following grounds, namely, |
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| (a) on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or fact, or mixed law and fact; and |
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| (b) on the ground that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the person should not be removed from Canada. |
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[24] Paragraph 70(5)(c) of the Act reads as follows:
| 70.(5) No appeal may be made to the Appeal Division by a person described in subsection (1) or paragraph (2)(a) or (b) against whom a deportation order or conditional deportation order is made where the Minister is of the opinion that the person constitutes a danger to the public in Canada and the person has been determined by an adjudicator to be |
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. . .
| (c) a person described in paragraph 27(1)(d) who has been convicted of an offence under any Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of ten years or more may be imposed. |
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[25] Subsection 13(4) of S.C. 1995, c. 15, proclaimed on July 10, 1995, reads as follows:
| Subsection 70(5) of the Act, as enacted by subsection (3), applies to an appeal that has been made on or before the coming into force of that subsection and in respect of which the hearing has not been commenced, but a person who has made such an appeal may, within fifteen days after the person has been notified that, in the opinion of the Minister, the person constitutes a danger to the public in Canada, make an application for judicial review under section 82.1 of the Act with respect to the deportation order or conditional deportation order referred to in subsection 70(5). |
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[26] Paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Act reads as follows:
| 53.(1) Notwithstanding subsections 52(2) and (3), no person who is determined under this Act or the regulations to be a Convention refugee, nor any person who has been determined to be not eligible to have a claim to be a Convention refugee determined by the Refugee Division on the basis that the person is a person described in paragraph 46.01(1)(a), shall be removed from Canada to a country where the person's life or freedom would be threatened for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion unless |
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. . .
| (d) the person is a person described in paragraph 27(1)(d) who has been convicted of an offence under any Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of ten years or more may be imposed and the Minister is of the opinion that the person constitutes a danger to the public in Canada. |
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ANALYSIS OF SUBSECTION 70(5)
[27] In the Williams case2, the Court of Appeal considered and analyzed subsection 70(5) of the Act. In particular, it considered the effect of the Minister's opinion and the role of the court in reviewing that opinion.
[28] Considerations with respect to the effect of the opinion:
| (a) The Minister's opinion should not be treated as a deportation order. (p. 660, par. 9); |
| (b) The permanent resident faces deportation primarily because it is the public policy of Canada, as expressed by elected members of Parliament, to deport non-citizens who commit crimes of a certain seriousness. (p. 660, par. 10); |
| (c) There is one common element to all persons who fall within the class of permanent residents described in paragraph 27(1)(d): they have all deliberately violated an essential condition under which they were permitted to remain in Canada. (p. 660, par. 10); |
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| (d) The fact of a deliberate violation of the condition imposed by paragraph 27(1)(d) is sufficient to justify a deportation order. (p. 660, par. 10); |
| (e) There is no constitutional obligation on Parliament to provide any kind of appeal or discretionary relief; it follows that any right of appeal conferred by Parliament can be qualified or abolished. (p. 660, par. 10); |
| (f) The grounds of appeal in subsection 70(1) include, in paragraph (a), any question of law or fact or mixed law and fact, and, in paragraph (b), a discretionary ground. (p. 660, par. 10); |
| (g) When the Minister forms an opinion that permanent resident is a danger to the public in Canada, that person loses the right to pursue an appeal under paragraph 70(1)(a) of the Act. (p. 661, par. 12); |
| (h) In place of this, the individual has the right to seek a judicial review which would be fully as effective in respect of any question of law but might not provide as complete a review of findings of fact. (p. 661, par. 12); |
| (i) The effect then of the Minister forming an opinion under subsection 70(5) is (1) to substitute a right of judicial review for a right of appeal of the deportation order, (2) substitution of the exercise by the Minister of the discretion to relieve from lawful deportation for the exercise of a similar discretion of the Appeal Division under paragraph 70(1)(b), and, (3) the substitution of the right to seek a judicial stay in lieu of a statutory stay. (p. 663, par. 15). |
[29] Considerations with respect to the reviewability of the Minister's opinion:
| (a) The Minister's power to make a finding under subsection 70(5) is stated in subjective terms. (p. 664, par. 17); |
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| (b) The test is not whether the permanent resident is a danger to the public but whether the Minister is of the opinion that he/she is such a danger. (p. 664, par. 17); |
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| (c) Such subject decisions cannot be judicially reviewed except on grounds such as that the decision maker acted in bad faith, or erred in law, or acted upon the basis of irrelevant considerations. (p. 664, par. 17); |
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| (d) The Court is not being asked to affirm the correctness of the Minister's opinion but only to determine whether there is any lawful basis for its review. (p. 664, par. 18); |
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| (e) Further, when confronted with the record which was, according to undisputed evidence, before the decision maker, and there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court must assume that the decision maker acted in good faith in having regard to that material. (p. 664, par. 17). |
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[30] Mr. Justice Strayer, on behalf of the Court, concluded as follows3:
| ... for the reasons set out above I am not prepared to assume that an opinion given under subsection 70(5) should be seen as the equivalent of a deportation order. At worst it replaces an appeal on law and facts with judicial review, substitutes the Minister's humanitarian discretion for that of the Appeal Division, and substitutes the possibility of a judicial stay of deportation for the certainty of a statutory stay. |
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[31] With respect to the meaning of "public danger", Mr. Justice Strayer opined4:
| ... the meaning of "public danger" is not a mystery: it must refer to the possibility that a person who has committed a serious crime in the past may seriously be thought to be a potential re-offender. It need not be proven"indeed it cannot be proven"that the person will reoffend. What I believe the subsection adequately focusses the Minister's mind on is consideration of whether, given what she knows about the individual and what that individual has had to say in his own behalf, she can form an opinion in good faith that he is a possible re-offender whose presence in Canada creates an unacceptable risk to the public. I lay some stress on the word "unacceptable" because, with the impossibility of proof of future conduct, there is always a risk and the extent to which society should be prepared to accept that risk can involve political considerations not inappropriate for a minister. She may well conclude, for example, that people convicted of narcotics offences have a greater likelihood of recidivism and that trafficking represents a particular menace to Canadian society. I agree with Gibson J. in the Thompson case5 that "danger" must be taken to refer to a "present or future danger to the public". But I am reluctant to assert that some particular kind of material must be available to the Minister to draw a conclusion of present or future danger. I find it hard to understand why it is not open to a minister to forecast future misconduct on the basis of past misconduct, particularly having regard to the circumstances of the offences and, as in this case, comments made by one of the sentencing judges. A reviewing court may disagree with the Minister's forecast, or consider that more weight should have been given to certain material, but that does not mean that the statutory criterion is impermissibly vague just because it allows the Minister to reach a conclusion different from that of the Court. |
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GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
[32] Here, as in Williams, the applicant has not challenged the adjudicator's finding that he is a person described in subparagraph 27(1)(d)(i) of the Act. The application is based on the following grounds:
| 1) The classification of the applicant as a danger to society is contrary to the finding of the Canadian governments own servants and is arbitrary and capricious in so far as it is not based on an actual assessment of the applicant or on the material available to the Minister and the Board, but on a statutory definition; |
| 2) That, as a result of classifying the applicant as a danger to society, the applicant has been denied a right to appeal his deportation and as such, the applicant will be deported to Iran, a country of which he is no longer a citizen; |
| 3) As a deserter of the Iranian army during a time of war, the applicant may be executed upon his arrival in Iran and, therefore, will be subject to cruel and unusual punishment; |
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| 4) That as a United Nations Convention Refugee who was sent to Canada for his own protection, the applicant is owed a continuing duty by the Canadian government to safeguard him and to provide for his security of person; |
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ANALYSIS
Status of the Applicant
[33] In the Williams case, the individual was a permanent resident. In the present case, the individual, the applicant herein, is a permanent resident who has also been determined to be a Convention refugee and is stateless.
Considerations
[34] The applicant's counsel, in a written submission dated January 31, 1996, made in response to the notice of possible issuance of the Minister's opinion pursuant to subsection 70(5) of the Act, recognized that there is a distinction between those factors that are to be considered in determining whether the applicant is a danger to the public and those that arise on equitable grounds. Counsel's submission was structured accordingly.
[35] The Criminal Backlog Review prepared for the Minister's delegate contains a "Danger to Public Assessment" and "Other Considerations"; the latter dealing with humanitarian and compassionate grounds and removal risk considerations.
[36] It would appear that the same material was relied on for the opinion under paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Act.
[37] As a result, the applicant's submissions, the review and the opinion deal with the ground of appeal described in paragraph 70(1)(b) of the Act.
[38] I will deal with each of these considerations.
Danger to Public Assessment
[39] Counsel for the applicant submits that the Minister erred in law by not applying the correct test for determining whether the applicant constitutes a danger to the public. Counsel submits that the Minister only considered the applicant's conviction and did not consider whether he constitutes a present or future danger to the public in Canada.
[40] It is not simply the Commission of an offence that brings into play a danger to the public opinion.
[41] In Williams, Mr. Justice Strayer confirmed that "danger"must be taken to refer to a present or future danger6.
[42] The Guide published by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration for the guidance of its officers and interested members of the public offers an outline of the procedures followed to obtain a Minister's opinion. Appendix D to the Guide entitled "Danger to the Public" lists a number of factors which should be considered, including:
| - The Nature of the Offence - offences considered dangerous to the public would normally involve violence, weapons, drugs, sexual offences; |
| - The Circumstances of the Offence - this would allow for consideration of what led up to the offence or the severity of the incident; |
| - The Sentence - the sentence of the judge in the court case would assist in deciding on the severity of the incident; |
| - Recidivism - multiple offences would be given greater weight than single offences; |
| - Humanitarian and Compassionate considerations - any circumstances which might mitigate the decision to remove will be considered; these include length of residency in Canada, age on entry, family in Canada and abroad, risk to the individual of persecution in the country to which he or she is to be returned. |
[43] In the case at hand, the Minister did look at the surrounding circumstances in making the danger to public assessment.
[44] The material before the decision maker indicated that the applicant:
| - was convicted both of trafficking in heroin and of possession of heroin for the purposes of trafficking; |
| - pleaded not guilty to the offences which occurred in April 1990, but was found guilty after a jury trial; |
| - was sentenced on April 22, 1993, to nine years on each charge, to be served concurrently; |
| - has continued to deny his involvement in the offences and to claim his innocence; and |
- shows no remorse.
[45] At this sentencing hearing, the judge made the following observations:
| General deterrence is, however, in this jurisdiction, as has been repeatedly underscored by the Court of Appeal, the paramount principle in sentencing heroin traffickers, particularly where there are very limited mitigating circumstances and the operation is a large scale commercial operation with enormous profits to be made. |
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| I am mindful of the fact that the accused is now a landed immigrant and has well employed his time since arrest to upgrade his education and get on with his life. And that these efforts, I assume will be drawn to the attention of the Parole Board in due course. |
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| But what we have here is an accused who is inextricably interwoven in the following heroin activities: |
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| 1. Warehousing the drug -- there is half a pound of very high quality heroin sitting in the closet of his room; |
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| 2. He is involved in holding or receiving (warehousing) the proceeds of a sale of these drugs -- $58,000.00 in cash under his dresser; and |
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| 3. He is an active participant in the transaction for a quarter pound of heroin for $40,000.00 that takes place in the Victoria Park subway station. |
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| The accused is trafficking in this drug and engaged in these activities purely for gain, and this is someone who has been granted asylum and opportunity in this country. It's called biting the hand that feeds you. |
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[46] The judge added:
| What we have here is a very large scale commercial heroin operation. It involves a drug which it is trite to say the Ontario Court of Appeal has repeatedly indicated is of a most insidious and devastating nature. Heroin literally destroys its users. |
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[47] The review also sets out factors which are favourable to the applicant.
[48] Counsel for the applicant claimed that the Correctional services evaluated the applicant's risk of reoffending as low and that the Reviewing Officer erred by characterizing it as moderate. This is not sufficient, in itself, to set aside the opinion of the Minister which was based on a number of factors.
[49] Counsel for the applicant submits that the Minister is bound by the more favourable review given by Correctional services which rates his risk as low. This is an annual review of the security classification of inmates. His offender security level in the penal institution progressed from medium to low.
[50] The Correctional Plan review is information that the Minister can review and consider but it is for the Minister to form an opinion under subsection 70(5) of the Act.
[51] It was open to the Minister's delegate to form the opinion that the applicant was a danger to the public. It cannot be said that the Minister's delegate acted in bad faith, on the basis of irrelevant criteria or evidence, or without regard to the material in reaching the opinion that he is a "public danger"7.
[52] As stated by Marceau J.A. in Nguyen8:
| I do not believe that the Minister needs to be compelled to follow formal guidelines as to the factors he should take into account in forming his opinion, and I consider the Minister's opinion in respect of public danger as reliable as that of a court. |
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[53] I also find that the requirements of fairness have been met in the "danger to public" assessment.
[54] In Williams9, Strayer J.A. concluded that, on the basis of the jurisprudence to date, he was unable to conclude that "liberty" in section 7 of the Charter includes the right of personal choice for permanent residents to stay in Canada where, as the Supreme Court said in Chiarelli10:
| They have all deliberately violated an essential condition under which they were permitted to remain in Canada. |
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[55] However, Strayer J.A. did not purport to decide the question in respect to refugees11.
[56] Here, the applicant was determined to be a Convention refugee.
[57] Even if the "liberty" of the applicant was engaged by the opinion of the Minister, the applicant, in this case, was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether he is a present or future danger to the public.
[58] With respect to the assessment of public danger, the applicant was advised of the material which the decision maker may refer to in forming an opinion and was given a fair opportunity to make submissions.
[59] As stated by Strayer J.A. in Williams12:
| The decision making authorized by subsection 70(5) is not judicial or quasi-judicial in nature involving the application of pre-existing legal principles to specific factual determinations, but rather the formation of an opinion in good faith drawn from the probabilities as perceived by the Minister from an examination of relevant material and an assessment as to the acceptability of the probable risk. In such circumstances the requirements of fairness are minimal... |
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Humanitarian Considerations
[60] Subsection 70(5) substitutes the Minister's humanitarian discretion for that of the Appeal Division. The Minister is vested with the discretionary power to exempt the applicant from lawful deportation.
[61] The exercise of the discretionary power by the Minister may have serious consequences for a permanent resident who has been determined to be a Convention refugee if he is ordered to be removed to the country from which he sought refuge.
[62] Much of the argument advanced by the applicant's new counsel at the hearing of this application was directed at the risk assessment and the treatment that the applicant may receive if returned to Iran by reason of his army desertion prior to seeking refuge in Canada and his drug conviction in Canada. Counsel for the applicant claims that the risk assessment is flawed and that it is based in large part on an Embassies Report that was not specifically referred to in the notification to the applicant.
[63] The danger report noted that the applicant was a permanent resident, a convention refugee and was stateless. It referred to a UNHCR letter confirming that the applicant was recognized as a convention refugee following his desertion from the army during the Iran-Iraq war. The report went on to summarize the submissions of his counsel in his favour.
[64] The danger report noted that he had no family or relatives in Canada, that his parents and two siblings were in Iran and that he had not returned to Iran since leaving in December 1985.
[65] The applicant's counsel claimed that the execution of the deportation order will result in his long-term detention, torture and even execution. The risk assessment reviewed the two issues raised by the applicant: the treatment of army deserters and the treatment of drug offenders.
[66] The review concluded that the applicant will not be at risk should he be returned to Iran. This conclusion was largely based on a Joint Embassies Report.
[67] The Report is a joint report of the embassies of Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.
[68] Counsel for the applicant claims that the applicant should have been given notification of this Report.
[69] Counsel for the applicant alleges that the Minister relied on this Report concerning conditions in Iran, its treatment of army deserters and of drug offenders. Accordingly, it should have been specifically disclosed to the applicant and not only referred to under the rubric of "other publicly available documentary material" in the notice to the applicant of materials to be relied on by the Minister in forming an opinion.
[70] Non-disclosure of publicly available documentary evidence has been found not amount to a breach of natural justice.
[71] However, the inscription "Restricted" appears on the cover page of the report. The source of this document appears to be the Document Centre of the Immigration and Refugee Board. There is no information on the record which would contradict or explain the "Restricted" designation on this report.
[72] A document which is restricted is not publicly or commonly available.
[73] This Report was specifically relied on by the reviewing officer and the Minister's delegate in forming the opinion that the applicant will not be at risk if returned to Iran. The assessment of this serious matter is largely based on this report. Clearly, this assessment is material to the exercise of the Minister's discretion.
[74] In Ghorvei and M.C.I. [1997] F.C.J. No. 1198, Court File No. IMM-2254-96, the Associate Chief Justice dealt with a similar situation, which arose from an opinion under paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Act.
[75] He dealt with the issue as follows:
| Finally, the applicant submitted that the Joint Embassies Report on conditions in Iran constituted extrinsic evidence (as per Shah v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1994), 170 N.R. 238, 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 82 (F.C.A.)). The applicant argued that this special non-annual report could not constitute "other publicly available documentary material." I would agree. (The phrase "other publicly available documentary material" is from the letter sent to the applicant notifying him of the case he had to meet.) The Report, not necessarily by its nature, but primarily because of its contents should have been properly disclosed to the applicant. Actual notice of the Joint Embassies Report should have been given to the applicant not only because it appears to be the only report relied upon by the immigration officer but more importantly because it contradicts the findings of the country reports typically used in these matters. This court has previously held that non-disclosure of publicly available documentary evidence does not amount to a breach of natural justice. However, the material must not only be publicly available but should be commonly available. When an immigration officer relies heavily on evidence that is not commonly consulted, this evidence should be disclosed to the applicant. In the case at bar, the applicant was not given proper notice of the Joint Embassies Report and as a result did not know the full case against him. |
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[76] I also conclude that the Report which was relied on by the Minister's delegate should have been disclosed specifically to the applicant at the time of notification of the review.
[77] For this reason, the Minister's delegate did not give the applicant a proper opportunity to be heard before exercising the Ministerial discretion under subsection 70(5) of the Act.
[78] The applicant is entitled to have the opportunity to make further representations and to submit further documentary material on the issue of risk assessment.
CONCLUSION
[79] The application for judicial review is allowed and the matter is remitted to the Minister for proper exercise of the Minister's discretion in accordance with these reasons.
__________________________
Judge
Ottawa, Ontario
February 12, 1998
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1 S.C. 1995, c. 15, s. 13(4).
2 [1997] 2 F.C. 646 (C.A.).
3 Supra, note 2, at 665.
4 Supra, note 2, at 668-69.
5 Thompson v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1996] F.C.J. No. 1097 (T.D.) (QL), at par. 21.
6 Supra, note 2, at 669, par. 29.
7 Supra, note 2, at 677.
8 Nguyen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 165 at 173 (F.C.A.).
9 Supra, note 2, at 667, par. 26.
10 Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, at 734.
11 Supra, note 2, at 666, par. 24.
12 Supra, note 2, at 678, par. 49.
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