Date:
20010508
Docket:
96-4799-IT-G
BETWEEN:
ANDRÉ
LÉGER,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY
THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasonsfor Judgment
(Delivered
orally from the bench
on June 9,
2000, at Québec, Quebec,
and amended
for greater clarity)
Archambault, J.T.C.C.
[1]
André Léger is
contesting net worth assessments made by the Minister of National
Revenue (Minister) for the 1988 to 1991 taxation years
(relevant period). To Mr. Léger's income, the
Minister added unreported income of $34,447 in 1988, $242,439 in
1989, $74,255 in 1990 and $170,301 in 1991. Although some of the
assessments may have been made after the normal assessment
period, counsel for Mr. Léger stated at the start of the
hearing that she was not going to contest their validity on that
basis.
[2]
The Minister also assessed a penalty for each of the four
taxation years at issue on the ground that Mr. Léger had
knowingly, or under circumstances amounting to gross negligence,
made a false statement or omission in his tax return. The
Minister also assessed a late filing penalty in respect of two
taxation years. Mr. Léger has not contested the
latter penalty.
[3]
Mr. Léger argued that the
Minister made mistakes in computing his income using the net
worth method. To make it easier to understand the issues in this
case, I am reproducing here a summary of the Minister's
calculations:
[TRANSLATION]
ANDRÉ
LÉGER
COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NET WORTH
|
12/31/87
|
12/31/88
|
12/31/89
|
12/31/90
|
12/31/91
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASSETS
|
|
|
|
|
|
Personal assets
|
158,249
|
187,412
|
443,600
|
451,378
|
532,768
|
Business assets
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
Total
|
158,249
|
187,412
|
443,600
|
451,378
|
532,768
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEBTS
|
|
|
|
|
|
Personal debts
|
44,135
|
63,056
|
98,399
|
73,040
|
66,859
|
Business debts
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
Total
|
44,135
|
63,056
|
98,399
|
73,040
|
66,859
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
NET
WORTH
|
114,114
|
124,356
|
345,201
|
378,338
|
465,909
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PREVIOUS YEAR'S NET WORTH
|
|
114,114
|
124,356
|
345,201
|
378,338
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
INCREASE (DECREASE) IN NET WORTH
|
|
10,242
|
220,845
|
33,137
|
87,571
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ADJUSTMENTS
ADDITIONS
|
|
|
|
|
|
Personal expenses
|
|
36,685
|
36,769
|
33,385
|
37,450
|
Capital loss
|
|
0
|
17,070
|
13,000
|
18,226
|
Tax paid
|
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
4,771
|
Unexplained withdrawals
|
|
37,851
|
7,284
|
55,662
|
49,681
|
Total
|
|
74,536
|
61,123
|
102,047
|
110,128
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEDUCTIONS
|
|
|
|
|
|
Race winnings
|
|
11,428
|
19,879
|
20,788
|
774
|
Tax refund
|
|
1,012
|
632
|
0
|
0
|
Total
|
|
12,440
|
20,511
|
20,788
|
774
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
TOTAL
ADJUSTMENTS
|
|
62,096
|
40,612
|
81,259
|
109,354
|
|
|
|
TOTAL
INCOME BASED ON ADJUSTED NET WORTH
|
|
72,338
|
261,457
|
114,396
|
196,925
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
REPORTED INCOME
|
|
|
|
|
|
André Léger
|
|
37,438
|
19,018
|
36,959
|
19,572
|
Carine Bonnardeaux
|
|
453
|
0
|
3,182
|
7,052
|
Total
|
|
37,891
|
19,018
|
40,141
|
26,624
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
TOTAL
DISCREPANCY
|
|
34,447
|
242,439
|
74,255
|
170,301
|
|
|
|
|
|
521,442
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
[4]
The mistakes referred to by Mr. Léger include the
following:
- absence
of property owned at the start of the relevant period;
-
overvaluation of some property;
- addition
of accounts receivable not belonging to
Mr. Léger;
- absence
of certain debts; and
- addition
of unexplained withdrawals.
Finally,
according to Mr. Léger, part of the unreported income is
race winnings that are not income for the purposes of the
Act.
Background
[5]
Mr. Léger testified that he
was raised by his father in a bar setting, with gambling, pool
games, card games and horse racing. He said that he was able to
make a lot of money at a very early age by helping his father in
the bar, sharing the proceeds of his father's bets on the
pool games he played and betting on races, which mainly involved
betting on horses owned by his father or his father's
friends.
[6]
Mr. Léger said that, during
the relevant period, he lived with a de facto spouse with whom he
had a child. That woman worked as a dancer in bars.
[7]
According to his own testimony, Mr. Léger succumbed to the
temptation to make easy money by trafficking in drugs. Moreover,
he stated that he was charged with conspiracy to traffic in about
1991 or 1992, a charge to which he pleaded guilty in about 1993.
He said that he was forced to admit that he had made $100,000
from drug trafficking and that he was ordered to pay that amount
- at the rate of $20,000 a year - to the Minister of Justice or,
in default, to serve seven months in prison. He said that he did
not have the money to pay and that he opted for prison
instead.
[8]
The Minister's auditor explained in her testimony that her
audit began as a result of information obtained from the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police. She made net worth assessments because
Mr. Léger did not seem to have reported his earnings from
his unlawful activities. Although the auditor gave him several
periods of time to provide her with his comments on the
calculations in the statement of net worth, no comments were
provided between January and the end of
March 1995.
[9]
The auditor explained that she reviewed the bank accounts and
tried to identify each withdrawal to determine how it had been
used. Unfortunately, she could not determine from that review how
some of the withdrawals, which totalled $150,478 for the relevant
period, had been used.
[10] In the
course of her work, the auditor examined the books of account of
a number of corporations in which Mr. Léger held
interests. The evidence showed that a holding company,
2700867 Canada Inc.
(Holding), owned shares in four
subsidiaries (subsidiaries) in 1991:
•
50 percent of 27563949 Canada Inc. (BSI)
(the other 50 percent was owned by a lawyer
named Belley);
•
50 percent of 27564673 Canada Inc. (MCI);
•
50 percent of 175254 Canada Inc. (ELI) (the other
50 percent was owned by a Mr. Roy); and
•
100 percent of 170931 Canada inc. (ECI).
[11] Mr.
Léger testified that he, his father and Mr. Belley each
owned a third of Holding. Before Holding acquired the four
subsidiaries, its three shareholders owned those subsidiaries
directly. They incorporated Holding to make it easier to manage
their interests in the subsidiaries. BSI operated a cocktail
lounge, MCI a mini-mall, ELI a 19-unit apartment building
and ECI a commercial building.
[12] The
auditor found that Mr. Léger had about $150,000 invested
in that group of corporations in 1991. According to Holding's
books of account for 1991, Mr. Léger owned $35,000
worth of shares of that company's capital stock and had also
advanced $40,473 to it, for a total investment of $75,473.
According to Mr. Léger, that amount represented all
of the funds invested by him in Holding and its subsidiaries.
According to the auditor, amounts owed to Mr. Léger
by the subsidiaries, namely a total of $61,528 in 1990 and
$75,128 in 1991, had to be added to that investment. In a
previous assessment for 1991, the Minister had added additional
accounts receivable of $75,474 to the amount of those investments
in Holding and the subsidiaries, but those accounts receivable
were eliminated in the assessments at issue here, thus taking
account of Mr. Léger's submission that they had
been calculated twice. Based on her review of the accounts
receivable of the corporations, the auditor also found that
Mr. Léger had advanced a large part of the amounts
himself by making cash deposits - often in small bills - at his
credit union.
Analysis
Burden
of proof
[13] First
of all, the burden of proof resting on Mr. Léger in
his appeals must be dealt with.
My colleague Judge Tardif had an
opportunity to discuss the burden of proof in a case that, like
this one, raised the issue of the use of the net worth
method.
[14]
In Bastille v.
R., [1999]
4 C.T.C. 2155 (99 DTC 431), he wrote the following at
paragraphs 5 et seq.:
5 I think it is
important to point out that the burden of proof rests on the
appellants, except with respect to the question of the penalties,
where the burden of proof is on the respondent.
6 A NET
WORTH assessment can never reflect the kind of mathematical
accuracy that is both desired and desirable in tax assessment
matters. Generally, there is a certain degree of arbitrariness in
the determination of the value of the various elements assessed.
The Court must decide whether that arbitrariness is
reasonable.
7 Moreover, use of
this method of assessment is not the rule. It is, in a way, an
exception for situations where the taxpayer is not in possession
of all the information, documents and vouchers needed in order to
carry out an audit that would be more in accordance with good
auditing practice, and most importantly, that would produce a
more accurate result.
8 The bases or
foundations of the calculations done in a NET WORTH assessment
depend largely on information provided by the taxpayer who is the
subject of the audit.
9 The quality,
plausibility and reasonableness of that information therefore
take on absolutely fundamental importance.
[15] Another
of my colleagues, Judge Bowman, stated the following in
Ramey v. Canada, [1993] T.C.J. No. 142 (QL) ([1993] 2
C.T.C. 2119, 93 DTC 791), at paragraph 6:
I am not
unappreciative of the enormous, indeed virtually insuperable,
difficulties facing the appellant and his counsel in seeking to
challenge net worth assessments of a deceased taxpayer. The net
worth method of estimating income is an unsatisfactory and
imprecise way of determining a taxpayer's income for the
year. It is a blunt instrument of which the Minister must avail
himself as a last resort. A net worth assessment involves a
comparison of a taxpayer's net worth, i.e. the cost of his
assets less his liabilities, at the beginning of a year, with his
net worth at the end of the year. To the difference so determined
there are added his expenditures in the year. The resulting
figure is assumed to be his income unless the taxpayer
establishes the contrary. Such assessments may be inaccurate
within a range of indeterminate magnitude but unless they are
shown to be wrong they stand. It is almost impossible to
challenge such assessments piecemeal. The only truly effective
way of disputing them is by means of a complete reconstruction of
a taxpayer's income for a year. A taxpayer whose business
records and method of reporting income are in such a state of
disarray that a net worth assessment is required is frequently
the author of his or her own misfortunes.
[16] In the
instant appeals, Mr. Léger was the only person who
testified in support of his position. The auditor whose work led
to the assessments testified for the respondent. In assessing the
evidence provided by Mr. Léger, something must be said
about the failure to call certain witnesses who could have
confirmed what he said. In Huneault v. The Queen, T.C.C., No. 96-1435(IT)G, February 6, 1998, at
page 7 (98 DTC 1488, at page 1491), my colleague Judge
Lamarre referred to certain statements that were made by Sopinka
and Lederman in The Law of Evidence in Civil Cases and
cited by Judge Sarchuk of this Court in Enns v. M.N.R., 87
DTC 208, at page 210:
In The
Law of Evidence in Civil Cases, by Sopinka and Lederman, the
authors comment on the effect of failure to call a witness and I
quote:
In
Blatch v. Archer, (1774), 1 Cowp. 63, at p. 65, Lord
Mansfield stated:
"It is
certainly a maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to
the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced,
and in the power of the other to have
contradicted."
The
application of this maxim has led to a well-recognized rule that
the failure of a party or a witness to give evidence, which it
was in the power of the party or witness to give and by which the
facts might have been elucidated, justifies the court in drawing
the inference that the evidence of the party or witness would
have been unfavourable to the party to whom the failure was
attributed.
In the
case of a plaintiff who has the evidentiary burden of
establishing an issue, the effect of such an inference may be
that the evidence led will be insufficient to discharge the
burden. (Levesque et al. v. Comeau et al.
[1970] S.C.R. 1010, (1971), 16 D.L.R. (3d) 425.)
General
assessment of Mr. Léger's credibility
[17] In the
case at bar, before analysing the relevant facts in detail, it is
also helpful to make some general comments on the credibility of
Mr. Léger, who, I repeat, was the only person to testify
in support of his appeal and who filed only one genuine document
to back up his position, namely a bank statement for his account
at the credit union. The other two documents were an argument
letter and a covering letter. The documents attached to those two
letters were not filed at the hearing. They had been sent to the
Minister at the objection stage.
[18] In my
view, it would be dangerous to give credence to
Mr. Léger's testimony without probative
corroborating evidence in the form of documents or of testimony
from credible witnesses. The relevant events occurred more than
nine to thirteen years before the hearing. It is difficult for a
witness to remember all the specific facts needed to dispose of
legal proceedings by relying on memory alone. Moreover, it is not
surprising that Mr. Léger often gave vague, imprecise
answers to the questions he was asked. One example is when he was
asked how a $19,000 withdrawal had been used. Yet that was quite
a substantial amount for someone who reports only about $30,000
in income a year.
[19] On the
other hand, some of his answers - although not many - were clear
and precise, including his statement that he always reported all
of his income to the tax authorities. Yet even if I allowed all
the adjustments for all of what he has identified as mistakes by
the Minister - aside from the $100,000 supposedly owed to the
Minister of Justice, which I will come back to -
Mr. Léger's unreported income (the amounts under
"total discrepancy" in the above table) would be
$198,413 in 1989 and $107,020 in 1991, for a total of $305,433.
For 1988 and 1990, the result would be negative differences, but
even if those negative differences were subtracted from the
unreported income, the total would be $207,610!
[20] Even if
I took account of some of the race winnings he says he received,
more than half of which were allowed by the Minister, we would be
a long way from a result indicating that all of Mr.
Léger's income was reported. Here, the fact that Mr.
Léger pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic in drugs and
admitted that he was involved in lucrative unlawful activities is
also an important factor in assessing his credibility. Those
activities could well be the source of the income not reported by
Mr. Léger.
[21] In view
of all these circumstances, even if I were not certain that he
had knowingly lied, I could at the very least conclude that some
of the explanations Mr. Léger gave the Court were
obviously wrong.
Absence
of $25,000 in petty cash at the start of the relevant
period
[22] I will
deal first with the assets that Mr. Léger allegedly had at
the beginning of the relevant period. He testified that he had
$25,000 in cash in a strongbox at his home. Obviously, if that
amount were allowed, it would have the effect of reducing the
difference in the increase in his assets and his net worth and
would therefore lead to a reduction in his income. Although
Mr. Léger testified at length about the fact that, as
a teenager, he made a great deal of money working in his
father's bar and by sharing the proceeds of his father's
bets and winning on races, all of these facts are not probative
evidence showing on a balance of probabilities that
Mr. Léger had the above-mentioned $25,000 on December
31, 1987.
[23] It is
possible that Mr. Léger made that money before 1988, but
it is just as possible to imagine that he spent it at the races,
in card games, on his other gambling activities and on his
girlfriends. If Mr. Léger really had that $25,000 in a
strongbox hidden in his home, why was his line of credit as high
as $28,375 at the start of the relevant period? Why did he need
to borrow $42,000 to repay the $16,000 mortgage on his home and
put about $25,000 back on his line of credit?
Mr. Léger testified that he used a line of credit
because his money was invested in term deposits. Yet a review of
his balance sheets shows that the $35,000 or so in term deposits
existed at the end of 1987 and throughout the relevant period. I
am therefore not satisfied by his explanation that he had an
additional $25,000 on January 1, 1988.
[24] If it
had to be believed that, as he claimed, Mr. Léger
always had a lot of money hidden in his home and
that he kept the $25,000 there, then it would also have to be
believed that, if he had it at the beginning of 1988, he also had
it at the end of the relevant period. Accordingly, if an asset is
added at the start of the period and for each year in the
relevant period, we end up with no difference. This adjustment
would have no effect on the "total discrepancy"
calculated by the Minister.
[25] I will
add that Mr. Léger's assertion that he kept that
substantial amount hidden in his home because he feared that the
banks would go bankrupt does not strike me as very credible.
First of all, Mr. Léger had term deposits worth at least
$35,000 during each year in the relevant period. Moreover, as far
as I know, none of the very large banking companies in Canada has
gone bankrupt. It is therefore difficult to imagine that this
really prompted Mr. Léger to keep $25,000 in his
home.
Adjustment of $26,484 for the renovation of a
home
[26] One of
the adjustments made by the Minister in calculating the cost of
Mr. Léger's assets in 1988 was the addition of
$26,484 for the cost of renovations or improvements made by Mr.
Léger that year to a home on Rue Mont-Luc. The
evidence showed that almost all of that amount had been obtained
through a $42,000 loan taken out on December 17, 1987. Of the
latter amount, $16,000 was to be used to refinance the first
mortgage on the home, while the balance of $26,000 was to be used
to reimburse the line of credit used to pay for the renovation
work. According to the documentary evidence, the loan was
received on January 15, 1988. The bank statements (Exhibit
I-6) corroborate this evidence or, in any event, support
this interpretation of the facts, since the bank account was
credited with $26,455.17 on January 15, 1988.
[27] The
auditor apparently considered - and this was also what counsel for the respondent
maintained in his arguments - that the home renovations were
financed using the line of credit and that the deposit of
$26,455.17 made it possible to put $25,000 back on the line of
credit on January 22, 1988 (Exhibit I-6).
[28] In
testifying, Mr. Léger denied having made such renovations;
however, Exhibit I-3, the credit application he signed,
states that the $26,000 was to be used to finance
renovations.
[29] Given
the date on which the loan was obtained, I think it is quite
reasonable to conclude that if - as the auditor believed - the
amount was used to repay a line of credit that had financed the
renovation costs, then obviously those costs were incurred before
January 1, 1988. Accordingly, the cost of the home on Rue
Mont-Luc should be increased as at December 31, 1987, and
not as at December 31, 1988, which was when the auditor did so.
This adjustment is beneficial for Mr. Léger, since it
leads to an increase in his 1987 assets that has the effect of
reducing the difference for 1988.
Accounts
receivable
[30] The
Minister added property described as "accounts
receivable" as assets for 1990 and 1991. I will not go back
over the facts I have already set out above. I conclude that the
evidence provided to me was clearly insufficient for me to find
that accounts receivable from the four subsidiaries totalling
$61,528 in 1990 and $75,128 in 1991 were not advances owed to Mr.
Léger.
[31] Mr.
Léger adduced no documentary evidence - share
certificates, records or minute books from Holding - confirming
the identity of that company's real shareholders. There was
no documentary evidence, and in particular no accounting record,
that showed that the $61,528 and $75,128 could have actually
belonged to someone other than Mr. Léger. No witness
appeared to state under oath that he or she was owed those
amounts. As I have already stated, the auditor found that the
advances to the four subsidiaries came from cash deposits made by
Mr. Léger at the credit union. In calculating
Mr. Léger's accounts receivable, she also took
care to exclude the advances that had been determined to be from
Mr. Belley and the $75,474 that might have been counted
twice.
Overvalued assets
[32] The
assets that were allegedly overvalued included the property on
Boulevard St-René purchased in 1989. On the balance
sheet, the auditor entered $134,350 as its cost. Mr. Léger
maintained that the cost of the property should instead be
$119,508. An adjustment sheet (Exhibit I-8) that was
probably prepared for the closing of the sale seems to support
Mr. Léger's assertion.
[33]
However, the respondent also filed another document (notary's statement) (Exhibit
I-7), which is a true copy of a sheet taken from the
notary's accounting records that contains figures very different
from those on the adjustment sheet. The notary's statement
indicates that Mr. Léger deposited $64,000 on
October 24, 1989, and that the notary received $70,000
from the Caisse populaire St-René-Goupil on
November 1, 1989. The notary's statement also provides
information about how the amounts given to the notary were used.
Moreover, it is much more specific than what appears on the
adjustment sheet. For example, it indicates that a portion of the
amounts, namely $50,098.27, was given to the credit union, while
another portion, $37,650, was given to a Mr. Farley and a
Ms. Gauthier.
[34]
Finally, the balance remaining in the bank account, $45,699, was
paid to Jean-Pierre Chartier "in trust". Mr.
Chartier was likely acting as a mandatary for the vendors, since
the notary's statement does not show any payment to the
vendors, whom the adjustment sheet identifies as René
Cossette and 159322 Canada Inc.
[35] In my
opinion, the notary's statement has much greater probative
value than the adjustment sheet. First of all, I note that the
adjustment sheet is not signed. It is therefore possible that it
was prepared as a draft but that it does not reflect what
actually happened when the sale was closed. It is also possible
that the adjustment sheet shows a price lower than the one
actually agreed on by the purchasers and the vendor, as it can be
imagined sometimes happens.
[36] In
testifying, Mr. Léger said that the amount of the mortgage
he obtained was more than he needed to finance the purchase of
the property in question and that around $10,000 or $12,000 was
given back to him by a broker. It is interesting to note that the
adjustment sheet does not show any amount owed as a real estate
brokerage fee.
[37] In the
circumstances, I conclude that the cost of the property on
Boulevard St-René was the amount determined by
the auditor, namely $134,350.
Debts
·
$100,000 penalty
owed to the Minister of Justice
[38] I see
absolutely no way in which Mr. Léger could reduce his
unreported income for the relevant period based on this figure.
First of all, the amount was allegedly negotiated in 1993, a year
that is clearly outside the relevant period. Furthermore, even if
it had been included in that period, Mr. Léger
testified that he could not afford to pay the amount and had to
serve time in prison instead. The $100,000 is therefore of no
relevance in calculating his net worth.
·
$22,000 car
loan
[39] There
remains the question of the $22,000 car loan that
Mr. Léger sought to include in calculating his
liabilities. As was the case for the other items contested by Mr.
Léger, I did not find the evidence he provided to me
concerning the existence of such a loan convincing. He could have
filed a copy of the cheque or could even have called his father
to testify. Moreover, his answers to the questions concerning the
existence of the loan were very evasive. He no longer remembered
which car the loan had been obtained for or what the amount of
the loan was. Mr. Léger has failed in his attempt to prove
that he had an additional debt of $22,000.
Race
winnings
[40] In
calculating Mr. Léger's net worth, the Minister
allowed him part of the $100,263 in race winnings that he wanted
to deduct from his unreported income. Since he had received some
vouchers, the Minister accepted $11,428 in 1988, $19,879 in 1989,
$20,788 in 1990 and $774 in 1991 as adjustments, for a total of
$52,869. Although the Minister allowed those adjustments, I am
not certain that those winnings are necessarily tax-exempt.
Mr. Léger is not someone who bets on horses at random
but someone who bets only on the eight horses owned by his
father. Those activities are closely related to the business run
by this father. However, it is not my intention to reverse the
Minister's decision in this regard, since the question was
not argued. I conclude, however, that no probative evidence was
adduced showing that Mr. Léger had race winnings over and
above those the Minister has already allowed for the relevant
period. Mr. Léger is therefore not entitled to any
adjustment for such amounts.
Unexplained withdrawals
[41] In my
opinion, the unexplained withdrawals that the Minister used to
make adjustments must be excluded from the net worth calculation.
It seems to me that those adjustments are redundant, since I
consider it possible that some of the assets acquired during the
relevant period were financed in part using those unexplained
withdrawals. One example I can give is the purchase of a car: the
contract of sale states that the price was paid in
cash.
[42] Some of
the withdrawals - amounts ranging from $150 to $500 - may have
been used to pay for groceries or meals in restaurants, but the
Minister's calculations already include an addition for
"personal expenses". Some of the withdrawals may also
have been used to make the advances to the four subsidiaries.
Part of the withdrawals may have been financed using the line of
credit. Moreover, the auditor was unable to determine to what
extent the withdrawals may have been used to repay the line of
credit or included in subsequent deposits.
[43]
Generally speaking, it strikes me as highly questionable to add
unexplained withdrawals in computing unreported income using the
net worth method. The risk of some of a taxpayer's assets
being counted twice is too high. In my view, the following
withdrawals should be excluded: $7,284 for 1989, $55,662 for 1990
and $49,681 for 1991. The result of this is that
Mr. Léger's income is reduced by the same
amount.
[44] I must
state at this point that the calculations I made to take account
of the changes made to the computation of the total discrepancy
amounts (that is, the unreported income) resulted in negative
unreported income of $29,888 for 1988. For the other taxation
years, the amounts of unreported income are positive: $235,155
for 1989, $18,593 for 1990 and $120,620 for 1991, for a total of
$374,368 in unreported income. To eliminate the negative
difference for 1988, I kept part of the unexplained withdrawals
as an adjustment, namely $29,888 out of the $37,851 added by the
auditor.
[45] In
short, based on my calculations, the total unreported income for
the relevant period, as computed by the Minister, is reduced by
$147,074. Part of that amount is attributable to the $26,484
adjustment for the cost of renovating the house on Rue
Mont-Luc, and the balance of $120,590 is attributable to
the elimination of the unexplained withdrawals.
Penalties
[46] There
remains the issue of the penalties for each year in the relevant
period. The respondent argued that the penalties should be
maintained for those taxation years. They were assessed under
subsection 163(2) of the Act, which reads as follows:
163(2) Every person
who, knowingly, or under circumstances amounting to gross
negligence in the carrying out of any duty or obligation imposed
by or under this Act, has made or has participated in, assented
to or acquiesced in the making of, a false statement or omission
in a return, form, certificate, statement or answer (in this
section referred to as a "return") filed or made in
respect of a taxation year as required by or under this Act or a
regulation, is liable to a
penalty . . . .
Subsection
163(3) of the Act specifies that the burden of proof is on the
Minister. It reads as follows:
163(3) Where, in
any appeal under this Act, any penalty assessed by the Minister
under this section is in issue, the burden of establishing the
facts justifying the assessment of the penalty is on the
Minister.
[47] It was
therefore up to the Minister to establish the facts justifying
the assessment of the penalties, that is, to prove in the instant
case that the taxpayer made a false statement or omission in a
tax return and that the false statement or omission was made
knowingly or under circumstances amounting to gross negligence.
The burden on the Minister is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt
but merely proof on a balance of probabilities. Raising a
reasonable doubt would therefore not be sufficient to overturn
the penalty.
[48]
In Dowling v. The
Queen, 93-934(IT)G, at
pages 25-26 (96 DTC 1250, at page 1261), my colleague
Judge Lamarre described the Minister's burden of
establishing the facts justifying the assessment of penalties
where a net worth assessment is made:
The
Minister must prove that the taxpayer made a false statement or
omission in filing its return. The fact that there is a
discrepancy between the taxpayer's increase in net worth and
the amount of income reported for a year will not be sufficient
evidence of this. In Richard Boileau v. M.N.R.,
89 DTC 247, Judge Lamarre Proulx stated at
250:
Indeed, the
Appellant was unable to contradict the basic elements of the net
worth assessments. However, in my view, this is not sufficient
for discharging the burden of proof which lies on the Minister.
To decide otherwise would be to remove any purpose to subsection
163(3) by reverting the Minister's burden of proof back onto
the Appellant.
[49] In
Boileau, the Minister relied only on the fact that the
taxpayer had been unable to reverse the net worth assessments. It
was held that the Minister had not adequately discharged his
burden of proof, and the penalties were deleted.
Judge Lamarre provided the following explanation at page 26
(DTC: at pages 1261-62):
The
Minister must present evidence to the effect that the taxpayer
made a false statement or omission in filing the return. This
evidence must amount to more than just showing that the net worth
statement was not disproved. Once the Minister proves, on a
balance of probabilities, that a false statement or omission was
made in the return, evidence must be presented that this
misrepresentation was made knowingly or under circumstances
amounting to gross negligence. In Venne, supra, Justice
Strayer defined gross negligence at 6256:
..."Gross negligence" must be taken to involve
greater neglect than simply a failure to use reasonable care. It
must involve a high degree of negligence tantamount to
intentional acting, an indifference as to whether the law is
complied with or not.
...The
sub-section obviously does not seek to impose absolute liability
but instead only authorizes penalties where there is a high
degree of blamewortheness [sic] involving knowing or
reckless misconduct [6258].
[50]
In Corriveau v.
R., 1998 CarswellNet
2792 ([1999] 2 C.T.C. 2580), I concluded, as my colleague Judge
Lamarre had in Dowling, that the penalties should be
deleted, but I did so for the following reason:
It is also
possible that the unreported amounts are from unlawful
activities, but there is no evidence that Mr Corriveau
engaged in or was convicted of such activities.
[51] Here,
that evidence was provided to me. Mr. Léger admitted that
he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic in drugs and, given
the size of the amounts determined using the net worth method, I
have no hesitation in concluding that Mr. Léger made
an omission in filing his tax return and that the omission was
attributable to gross negligence at the very least.
[52] For
these reasons, Mr. Léger's appeals must be allowed and
the assessments must be referred back to the Minister for
reconsideration and reassessment on the basis that the $34,447 in
unreported income must be eliminated from Mr. Léger's
income for 1988 and that the penalty must also, of course, be
deleted for that year. For the 1989 to 1991 taxation years, the
unreported income is $235,155 rather than $242,439 for 1989,
$18,593 rather than $74,255 for 1990 and $120,620 rather than
$170,301 for 1991. The amount of the penalties must be determined
on the basis of these new amounts of unreported
income.
[53] In view
of the results obtained on both sides, I conclude that the
Minister is entitled to only half of the costs.
Signed at
Ottawa, Canada, this 8th day of May 2001.
J.T.C.C.
Translation
certified true on this 24th day of September
2002.
Stephen Balogh,
Revisor
[OFFICIAL
ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
96-4799(IT)G
BETWEEN:
ANDRÉ
LÉGER,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY
THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals
heard on June 8 and 9, 2000, at Québec, Quebec,
by
the
Honourable Judge Pierre Archambault
Appearances
Counsel
for the
Appellant:
Marie-France La Haye
Counsel
for the
Respondent:
Martin Gentile
JUDGMENT
The appeals from the assessments made under the Income Tax
Act (Act) in respect of the 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991
taxation years are allowed and the assessments are referred back
to the Minister of National Revenue for reconsideration and
reassessment on the basis that the amounts of additional income
computed using the net worth method and identified under
"total discrepancy" in the statement of net worth
prepared by the respondent are nil for 1988, $235,155 for 1989,
$18,593 for 1990 and $120,620 for 1991.
The penalty under subsection 163(2) of the Act for 1988 is
deleted and the penalties for 1989 to 1991 are to be computed on
the basis of the new amounts of unreported income determined in
accordance with this judgment.
The respondent is entitled to 50 percent of the costs.
Signed at
Ottawa, Canada, this 14th day of June 2000.
J.T.C.C.
Translation
certified true on this 24th day of September
2002.
Stephen Balogh,
Revisor
[OFFICIAL
ENGLISH TRANSLATION]