Date: 20000411
Docket: 96-1319-IT-G
BETWEEN:
JANE M. BAPTIST,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Bonner J.
[1] This is an appeal from an assessment of income tax for the
1993 taxation year. The Appellant is now, and was in 1993, a
police officer. During that year she earned wages from her
employer, the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force
("force"). In addition, she earned compensation for the
performance of work variously described as pay duty or special
pay duty ("SPD"). In a return of income for 1993 the
Appellant reported as income from employment the wages received
by her from the force. As well, she reported the compensation
received by her for SPD as the revenues of a business and claimed
deductions for vehicle expense and office expense in arriving at
profit from the business. The Minister of National Revenue
("Minister") assessed tax on the basis that both the
wages and the compensation for SPD were income from employment
and consequently the Minister found that the deductions sought
were prohibited by subsections 8(2) and 8(10) of the
Income Tax Act ("Act").
[2] The primary issue in this appeal is whether compensation
for SPD is income from an office or employment within the meaning
of subsection 5(1) of the Act or whether it is income from
a source which is a business. There is a secondary issue with
respect to the quantum of deductible expense in the event that
the SPD activity constitutes a business.
[3] SPD appears to be a scheme for the provision of police
services on a cost recovery basis where the need for such
services flows from the activities of a particular person or
group. An assignment of SPD is generated by a process which
starts with a request by a client who requires the services of a
police officer for a special occasion. For example, a funeral
director may require motorcycle officers to escort a funeral
procession. A person who organizes an exhibition, concert or
sporting event such as a hockey or baseball game which might be
expected to attract large crowds may require police officers to
direct traffic to and from the site of the event and to keep
order while the event is being staged. Permits issued for the
construction of a building may contain a condition which requires
the builder to arrange for the presence of officers for the
purposes of ensuring the safety of the public and directing the
flow of traffic when equipment on the street adjacent to the
construction site may interfere with the safe passage of vehicles
and pedestrians. Such work is commonly performed by police
officers on SPD. It is performed not at the expense of rate
payers generally but rather at the expense of the client.
[4] It may be helpful at the outset to refer to four principal
features of SPD which distinguish it from day to day duty
performed by a police officer in return for wages paid by the
employer. First, police officers are not required to undertake
SPD. It is assigned only to those officers who volunteer for it.
Second, SPD is performed only during the officer's time off
from ordinary duty. Third, the officer's compensation for SPD
is paid directly to the officer by the client whose request has
led to the assignment of SPD. The police force assumes no
responsibility for the collection of the money earned by the
officer who has performed SPD. Fourth, the hourly rate earned by
an officer on SPD is fixed, not by the collective agreement
between the Toronto Police Association[1] and the force, but rather by the
Association acting unilaterally.
[5] The position taken by counsel for the Appellant is that
the Appellant, when performing SPD, provides her services not to
the force, her employer, but rather to the client who has
requested them. Counsel asserts that the police force and its
officers come together in a joint venture in which the force acts
as agent for the individual police officer to form a contract
with the client for the provision by that police officer of a
service to the client. That service, according to the argument,
is not a police service but is in the nature of a security
service, is performed pursuant to contracts of service and is
outside the contract of employment.
[6] Counsel refers to provisions of the Police Services
Act[2] which
restrict the ability of an officer to perform secondary
employment. She notes that subsection 49(2) of that Act
permits officers to provide their services in a private capacity
to third parties where the services have been arranged through
the police force. Section 49 reads in part:
49. (1) A member of a police force shall not engage in any
activity,
...
(d) in which he or she has an advantage derived from
employment as a member of a police force.
(2) Clause (1)(d) does not prohibit a member of a police force
from performing, in a private capacity, services that have been
arranged through the police force.
According to the Appellant's argument it is subsection
49(2) which permits police officers to perform SPD.
[7] The Respondent maintains that a police officer in
performing SPD earns income from employment as an employee of the
police force.
[8] At the hearing of the appeal evidence was given by
Frank Chen, director of financial administration of Toronto
Police Services. Mr. Chen described SPD as an assignment of
work requested by the client for the purpose of performing a
police activity particularly for that client.
[9] The SPD scheme is structured and operated in accordance
with rules and policy directives which form part of the body of
directives governing all aspects of police operations. According
to Mr. Chen the Rules are developed by the corporate
planning group within the police administration.
[10] Section 6 of the Rules deals with SPD. A careful reading
of section 6 is essential to an understanding of the system.
Section 6 reads:
6.6.0 SPECIAL PAY DUTIES
6.6.1 AUTHORIZATION FOR PAY DUTY OFFICERS
Except when otherwise directed by the chief of police,
requests for police officers to perform special pay duties may be
approved by the unit commander, provided that the nature of the
employment or business activity is not incompatible or
inconsistent with the duties of a police officer, the policies of
the Board or this By-law.
Police officers shall only perform special pay duties which
have been approved by a unit commander.
6.6.2 REQUESTS TO BE IN WRITING
Requests for special pay duty officers shall be submitted in
writing. Such requests shall include the nature of the duties to
be performed, the number of hours involved, the specific hours
for which the service is requested and the reason for requiring
special pay duty officers.
6.6.3 ALLOTTING AND RECORDING OF PAY DUTIES
Officers in charge shall ensure that special pay duties:
- are allotted to members of their unit in a fair and
impartial manner;
- do not interfere with regular police duties.
The recording and processing of special pay duties shall be in
accordance with the established practice.
6.6.4 PAY DUTY HOURS LIMITED
Police officers shall not perform a special pay duty, or any
number of special pay duties, exceeding twelve hours in a
twenty-four hour period. The time worked on a special pay duty
shall not exceed five hours if immediately preceded, or followed,
by a normal tour of duty.
6.6.5 UNABLE TO FULFILL PAY DUTY ASSIGNMENT
When police officers become aware that they will be unable to
perform an assigned special pay duty, they shall immediately
notify the officer in charge of their unit who shall be
responsible for assigning a replacement.
Police officers shall not be excused from special pay duty
assignments, unless they have a bona fide reason for not
attending.
6.6.6 REMUNERATION
Remuneration for special pay duties shall be the
responsibility of the party requesting such duties. Police
officers who perform special pay duties shall not receive
remuneration greater than the hourly rate provided for in
accordance with the terms of the Uniform Collective Agreement
between the Board and the Metropolitan Toronto Police
Association.
6.6.7 DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED BY OFF-DUTY POLICE OFFICERS
Police officers shall not accept a special pay duty when any
portion of such assignment will overlap with their regular
duty.
Supervisory officers shall not perform special pay duties
which could be performed by members of a subordinate rank.
6.6.8 TRAFFIC CONTROL DUTIES
Police officers performing pay duties involving traffic
control on public streets shall facilitate the orderly movement
of traffic and shall not unnecessarily delay the flow of
vehicular and pedestrian traffic on public thoroughfares.
6.6.9 REPORTING ON AND OFF DUTY
Unless otherwise instructed, police officers assigned to
special pay duties shall report on and off duty, in person, to
the officer in charge of their unit. Officers in charge shall
ensure that such police officers:
- are properly attired, equipped, and fit for duty;
- report on and off duty in compliance with this section.
Such officers in charge shall record the commencement and
completion times of the special pay duties on the appropriate
form.
6.6.10 POLICE OFFICERS TO BE VISITED
When practicable, police officers performing special pay
duties shall be visited by a supervisory officer from their unit
and both members shall record the visit in their memorandum
book.
[11] SPD is performed under a contract between the client and
the police force. The individual police officer is not a party to
that contract. The contract is made and terms are fixed by a
process in which the individual police officer does not
participate. It is only after the contract is made under sections
6.6.1 and 6.6.2 of the Rules that the allotment process under
6.6.3 takes place. The reference in 6.6.1 to a unit commander is
to the commander of the unit which would have jurisdiction over
the area or subject-matter if the police service were to be
furnished in the ordinary way at public expense. In the Toronto
force the unit may be a geographic division such as 53 Division
commanded by the witness Selwyn Fernandez or a functional
division such as the Traffic Division commanded by the witness
Gary Grant. In short, the division of administrative
authority and responsibility which governs the ordinary
operations of the Police Department, also governs all facets of
SPD.
[12] Further, with respect to Rule 6.6.1, it should be noted
that it is not the individual officer but rather the police force
which determines the criteria by which the suitability of a
request for SPD must be judged. Thus, for example, Policy
Directive 20-01 of the police force provides in part:
PROHIBITED FUNCTIONS
Pursuant to the rule entitled 'Authorization for Pay Duty
Officers' (6.6.1), pay duties will NOT be performed
- on behalf of an employer or union that is related to a
labour dispute
- at a function likely to promote a confrontation between
participating groups
- as a bodyguard service
- for a money escort
[13] Police Force Policy Directive 20-01 expands on Rule
6.6.2 as follows:
All requests for a special pay duty must be made on a Pay Duty
Request (TPS 784) and signed by the requester prior to
approving the request. The TPS 784 may be submitted by the
requester in either hard copy or forwarded through a facsimile
transmission (FAX).
The TPS 784 form sets out the terms of the agreement under
which the SPD is performed. Those terms include the time, the
place and the particulars of the specific duty which the client
has requested, the number of officers and the police equipment
requested and finally, the following standard terms:
1. Payment in full for the officer's services is to be
made to each officer upon completion of the pay duty.
2. Where the event is of significant size and it would be
impractical to pay each officer individually, an all inclusive
deposit may be made to the Police Credit Union for
subsequent distribution to the participating members. This option
is available only with prior approval of the unit
commander involved and the Police Credit Union. When this option
is utilized, full payment must be deposited prior to the
scheduled event, unless other contractual agreements have been
completed in advance.
3. The current rate of pay is:
Constable $43.00 (per officer with a three hour minimum
Sergeant $48.00 (per officer with a three hour minimum)
Staff Sergeant (when in
charge of 14 or less officers) $53.00 (per officer with a
three hour minimum)
Staff Sergeant (when in
charge of 15 or more officers) $54.00 (per officer with a
three hour minimum)
4. Police officers are prohibited from working more than 12
hours in a 24 hour period on pay duties. It may be necessary to
make several bookings when the maximum period may be
exceeded.
5. The current hourly rate for police equipment is:
motor vehicles/motorcycle $ 35.00 per hour (minimum three
hours)
motorized boat $330.00 per boat (for first three hours)
$100.00 per boat (for each subsequent hour)
rowboat $ 50.00 per assignment
trailer or bicycle $ 20.00 per assignment
horse or dog $ 50.00 per assignment
6. Where a scheduled event extends beyond the original time
period listed, the hourly rate will apply to each officer
participating and/or the use of any police equipment.
7. An administrative fee (15%) will be charged on the total
amount of each pay duty. In addition, the 7% GST rate will be
applied to the administrative fee and the use of police
equipment.
8. Generally, the administrative fee, police equipment rates,
and GST will be invoiced separately at a later date. These fees
are not to be paid to the officers or deposited to the
Police Credit Union. NOTE: For major events, where the Police
Credit Union option is used – all fees, including the
administrative and equipment, etc. will be deposited in
advance.
9. Failure to meet the financial obligations in relation to
the officer, use of police equipment or the administrative fee
may result in suspension of further pay duty provisions.
10. The number of police officers required (all ranks) is open
to discussion with the unit commander involved.
11. A pay duty may be cancelled by the unit commander or the
officer in charge of a unit where climatic conditions deteriorate
to a state which would be unsafe or hazardous.
12. The minimum cancellation time that is allowed is eight (8)
hours prior to the scheduled start time. In the event that notice
for cancellation is not received before this period, a minimum
payment of three (3) hours per officer will be charged, along
with associated fees and taxes. Fees for the use of police
equipment will not be charged.
The individual officer who is to perform the SPD assignment
does not sign the contract. The form contains nothing which would
indicate that the officer is intended to be a party to the
contract.
[14] SPD is much sought after as a means of supplementing the
income of members of the police force. It is therefore necessary
to ensure that opportunities to perform SPD be fairly allocated
among those who wish to undertake the work. It is not necessary
to describe details of the allocation system. What is significant
for present purposes is that the system is operated by the police
force itself and that the force reserves the right to deny SPD to
individual officers. The evidence of
Superintendent Fernandez indicates that an officer's
opportunity to perform SPD may be withheld by the commanding
officer as a disciplinary measure. Nothing in the evidence
supports the notion advanced in argument that the police force
acts as agent of the individual officer to effect a contract
between that officer and the client. The evidence does not
suggest that the force purports to do so or intends to do so.
[15] The administrative fee (paragraph 7 of the TPS 784 form)
is intended to recover salaries paid to police personnel engaged
in the administration of the SPD system. The time spent by
employees of the police department in administering SPD is
substantial. During the early 1990s the total annual direct cost
to the force of employee time so spent was about $700,000.00. The
total paid duty income to police officers in 1992 was in excess
of $8,800,000.00.
[16] When performing SPD police officers remain under the
control of the force which not only decides whether the task will
be undertaken at all but also supervises and directs the manner
in which the officer will do his or her work. One example of such
control is Rule 6.6.8 reproduced above. Another example is the
detailed safety equipment direction found in the policy and
procedure manual:
Use of Appropriate Safety Equipment
Officers shall wear a "blaze" orange safety vest or
an outer garment with high visibility, reflective material
attached, while performing traffic or pedestrian control duties.
When these duties are performed during hours of darkness, a
flashlight must also be used. If the duty involves overhead
construction, officers shall wear an approved safety hat.
When practicable, officers shall be equipped with a portable
radio while performing a pay duty.
Yet another example is the police department requirement that
the police officer parade before the officer in charge at least
15 minutes before the scheduled start time of pay duty and, after
completing pay duty, report off-duty to the officer in charge of
his or her unit and turn in his or her memorandum book to the
officer. The purpose of the parade is to ensure that the officer
is properly equipped and fit for duty. Still another example of
control by the force over the manner in which SPD is performed is
the detailed set of directions which governs the conduct of
motorcycle officers who escort funeral processions.
[17] Section 20.01 of the Police Force Policy and Procedure
Manual provides in part:
Police Officer ...
3. While performing a pay duty shall not
search any member of the public, except where authorized by
statute or in compliance with the directive entitled 'Search
of persons' (01-02)
use their personal vehicle to transport persons and/or cash
for the requester
4. After the completion of a pay duty shall
unless otherwise instructed , report off duty to the officer
in charge at the unit
submit the memorandum book to the officer in charge.
The evidence of Superintendents Grant and Fernandez makes it
clear that the rules and policies of the Toronto police force
must be followed by officers under their command. My clear
impression is that neither of these senior officers will tolerate
any departure from the rules of the force whether the officers
under their command are on regular duty or on SPD.
[18] The disciplinary regime to which police officers are
subject is the same whether the officer is on regular duty or on
SPD. Superintendent Fernandez indicated in his testimony
that he has disciplined officers who have been late for SPD and
for being improperly equipped while on SPD.
[19] The Appellant, in her testimony, suggested that she was
under the control of the client while on SPD. She said that while
at a baseball game on SPD she received directions from employees
of the team or stadium. I do not accept that testimony. I formed
the impression that the Appellant, when testifying, was more
concerned with advocacy than with accuracy. It is clear that
supervisory officers were present at major events in accordance
with the requirements established by the Police Force Policy and
Procedure Manual, namely:
Supervisory Requirements
Based on the Uniform Collective Agreement provisions for
officers, the standards established are
I. at least one (1) sergeant/detective is required for a group
of four (4) or more police constables
II. when ten (10) or more police officers are assigned to a
pay duty, such officers shall, in addition to a
sergeant/detective be supervised by a staff sergeant/detective
sergeant.
NOTE: Where the number of police officers being supervised
exceeds 15, staff/detective sergeants are entitled to an
increased rate of salary in accordance with the Uniform
Collective Agreement.
[20] The Appellant testified that she rarely encountered
supervisors while on SPD. The witness Sylvie Guay, a police
officer of 12 years' standing, testified that she had never
been visited by a supervisor while on SPD except by a supervisor
on general patrol. She acknowledged, however, that she would be
obliged to respect the orders of a sergeant while on SPD.
Although supervision by the police force of officers on SPD may
not be continuous I prefer the more objective evidence of
Superintendents Grant and Fernandez that supervisors do, at least
occasionally, attend where SPD is performed in order to ensure
that the work is done properly. Moreover it is the right to
control and not the exercise of it which is of significance.
[21] Police officers performing SPD wear their uniforms in
most instances. Those uniforms are the property of the police
force. The other equipment carried and used by officers while on
duty such as weapons, radios and cell phones also belong to the
force. Vehicles such as motorcycles and police cruisers sometimes
used on SPD are the property of the force. Virtually nothing used
in carrying out SPD belongs to the individual officer.
[22] The Appellant testified that she maintained an in-home
office equipped with a desk, telephone and a bookshelf for
purposes of making and keeping records of SPD. Here again, I
believe that the Appellant's evidence is disingenuous. I am
not convinced that either the office or its furnishings play any
realistic role in the income earning process. The police force
keeps a complete record of each officer's SPD time and
earnings and supplies a copy of it to the officer. There is no
real need for anything else.
[23] The police department issued T4 slips to its officers in
respect of SPD earnings of some years but not in respect of
others. My impression is that variations in T4 slip reporting
practices were more representative of the relative strength from
time to time of, on the one hand, Revenue Canada demands for the
issuance of the slips and, on the other hand, police association
resistance to the issuance of them. I am sure that each
organization was sincere in the views implicit in its stance with
respect to T4s but I do not find that the reporting practices are
of any assistance in deciding the issue now before the Court.
[24] As indicated by Rule 6.6.6 and paragraph 1 of the
standard terms of the TPS 784 contract, the officer's
remuneration for SPD is paid to him or her directly by the client
(or by deposit in the officer's police credit union account).
The officer bears the risk of non-payment and is reminded of this
fact by signs posted in police stations which bluntly indicate
that the police force is not a collection agency. In the
relatively rare cases where clients do fail to pay for SPD,
senior officers will, sometimes, on an unofficial basis, write
dunning letters on police department letterhead to the delinquent
client.
[25] In Wiebe Door Services Ltd. v. M.N.R.,[3] the Federal Court of
Appeal ruled that the test for distinguishing between a contract
of service and a contract for services is a "... four-in-one
test, with emphasis always retained on what Lord Wright,
supra, calls 'the combined force of the whole scheme
of operations' even while the usefulness of the four
subordinate criteria is acknowledged." [4] The four elements of the
approved test are control, ownership of tools, chance of profit
and risk of loss and, finally, the integration or organization
test. In Wiebe Door the Court of Appeal described as
"the best synthesis found in the authorities"[5] the following passage
from the reasons of Cooke J. in Market Investigations Ltd. v.
Minister of Social Security:[6]
The observations of Lord Wright, of Denning L.J., and of the
judges of the Supreme Court in the U.S.A. suggest that the
fundamental test to be applied is this: "Is the person who
has engaged himself to perform these services performing them as
a person in business on his own account?" If the answer to
that question is "yes", then the contract is a contract
for services. If the answer is "no" then the contract
is a contract of service. No exhaustive list has been compiled
and perhaps no exhaustive list can be compiled of considerations
which are relevant in determining that question, nor can strict
rules be laid down as to the relative weight which the various
considerations should carry in particular cases. The most that
can be said is that control will no doubt always have to be
considered, although it can no longer be regarded as the sole
determining factor; and that factors, which may be of importance,
are such matters as whether the man performing the services
provides his own equipment, whether he hires his own helpers,
what degree of financial risk be taken, what degree of
responsibility for investment and management he has, and whether
and how far he has an opportunity of profiting from sound
management in the performance of his task. The application of the
general test may be easier in a case where the person who engages
himself to perform the services does so in the course of an
already established business of his own; but this factor is not
decisive, and a person who engages himself to perform services
for another may well be an independent contractor even though he
has not entered into the contract in the course of an existing
business carried on by him.
[26] In my view the evidence in this case does not support a
conclusion that the Appellant when performing SPD is doing so as
a person carrying on business on her own account. As I see it,
she puts her services at the disposal of the police force and not
at the disposal of the client. It is the police force which has
entered into the contract with the client to provide police
services. It has done so in a process in which the individual
police officer does not participate. The officer is not selected
until after the contract with the client has been made. It is the
police force, not the Appellant, which is carrying on the
business of furnishing the service.
[27] The Appellant, in accepting an assignment of SPD, does
not, as is common in the case of an independent contractor, agree
to accomplish a defined objective. Her agreement, as section
6.6.5 of the Rules makes evident, is to personally work for a
period of time. The Appellant has no right to fulfil her
obligation by sending in a substitute. It is the police force
which possesses that right.
[28] The Appellant, in performing SPD, does not have any
opportunity to exercise entrepreneurial judgment. She can do
nothing to maximize revenues except, of course, to work a greater
number of hours and even that is a matter largely beyond her
control. She can do virtually nothing to minimize expense; SPD
involves little in the way of expense and in this respect
resembles ordinary employment.
[29] In paragraph 4 of these reasons I have referred to the
four principal features of SPD which distinguish it from ordinary
duty. Employment undertaken voluntarily is nonetheless
employment. Work done for an employer during what would otherwise
be the employee's time off may, nevertheless, be governed by
the contract of employment as in the case of voluntary overtime.
Payment by the client is without doubt an unusual feature of the
SPD scheme. It might in some circumstances suggest the existence
of some kind of contract between the individual officer and the
client for whom SPD is to be performed. It does not suggest that
in the present context. It must be remembered that income from
employment does not always come from the employer. For example,
persons employed in the hospitality industry often earn very
substantial portions of their income from gratuities. Finally,
the role of the police association in unilaterally fixing the
hourly rate of pay pursuant to a right under the collective
agreement between the association and the police force, does not
help the Appellant. The fact that the right exists as a term of a
collective agreement tends to suggest that SPD may be regarded as
a part of the master-servant relationship governed by the
collective agreement.
[30] All elements of the four-in-one test point to a
conclusion that the Appellant, in performing SPD, does so as an
employee of the police force. She has no independent business of
her own. She does work which the police force has been engaged to
do under a contract between force and client to which she is a
stranger. The force has and exercises the right to control the
manner in which the work is done. That right is not illusory. The
Appellant's SPD work is in fact controlled by the force.
Moreover, it is performed with the use of equipment supplied by
the force.
[31] Clause 49(1)(d) of the Police Services Act has no
application. Obviously that provision is not intended to prohibit
a member of the police force from serving as an employee of the
force and that, in my view, is exactly what police officers do
when they work on SPD.
[32] I recognize that my decision is inconsistent with
Gordon v. The Queen,[7] a decision of this Court given under the
informal procedure. It would seem that the Court did not, in that
case, have the benefit of the evidence which was put before
me.
[33] For the foregoing reasons the appeal will be dismissed,
with costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 11th day of April 2000.
"Michael J. Bonner"
J.T.C.C.