Date: 20000214
Docket: 98-2823-IT-I
BETWEEN:
JAYANT RADIA,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Bowie J.T.C.C.
[1] In filing his return under the Income Tax Act (the
Act) for the 1996 taxation year, the Appellant claimed
non-refundable disability tax credits in respect of both his wife
and his son. At the hearing before me, he abandoned the claim in
respect of his son, but pursued that in respect of his wife. It
is not disputed by the Respondent that the Appellant would be
entitled to have the full amount of the credit in respect of his
wife transferred to him pursuant to section 118.8, as she has no
income tax payable for the year.
[2] Section 118.3 of the Act provides that the
entitlement to receive the disability tax credit provided for in
that section is conditional upon, among other things, filing a
satisfactory certification of the disability in a prescribed form
completed by a medical practitioner. However, the practice of the
Minister of National Revenue has been that where a permanent
disability has once been established, the taxpayer is not
required to file the prescribed form each year, unless either
there is a change in the circumstances of the individual, or the
Minister specifically requires it to be filed.[1] The Appellant's wife has
suffered from schizophrenia since at least 1988. A satisfactory
medical certificate filed for the 1988 taxation year established
that her mental disability met the requirements of sections 118.3
and 118.4. Pursuant to the practice, the Appellant received the
credit for the 1988 taxation year, and he continued to receive it
annually, until 1995, without the need to file a new certificate
each year. He was, however, required by the Minister to file a
new certificate in respect of the 1996 taxation year, and when he
failed to do so, his claim for the credit was denied.
[3] The Appellant testified that his wife's condition has
not improved since 1988. It is clear from his evidence that she
has no touch with reality, and that she does in fact meet the
requirements of the Act, in that she does not have the
ability to think, perceive and remember. She suffers from a
permanent disability which markedly restricts her ability to
perform the basic activities of daily living, as that expression
is defined in section 118.4 of the Act. He also testified
that, try as he might, he has been unable to persuade her to
attend a medical appointment, either for treatment, or to permit
a physician to examine her with a view to completing the
prescribed form that the Minister has now required him to file.
On one occasion, when he attempted to take her to an appointment
with the doctor, she attempted to jump out of the car while it
was moving. On another occasion, when he suggested that he would
take her to see the doctor, she threatened to jump from the
balcony of their apartment. Nor has he been able to have a doctor
examine his wife at home for the purpose of making the prescribed
certificate.
[4] I found the Appellant to be a sincere and credible
witness. I do not believe that he was exaggerating either the
severity of his wife's condition, or the lengths to which she
would go in order to avoid seeing a doctor. I accept his
contention that, as a practical matter, it is impossible for him
to obtain the required certificate, although his wife's
medical condition falls within the defined ambit of the
expression "severe and prolonged mental or physical
impairment".
[5] Counsel for the Respondent did not challenge the
Appellant's version of these facts, but simply rested her
case upon the recent decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in
the cases of MacIsaac v. Canada and Morrison v.
Canada.[2] The
Court held there that for a taxpayer to become entitled to the
disability tax credit
... there must be a certificate by the doctor that the
individual suffers impairments in the language of ...
[subsections 118.3(1) and 118.4(1)]
The Court considered itself to be bound by the earlier
decision[3] of a
different panel of the same Court, which had upheld the
conclusion of Lamarre Proulx J. of this Court that "... a
certificate from a medical doctor was a prerequisite for
obtaining the disability credit created by section 118.3
...". The subsection in question reads as follows:
118.3(1) Where
(a) an individual has a severe and prolonged mental or
physical impairment,
(a.1) the effects of the impairment are such that the
individual's ability to perform a basic activity of daily
living is markedly restricted,
(a.2) in the case of
(i) a sight impairment, a medical doctor or an
optometrist,
(ii) a hearing impairment, a medical doctor or an audiologist,
and
(iii) an impairment not referred to in subparagraphs (i)
or (ii), a medical doctor
has certified in prescribed form that the impairment is a
severe and prolonged mental or physical impairment the effects of
which are such that the individual's ability to perform a
basic activity of daily living is markedly restricted,
(b) the individual has filed for a taxation year with
the Minister the certificate described in paragraph (a.2),
and
(c) no amount in respect of remuneration for an
attendant or care in a nursing home, in respect of the
individual, is included in calculating a deduction under section
118.2 (otherwise than because of paragraph 118.2(2)(b.1))
for the year by the individual or by any other person,
for the purposes of computing the tax payable under this Part
by the individual for the year, there may be deducted an amount
determined by the formula ...
[6] In recent decisions,[4] the Federal Court of Appeal has approved the
humane and compassionate approach to the interpretation of
sections 118.3 and 118.4 which was developed by Judge Bowman in
such cases as Noseworthy,[5] Cotterell,[6] Radage,[7] and Lawlor.[8] However, the language of the
subsection, although no model of simplicity and clarity, admits
of no ambiguity as to the requirement that each of the five
conditions set out there must be satisfied before the taxpayer is
entitled to the tax credit. The unusual facts of this case cry
out for relief. However, it is not for the courts to provide that
relief, in the face of statutory requirements which the Appellant
simply cannot meet. The Financial Administration Act[9] gives the Governor
in Council, on the recommendation of the appropriate Minister,
very broad powers to remit taxes where it would be unreasonable,
unjust, or otherwise not in the public interest to collect them.
I cannot arrogate that power to myself.
[7] It is with regret that I dismiss the appeal.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 14th day of February, 2000.
"E.A. Bowie"
J.T.C.C.