Date: 000221
Docket: 97-3644-IT-G
BETWEEN:
PAUL PEROVICH,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Bonner, J.T.C.C.
[1] The Appellant appeals from assessments of income tax for
the 1990 to 1993 taxation years. The appeals relate to the
purchase and resale at a loss of a parcel of land known as the
Milton property. The purchaser named in the Agreement to Purchase
was Paul Perovich Company Inc. ("PPCI"), a corporation
which did not exist at the time the agreement was made. From the
time of the closing of the purchase in May of 1990 to the time of
the closing of the sale in June of 1992, title to the Milton
property was registered in the name of PPCI. The first issue in
the appeals is whether the loss on the sale of the Milton
property was incurred by PPCI, the corporation which ostensibly
bought the property and later resold it at a loss or whether, as
the Appellant contends, PPCI acted throughout as bare trustee for
the Appellant with the consequence that it was the Appellant who
incurred the loss. The second issue is whether the loss was of a
capital or non-capital nature. The third issue relates to the
timing of the Appellant's claim to deduct the loss.
[2] The Appellant was born in 1942 in Yugoslavia. He came to
Canada in 1964. He quickly became a versatile and active
entrepreneur. In 1966 he started a business involving the
manufacture of precision parts. The business was incorporated
under the name Truetech in 1982. Truetech manufactured tools for
grinder wheels. In 1992 the corporate name was changed from
Truetech to Budva. Budva was sold in 1996. The Appellant then
entered the business of manufacturing bikini bathing suits.
[3] The Appellant gave evidence at the hearing of the appeals.
He testified that he entered the business of buying and selling
real estate for profit and he described the trading history in
some detail. In 1987 the Appellant and his brother Peter acquired
property in Scarborough. The Appellant stated that the property
was purchased for occupation by Truetech. Very little of the
purchase price was paid in cash. The property was sold six months
later at a gain of approximately $250,000.00. The Appellant
stated that the property proved to be too small for use by
Truetech.
[4] In April of 1988 Perovic Holdings Inc. was incorporated.
The issued shares in that corporation were divided equally
between the Appellant and his brother, Peter Perovic. In
September 1988 Perovic Holdings Inc. acquired five acres of
vacant land in Pickering, Ontario at a cost of $550,000.00. The
Appellant said that he intended to rezone and sell the property.
The property was resold in January of 1989 for $1,075,000.00.
[5] At this point I will note that there appears to be little
or no correlation between the corporate and individual names used
to carry out the transactions referred to by the Appellant and
the persons who, at least so far as the Appellant was able to
remember in cross-examination, reported the gains for income tax
purposes. The documentation pertaining to the Scarborough
transaction indicates that the owners were the Appellant and his
brother. The Appellant indicated that the gain on resale was not
divided evenly between himself and his brother. He said, somewhat
enigmatically, that he had a silent partner. The Appellant could
not say how the transaction was reported in his return of
income.
[6] The agreement to purchase the Pickering property named
"P. Perovich in trust for a company to be incorporated"
as purchaser. Title was taken in the name of Perovic Holdings
Inc. According to the Appellant the profit on this transaction
was reported as a capital gain by his sons, his brother and
spouse. The reasons for so reporting the gain were not
explained.
[7] It is against this background that the Milton property was
purchased. The property was acquired pursuant to an agreement of
purchase and sale formed in September of 1989. The purchaser
named in the Agreement to Purchase was PPCI. The corporation
bearing the name Paul Perovich Company Inc. was not incorporated
until April 26, 1990, a few days before the closing of the
purchase.
[8] The Appellant's evidence with regard to the identity
of the purchaser of the Milton property was, in many respects,
inconsistent and, I find, unreliable. He testified that the
Agreement to Purchase the property was prepared by the real
estate agent. He stated during the examination-in-chief that he
always buys property in trust for a corporation to be
incorporated and that, in the case of the Milton property, the
agent mistakenly named PPCI as purchaser. He said that the vendor
refused to allow him to correct the mistake. During
cross-examination the Appellant reiterated that the Agreement had
not been properly prepared and stated that the purchaser named in
the Agreement should have been Paul Perovich in trust for a
company to be incorporated. That testimony makes it very
difficult to conclude that it was the Appellant's intention
that he and not a corporation be the purchaser.
[9] There was entered in evidence a photostatic copy of a
declaration of trust referring to the Milton property. It is on
this document that the Appellant relies as proof that the Milton
property was to be held in trust for his sole benefit. The
document reads in part:
KNOW YE ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that the undersigned, Paul
Perovich Company Inc., Trustee, do hereby acknowledge, covenant,
agree and declare that whatever interest it holds in Part Lot 15,
Concession 2, Town of Milton is held in trust for an for the sole
benefit of the following:
Paul Perovich 100%
...
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have hereunto caused to be
affixed their signatures duly attested to by the wtinesses'
co-signatures this 13th day of September, 1989.
BENEFICIARY TRUSTEE
PAUL PEROVICH COMPANY INC.
"Paul Perovich" Per: "Paul Perovich"
It will be observed that the trustee named in the Declaration
did not exist on the date which the document bears.
[10] The Declaration of Trust does little to clarify matters.
At one stage in his testimony the Appellant asserted that the
document was prepared not on the date which it bears but rather
some nine months later at or about the time of closing. By that
time, of course, the supposed corporate trustee had been
incorporated. At another stage the Appellant stated that the
document was executed on September 13, 1989. Obviously the
Declaration could not serve to create or evidence a trust formed
in September of 1989 because the trustee did not then exist. No
clear and convincing explanation was given for the supposed
execution in May of 1989 of a backdated document. I doubt that it
happened then.
[11] I note that it is difficult to reconcile the alleged role
of PPCI as trustee with the declared intention of the Appellant
to purchase in trust for that corporation.
[12] The position, as I see it, is governed by section 21 of
the Business Corporations Act, S.O. 1982, C. 4.
Subsections (1), (2) and (3) provide:
(1) Except as provided in this section, a person who enters
into an oral or written contract in the name of or on behalf of a
corporation before it comes into existence is personally bound by
the contract and is entitled to the benefits thereof.
(2) A corporation may, within a reasonable time after it comes
into existence, by any action or conduct signifying its intention
to be bound thereby, adopt an oral or written contract made
before it came into existence in its name or on its behalf, and
upon such adoption,
(a) the corporation is bound by the contract and is
entitled to the benefits thereof as if the corporation had been
in existence at the date of the contract and had been a party
thereto; and
(b) a person who purported to act in the name of or on
behalf of the corporation ceases, except as provided in
subsection (3), to be bound by or entitled to the benefits of the
contract.
(3) Except as provided in subsection (4), whether or not an
oral or written contract made before the coming into existence of
a corporation is adopted by the corporation, a party to the
contract may apply to a court for an order fixing obligations
under the contract as joint or joint and several or apportioning
liability between the corporation and the person who purported to
act in the name of or on behalf of the corporation, and, upon
such application, the court may make any order it thinks fit.
As I see it, PPCI adopted the contract which had been made in
its name when it completed the Agreement to Purchase the Milton
property and took title to the land in its name. As a consequence
paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (2) apply to
the transaction and exclude the Appellant from rights or benefits
under the contract.
[13] For purposes of the Income Tax Act the profits or
losses from a business are the income or loss of the proprietor.
Thus, where the business takes the form of an adventure in the
nature of trade, it is necessary to identify the person who, as a
consequence of the purchase of the property which was the subject
of the adventure, stood to earn profit or suffer loss from the
anticipated resale. In the present case that person was PPCI.
[14] In making the assessments in issue the Minister proceeded
on the basis that PPCI did not purchase the Milton property in
trust for the Appellant. The onus was on the Appellant to
establish on the balance of probabilities that that assumption
was wrong. The Appellant has failed to discharge that onus. I can
derive no assistance from the testimony of Timothy Saloma.
He stated that he was the Appellant's solicitor until 1996
when he ceased to practice law. Mr. Saloma was unable to
give any lucid explanation for the use of the Declaration of
Trust. At one stage he asserted that the document was prepared to
indicate that the Appellant was sole owner of the property
because the Appellant's brother was recorded as owner of one
common share of PPCI. When asked why the vendor could not have
been directed and authorized to convey title to the Appellant
rather than PPCI, Mr. Saloma pointed out that a direction
would have to come from PPCI and that it had not been
incorporated and therefore could not sign the direction to the
vendor. The evidence established that PPCI was incorporated prior
to closing. I regret that I cannot find Mr. Saloma's
evidence to be any more reliable than that of the Appellant.
[15] Since it has not been established that it was the
Appellant who sustained a loss on the purchase and sale of the
Milton property, it is not necessary to consider the issues with
respect to the nature of the loss and the timing of the loss.
[16] For the foregoing reasons the appeals will be dismissed
with costs.
Signed at Toronto, Canada, this 21st day of February 2000.
"Michael J. Bonner"
J.T.C.C.