Date: 20000815
Docket: 1999-2532-GST-I
BETWEEN:
1036705 ONTARIO LIMITED,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Bowman, A.C.J.
[1] This appeal is from an assessment of Goods and Services
Tax made under the Excise Tax Act, in respect of the
period September 10, 1993 to January 31, 1995.
[2] There are three issues:
(a) what was the fair market value of three houses at the
later of the time when construction of the houses was completed
and the giving of possession to tenants
(b) whether the appellant exercised due diligence so as to
justify the deletion of the penalties imposed under section
280
(c) whether the Input Tax Credits allowed to the appellant
were correctly computed.
[3] The appellant was engaged in the business of constructing
residential units and renting them to tenants. It constructed
three houses that were specifically designed for occupancy by
disabled persons. It built two virtually identical houses at
18 Simson Avenue and 36 Turner Drive, Simcoe, Ontario,
and a duplex at 264 Queen Street South, Simcoe.
[4] The appellant rented the Simson Avenue and Turner Drive
properties to tenants in or about December 1993 and the Queen
Street property in or about December 1994.
[5] The appellant did not apply to be registered under
Subdivision d of Division V of the Act. Prior to
starting the construction of the three houses, Mr. James
King, the general manager of the appellant, telephoned someone in
the Hamilton District Office of the Department of National
Revenue and asked about the GST on rental properties. The
evidence of the precise wording of the question was not
particularly clear. The answer was also somewhat vague but
apparently it was more or less to the effect that rentals on long
term lease agreements are not subject to GST and that the builder
would not be entitled rebates (by which I take it he meant
ITCs).
[6] One thing is reasonably clear: he was not told about
subsection 191(1) of the Excise Tax Act, which
reads:
For the purposes of this Part, where
(a) the construction or substantial renovation of a
residential complex that is a single unit residential complex or
a residential condominium unit is substantially completed,
(b) the builder of the complex
(i) gives possession of the complex to a particular person
under a lease, licence or similar arrangement (other than an
arrangement, under or arising as a consequence of an agreement of
purchase and sale of the complex, for the possession or occupancy
of the complex until ownership of the complex is transferred to
the purchaser under the agreement) entered into for the purpose
of its occupancy by an individual as a place of residence,
(ii) gives possession of the complex to a particular person
under an agreement for
(A) the supply by way of sale of the building or part thereof
in which the residential unit forming part of the complex is
located, and
(B) the supply by way of lease of the land forming part of the
complex or the supply of such a lease by way of assignment,
other than an agreement for the supply of a mobile home and a
site for the home in a residential trailer park, or
(iii) where the builder is an individual, occupies the complex
as a place of residence, and
(c) the builder, the particular person or an individual who is
a tenant or licensee of the particular person is the first
individual to occupy the complex as a place of residence after
substantial completion of the construction or renovation,
the builder shall be deemed
(d) to have made and received, at the later of the time the
construction or substantial renovation is substantially completed
and the time possession of the complex is so given to the
particular person or the complex is so occupied by the builder, a
taxable supply by way of sale of the complex, and
(e) to have paid as a recipient and to have collected as a
supplier, at the later of those times, tax in respect of the
supply calculated on the fair market value of the complex at the
later of those times.
[7] Subsection 191(3) is to the same effect with respect
to multiple unit residential complexes.
[8] The result was that when the properties were rented the
Minister concluded that there was a deemed taxable supply by way
of sale of the properties at fair market value.
[9] It was assumed that the fair market value of the Simson
Avenue and Turner Drive properties was $128,000 each and of the
duplex on Queen Street, $135,000. These figures were based upon
the appellant's financial statements in which it used, for
the purpose of the calculation of depreciation and capital cost
allowance, an estimate of the fair market value rather than cost.
Amended financial statements were filed recording the properties
at cost, but this has nothing to do with the issue in this
case.
[10] At trial the respondent filed expert witness reports in
accordance with section 7 of the rules of this court
respecting GST appeals. The expert, Mr. Udvari, was of the
view that the duplex had a value of $125,000 and the two single
family houses each had a value of $110,000.
[11] Mr. King, who represented the appellant, apparently
had a valuation of these properties but he was not prepared to
call the valuator and I did not permit him to put the valuation
in evidence in light of subsection 7(2) of the rules. This
case was heard under the informal procedure. Under
subsection 18.15(4) of the Tax Court of Canada Act
the court is not bound by technical rules of procedure
(Ainsley v. Canada [1997] F.C.J. No. 701 (F.C.A.);
Brennan v. R. [1998] 1 C.T.C. 2143). This does
not mean, however, that a case in the informal procedure can
proceed with no regard to rules of procedural fairness. I did not
think it was appropriate that an expert witness report could be
adduced unless the author could be cross-examined.
[12] The result is that the appellant adduced no evidence to
displace the evidence of Mr. Udvari. Although there were a
few minor technical errors in the valuations their substance
remained basically unchallenged despite a very thorough
cross-examination by Mr. King.
[13] Mr. Udvari's approach was relatively
conventional. He chose comparables in the vicinity and made
adjustments.
[14] I tend to think Mr. Udvari's values for the
subject properties may be a little high. This is based on looking
at the pictures of the properties in question and the
comparables. The comparables are more attractive and look as if
they could command a higher price. Also, the comparables all have
basements, some of which are finished and some of the comparables
have garages, as well.
[15] Mr. Udvari used the Marshall And Swift costing
services to make whatever adjustments he did with respect to the
garages and basements, as follows:
single garage $4,000
basement $10 per square foot
finished basement $10 per square foot
½ bathroom $1,500
1.5 bathroom $,5000
The subject properties had no basement and no garage.
[16] After the adjustments were made to arrive at an adjusted
sale price Mr. Udvari determined a value per square foot and
applied it to the subject properties.
[17] I can find no fault with his methodology. Although I
think that the downward adjustments for the garages and basements
may be somewhat low, I have no evidentiary basis for disagreeing
with them.
[18] The result is that the figures in Mr. Udvari's
reports must stand.
[19] So far as the ITCs are concerned Mr. Liota, the
auditor, gave the appellant ITCs totalling $10,240.29.
Mr. King suggested that GST was paid on the building lots
when the appellant bought them. That is, I suppose, possible, but
no evidence of this was presented.
[20] Finally, there is the question of due diligence. The
Department of National Revenue has been forced, with reluctance
and, I daresay, some consternation to accept that due diligence
is a defence to the imposition of penalties (Pillar Oilfield
Projects Ltd. v. The Queen [1993] G.S.T.C. 49;
Consolidated Canadian Contractors Inc. v. The Queen [1998]
G.S.T.C. 91. I question what policy reason can justify
penalizing mistakes made in good faith under the Excise Tax
Act when similar mistakes are not penalized under the
Income Tax Act. However, in forcing the recognition of the
due diligence defence considerable progress has been made. Due
diligence is not the same as innocent good faith. I do not think
that a phone call to some unnamed official in the tax department
with a couple of broad general questions, eliciting equally broad
and general answers, amounts to the type of due diligence
required to avoid the penalty imposed under section 280. The
trouble with the type of enquiry that was evidently made here is
that I doubt that Mr. King really knew what questions to
ask. Mr. King called some evidence to show that sometimes
general answers given by departmental officials to broad
questions are less than satisfactory. That is self evident. I
doubt that one really needs evidence to support such a
proposition. However, due diligence requires more than casual
enquiries.
[21] The appeals are allowed to give effect to the valuations
of the property in question established by the expert
reports.
[22] There will be no order for costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 15th day of August 2000.
"D.G.H. Bowman"
A.C.J.