Date: 20000918
Docket: 1999-4611-EI
BETWEEN:
THE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF BRITISH
COLUMBIA,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent,
and
RYAN LAKE,
Intervenor
Reasonsfor
Judgment
Beaubier, J.T.C.C.
[1]
This appeal was heard at Vancouver, British Columbia on
August 25, 2000. Ryan Lake was the only witness.
Solicitors for the other parties read in portions of Examinations
for Discoveries.
[2]
It is an appeal by the Appellant ("ICBC") from a
decision of Revenue Canada dated August 27, 1999, which
reads:
Insurance Corporation of British Columbia
c/o Corporate Law
Department
L. Desrochers
151 West Esplanade
Street
Appeals Division
North Vancouver,
B.C.
Section 430-25
V7M
3H9
27 Aug 1999
Dear Sirs:
This letter concerns an appeal made by you under the
Employment Insurance Act of a ruling concerning Shannie
Harvey's employment with Ryan Lake during the period of
September 1, 1997 to June 26, 1998.
It has been decided that Shannie Harvey was employed by Ryan
Lake under a contract of service and thus was employed in
insurable employment; as Shannie Harvey was paid by the Insurance
Corporation of British Columbia, the Insurance Corporation of
British Columbia was deemed to be the employer of the insured
person in addition to the actual employer.
If you disagree with this decision, you may appeal to the Tax
Court of Canada within 90 days of the mailing date of this
letter. Details on how to appeal can be found in the enclosed
attachment.
The decision in this letter is issued pursuant to section 93
of the Employment Insurance Act. The decision is based on
section 5 of the Employment Insurance Act and section 10
of the Insurable Earnings and Collection of Premiums
Regulations.
Yours sincerely,
Chief of Appeals
Vancouver Taxation Services Office
[3]
Paragraphs 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.11, 3.15, 3.20,
3.24, 3.25, 3.27, 3.28, 3.29, 3.30 and 3.31 of the Notice of
Appeal were admitted by the Respondent. Insofar as Mr. Lake's
testimony touched upon these paragraphs, that testimony confirmed
the admissions. Those admitted paragraphs of the Notice of Appeal
read:
3.1
This is an appeal pursuant to section 103 of the Employment
Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23, as amended (the
"EIA").
3.2
The Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (the
"Appellant") is a body corporate continued by the
Insurance Corporation Act, RSBC 1996, c. 228, as amended
(the "ICA").
...
3.4
At all relevant times the Appellant was in the business of
insuring motor vehicles and occupants of motor vehicles against
damage.
3.5
At all relevant times, Mr. Ryan Lake ("Lake") lived in
Richmond, B.C.
3.6
Lake was involved in a motor vehicle accident on or about May 3,
1997.
3.7
At the time of his accident, the Appellant insured Lake against
damages from motor vehicle accidents.
3.8
Following the accident, Lake made a claim against the Appellant
for compensation in respect of injuries suffered in the
accident.
...
3.11 In or
about late August, 1997, Lake retained Harvey as an attendant to
assist him with general day-to-day functions while he was
injured.
...
3.15 At all
relevant times, Lake and not the Appellant was Harvey's
actual employer.
...
3.20 The
Appellant agreed to and did mail cheques to Harvey at Lake's
address.
...
3.24 At a date
unknown to the Appellant, Harvey applied to the Canadian
Department of Human Resources Development for benefits under the
EIA.
3.25 At a date
unknown to the Appellant, the Canadian Department of Human
Resources Development requested a ruling from the Minister of
National Revenue (the "Minister") as to whether Harvey
was entitled to benefits under the EIA.
...
3.27 In the
Ruling the Minister ruled that Lake was Harvey's actual
employer.
3.28 In the
Ruling the Minister ruled that the Appellant was deemed to be
Harvey's employer pursuant to paragraph 10(1)(a) of the
Insurable Earnings and Collection of Premiums Regulations
(made under the EIA), SOR/97-33, as amended (the
"IECPR") on the basis that the Appellant had
"paid" Harvey.
3.29 By letter
dated September 8, 1998 (the "Letter"), the Minister
informed the Appellant about the Ruling.
3.30 The
Letter confirmed the Minister's position that the Appellant
was deemed to be Harvey's employer and hence the Appellant
was responsible for withholdings and employer premiums under the
EIA in respect of amounts paid to Harvey in respect of her
employment by Lake.
3.31 The
Appellant appealed the Ruling and the Letter to the Minister by
letter dated December 4, 1998 but the Minister confirmed the
Ruling and Letter by letter dated August 27, 1999.
[4]
Paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Reply read:
6.
In response to an appeal of a ruling by the Appellant pursuant to
section 91 of the Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c.
23 (the "EI Act"), the Respondent decided that
the Appellant was the deemed employer of Shannie Harvey (the
"Worker") for the purpose of calculating and remitting
employment insurance premiums as the Worker was employed by Ryan
Lake ("Lake") in insurable employment during the period
from September 1, 1997 to June 26, 1998 (the
"Period").
7.
In making his decision, the Respondent relied upon the following
assumptions of fact:
(a)
Lake was involved in a motor vehicle accident on or about May 3,
1997;
(b)
Lake had motor vehicle insurance coverage with the Appellant;
(c)
Lake made a claim to the Appellant for approval to cover the cost
of hiring an attendant to assist him during his period of
recovery from the injuries he suffered during the motor vehicle
accident;
(d)
the Appellant provided Lake with the approval to hire an
attendant;
(e)
the Appellant set the pay rate of the attendant at $15.00 per
hour for a maximum of 4 hours per day for personal care to Lake
and at $8.25 per hour for child care of Lake's children;
(f)
Lake Hired the Worker to perform the personal care and the child
care duties at his residence, from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., Monday
through Friday, for the pay rate set by the Appellant;
(g)
Lake directed and supervised the Worker in the performance of her
duties;
(h)
the Appellant provided the time sheets to be completed by the
Worker and signed by Lake;
(i)
the Appellant paid the salary/wage to the Worker upon receipt of
the signed time sheets;
(j)
the payment of the salary/wage to the Worker by the Appellant was
not a reimbursement of an expense incurred by Lake;
(k)
the Appellant monitored the need for an continued to pay for the
personal care attendant for Lake during the Period;
(l)
the Appellant is the deemed employer of the Worker for purposes
of employment insurance premiums as the Appellant paid the
salary/wages directly to the Worker and did not reimburse
Lake.
B.
THE
STATUTORY PROVISIONS UPON WHICH THE RESPONDENT RELIES AND THE
REASONS WHICH HE INTENDS TO SUBMIT
8.
He relies upon paragraph 5(1)(a) and subsection 2(1) and section
91 of the EI Act and on section 10 of the Insurable
Earnings and Collection of Premiums Regulations (the
"IECPRegs"), as amended.
9.
He respectfully submits that he correctly decided that the Worker
was employed by the Lake during the Period in insurable
employment within the meaning of paragraph 5(1)(a) and subsection
2(1) of the EI Act, as the Worker was performing the
duties of employment under a contract of service. He further
submits that the Appellant is the deemed employer of the Worker
within the meaning of section 10 of the IECPRegs, as the
Appellant paid the Worker salary/wages during the Period.
[5]
Assumptions 7(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i) and (k)
are correct. With respect to assumption (j), Lake incurred the
expense of Harvey by hiring her, but he was not reimbursed by the
Appellant; the Appellant paid Harvey directly. Assumption (l) is
the subject of the dispute among the parties.
[6]
Section 10 of the Insurable Earnings and Collection of
Premiums Regulations (the "Regulations")
was instituted pursuant to
paragraphs 108(1)(d) and (f) of the
Employment Insurance Act (the "EI
Act"). They read:
108. (1) The Minister may, with the approval of the Governor
in Council, make regulations
...
(d)
respecting the manner in which any provision of this Act that
applies or extends to an employer of an insured person shall
apply or extend to
(i)
a person by whom the remuneration of an insured person for
services performed in insurable employment is paid either wholly
or in part, and
(ii)
the employer of that person;
...
(f)
providing that, in any case or class of cases where insured
persons work
(i)
under the general control or direct supervision of or are paid by
a person other than their actual employer, or
(ii)
with the concurrence of a person other than their actual employer
on premises or property with respect to which that person has any
rights or privileges under a licence, permit or agreement,
the other person is, for the purposes of paying premiums,
deemed to be the employer of the insured persons in addition to
the actual employer, and providing for the payment and recovery
of premiums paid for the insured persons;
[7]
Section 10 of the Regulations reads:
10.(1) Where, in any case not
coming within any other provision of these Regulations, an
insured person works
(a)
under the general control or direct supervision of, or is paid
by, a person other than the insured person's actual employer,
or
(b)
with the concurrence of a person other than the insured
person's actual employer, on premises or property with
respect to which that other person has any rights or privileges
under a licence, permit or agreement,
that other person shall, for the purposes of maintaining
records, calculating the insurable earnings of the insured person
and paying, deducting and remitting the premiums payable on those
insurable earnings under the Act and these Regulations be deemed
to be the employer of the insured person in addition to the
actual employer.
(2)
The amount of any employer's premium paid by the person who
is deemed to be the employer under subsection (1) is recoverable
by that person from the actual employer.
(3)
Where a person who is deemed under these Regulations to be an
employer of an insured person fails to pay, deduct or remit the
premiums that an employer is required to pay, deduct or remit
under the Act or these Regulations, the provisions of Parts IV
and VI of the Act shall apply to the person as if the person were
the actual employer.
[8]
There are two legal issues in dispute in this appeal:
1.
Is the Appellant immune from subsection 10(1) of the
Regulations under the EI Act?
2.
If the Appellant is not immune, did the Appellant pay Harvey
within the meaning of subsection 10(1)?
[9]
Section 13 of the Insurance Act of British Columbia, RSBC
1996 (the "Act"), Chap. 228 sets out the extent
of the immunity granted to ICBC. It reads:
Corporation an agent of the government
13
(1)
All property and money acquired or administered by the
corporation is deemed to be the property of the government for
all purposes, including exemption from taxation.
(2)
The corporation is an agent of the government.
(3)
Money, funds, investments and property acquired or administered
by the corporation may not be taken, used or appropriated by the
government for any purpose whatever, except under subsection (5),
section 26(1) or to repay advances by or money borrowed from the
government and the interest on it.
(4)
Subsection (3) does not apply to the revenue referred to in
section 7(h) that is received by the corporation.
(5)
The corporation must pay to the government any tax or impost
that, but for subsection (3), would be assessed or levied against
the corporation, its business or property under any other Act,
except income tax under the Income Tax Act.
This Act, as amended, is the statute which incorporates
the Appellant, "ICBC". The objects, power and capacity
of ICBC are set forth in section 7 and section 9 of its
Act. They read:
Objects, power and capacity
7
It is the function of the corporation and it has the power and
capacity to do the following:
(a)
subject to the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council,
engage in and carry on, inside and outside of British Columbia,
the business of insurance and reinsurance in all its classes;
(b)
subject to the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council,
operate and administer plans of insurance, including automobile
insurance, authorized under any other enactment;
(c)
engage in and carry on the business of repairing insured property
and of salvaging and disposing by public or private sale property
insured and acquired under a contract by which the corporation
may be liable as an insurer, or make agreements with other
persons for those purposes;
(d)
subject to the Medical Practitioners Act and the
Hospital Act, engage in and carry on the business of
providing medical and hospital services to a person insured under
a contract by which the corporation may be liable as an insurer,
or make agreements with other persons for those purposes;
(e)
for its own use and benefit, acquire or expropriate, and hold or
take options on land required for its business, conveyed,
mortgaged or hypothecated to it by way of security, acquired as
an investment, or conveyed to it in full or partial satisfaction
for debts and judgments, and may dispose of the whole or part of
the land;
(f)
acquire some or all of the shares or business and property of an
insurer, agent, adjuster or motor vehicle repairer, or make an
agreement to carry on jointly a class of insurance with another
insurer, inside or outside of British Columbia, and the
Insurance Act and the Financial Institutions Act do
not apply to the agreement;
(g)
carry out any powers, duties and functions in relation to the
Motor Vehicle Act or the Commercial Transport Act,
or to any program of the government or of an agency of the
government, that may be authorized under the Motor Vehicle
Act, the Commercial Transport Act or another enactment
respecting motor vehicles or vehicles, or that may be assumed by
the corporation by agreement with the government or an agency of
the government;
(h)
receive, hold, manage and collect, for and on behalf of the
government,
(i)
revenue from fines in connection with violation tickets under the
Offence Act, for contravention of enactments referred to
in the regulations under that Act, including revenue from fines
imposed by the Provincial Court for contraventions for which
violation tickets have been issued; and
(ii)
revenue from licence, permit and other fees under the Motor
Vehicle Act, the Commercial Transport Act or another
enactment respecting motor vehicles or vehicles;
(i)
promote and improve highway safety.
...
Additional power
9
(1)
The corporation has the power and capacity to do all
acts and things necessary or required for the purpose of
carrying out its functions and powers.
(2)
Without limiting subsection (1), the corporation may do any of
the following:
(a)
conduct surveys and research programs and obtain statistics for
its purposes and to establish and administer any insurance
plan;
(b)
enter into an agreement with, or retain agents or adjusters to
solicit and receive applications for insurance, to collect
premiums, adjust claims, and do other things on its behalf it
considers necessary;
(c)
prescribe forms for application, contracts, policies and other
matters it considers necessary;
(d)
prescribe the detail required to be set out on a form;
(e)
evaluate damages and losses and pay claims under a contract by
which the corporation may be liable as an insurer;
(f)
reinsure the whole or part of a contract of another insurer, and
reinsure its risks under the whole or part of a contract with
another insurer, whether or not the other insurer is inside or
outside of British Columbia, or is authorized under the
Financial Institutions Act;
(g)
do anything necessary to settle, adjust, investigate, defend and
otherwise deal with, under this Act, the Insurance Act or
the Financial Institutions Act so far as is applicable and
the regulations made under those Acts, claims made on contracts
by which the corporation may be liable as insurer or on a plan
established under sections 7 and 8(1);
(h)
make bylaws and pass resolutions, not contrary to law or this
Act, it considers necessary or advisable for the conduct of its
affairs including the time and place of its meetings, procedure
at meetings and generally the conduct of its affairs in all
ways.
Of all the objects, power and capacity set forth in these two
sections, only subsections 7(e), (f) and (h) deal with property
and money which are particularized in subsection 13(1) as
"deemed to be the property of the government for all
purposes".
[10] In
Regina v. Eldorado Nuclear Limited et al. (S.C.C., 1983) 4
D.L.R. 4th 193, Dickson, J., for the majority, said at pages 205
and 206:
Uranium Canada and Eldorado are each, by statute, expressly
made "an agent of Her Majesty". Uranium Canada owes its
status as a Crown agent to s. 10(4) of the Atomic Energy
Control Act, which reads:
10(4) A company is for all its purposes an agent of Her
Majesty and its powers may be exercised only as an agent of Her
Majesty.
Eldorado's agency status derives from the Government
Companies Operation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. G-7; s. 3,
reads:
3(1) Every Company is for all its purposes an agent of Her
Majesty and its powers may be exercised only as an agent of Her
Majesty.
The fact that these statutory provisions make each of the
respondent corporations "for all its purposes" an agent
of the Crown does not mean, however, that these companies act as
Crown agents in everything they do.
Statutory bodies such as Uranium Canada and Eldorado are
created for limited purposes. When a Crown agent acts within the
scope of the public purposes it is statutorily empowered to
pursue, it is entitled to Crown immunity from the operation of
statutes, because it is acting on behalf of the Crown. When the
agent steps outside the ambit of Crown purposes, however, it acts
personally, and not on behalf of the State, and cannot claim to
be immune as an agent of the Crown. This follows from the fact
that s. 16 of the Interpretation Act works for the benefit
of the State, not for the benefit of the agent personally. Only
the Crown, through its agents, and for its purposes, is immune
from the Combines Investigation Act.
and then said at pages 212 and 213:
The position at common law is not that those under de
jure control are entitled to Crown immunity, but rather that
immunity extends to those acting on behalf of the Crown. In
Metropolitan Meat Industry Board v. Sheedy et al., [1927]
A.C. 899, the Privy Council found the board not to be a Crown
agent because "there is nothing in the statute which makes
the acts of administration his [the Minister's] as
distinguished from theirs" (p. 905). Sheedy is not an
immunity case, rather, the question was whether Crown priority
could be asserted in a liquidation. Nevertheless, it does
indicate that the de jure test applies only in the
absence of specific language indicating the body acts on behalf
of or as an agent of the Crown: see also Tamlin v.
Hannaford, [1950] 1 K.B. 18 (C.A.). A case such as British
Columbia Power Corp. Ltd. v. A.-G. B.C. et al. (1962), 34
D.L.R. (2d) 25, 38 W.W.R. 657, is easily distinguishable. In that
case the statutory designation of Crown agent was held not to be
conclusive, because the statute did not say "for all its
purposes". The majority concluded the statute made the Power
Corporation an agent only for some purposes, not including the
matter at issue in that appeal.
This Court's decision in Formea Chemicals Ltd. v.
Polymer Chemicals Ltd. v. Polymer Corp. Ltd. (1968), 69
D.L.R. (2d) 114, 55 C.P.R. 38, [1968] S.C.R. 754, is also
instructive. The case concerned s. 19 of the Patent Act,
R.S.C. 1952, c. 203.
19. The Government of Canada may, at any time, use any
patented invention, paying to the patentee such sum as the
Commissioner reports to be a reasonable compensation for the use
thereof, and any decision of the Commissioner under this section
is subject to appeal to the Exchequer Court.
Martland J., speaking for the Court, equated "Government
of Canada" with the Crown. Polymer, like Eldorado, was made,
for all its purposes, an agent of the Crown, though not under
de jure control. None the less, Polymer was held entitled
to take advantage of s. 19 (at p. 123 D.L.R., p. 49 C.P.R., p.
764 S.C.R.):
In my opinion the Crown, under s. 19, has an unrestricted
right to use a patent. It caused the respondent [Polymer] to be
incorporated to manufacture, sell and deal in synthetic rubber
and made the respondent, for all its purposes, its agent. The use
by the respondent of the patent was, in the circumstances, a use
by the Crown within s. 19. This being so, there was no
infringement by the respondent of such patent.
The "agent for all its purposes" designation was
held to be determinative; there was no inquiry into the actual
independence of Polymer. I think this case makes it clear that
when an enactment refers to the Crown, and a particular body is
expressly made a Crown agent for all purposes, the enactment
embraces the statutory agent. This applies to the construction of
s. 16 of the Interpretation Act.
[11] In
British Columbia Power Corp. Ltd. v. A.G.B.C. et al.
(1962) 34 DLR (2d) 25, at 29 et seq, Sheppard, J.A., as
part of the majority, cited a number of tests to be applied where
a corporation is alleged to be an agent of the government. These
include (with answers and statutory citations from the Act
incorporating ICBC):
1.
Did the Crown delegate control and management to ICBC's
Board? (p. 32) (Yes, s.3)
2.
Is ICBC in its essential nature "a government
department" and do its powers fall within the province of
government? (p. 32) (No, ss. 7 and 9)
3.
Is ICBC an instrument of government or is it a corporation
incorporated to carry on the business? (p. 32) (It is
incorporated to carry on the business of insurance and
reinsurance, s.7)
4.
Has ICBC contractual capacity apart from the Crown? (p. 33) (Yes,
ss. 7 and 9)
5.
Is ICBC's power to contract limited by its incorporation
documents? (p. 33) (Yes, s. 7 and 9)
6.
Does ICBC own its assets and is the Crown merely its shareholder?
(p. 33) (It owns its assets and is controlled by the BC
government.)
7.
Do ICBC's directors have their own discretionary powers? (p.
33) (Yes, s. 3)
8.
Are ICBC's employees civil servants? (p. 34) (No)
9.
Has ICBC the power to sue and to be sued? (p. 34) (Yes, ss. 9(1)
and para. 9(2)(g)).
[12] In light
of these comments, section 13 of the Act bears a closer
examination:
1.
Subsection (1) deems only the property and money acquired or
administered by the corporation to be property of the government
for all purposes.
2.
Subsection (2) then states that the corporation is an agent of
the government. Thus its scope is broader than the scope of
subsection (1) which is limited to "property and
money". But the power of agency is not granted "for all
purposes".
3.
Moreover subsection (5) states that the corporation must pay to
the (British Columbia) government any impost levied against the
corporation, except income tax under the Income Tax
Act.
Therefore, it appears that the usage "for all
purposes" is limited to protecting the property and money of
the corporation from the exercise of powers such as an execution
or garnishee. But ICBC's grant of immunity contained in
section 13 of the Act does not extend so far as to protect
it in a case such as this. It is not immune from liability under
Section 10 of the Regulations.
[13]
Appellant's counsel thereupon argues respecting the meaning
of "pay", that legally there is only payment by ICBC to
Harvey if that payment to Harvey discharges an obligation which
ICBC owes to Harvey. Lake agreed to hire Harvey and entered into
the contract of employment with her. Harvey then phoned ICBC to
confirm Lake's representation that ICBC was paying Lake in
respect to part of her employment by Lake. Thereafter ICBC and
Lake agreed that ICBC would make its cheque out to Harvey based
upon Lake submitting to ICBC a record of hours of employment
signed by both Lake and Harvey. Harvey knew this and that is what
happened. Lake owed the obligation to pay Harvey to satisfy his
indebtedness. ICBC did not.
[14] In Re
Attorney General of Canada and Théoret 61
D.L.R. (4th) 289 the Federal Court of Appeal dealt with
subsection 18(1) of the Unemployment Insurance (Collection of
Premiums) Regulations, the predecessor of section 10 of the
Regulations. At pp. 310 to 312, Desjardins, J. A.
said:
Jean-Louis Baudouin, in Les Obligations (Cowansville,
Quebec: Les Éditions Yvon Blais Inc., 1982), a pp. 351-52,
explains the various meanings of the word "to pay"
(translation):
To pay, in popular language, primarily means giving a sum of
money. In legal language, to pay is to perform an obligation no
matter what its nature, whether it consists of doing or
refraining from doing something or giving an object or a sum. The
payment, which is an act of performance of the obligation assumed
by the debtor, has the effect of extinguishing the obligation and
putting an end to the juridical relationship between the debtor
and his creditor. The juridical nature of the payment has given
rise to a theoretical and jurisprudential controversy: some
authorities view it as a mere juridical fact, and therefore
capable of being proved by any means, while others see it as a
juridical act subject to the strict proof thereof under articles
1233 et sq. of the Civil Code. And some even view it as a
convention, since it presupposes an agreement between the
creditor and the debtor. Whatever it is, a payment comprises both
a material element (the surrender of the object that is owed) and
an intentional element (the desire to extinguish the
obligation).
In this case, what was the intentional element performed by
the respondent notary? If he paid in the juridical sense, his act
binds him as the deemed employer, under the provisions of s.
18(1) of the regulations.
[15] The
Federal Court of Appeal's decision in Théoret
respecting Quebec's Civil Code also applies to the
application of Section 10 of the Regulations under the
common law. The meaning of "pay" in
Théoret is also one of the meanings of
"pay" in common law as can be seen in the Black's
Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. where "pay" is defined as:
Pay, n. Compensation; wages; salary;
commissions; fees. The act or fact of paying or being paid.
See Discharge; Payment.
Pay, v. To discharge a debt by tender of payment
due; to deliver to a creditor the value of a debt, either in
money or in goods, for his acceptance. U.C.C. § § 2-511,
3-604. To compensate for goods, services or labor. See
also Discharge; Payment.
[16] Since
ICBC did not owe an obligation to pay Harvey and Harvey knew
this, ICBC did not pay Harvey within the meaning of subsection
10(1) of the Regulations under the EI Act.
[17] For this
reason the appeal is allowed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 18th day of September,
2000.
"D. W. Beaubier"
J.T.C.C.
COURT FILE
NO.:
1999-4611(EI)
STYLE OF
CAUSE:
The Insurance Corporation of British
Columbia v. The Queen and Ryan Lake
PLACE OF
HEARING:
Vancouver, British Columbia
DATE OF
HEARING:
August 25, 2000
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The
Honourable Judge D. W. Beaubier
DATE OF
JUDGMENT:
September 18, 2000
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for the Appellant: Joel Nitikman and Lori Mathison
Counsel for the
Respondent:
Ron Wilhelm and Victor Caux
For the
Intervenor:
The Intervenor himself
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the
Appellant:
Name:
Joel Nitikman
Firm:
Fraser Milner
Vancouver, British Columbia
For the
Respondent:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
1999-4611(EI)
BETWEEN:
THE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF BRITISH
COLUMBIA,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent,
and
RYAN LAKE,
Intervenor.
Appeal heard on August 25, 2000 at Vancouver,
British Columbia by
the Honourable Judge D. W. Beaubier
Appearances
Counsel for the
Appellant:
Joel Nitikman and Lori Mathison
Counsel for the
Respondent:
Ron Wilhelm and Victor Caux
For the
Intervenor:
The Intervenor himself
JUDGMENT
The
appeal is allowed and the decision of the Minister is
vacated.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 18th day of September,
2000.
J.T.C.C.