Date: 20000928
Docket: 1999-1143-IT-I
BETWEEN:
MAX CHARLAND,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasonsfor
Judgment
Lamarre Proulx, J.T.C.C.
[1]
This is an appeal under the informal procedure for the 1993 and
1994 taxation years. The issue is whether the appellant worked
for Les Entreprises N. Giguère Enr. as an employee or
as a self-employed worker during those years.
[2]
The facts on which the Minister of National Revenue ("the
Minister") relied in making his reassessments are set out as
follows in paragraph 7 of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal
("the Reply"):
[TRANSLATION]
(a) the appellant's income tax return for each of the 1993
and 1994 taxation years had to be filed at the latest by April
30, 1994, and April 30, 1995, respectively;
(b) the appellant did not file a tax return for the 1993 and
1994 taxation years;
(c) since the appellant failed to file his tax returns for the
1993 and 1994 taxation years, the Minister assessed the tax
payable, interest and a late filing penalty for each of the said
taxation years using information in his possession;
(d) in objecting to the assessments, the appellant submitted
amended tax returns for the 1993 and 1994 taxation years in which
he claimed that he operated a business involving services
rendered mainly on the premises of Normand Giguère
operating as Les Entreprises N. Giguère Enr.;
(e) the appellant claimed the following expenses for the
taxation years at issue:
1993 1994
(i) insurance 850.00 850.00
(ii) accounting 250.00 250.00
(iii) motor vehicle 5,490.00 4,535.00
(iv) office 1,140.00 1,200.00
(v) maintenance and repairs 410.00 380.00
(vi) interest, bank charges 95.00
(vii) delivery and transportation 295.00 280.00
(viii) equipment rental 583.00 490.00
(ix) tools and supplies 1,790.00 1,098.55
(x) business tax 390.00
(xi) management fees 115.00
(xii) telephone and utilities 120.00
(xiii) capital cost allowance 2,332.50
13,235.50 9,708.55
(f) the Minister looked at the appellant's working
conditions at Les Entreprises N. Giguère Enr.:
(i) the appellant was not usually required to work away from
the payer's place of business;
(ii) the appellant did not have to pay for expenses incurred
in performing the work assigned to him;
(iii) the appellant was not obliged to rent an office away
from the payer's place of business or use part of his
home;
(iv) the appellant did not have to purchase the supplies used
directly in the performance of his duties;
(v) when the appellant had to go to repair cars away from the
payer's place of business, he used a vehicle owned by the
payer.
[3]
The appellant admitted subparagraphs 7(a) to (e) of the
Reply.
[4]
As regards the statement in subparagraph 7(f)(i), the appellant
said that he sometimes worked away from the business's garage
when calls came in concerning vehicles that had broken down.
[5]
As regards subparagraph 7(f)(ii), the appellant said that he had
to provide his own toolbox. He also said it has happened a few
times that he took his own vehicle to get to places where he had
to do repairs.
[6]
As for the statement concerning the office expense, he argued
that the office was necessary so that he could, once a week, draw
up the invoice that the business requested of him so that he
could be paid as a self-employed worker. The invoices in question
were filed as Exhibit A-1. They show an hourly rate of $13
initially and $14 as of May 3. The average number of hours worked
each week is about 46. The appellant said that the number of
hours he worked was not always the same. It could vary within a
range of anywhere from a few hours to ten or so hours a week.
This is shown by the invoicing summary table for 1993 filed as
Exhibit A-2.
[7]
Exhibits I-1 and I-3 are the tax returns established
by the Minister for 1993 and 1994. The total earnings shown for
1993 are $30,031.50 and are entirely from Les Entreprises N.
Giguère Enr. For 1994, there are earnings of $4,520.30
from Les Entreprises N. Giguère Enr. and $6,160 from
Les excavations Maurice Daoust Inc.
[8]
Exhibits I-2 and I-4 are the tax returns prepared by
the taxpayer for 1993 and 1994 in response to those established
by the Minister. In those returns, the appellant states that he
is a self-employed worker and claims the expenses referred to in
subparagraph 7(e) of the Reply.
[9]
Normand Giguère testified for the respondent. He
confirmed that the appellant did not have to work away from the
garage except when there were emergency calls. At such times, the
appellant used the garage's vehicle. The appellant did not
have to pay any expenses aside from providing his own toolbox,
although the garage provided most of the necessary tools. He said
that any work that was redone was redone at the garage's
expense. The appellant had stated that there had been a few times
when he had not included the hours he had worked in instances
where it had been necessary to redo work. Exhibit I-5 is the
statement of the appellant's working conditions drawn up by
the employer on February 16, 1998. The description of those
working conditions confirms the facts taken into account by the
Minister and set out in the Reply.
[10] The
appellant's agent also questioned the procedural fairness of
the audit conducted by Employment Insurance officers in respect
of Les Entreprises N. Giguère Enr. That business had a
policy of recruiting its workers as self-employed
individuals. The evidence did not show whether the workers signed
a contract for services. No contract was filed in evidence. The
Employment Insurance audit officers determined that the workers
were employees, which the employer accepted.
[11] The
Auditor's Statement of Account was filed as Exhibit A-3. That
statement was accepted by the employer. The auditor does not seem
to have met with the workers. In this regard, Mr. Giguère
said that he had asked the workers to go and meet with the
auditors but they never went.
Conclusion
[12] There is
not a shadow of a doubt that we are dealing here with a contract
of employment and not a contract for services. The appellant
worked every weekday, 46 hours on average, for the same person.
That is what is called full-time employment. The appellant
had no risk of loss and was paid for the hours he worked. He did
not hire his own assistants. He could not arrange to have someone
fill in for him. He did not find his own customers. There is
really nothing to indicate that the appellant was in a contract
for services situation.
[13] As
regards the possible employment-related deductions, they
are provided for in section 8 of the Income Tax Act
("the Act"). We learn from that section that the
only deduction that might be applicable is that set out in
subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iii), which reads as follows:
8(1) Deductions allowed — In computing a
taxpayer's income for a taxation year from an office or
employment, there may be deducted such of the following amounts
as are wholly applicable to that source or such part of the
following amounts as may reasonably be regarded as applicable
thereto:
. . .
(i) . . .
(iii) the cost of supplies that were consumed directly in the
performance of the duties of the office or employment and that
the officer or employee was required by the contract of
employment to supply and pay for,
. . .
[14]
However, the appellant did not mention any tools normally
destroyed through use or any equipment used directly in the
performance of his duties. He referred only to the cost of
purchasing tools as found in his statement of expenses cited in
subparagraph 7(e) of the Reply, supra, without explaining
which tools were involved. In the circumstances, section 8 of the
Act does not apply.
[15] As for
the procedural fairness argument, the appellant's agent
submitted that, before reaching an agreement or decision on
whether the employment of the business's workers was
insurable, the auditor should have met with the workers to find
out what their working conditions were. He suggested that the
fact that the decision was made without meeting with the workers
prevented them from getting involved in a timely fashion and
infringed their rights.
[16] I must
point out that the Employment Insurance Act provides a
process for appealing a decision by the Minister that a person
holds insurable employment. It is that method of appeal that
should have been used if for some reason one was dissatisfied
with the decision on the insurability of the employment. I have
no jurisdiction to rule on a decision made by the Minister under
the Employment Insurance Act when the appeal before me
concerns an assessment made by the Minister under the Act.
It is on the validity of that assessment alone that I must
rule.
[17]
Subsection 152(7) of the Act provides that the Minister is
not bound by a return or information supplied by a taxpayer. It
reads as follows:
152(7) Assessment not dependent on return or
information. The Minister is not bound by a return or
information supplied by or on behalf of a taxpayer and, in making
an assessment, may, notwithstanding a return or information so
supplied or if no return has been filed, assess the tax payable
under this Part.
[18] The
Act provides ways to contest an assessment, namely through
an objection served on the Minister and an appeal to this Court.
The appellant did not argue that he had been deprived of his
means of contesting the assessment.
[19] It is
therefore my view that the Minister's assessment was
correctly made. Based on the evidence, I can only conclude that
the appellant was an employee and not a self-employed worker.
[20] The
appeals are accordingly dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 28th day of September 2000.
"Louise Lamarre Proulx"
J.T.C.C.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
1999-1143(IT)I
BETWEEN:
MAX CHARLAND,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on July 28, 2000, at
Montréal, Quebec, by
the Honourable Judge Louise Lamarre Proulx
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant:
Raymond
Charland
Agent for the
Respondent:
Annick
Provencher (Student-at-law)
JUDGMENT
The
appeals from the assessments made under the Income Tax Act
for the 1993 and 1994 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 28th day of September 2000.
J.T.C.C.