Date: 20001115
Docket: 1999-4438-IT-I
BETWEEN:
LIONEL-AIMÉ LUSSIER,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasonsfor
Judgment
Archambault, J.T.C.C.
[1]
Lionel-Aimé Lussier is appealing from notices
of income tax assessment issued by the Minister of National
Revenue (Minister) for the 1995, 1996 and 1997 taxation
years (relevant period). The assessments raise two quite
separate but similar issues for each of those years. The Minister
disallowed the deduction of rental losses on a property located
in Racine (Racine house), a municipality situated near
Valcourt in the Eastern Townships. The Minister also disallowed
the deduction of losses incurred in the business that Mr. Lussier
claims to have carried on during the relevant period. In both
cases, the Minister's position is that Mr. Lussier had no
reasonable expectation of profit from either of those sources of
income.
Facts
[2]
To better delineate the facts relevant to each of the two issues,
I will recount them separately for each issue even though some of
them are relevant to both. I will begin with the facts relating
to the rental losses and then set out those relating to the
business losses.
Rental losses
[3]
Mr. Lussier and his wife live in Valcourt, and both of them work
at Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier). Mr. Lussier has been an
employee of that company for about 40 years. During the
relevant period, he generally worked days as a maintenance
foreman, while Mrs. Lussier worked evenings on the assembly line.
They have two children, Sylvain and Benoît, who also worked
for Bombardier, the former, generally evenings, and the latter,
nights.
[4]
In 1979, Sylvain was living with his de facto spouse in a house
(Valcourt house) that he had built in Valcourt on land
owned by his parents. He had apparently obtained a $15,000
personal loan from a credit union for that purpose. Because he
was unemployed from 1981 to 1983, Sylvain had trouble repaying
the loan. Since they had sold their own home, Sylvain's
parents offered to take his house and repay his loan. In 1983,
Sylvain had two daughters and had been separated from his
de facto spouse since 1982. When she moved to Western Canada
in 1986, Sylvain was given custody of his daughters.
[5]
On May 8, 1987, Sylvain married a former childhood friend,
Carole Boissonneault. A few days before the wedding, on
April 23, 1987, Mr. Lussier purchased the Racine house for
$38,000. The purchase was financed through a $31,000 loan
obtained from the Caisse populaire de Valcourt at an interest
rate of 9.25 percent. That house was opposite an elementary
school that was rumoured to be closing. The school had around 10
classrooms on the ground floor and a large room upstairs.
According to Mr. Lussier, he entertained plans of purchasing the
school with 10 other investors in order to convert it into a
residence for seniors who could live independently.
[6]
Mr. Lussier also testified that his goal in purchasing the Racine
house was to set up the administrative office of the residence
there on the ground floor. He wanted to convert the three
upstairs bedrooms into a small three-and-a-half
room apartment.
[7]
In her testimony, Mrs. Lussier also stated that the Racine house
was to be used as the administrative office for the seniors'
residence. However, she made no reference at all to putting in a
three-and-a-half room apartment on the upper
floor. She said, moreover, that Mr. Lussier was to purchase the
elementary school by himself. She had no knowledge of the other
10 investors who were supposed to join with her husband.
[8]
The Minister's auditor said that Mrs. Lussier told him during
a telephone conversation on March 23, 1994, that the Racine house
had been purchased by Mr. Lussier to give his son Sylvain
somewhere to live following his marriage to
Ms. Boissonneault. In his audit report, the auditor stated:
[TRANSLATION] "She [Mrs. Lussier] explained that,
to help get Sylvain's second union off to a good start, she
and the taxpayer purchased the house for Sylvain and his spouse
to help him out financially". In her testimony, Mrs.
Lussier strongly denied this assertion by the auditor. She
claimed that he had distorted what she said and mixed up the
purchase of the Racine house with the construction of the
Valcourt house.
[9]
Mr. Lussier personally signed the Answer filed in response to the
Reply to the Notice of Appeal and admitted therein that his son
Sylvain had lived with his spouse in the Racine house from May
1987 to February 1990. At the time it was purchased, the Racine
house was not fit to live in—there was no toilet, among
other things—and renovations were quickly begun to make it
habitable, starting with the installation of a bathroom. Mrs.
Lussier confirmed that Sylvain preferred to live in the Racine
house with his two daughters and his wife even though, as can be
imagined, the renovation work created a great deal of dust.
According to one version given by Mrs. Lussier, Sylvain's
family did not begin living in the Racine house until August
1987; according to another, the family began living there in
May 1987.
[10] Mr.
Lussier said that, when he learned a year later that the school
board had given up its plan to sell the school, he decided to
renovate the Racine house with a view to renting it out and, six
months later, he even tried to resell it. However, he could only
have obtained the ridiculously low price of $16,000. According to
Mrs. Lussier, the house remained for sale during all those
years and a for sale notice was posted on the bulletin board at
Bombardier. In 1991 or 1992, an offer of $60,000 was apparently
made, but it was refused because it was well below the cost of
the house, which Mr. Lussier estimated at about $110,000.
[11]
Sylvain Lussier's former de facto spouse returned in
early 1990, and it was apparently at that time that he separated
from Ms. Boissonneault. She moved out of the Racine house with
all the furniture in April 1990. After the separation, Sylvain
had to pay his wife $75 a week in support.
[12] Mr.
Lussier, with his son Sylvain's help, continued renovating
the Racine house between February 1990 and July 1, 1991. The
repair work done in 1990 included the replacement of the former
stone foundations with concrete foundations.
[13] Starting
on July 1, 1991, the house was rented by a couple unrelated to
Mr. Lussier. The rent was $360 a month. The lease was not
renewed, and Sylvain's spouse, Ms. Boissonneault, came back
to live in the house on July 1, 1992. She stayed there
until June 30, 1996, with her son, who had been born in 1988 of
her marriage to Sylvain. The rent paid by Ms. Boissonneault was
$500[1] a month
until June 30, 1995, and $525 for the last year of her lease.
From June 1996 until 2000, the Racine house was rented to persons
not related to the family.
[14] According
to Mr. Lussier, the renovation work on the Racine house cost
about $50,000, including $17,000 for a dual energy heating system
(heat pump and propane gas), $7,000 for two bathrooms (one on the
ground floor and the other upstairs), $8,000 for new windows and
$3,500 for new cladding on the outside walls. Around 1991, a
garage was also built at a cost of about $22,000. The garage was
to be used as a repair shop, and one car could be parked in it. A
few years later, in 1997 or 1998, Sylvain put in a
three-and-a-half room bachelor apartment above the garage. He
allegedly invested at least $10,000 in that apartment.
[15] Mr.
Lussier reported rental losses from 1987 to 1998, a period of
12 years, and a slight profit for 1999, as shown in the
following table:
Year
|
Gross income
|
Loss reported
|
1987
|
$ 2,352
|
($ 2,447)
|
1988
|
$ 4,032
|
($ 5)
|
1989
|
$ 4,116
|
($ 4,732)
|
1990
|
$ 4,260
|
($ 2,718)
|
1991
|
$ 2,160
|
($ 5,864)
|
1992
|
$ 5,160
|
($ 9,335)
|
1993
|
$ 6,000
|
($ 1,178)
|
1994
|
$ 7,200
|
($ 2,144)
|
1995
|
$ 6,000
|
($ 1,454)
|
1996
|
$ 6,300
|
($ 2,100)
|
1997
|
$ 9,600
|
($ 3,946)
|
1998
|
$ 8,250
|
($ 497)
|
1999[2]
|
$ 6,800
|
$ 42.30
|
[16] Mr.
Lussier's agent, an accountant, testified that the Racine
house generated a profit in 1999 if the principal repayments made
by Sylvain on the loan he obtained to put in the apartment above
the garage are added to the rent paid by the tenant (who was
unrelated to Mr. Lussier). The accountant also said that the 1999
rent on the Racine house amounted to $620 per month; the rent
paid by Sylvain was therefore $1,840 [6,800 - (8 x 620) =
$1,840], or $230 a month [1,840 ÷ 8 = 230].
Business losses
[17] Mrs.
Lussier described her husband as an extremely active person. She
said that he always needs to be busy doing something. In 1986, he
purchased a small $12,000 tractor that he used to clean up a
woodlot he owned, to drain his land and to transport crushed
stone. At that time, he also owned a pickup truck that he had
purchased in 1984 for about $10,000.
[18] In 1989,
while visiting an exhibition, Mr. Lussier let a vendor talk him
into buying a mini-excavator for $38,000. He did not even check
whether his banker would agree to finance such a purchase.
According to Mrs. Lussier, the vendor had promised to send him
customers and not to sell similar equipment to purchasers in the
Valcourt area. Mr. Lussier said that a neighbour who ran a
construction business and used heavy equipment had also
encouraged him to purchase a mini-excavator. There were in
the area no businesses with such equipment at that time. However,
Mrs. Lussier said that she was against her husband's making
that purchase.
[19] Mr.
Lussier wanted to supplement his income by means of the
mini-excavator and to get his children involved in that
business (excavation business). The partnership between
Mr. Lussier and his two children was registered on
August 8, 1989, at the firm name office under the name
"Mini-excavation Lussier et fils
enregistré". However, a few months later, when the
time came to invest additional money, the two children decided to
get out of the business. The firm name was cancelled on May 8,
1991, and Mr. Lussier continued operating the business alone
after that.
[20]
Mini-excavation Lussier provided such services as
installing drains around houses, planting cedar hedges and
digging graves in the cemetery. The hourly rate for the use of
the mini-excavator was $38 in 1989 and went up to $45
starting in 1991.
[21] To
publicize his services, Mr. Lussier purchased advertising once a
year in a special section of the local newspaper. He also
advertised in the parish flyer and put up signs along a
snowmobile trail. His business card was also on the bulletin
board at Bombardier. However, Mr. Lussier's firm name was not
in the yellow pages of the phone book. According to Mrs. Lussier,
it did not have to be since Mr. Lussier was very well known in
the area.
[22] Although
he ran his business alone, Mr. Lussier continued using his son
Sylvain's services to operate the mini-excavator and
perform excavation work. His other son, Benoît, also helped
occasionally. Neither of Mr. Lussier's children was paid
any wages for his services. Sylvain was available to operate the
mini-excavator during the day on weekdays and also on
weekends. As well, Mr. Lussier was able to operate it in the
evenings and help his son with the excavation work on weekends.
Mr. Lussier admitted that he had no experience using that
type of equipment before purchasing the mini-excavator.
[23] According
to Mrs. Lussier and to Mr. Lussier's accountant, the vehicles
and heavy equipment used in the business consisted solely of the
mini-excavator purchased in 1989, a single-axle truck
subsequently purchased for $3,000 to transport the sand and
crushed stone needed for customers' jobs and a trailer that
Mr. Lussier had made himself. However, Mr. Lussier admitted that
he used the small tractor in his excavation business. In addition
to that heavy equipment, there were small tools, such as a
welder, that fall under Class 8 of depreciable property.
[24] From 1989
to 1997, Mr. Lussier did nothing but incur losses in operating
the excavation business. The figures are as follows:
Year
|
Gross income
|
Loss reported
|
1989
|
$ 2,105
|
($ 987)
|
1990
|
$ 4,415
|
($ 5,894)
|
1991
|
$ 19,044
|
( $ 9,527)
|
1992
|
$ 16,531
|
( $ 6,293)
|
1993
|
$ 11,413
|
($ 12,081)
|
1994
|
$ 13,018
|
( $ 2,413)
|
1995
|
$ 4,720
|
( $ 2,563)
|
1996
|
$ 3,800
|
( $ 7,903)
|
1997
|
0
|
($ 37,062)
|
[25] The
accountant testified that the significant increase in gross
income in 1991 and 1992 was due to the sale of scrap metal that
Mr. Lussier purchased from Bombardier. Because of neighbours'
complaints about that activity being carried on at his home, Mr.
Lussier had to reconcile himself to giving it up.
[26] Mr.
Lussier explained his losses as follows. First of all, the vendor
broke his promise and sold similar mini-excavators to other
people in the Valcourt area, and Mr. Lussier ended up with
more competitors than expected. As well, the high level of the
prevailing interest rates and, more generally, the difficult
economic situation at the time account for the decrease in
construction work in the area.
[27] It must
be added that the single-axle truck turned out to be a very
bad purchase. According to Mr. Lussier, it always broke down
after two trips. A great deal had to be spent on repairs.
[28] His
financial losses, added to the fact that the Minister had decided
to disallow the deduction of those losses, led him to put an end
to his excavation business. The single-axle truck was sold
in 1995 for $3,500 and the mini-excavator in 1997 for about
$12,000. Mr. Lussier had to do repairs before he could make
the latter sale. In 1996, he replaced the tracks at a cost of
$1,200 each and small engines that drove them at a price of
$1,800 each, for a total cost of about $6,000. At the end of
1997, Mr. Lussier still owned the trailer but it no longer had
any value, and it still sits rusting on his land.
[29] The
amount of the loss for which a deduction was claimed in 1997
represents a terminal loss resulting largely from the disposition
of the mini-excavator in 1997 and the single-axle
truck in 1995.
Analysis
[30] This
Court is regularly called upon to decide whether a taxpayer who
incurs rental or business losses has a reasonable expectation of
profit. The approach that must be taken by this Court has been
clearly established, and I explained it in
Pierre-Yvan Aubé v. The Queen, T.C.C.,
No. 97-2118(IT)G, March 17, 1999 (99 DTC 811), in
paragraphs 16-22, which I reproduce here:
[16] As the Supreme Court of Canada held in Moldowan v. The
Queen, [1978]
1 S.C.R. 480, it is essential that there be a source of
income in order for a taxpayer to be able to deduct business
losses. For the purposes of determining whether there is a source
of income, a business exists only if an activity is profitable or
is carried on with a reasonable expectation of profit.
[17] Some of the analytical factors used in making an
objective determination as to whether a taxpayer has a reasonable
expectation of profit are stated in a number of decisions,
including Moldowan, supra, and Landry v. The
Queen, 94 D.T.C. 6624. In Moldowan, Dickson J.
described these factors as follows at page 486:
In my view, whether a taxpayer has a reasonable expectation of
profit is an objective determination to be made from all of
the facts. The following criteria should be considered:
the profit and loss experience in past years, the taxpayer's
training, the taxpayer's intended course of action, the
capability of the venture as capitalized to show a profit after
charging capital cost allowance. The list is not intended
to be exhaustive. The factors will differ with the nature and
extent of the undertaking: The Queen v. Matthews
[(1974), 74
D.T.C. 6193].
[My emphasis.]
[18] In Landry, Décary J.A. proposed the following
factors at page 6626:
Apart from the tests set out by Mr. Justice Dickson, the tests
that have been applied in the case law to date in order to
determine whether there was a reasonable expectation of profit
include the following: the time required to make an activity of
this nature profitable, the presence of the necessary ingredients
for profits ultimately to be earned, the profit and loss
situation for the years subsequent to the years in issue, the
number of consecutive years during which losses were incurred,
the increase in expenses and decrease in income in the course of
the relevant periods, the persistence of the factors causing the
losses, the absence of planning, and failure to adjust. Moreover,
it is apparent from these decisions that the taxpayer's good
faith and reputation, the quality of the results obtained and the
time and energy devoted are not in themselves sufficient to turn
the activity carried on into a business.
[19] In Tonn v. Canada, [1996]
2 F.C. 73, at page 105, Linden J.A., like Dickson J. in
Moldowan, notes that this list is not exhaustive:
These quotations suggest that the list of relevant factors is
growing and that it may continue to grow. What this indicates is
that a detailed look at the business in the context of its
operations is what is required, and that reasonableness is to be
assessed on the basis of all the relevant factors, both the
already listed ones and any new ones that may be helpful.
[20] In assessing these factors, it is important that the
courts use common sense and that taxpayers not be penalized
retroactively when their business proves to be less profitable
than expected. Linden J.A. stated the following in Tonn at
pages 95 and 96:
The tax system has every interest in investigating the bona
fides of a taxpayer's dealings in certain situations, but
it should not discourage, or penalize, honest but erroneous
business decisions. The tax system does not tax on the basis of a
taxpayer's business acumen, with deductions extended to the
wise and withheld from the foolish. Rather, the Act taxes on the
basis of the economic situation of the taxpayer—as it is in
fact, and not as it should be, subject to what is said
below.
. .
.
Consequently, when the circumstances do not admit of any
suspicion that a business loss was made for a personal or
non-business motive, the test should be applied sparingly and
with a latitude favouring the taxpayer, whose business
judgment may have been less than competent.
[My emphasis.]
[21] In Mastri v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998]
1 F.C. 66, the Federal Court of Appeal had an opportunity to
clarify its thinking on this approach, at page 75:
In other words, the term "sparingly" was meant to
convey the understanding that in cases, for example, where there
is no personal element the judge should apply the reasonable
expectation of profit test less assiduously than he or
she might do if such a factor were present. It is in this sense
that the Court in Tonn cautioned against
"second-guessing" the business decisions of
taxpayers.
[My emphasis.]
[22] The case law is full of examples in which activities
carried on by taxpayers represent a source of personal benefit.
This is the case, for example, with the city dweller who loves
horseback riding and purchases a farm to engage in horse
breeding. Being able to deduct certain farming expenses might
enable him to finance a secondary residence and the indulgence in
an enjoyable sport at least in part out of tax savings.
Similarly, there is a source of personal benefit when a taxpayer
purchases a building and leases a portion of it to members of his
family at a below-market rent.
Rental losses
[31] One of
the important questions to be looked at in analysing the rental
losses incurred by Mr. Lussier is whether a personal element
exists. The existence of such an element may be determined by
considering the time at which the property was acquired and also
the period during which it was used. Here, Mr. and
Mrs. Lussier argued that Mr. Lussier had purchased the
Racine house to set up the administrative office of a
seniors' residence there. They maintained that they never
intended to purchase the property to benefit members of their
family. Their testimony was obviously intended to demolish the
fact on which the Minister had relied in making his assessment,
namely that the Racine house had been purchased to give their son
Sylvain somewhere to live and help him out financially following
his marriage to Ms. Boissonneault on May 8, 1987.
[32] According
to well-settled case law, the burden of proof in that
regard was on Mr. Lussier. Unfortunately, I am not satisfied
that Mr. Lussier purchased the property in connection with a
business of operating a seniors' residence. Not only were
there a number of inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Lussier, but their version of the
facts also strikes me as highly implausible in the
circumstances.
[33] First of
all, there is the assertion that Mr. Lussier wanted to buy the
elementary school with 10 other investors, whereas Mrs. Lussier
said that her husband was to purchase it by himself. If Mr.
Lussier wanted to buy the school in partnership with 10 other
investors, why would he have acted alone in purchasing the Racine
house to set up the administrative office of the seniors'
residence there?
[34] Moreover,
it seems quite improbable to me that an administrative office had
to be set up in the Racine house, on the other side of the
street, to operate the seniors' residence. Mr. Lussier spoke
of putting in that school a residence for a dozen seniors who
were to live independently. I have a great deal of difficulty
imagining that such a residence would require an 810-square-foot
administrative office. Even if that were the case, I find it hard
to believe that that space could not have been found inside the
school building itself. That building had 10 or so classrooms on
the ground floor and a large room upstairs. There was space in
the basement as well.
[35] It is
also very odd that Mr. Lussier embarked on such a venture by
purchasing the Racine house by himself before even contacting the
school board and without there having been any serious
negotiations among the 11 investors. None of those investors
testified to corroborate what Mr. Lussier said.
[36] The fact
that Mr. Lussier's son moved into the Racine house a few days
after it was purchased on April 23, 1987, shortly after his
wedding, and that he remained there until February 1990 makes the
version of the facts given by Mrs. Lussier to the
Minister's auditor and reported by the latter the more
credible one. That version seems to me to be much more plausible
than the one given by Mr. and Mrs. Lussier at the
hearing.
[37] Moreover,
it was not the first time that the Lussiers had helped out their
children financially, especially their son Sylvain. A few years
earlier, Sylvain had built the Valcourt house on land owned by
his parents. They had to come to his rescue because of the
precariousness of his financial situation at the time: he was
unemployed for three years and was obliged to pay support to his
former spouse for his two daughters. Mr. and Mrs. Lussier had to
take possession of the house and repay the personal loan that
Sylvain had taken out to finance its construction.
[38] What
counts is not just the intention when the Racine house was
purchased, but also the use that has been made of it. It is
important to note that the house has been occupied by strangers
for only five of the fourteen years that Mr. Lussier has
owned it. It must be said that, for three of those five years,
Sylvain lived in an apartment above the garage located near the
house. Thus, the property in question has been used exclusively
by non-family for just two years.
[39] It should
also be noted that the first year the Racine house was rented to
a stranger, namely from July 1, 1991, to June 30, 1992, it was so
rented because Sylvain and his spouse had separated in February
1990. From February 1990 to June 1991, the property was
vacant and additional renovation work was done. From
July 1992 to June 1996, the property was occupied again
by Ms. Boissonneault, who is the mother of Sylvain's son
and to whom he is required to pay support.
[40] I
conclude that the property was purchased to give
Mr. Lussier's son somewhere to live. That use was
obviously for personal purposes. In such a context, the Court
must apply the reasonable expectation of profit test more
assiduously. Here, the property never generated a profit prior to
1999, and it must be pointed out that that profit was only $42.50
and was moreover calculated in a very strange way by the
accountant: he included in the rent part of the repayment of a
loan taken out by Sylvain to put in his bachelor apartment. No
evidence was adduced to establish that a lease existed between
Sylvain and his parents.
[41] In
Moldowan, supra, Dickson J. stated that capital
cost allowance has to be taken into account in determining
whether an activity constituted a source of income and whether
there was a reasonable expectation of profit. Here, the loss
amounts were determined before capital cost allowance. Mr.
Lussier has therefore not proved that his investment was capable
of generating a profit. For these reasons, I conclude that the
Minister rightly disallowed the deduction of the rental losses
for the relevant period.
Business losses
[42] Did the
purchase of the mini-excavator and single-axle truck
involve a personal element similar to the one that was present in
the purchase of the Racine house? In my opinion, the situation is
very different. In making his assessments, the Minister assumed
that Mr. Lussier had carried on the activities in question for
pleasure and to be able to keep busy when he retired.
[43] I do not
know what Mr. Lussier's wages were in 1989 when he purchased
the mini-excavator. However, in 1995, he reported income of
about $40,000. I do not think that a person earning that kind of
income can afford to purchase for recreational purposes two toys
costing in excess of $41,000. I am satisfied that
Mr. Lussier wanted to carry on a business when he purchased
the mini-excavator.
[44] Moreover,
evidence was adduced that Mr. Lussier did not use the
mini-excavator and single-axle truck for personal
purposes. When he provided services to members of his family, he
billed them at the same hourly rate he charged his other
customers, which apparently led to strained relations between him
and his family members.
[45] It is
true, it seems to me, that Mr. Lussier did not act prudently when
he got involved in that business. Even his wife disagreed with
the decision. As Linden J.A. stated in Tonn,
supra, the tax system should not penalize taxpayers'
honest but erroneous business decisions.
[46] Although
Mr. Lussier had a full-time day job as a foreman at
Bombardier, he could count on the help of his son Sylvain, who,
as indicated above, benefited from his parents' generosity.
Sylvain worked at Bombardier evenings only and was therefore free
to work during the day. He was also available to work on
weekends.
[47] In 1991,
the gross income of Mr. Lussier's business increased
substantially, going from $4,415 in 1990 to $19,044 in 1991. It
is true that part of those gross receipts was from the sale of
scrap metal. However, it must be noted that it was no doubt
thanks to his vehicles and other equipment that he was able to
transport and handle the scrap metal.
[48] In
analysing the losses, the difficult context in which the business
had to be carried on must also be noted. The economic recession
certainly made things difficult from 1989 to 1995. If the more
favourable economic conditions that currently prevail had existed
at that time, Mr. Lussier could probably have made a profit from
his excavation business. Another problem he was faced with was
that of greater competition because his supplier sold similar
equipment to other people in the area.
[49]
Obviously, a person cannot go on incurring losses year after
year. There comes a time when it is necessary to face facts and
admit that a business does not have what it takes to succeed. Mr.
Lussier reached that conclusion in 1996 and 1997. After repairing
his mini-excavator and selling it in 1997, he ceased
operating his business.
[50] In the
circumstances of this appeal, I consider it reasonable to
conclude that Mr. Lussier was carrying on a business during the
relevant period and that he had a reasonable expectation of
profit.
[51] Counsel
for the respondent argued in the alternative that Mr. Lussier
could not claim a deduction for business losses for 1997 because
two items of Class 10 property remained, namely his pickup
truck and the trailer. Subsection 20(16) of the Income Tax
Act (Act) states the following:
(16) Terminal loss — Notwithstanding paragraphs
18(1)(a), (b) and (h), where at the end of a
taxation year,
(a) the total of all amounts used to determine A to D
in the definition "undepreciated capital cost" in
subsection 13(21) in respect of a taxpayer's depreciable
property of a particular class exceeds the total of all amounts
used to determine E to J in that definition in respect of that
property, and
(b) the taxpayer no longer owns any property of
that class,
in computing the taxpayer's income for the year
(c) there shall be deducted the amount of the excess
determined under paragraph (a), and
(d) no amount shall be deducted for the year under
paragraph (1)(a) in respect of property of that class.
[Emphasis added.]
[52] In his
Reply to the Notice of Appeal, the only explanation given by the
Minister for disallowing the deduction of the losses is that
there was no reasonable expectation of profit. No reasons were
given for disallowing the deduction of the terminal loss claimed
by Mr. Lussier for 1997.
[53] Because
the Minister did not make his assessment on the basis that
Mr. Lussier still owned property in Class 8 or 10 at the end
of 1997, the burden was on him to prove that fact. For the same
reason, not all of the legal arguments that it would have been
appropriate to make were advanced before me. However, a number of
factors seem to me, at first glance, to militate against the
alternative position of counsel for the respondent. Even if the
pickup truck were to be considered to be part of the property
used by Mr. Lussier in carrying on his business and thus to be
Class 10 depreciable property, it was no longer such at the end
of 1997 because Mr. Lussier had ceased carrying on his business
and had started using the pickup solely for personal purposes.
Under the change of use rules set out in paragraph
13(7)(a) of the Act, Mr. Lussier was deemed to have
disposed of the pickup truck. It could therefore no longer be
depreciable property, since it was no longer being used in
connection with a business.
[54] The same
reasoning applies to the trailer and all the other property of
the business that was not sold before the end of 1997. With
regard to the trailer, there is another reason that could be
relied on if necessary: in interpretation bulletin IT-460,
the Minister recognizes that a disposition occurs when a capital
property is abandoned and beyond reasonable expectation of
recovery. In my opinion, the trailer, which sits rusting on Mr.
Lussier's land, meets the conditions stated by the Minister
in his interpretation bulletin.
[55] For these
reasons, Mr. Lussier's appeals are allowed and the
assessments are referred back to the Minister of National Revenue
for reconsideration and reassessment on the basis that, in
computing his income, Mr. Lussier is entitled to deduct $2,563
for 1995, $7,903 for 1996 and $37,062 for 1997.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 15th day of November 2000.
"Pierre Archambault"
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified true on this 16th day of January
2002.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Erich Klein, Revisor
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
1999-4438(IT)I
BETWEEN:
LIONEL-AIMÉ LUSSIER,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on May 23 and 24, 2000, at
Sherbrooke, Quebec, by
the Honourable Judge Pierre Archambault
Appearances
Agent for the
Appellant:
Bernard Brosseau
Counsel for the
Respondent:
Simon Petit
JUDGMENT
The
appeals from the assessments made under the Income Tax Act
for the 1995, 1996 and 1997 taxation years are allowed and the
assessments are referred back to the Minister of National Revenue
for reconsideration and reassessment on the basis that the
appellant, in computing his income, is entitled to deduct $2,563
for 1995, $7,903 for 1996 and $37,062 for 1997.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 15th day of November 2000.
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified true
on this 16th day of January 2002.
Erich Klein, Revisor