Date: 19991019
Docket: 98-2682-IT-I
BETWEEN:
NICOLE DION,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Lamarre Proulx, J.T.C.C.
[1] This is an appeal respecting the calculation of tax
benefits for the 1995 and 1996 base years.
[2] The point for determination is who, the appellant or
Alain Rajotte, primarily fulfilled the responsibility for
the care and upbringing of their child, Gaël, during the
periods from July 1996 to June 1997 and from July 1997 to
June 1998, within the meaning of the definition of
"eligible individual" in section 122.6 of the
Income Tax Act (the "Act").
[3] The facts on which the Minister of National Revenue (the
"Minister") relied in making his decision are set out
in paragraph 7 of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal (the
"Reply") as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
(a) during 1996 and 1997 and until June 1998, the appellant
and her former spouse, Alain Rajotte, had elected domicile
at different addresses;
(b) the appellant and her former spouse are the parents of a
son named Gaël born in April 1995;
(c) in response to the applications for child custody by each
of the respective parents, the Honourable Judge
Jean Archambault granted shared custody of the minor child,
Gaël, on August 1, 1996;
(d) the child was to live at the father's home for one
week and at the appellant's home the following week;
(e) in September 1996, the father, Alain Rajotte, applied
for the child tax benefit for his son Gaël for the base year
1995;
(f) as a result of a joint custody review conducted in
December 1996, the father was deemed to be the person primarily
fulfilling the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the
child;
(g) on January 20, 1997, the Minister issued a notice of
child tax benefit determining in respect of the 1995 base year
that the father had been the person primarily responsible for the
care and upbringing of the child Gaël since September
1996;
(h) in November 1997, the appellant, Nicole Dion, applied
for the child tax benefit for her son Gaël for the 1996 base
year;
(i) based on a second joint custody review conducted in
January 1998, the Minister once again deemed the father to be the
person primarily responsible for the care and upbringing of the
child;
(j) on February 10, 1998, the Minister informed the
appellant that he did not consider her to be the person primarily
responsible for the care and upbringing of the child Gaël in
respect of the 1996 base year;
(k) on April 8, 1998, a judgment of the Superior Court
granted legal custody of the child to the father,
Alain Rajotte, as of August 15, 1998.
[4] The grounds stated in the Notice of Appeal herein are as
follows:
[TRANSLATION]
. . .
Ms. Dion should have continued to receive the benefits
(CTB) since the child Gaël was subject to joint custody
(1 week/1 week) from August 1, 1996 until
August 15, 1998.
Ms. Dion was and is still receiving income security
benefits. Mr. Rajotte has a steady job and annual income of
approximately $25,000. He has never paid support for the child,
but Ms. Dion retained the family allowances.
. . .
[5] The appellant and Alain Rajotte testified, the latter
at the request of counsel for the respondent.
[6] Exhibit I-1 is the judgment dated
August 1, 1996 referred to in subparagraph 7(c) of the
Reply. In particular, the judgement states:
[TRANSLATION]
. . .
Awards the parties joint custody of the said child on the
basis of one week at the father's home and one week
at the mother's home and so on; starting on August 2,
the child will be with the mother until Friday, August 9 at
4:30 p.m.;
Directs the father, in lieu of child support, to pay for all
the child Gaël's clothing, which shall follow the
child.
. . .
[7] Exhibit I-2 is the report on a psychosocial
assessment conducted upon the judge's request made at the end
of a hearing on custody of the child Gaël. The report is
dated August 4, 1997 and concludes that the father should
have primary custody of the child. Exhibit I-3 is the
order dated April 10, 1997 requiring that assessment. The
report (Exhibit I-2) concludes as follows at
page 4:
[TRANSLATION]
Since
- the father's attitude toward the child is more
altruistic and thus more conducive to the child's better
growth and development;
We recommend:
- that the father have primary custody of the child.
. . .
[8] On April 8, 1998, judgment (Exhibit I-4)
was rendered on the application to amend child custody filed by
the child's father. The judgment concluded that the father
should have primary custody of the child.
[9] Exhibit I-5 is the application for child tax benefit
filed by Alain Rajotte and dated October 2, 1996.
Exhibit I-6 is a similar application submitted by the
appellant and dated November 7, 1997.
Exhibits I-7 and I-8 are the questionnaires
completed by the appellant for the assessment of the person
primarily responsible for the care and upbringing of children
where there is joint custody. Exhibits I-9 and I-10
are the same questionnaires but completed by
Alain Rajotte.
Analysis
[10] The definition of "eligible individual" in
section 122.6 of the Act reads as follows:
"eligible individual" in respect of a qualified
dependant at any time means a person who at that time
(a) resides with the qualified dependant,
(b) is the parent of the qualified dependant who
primarily fulfils the responsibility for the care and upbringing
of the qualified dependant,
(c) is resident in Canada,
(d) is not described in paragraph 149(1)(a)
or (b), and
(e) is, or whose cohabiting spouse is, a Canadian
citizen or a person who
(i) is a permanent resident (within the meaning assigned by
the Immigration Act),
(ii) is a visitor in Canada or the holder of a permit in
Canada (within the meanings assigned by the Immigration
Act) who was resident in Canada throughout the 18 month
period preceding that time, or
(iii) was determined before that time under the Immigration
Act, or regulations made under that Act, to be a Convention
refugee,
and for the purposes of this definition,
(f) where the qualified dependant resides with the
dependant's female parent, the parent who primarily fulfils
the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified
dependant is presumed to be the female parent,
(g) the presumption referred to in
paragraph (f) does not apply in prescribed
circumstances, and
(h) prescribed factors shall be considered in
determining what constitutes care and upbringing.
(My emphasis.)
[11] Subsection 6301(1)(d) of the Income Tax
Regulations (the "Regulations"), Part LXIII,
Child Tax Benefits, reads as follows:
(1) For the purposes of paragraph (g) of the
definition "eligible individual" in section 122.6
of the Act, the presumption referred to in
paragraph (f) of that definition does not apply in
the circumstances where
. . .
(d) more than one notice is filed with the Minister
under subsection 122.62(1) of the Act in respect of the same
qualified dependant who resides with each of the persons filing
the notices if such persons live at different locations.
[12] Thus the presumption stated in paragraph (f)
of the definition of "eligible individual" does not
apply here as both parents filed an application for child tax
benefit for their son who lives with both of them. It therefore
remains to be determined which of the two parents mainly cared
for Gaël during the periods in issue. This determination
must be made based on the factors set out in section 6302 of
the Regulations cited below.
[13] Section 6302 of the Regulations reads as
follows:
For the purposes of paragraph (h) of the
definition "eligible individual" in section 122.6
of the Act, the following factors are to be considered in
determining what constitutes care and upbringing of a qualified
dependant:
(a) the supervision of the daily activities and needs
of the qualified dependant;
(b) the maintenance of a secure environment in which
the qualified dependant resides;
(c) the arrangement of, and transportation to, medical
care at regular intervals and as required for the qualified
dependant;
(d) the arrangement of, participation in, and
transportation to, educational, recreational, athletic or similar
activities in respect of the qualified dependant;
(e) the attendance to the needs of the qualified
dependant when the qualified dependant is ill or otherwise in
need of the attendance of another person;
(f) the attendance to the hygienic needs of the
qualified dependant on a regular basis;
(g) the provision, generally, of guidance and
companionship to the qualified dependant; and
(h) the existence of a court order in respect of the
qualified dependant that is valid in the jurisdiction in which
the qualified dependant resides.
[14] Having heard both parents, I am of the opinion that the
assessment by the Department's analyst, which leaned in the
father's favour, was reasonable. The evidence showed that
both parents love their child very much, each in their own way,
but did not give me any grounds to amend the Minister's
determination that the father was the person who mainly cared for
the child Gaël during the periods in issue. Relying on the
factors described in paragraphs 6302(a), (d)
and (g) of the Regulations, I find that this determination
was reasonably made.
[15] The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 19th day of October 1999.
"Louise Lamarre Proulx"
J.T.C.C.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]