Date: 19990702
Docket: 97-3163-GST-I
BETWEEN:
BRIAN FEDAK,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Lamarre Proulx, J.T.C.C.
[1] This is an appeal, by way of the informal procedure, from
an assessment made by the Minister of National Revenue
(the "Minister") pursuant to the Excise Tax
Act (the "Act").
[2] The question at issue is whether the Appellant is entitled
to a rebate of tax respecting a trade-in property accepted as
partial consideration by the supplier of a supply on which the
Appellant paid the tax on the full amount of the supply.
[3] The Minister based his assessment on the assumptions of
fact described at paragraph 6 of the Reply to the Notice of
Appeal (the "Reply") as follows:
(a) the facts admitted and stated in this Reply, some of which
are repeated here for ease of reference;
(b) the Appellant bought a boat from the Supplier;
(c) on March 18, 1996, the Appellant and the Supplier
entered into an agreement in writing with respect to the supply
by way of sale of the boat;
(d) the consideration for the boat sold by the Supplier was
$21,995;
(e) the goods and services tax ("GST") collectible
by the Supplier and payable by the Appellant in respect of the
boat supplied by the Supplier was $1,539.65 (7% of $21,995);
(f) the GST payable with respect to the supply of the boat by
the Supplier was clearly indicated in the written agreement;
(g) the Supplier credited the value of the Trade-in against
the consideration payable for the boat supplied to the
Appellant;
(h) the Trade-in was valued at $6,000;
(i) the GST charged and collected by the Supplier on the
supply of the boat was calculated on the consideration for the
boat, without reference to the amount credited by the Supplier to
the Appellant with respect to the Trade-in;
(j) the Supplier was entitled to claim an input tax credit of
$392.52 with respect to the Trade-in;
(k) the Appellant received possession of the boat he acquired
from the Supplier on May 25, 1996; and
(l) the agreement in writing with respect to the supply of the
boat was entered into before July 1996.
[4] The Appellant denied paragraph 6(c) of the Reply by
saying that the date of the sale agreement should be May 25,
1996, which is the date of delivery of the boat as shown in
Exhibit R-1, the contract of sale. The contract is
dated March 18, 1996. It is signed by the Appellant, the
salesman and the manager.
[5] The total price of the boat acquired by the Appellant is
shown as $21,995. There is an amount of $6,000 that is shown next
to the description of the Appellant's boat to be traded in,
and then the sub-total is shown as $15,995. The amount of
tax, $1,539.65, was calculated on the full amount of $21,995. The
Appellant paid the purchase price ($15,995 + $1,539.65) at the
end of May 1996.
[6] The Appellant stated that the trade-in boat was
officially sold sometime in July. That was another of the
Appellant's submissions that this date was the date when the
deal of sale was finally concluded and should be the date of the
agreement. The Appellant stated that no final transaction was
made before that time and that everything was contingent on the
resale of the trade-in boat.
[7] The Appellant stated that the vendor had told him that it
would be applying for a credit or maybe that he should apply for
a credit to which he may be entitled. The amount of $420 of tax
claimed by the Appellant is the result of 7% on the amount of
$6,000.
Analysis
[8] Paragraph 176(1)a) of the Act, as it then
was, was applicable to a supply made before April 24, 1996 where
the acquisition of a used good was part of the consideration for
the supply. It read as follows:
“(1) Acquisition of used goods — Subject to
this Division, where
(a) used tangible personal property is supplied in
Canada by way of sale after 1993 to a registrant, tax is not
payable by the registrant in respect of the supply, and the
property is acquired for the purpose of consumption, use or
supply in the course of commercial activities of the registrant,
or
(b) used tangible personal property is supplied in
Canada by way of sale before 1994 to a registrant, tax is not
payable by the registrant in respect of the supply, and the
property is acquired for the purpose of supply in the course of
commercial activities of the registrant,
for the purposes of this Part, the registrant shall be deemed
(except where the supply is a zero-rated supply or where section
167 applies to the supply) to have paid, at the time any amount
is paid as consideration for the supply, tax in respect of the
supply equal to the tax fraction of that amount.
[9] The Technical Notes (February 1993) explain the purpose of
this provision as follows:
Section 176 deems tax to have been paid by a registrant
acquiring used goods, in certain circumstances, from a person not
required to charge tax. This is in order to enable the registrant
to claim input tax credits in respect of these purchases to the
extent that they are for consumption, use or supply in a
commercial activity. The notional input tax credit is intended to
remove tax that the supplier originally paid on the goods but did
not recover. As a result, when the used good is resold by the
registrant, there is no cascading of tax – i.e., GST is not
charged on an amount that already includes an element of tax.
[10] Respecting the amount of credit that may be claimed, the
Technical Notes (May 1990) state as follows:
Provided that the registrant acquires the used good for use,
consumption or supply in the course of the registrant's
commercial activities, this subsection treats the registrant as
having paid GST, equal to 7/107ths of the purchase price. The
registrant may then claim an input tax credit in respect of this
amount under the rules in section 169. As an example, assume a
used car dealer pays $5,350 for a car purchased from an
individual. The dealer would be treated as having paid tax of
$350 (7/107 X $5,350) in respect of which an input tax credit
could be claimed.
[11] Subsection 176(1) of the Act provided a notional
input tax credit to a registrant who bought used goods from a
non-registrant for resale. The person who was entitled to the
notional input tax credit was the registrant, not the individual
trading in a property. The purpose behind this provision was that
an amount of tax originally paid by the trader was part of the
price of the traded-in property acquired by the registrant
(vendor) and that the registrant was entitled to claim that
notional tax as an input tax credit. A supplier was to tax the
full amount of a supply when there was a trade-in and then claim
a notional input tax credit under section 176 of the Act.
There was no requirement in the legislation to pass the value of
the trade-in to the recipient. In such a case, the notional input
tax credit under subsection 176(1) of the Act is 7/107 of
the trade-in value.
[12] Subsection 176(1) of the Act was amended by
section 25 of an Act to amend the Excise Tax Act, the
Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act, the Income Tax Act,
the Debt Servicing and Reduction Account Act and related
Acts, S.C. 1997, c. 10, "the amending Act".
Subsection 176(1) of the Act was replaced by a provision
respecting used returnable containers coming into force on April
24, 1996.
[13] From that date, the provision of the Act that is
of application for the situation of the type under appeal is
subsection 153(4) of the Act that was added by subsection
13(1) of "the amending Act". It reads as
follows:
(4) Where, at the time a supplier makes a supply of tangible
personal property to a recipient, the supplier accepts, in full
or partial consideration for the supply, other property (in this
subsection and subsection (5) referred to as the
“trade-in”) that
(a) is used tangible personal property or a leasehold
interest therein, and
(b) is acquired for consumption, use or supply in the
course of a commercial activity of the supplier,
and the recipient is not required to collect tax in respect of
the supply of the trade-in, the value of the consideration for
the supply made by the supplier is deemed, for the purposes of
this Part, to be equal to the amount, if any, by which the value
of the consideration for that supply (as otherwise determined
under this Part) exceeds
(c) except where paragraph (d) applies, the
amount credited to the recipient in respect of the trade-in,
and
(d) where the supplier and the recipient are not
dealing with each other at arm's length at the time the
supply is made and the amount credited to the recipient in
respect of the trade-in exceeds the fair market value of the
trade-in at the time ownership thereof is transferred to the
supplier, that fair market value.
[14] The purpose of adding that section was to remove the
system of notional input tax credit. The provision now allows the
tax to be calculated on the net amount of a supply when there is
a trade-in provided in full or partial consideration of
that supply.
[15] The Technical Notes (July 1997) explain the nature of the
amendment as follows:
New subsection 153(4) provides that, where a supplier who is a
registrant accepts a used good (or a leasehold interest therein)
as full or partial consideration for another good, the supplier
has to collect GST only on the net value if the property being
accepted as a trade-in is for consumption, use or supply by the
supplier in the course of commercial activities and the person
trading in the property is not required to collect tax on it. For
example, a car dealer who accepts a trade-in from a consumer as
partial consideration for a new car will charge tax only on the
difference between the value of the new car and the value of the
used car.
...
The new trade-in rule is added as a consequence of the
amendment to section 176, which eliminates notional input
tax credits except for certain returnable containers (see
commentary on clause 25). Charging tax on the net value prevents
tax cascading when a used good, for which no input tax credit was
claimed, is accepted as a trade-in by a supplier and is
subsequently resold on a taxable basis.
[16] Subsection 13(2) of "the amending Act"
reads as follows:
13(2) Subsection (1) [being subsection 153(4) of the
Act] applies to supplies made after April 23, 1996 other
than any supply to a recipient of particular property for which
the supplier accepted, as full or partial consideration under an
agreement in writing entered into before July 1996, other
tangible personal property (in this subsection referred to as the
"trade-in") where the supplier charged or collected tax
in respect of the supply of the particular property calculated
without reference to the amount credited by the supplier to the
recipient in respect of the trade-in.
[17] It is therefore important to determine the date of a
supply. Section 133 of the Act determines that date. It
reads as follows:
Agreement as supply – For the purposes of this Part,
where an agreement is entered into to provide property or a
service,
(a) the entering into of the agreement shall be deemed
to be a supply of the property or service made at the time the
agreement is entered into; and
(b) the provision, if any, of property or a service
under the agreement shall bed deemed to be part of the supply
referred to in paragraph (a) and not a separate
supply.
[18] It is my view that the evidence has shown clearly that
the Appellant has entered into an agreement of purchase and sale
on March 18, 1996. On that date, the vendor sold a boat to the
Appellant. The Appellant agreed to pay the sale price. There was
no mention of the date of delivery of the Appellant's boat
but there is a mention of its acquisition by the supplier. Except
as to the statement made by the Appellant and referred to at
paragraph 6 of these Reasons, there is no evidence that the
acquisition of the traded boat did not take place on
March 18, 1996 and no evidence that the agreement of sale
was conditional to the sale of the traded-in property.
[19] The other date mentioned in subsection 13(2) of "the
amending Act" reproduced at paragraph 16 of these
Reasons is July 1996. Subsection 153(4) of the Act will
not apply to a supply made after April 23, 1996 under an
agreement in writing entered into before July 1996 where the
supplier charged or collected the tax in respect of the supply
without reference to the amount credited by the supplier to the
Appellant in respect of the trade-in. There is no doubt that the
written agreement was entered into before July 1996 and that the
supplier charged the tax on the full amount as evidenced by
Exhibit R-1.
[20] The only conclusion that can be reached considering the
written agreement (Exhibit R-1) and section 133 of the Act
is that the supply took place at the date of the agreement, that
is March 18, 1996. In consequence, the appeal of the Appellant
must fail since subsection 153(4) of the Act cannot
apply.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 2nd day of July 1999.
"Louise Lamarre Proulx"
J.T.C.C.