Date: 19990322
Docket: 97-1557-IT-G
BETWEEN:
THE ESTATE OF SHOLTO WALMSLEY,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for judgment
Beaubier, J.T.C.C.
[1] These appeals pursuant to the General Procedure were heard
at Victoria, British Columbia on February 17, 1999. Mark
Walmsley, son of the deceased and Executor and Trustee of his
estate, testified as did Peter Yuile and Revenue Canada's
auditor, Calvin Poon, C.G.A.
[2] Sholto Walmsley died at Vancouver, British Columbia on
December 2, 1986. He left his estate to Mark to hold in trust for
the benefit of his widow, Margery. Upon her death the estate
remaining was distributed to his three children in equal shares.
The executor applied for probate on April 14, 1987, at which time
the gross value of the estate was $710,430.84.
[3] On May 31, 1988 the residuary beneficiaries agreed in
writing to the following compensation to be paid to Mark as
Executor and Trustee of Sholto's estate:
What we agreed would be your monetary compensation is the
following:
° A payment of 5% of the amount that father's estate
value has increased at each year-end versus the value from the
previous year-end.
° A payment of 0.4% of father's estate value at
year-end.
° A payment of 3% of father's estate value at the time
your duties were satisfactorily concluded.
° A payment of 2% of the combined estate value when
mom's estate and father's estate needs to be settled
(again) at the time of mom's death (assuming that you are the
executor of her estate).
As we discussed, you can take some or all of these monies at
this time. If you prefer, you can take some or all of the them at
a future date of your choosing. You could also take pieces of
them at regular or irregular intervals. All that we ask, is that
you acknowledge that these payments are reasonable and that you
accept them.
Please let us know what monies are due to you. I think that a
statement very similar to the one in your letter, but more formal
and covering year-end 1987, the 3% closing payment, and any other
monies due to you as of June 1, 1988 would be appropriate. This
statement would then serve as a record for our reference in the
future. A statement on or about year-end 1988 and future
year-ends would also be suitable for subsequent years.
(Exhibits A-1 and A-2)
[4] Sholto's widow, Margery, was supported by his estate.
Taxes and fees were also paid from Sholto's estate. Mark
reported to the beneficiaries two to four times per year and
administered the estate, according to his Notice of Appeal, by
doing the following as set out in paragraph 7:
7. The Executor performed the following functions:
(i) determination of Estate's assets and liabilities at
time of death;
(ii) search of all banks, trusts and other institutions who
may have been involved with the Estate;
(iii) continuous work with the Estate's lawyer to ensure
all aspects of the Will were understood and adhered to, followed
and implemented (e.g. death benefit, life insurance, etc.);
(iv) communicated with and obtained input from the
Beneficiaries of the Estate, both of which were outside the local
jurisdiction and took care of the Estate on a daily basis;
(v) ensured that the Testator's surviving spouse, who was
also a Beneficiary of the Estate, was taken care of financially
and budgeted for and worked with the other beneficiaries on a
constant basis to understand the financial and other needs to be
provided by the Estate to the Testator's surviving spouse
including setting up financial mechanisms in order to provide
sufficient financial support and included the setting up of
housing, health and other care for the surviving spouse;
(vi) kept constant analysis of the financial status of the
Estate as well as making day to day decisions regarding the
nature of investment risks involved and investments to invest in
and included written accounts of these decisions to the other
Beneficiaries on a consistent basis;
(vii) maintained a system of filing and record keeping with
respect to these investments as well as the other assets and
decisions made in the Estate by the Executor;
(viii) worked with mutual fund trust manager to ensure that
investments were performing well and made decisions with respect
to these mutual fund investments (i.e. when to sell, when to buy,
etc.);
(ix) established a system to provide loans to Beneficiaries
which was consistent with instructions in the Will and recorded
and accounted for these loans;
(x) worked with the Estate's accountant to gather the
materials relating to the preparation of financial statements,
prepare same and provide the Respondent with the appropriate
income tax filings;
(xi) set up and maintained a system of paying the Estate's
bills on an ongoing basis, including all necessary banking;
(xii) maintained an Estate current account and savings
account;
(xiii) established and implemented the means of appropriate
liquidation and dissolution of the Estate when the surviving
spouse died, and then distributed these assets in an appropriate
manner to the Beneficiaries of the Will in accordance with the
guidance of the Will; and
(xiv) was involved in and dealt with an audit by the
Respondent of the Estate.
[5] Margery died in 1994, at which time the fair market value
of the remaining estate assets was $1,313,928. Paragraphs 8 to 10
of the Notice of Appeal list the fees that the estate paid Mark
from 1986 to 1994 and the deductions made by the estate
respecting those fees. They read:
8. The following compensation was provided during the
respective years by the Appellant to the Executor:
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
$NIL $NIL $6,510 $5,900 $6,000 $6,106 $7,011 $5,960
$82,025
9. The Appellant claimed a deduction equal to the amounts and
in the years provided in Paragraph 8 above, respecting the
Executor's compensation.
10. The Respondent denied the Appellant's claim for a
deduction for the Executor's compensation in the 1992 and
1994 taxation years.
[6] The audit disallowed the following expenses claimed for
trustee fees in 1992 and 1994:
1992 $916.00
1994 $69,892.00
Paragraphs 8 to 14 inclusive of the Reply to the Notice of
Appeal detail the bases for the disallowance. They read:
8. In so assessing the Appellant, the Minister relied, on,
inter alia, the following assumptions:
a) the facts stated and admitted herein;
b) trustee fee expenses in excess of the amount allowed by the
Minister were not incurred for the purpose of gaining or
producing income from a business or property;
c) trustee fee expenses in excess of the amount allowed by the
Minister were not current expenses, but were expenses that were
capital in nature;
d) trustee fee expenses in excess of the amount allowed by the
Minister were not expenses that were reasonable in the
circumstances;
e) the trustee fees paid by the Appellant in the 1992 and 1994
taxation years were not paid to a person whose principal business
is advising others as to the advisability of purchasing or
selling specific shares or securities;
f) the trustee fees paid by the Appellant in the 1992 and 1994
taxation years were not paid to a person whose principal business
includes the provision of services in respect of the
administration or management of shares or securities.
B. ISSUE TO BE DECIDED
9. The issue is whether the Minister properly disallowed
expenses for trustee fees claimed by the Appellant in the amounts
of $916.00 and $69,892.00 in the 1992 and 1994 taxation years,
respectively.
C. STATUTORY PROVISIONS RELIED ON
10. He relies on sections 3, 9 and 67, subsection 20(1) and
paragraphs 18(1)(a), 18(1)(b) and 18(1)(h) of the Income Tax
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended
(the "Act").
D. GROUNDS RELIED ON AND RELIEF SOUGHT
11. He respectfully submits that the disallowed trustee fee
expenses were not incurred for the purpose of gaining or
producing income from a business or property within the meaning
of paragraph 18(1)(a) of the Act but were expenses that
were capital in nature within the meaning of paragraph 18(1)(b)
of the Act.
12. He respectfully submits that the trustee fee expenses
disallowed by the Minister were not expenses that were reasonable
in the circumstances within the meaning of section 67 of the
Act.
13. He respectfully submits that the trustee fees paid by the
Appellant in the 1992 and 1994 taxation years were not paid to a
person whose principal business is advising others as to the
advisability of purchasing or selling specific shares or
securities pursuant to subparagraph 20(1)(bb)(iii) of the
Act.
14. He respectfully submits that the trustee fees paid by the
Appellant in the 1992 and 1994 taxation years were not paid to a
person whose principal business includes the provision of
services in respect of the administration or management of shares
or securities pursuant to subparagraph 20(1)(bb)(iv) of the
Act.
Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Reply are correct. Mark's
occupation did not fall within subparagraphs
20(1)(bb)(iii) or (iv) of the Act.
[7] The Appellant called Mr. Yuile of Victoria who testified
as to fees he charges for professional investment advice.
Essentially he charges an annual fee based on the total value of
assets administered. It is 1% of the first $250,000,
¾ of 1% of the second $250,000; ½ of 1% of the
third $250,000 and ¼ of 1% thereafter. In Vancouver and in
the investment advisor industry the fees generally range from 1%
to 2% per annum based on the value of the financial assets
administered.
[8] Mark Walmsley did not break down his services or fees
among the portions spent attending to Margery Walmsley's
needs, the portion spent on income matters, on capital matters or
on administrative or any other matter or matters. Essentially he
simply charged his fees based upon the terms of Exhibits A-1
and A-2 which are quoted on a gross basis.
[9] Mark did not give any detail respecting his fees to the
auditor when he was asked for detail. As a result, the auditor
calculated the fees he allowed based upon the Ontario tariff of
fees allowed for executors and administrators, based upon the
income of the estate and the taxable capital gains of the estate.
Although Mr. Poon's calculations based upon taxable capital
gains may be questionable, the Appellant did not present detailed
evidence in support of an alternative method of calculating the
fees related to income or other gains earned by the estate. The
rationale presented by the Appellant was that the estate
increased remarkably in value and therefore the fees are
deductible. The failure in this rationale is that the trustee had
to administer the care of Margery and administer the estate
generally (and wind it up) in addition to attempting to earn
income and to retaining or increasing the value of the estate
assets. He performed a mixture of duties, only some of which were
related to earning income. But he did not give any evidence which
broke down the fees he charged for activities performed in order
to earn income for the estate.
[10] For this reason, the Appellant failed to refute
assumptions 8(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f).
[11] Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. The Respondent is
awarded party and party costs respecting the appeal.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 22nd day of March
1999.
"D.W. Beaubier"
J.T.C.C.