Date: 19990112
Docket: 96-4726-IT-G
BETWEEN:
LGL LIMITED,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for judgment
Bowman, J.T.C.C.
[1] These appeals are from assessments for the appellant's
1991, 1992 and 1993 taxation years. The sole issue is whether
certain costs of scientific research and experimental development
("SR & ED") work that was admittedly carried on
outside the geographical boundaries of Canada as part of four
projects qualify under paragraph 37(1)(a) of the Income
Tax Act as SR & ED "carried on in Canada".
[2] It is admitted that each of the projects in its entirety
is SR & ED and that the expenditures are of a current
nature.
[3] The parties have filed a partial consent to judgment with
respect to two projects, the Snow Goose Project and the Eider
Project in which it is agreed that these two projects are
projects of the appellant and not of LGL Alaska. It is
unnecessary to set out the detailed terms of the consent. The
appeal for 1991 will be allowed to give effect to the partial
consent to judgment.
[4] Evidence was adduced substantially by a detailed partial
agreed statement of facts. In addition, an expert witness report
of Dr. Roger H. Green, a professor of zoology at the University
of Western Ontario, was filed on behalf of the appellant. His
evidence was accepted by the respondent and he was not called or
cross-examined. Also, Dr. Rolph A. Davis, the president of the
appellant, supplemented the agreed statement of facts with
viva voce testimony.
[5] I shall not reproduce in full the agreed statement of
facts. It consists of 16 pages, together with two detailed
appendices with a total of 12 pages. It is not necessary for
the purposes of my analysis of the question of statutory
interpretation involved in these appeals. A brief summary of the
issues and the facts will suffice.
[6] Paragraph 37(1)(a) of the Act provides:
(1) Where a taxpayer carried on a business in Canada in a
taxation year and files with his return of income under this Part
for the year a prescribed form containing prescribed information,
there may be deducted in computing his income from the business
for the year such amount as he may claim not exceeding the
amount, if any, by which the aggregate of
(a) the aggregate of all amounts each of which is an
expenditure of a current nature made by the taxpayer in the year
or in a preceding taxation year ending after 1973
(i) on scientific research and experimental development
carried on in Canada, directly undertaken by or on behalf of the
taxpayer, and related to a business of the taxpayer,
(ii) by payments to
(A) an approved association that undertakes scientific
research and experimental development,
(B) an approved university, college, research institute or
other similar institution,
(C) a corporation resident in Canada and exempt from tax under
paragraph 149(1)(j),
(D) a corporation resident in Canada, or
(E) an approved organization that makes payments to an
association, institution or corporation described in any of
clauses (A) to (C)
to be used for scientific research and experimental
development carried on in Canada, related to a business of the
taxpayer, and provided that the taxpayer is entitled to exploit
the results of such scientific research and experimental
development, or
(iii) where the taxpayer is a corporation by payments to a
corporation resident in Canada and exempt from tax under
paragraph 149(1)(j), for scientific research and
experimental development that is basic research or applied
research carried on in Canada
(A) the primary purpose of which is the use of results
therefrom by the taxpayer in conjunction with other scientific
research and experimental development activities undertaken or to
be undertaken by or on behalf of the taxpayer that relate to a
business of the taxpayer, and
(B) that has the technological potential for application to
other businesses of a type unrelated to that carried on by the
taxpayer.
[7] If the current expenditures on SR & ED fall within this
provision and, specifically, if the SR & ED is carried on in
Canada (effectués au Canada) the taxpayer is entitled
to an investment tax credit ("ITC") under
section 127 which will give rise to a credit against tax
otherwise payable or a refund to the extent that the taxpayer is
unable to utilize the credit. Such expenditures may also be
pooled.
[8] Current expenditures on SR & ED carried on outside of
Canada are dealt with under subsection 37(2). They do not give
rise to an ITC.
[9] In the years in question, paragraph 37(7)(b)
provided that SR & ED had the meaning given to that expression
by regulation. That definition is found in section 2900 of the
Regulations made under the Act. It is unnecessary to
reproduce that definition. It is common ground that the
activities carried on by the appellant fall within it.
[10] The appellant is a Canadian company, owned and managed by
Canadians. It has offices and laboratories in King City, Ontario,
Sidney, British Columbia and St. John's, Newfoundland. It is
also affiliated with two research companies in Texas and
Alaska.
[11] Its business involves doing research on behalf of
governments, industry and other organizations in such matters as
environmental effects, environmental planning and assessment,
resource management, ecological research into terrestrial,
freshwater and marine systems and bird hazards to aircraft.
[12] It has a highly qualified professional staff in the
numerous disciplines relating to the expertise requisite to its
business and it has a worldwide reputation and clientele.
[13] In the taxation years in question, the appellant carried
on SR & ED projects in relation to a number of projects
relating broadly to the environmental effect of certain
activities on whales, birds and fish. It was necessary that data
forming the basis of the research be collected off the northern
coast of Alaska. The data so acquired was brought to Canada where
it was analysed as part of the overall research projects. It is
the direct cost of the work done outside of Canada in collecting
the data necessary for the research done in Canada, together with
a portion of the overhead allocable to that work, that is in
issue here. The appellant claims that these expenditures fall
within paragraph 37(1)(a) as SR & ED carried on in
Canada. The respondent denies the claims on the basis that the
activities outside of Canada are not SR & ED carried on in
Canada.
[14] The mathematical computation of the claim is not in
dispute. The claim for SR & ED includes:
(a) recoverable direct SR & ED costs attributable to each
project; and
(b) the allocation of the appellant's allowable overhead
expenses attributable to each project.
[15] The appellant's allowable overhead allocable to
SR & ED is determined in accordance with the following
formula:
Fees Billed on
SRED Projects
Appellant's
Total Fees
|
X
|
Appellant's
Total Overhead
|
[16] It follows that a reduction of fees billed on SR & ED
projects reduces the amount of overhead cost otherwise allocable
to SR & ED.
[17] The parties agree that the formula is acceptable and they
also agree on the amount of the denominator as well as the
appellant's total allowable overhead.
[18] Where they disagree is whether the portion of the costs
of the projects referable to work done outside of Canada
represents expenditures on SR & ED carried on in Canada.
[19] The four projects are the following.
The Whale Project
[20] The object of this project was to determine whether
offshore oil exploration would have any adverse effects on the
behaviour of spring migrating bowhead and white whales.
[21] The fieldwork that was conducted was based in Barrow,
Alaska and lasted about a month in each year of the project. The
collection of the field data conducted outside of Canada involved
placing a sound projector that simulated the noise of a drilling
rig and the placing of a hydrophone (called a Sonabuoy) among the
whales to determine what the whales were hearing. The sound
received by the hydrophone was transmitted to the aircraft that
circled above.
[22] The behaviour of the whales in the vicinity of the sound
projector was observed from the aircraft and recorded.
[23] All of the data so collected was taken to King City,
Ontario. In King City, the data was transcribed and tabulated,
hypotheses were formulated, experimental designs were determined,
systematic study protocols were evaluated and tested, the field
logistics were planned and arranged, the data was analyzed, the
results interpreted, conclusions were formed and the lengthy and
detailed report was prepared.
[24] In short, everything relating to the project was done in
Canada except for the collection of the data, which was done in
international waters.
[25] The project continued into the 1992 and 1993 taxation
years.
[26] Based upon the agreed facts, the testimony of Dr. Davis
and the affidavit of the expert Dr. Green, I am satisfied that
the field work and data collection was an integral and essential
part of the scientific research project and that it was necessary
that it be carried on outside of Canada. The only location in
which the data collection and the observation of the whales could
safely be carried on was outside Canada and specifically off
Point Barrow, Alaska. The work could not have been carried on in
Canada.
The Oldsquaw Project
[27] This project was undertaken to determine whether coastal
and near shore oil and gas development would affect populations
of oldsquaw and other waterfowl that moult in such areas. The
null hypothesis being tested was that such activity would not
change the distribution and behaviour patterns of moulting
oldsquaw ducks in the Alaskan Beaufort Sea.
[28] The reasons for conducting the activities outside of
Canada were the following:
32. The activities conducted outside Canada consisted of the
collection of field data in the Alaskan Beaufort Sea where
previously disturbed and undisturbed moulting areas could be
compared. The collection activities consisted of a series of
aerial surveys of Oldsquaw and other moulting waterfowl in the
experimental and control areas identified during the project
planning phase. The surveys provided seasonal, geographic and
climatic data that affects numbers of Oldsquaws. The surveys
consisted of a series of low level aerial transect grids. The
surveyors observed and counted the number of ducks on and
adjacent to the transect strips.
33. The kind of field study undertaken could not have been
performed in any other location as far as LGL Limited was aware
as:
(a) There are several locations along the arctic coasts of
Alaska and Canada where moulting waterfowl congregate during the
open water season and the presence of oil and gas developments in
any of these areas could have negative effects on waterfowl
populations. However, in order to document effects, it was
necessary to determine if future population changes could be
reliably attributed to industrial activities;
(b) The study area selected in Alaska included an area that
had been subjected to previous oil exploration and a control area
that had not been exposed to exploration; and
(c) There was a data base of 9 years of waterfowl surveys in
these two areas that could be used to establish the ranges and
types of variability that could be expected to occur. These data
were used to define the parameters of the statistical models to
be tested during the field phase of the study. The study could
not have been conducted in other areas because these areas did
not have 9 years of background data that could be used.
34. The data collected in the Beaufort Sea were specifically
designed to test the mathematical models and statistical
procedures developed by LGL Limited in Canada. The data have no
immediate value outside the context of the Canadian study.
[29] As in the case of the Whale Project, everything but the
collection of data was performed in Canada, as set out in the
partial agreed statement of facts:
30. The activities conducted in Canada included:
(a) the formulation of a series of testable hypotheses;
(b) determination of an appropriate experimental protocol;
(c) evaluation and testing of various systematic study
designs;
(d) data reduction and analyses;
(e) data interpretation;
(f) the development of appropriate mathematical models and
statistical procedures to allow detection of changes in Oldsquaw
distributions that could be attributed to industrial activities;
and
(g) preparation of scientific reports.
[30] I accept that the work that was done outside of Canada
had to be performed where it was and that it was an integral and
essential part of the overall SR & ED project.
[31] The Eider Project
The purpose of this project was to determine whether nearshore
causeways affected the distribution and number of Eider duck
populations. Solid-fill causeways built by the oil industry
extend offshore for several kilometres into the Alaskan Beaufort
Sea. No such causeways exist in the Canadian Arctic and
accordingly the null hypothesis (that such causeways do not
affect the distribution and numbers of the Eider ducks) could not
have been tested using Canadian field data.
[32] The activities conducted outside of Canada consisted of
fieldwork in Alaska, gathering observation data on the
distribution, breeding success, brood rearing and moulting
activities of the Common Eider duck near the Endicott causeway.
Apart from the gathering of raw data, all other work was done in
Canada and was substantially of the same nature as that carried
out in connection with the Whale and Oldsquaw Projects.
[33] I accept that the work done in Alaska could not have been
carried out in Canada, and that it was an essential and integral
part of the overall research project.
[34] The Endicott Fish Project
The purpose of this project was to determine the effects of
the Endicott causeway on the coast of Alaska on the migration of
the Arctic Cisco from the Mackenzie River (Canada) to the
Colville River (Alaska).
[35] The hypotheses tested were the following:
46. The specific null hypothesis that was tested was that the
Endicott causeway does not interfere with longshore movements of
anadromous fish. The 1992 and 1993 field work also addressed a
new null hypothesis. That is, installation of major breaches in
the causeway will not improve the longshore movements, general
body condition, and the survivability of anadromous fish. The new
hypothesis was added after the regulatory agencies decreed that
large breaches (=bridges) must be created in the Endicott
causeway.
[36] For obvious reasons the observation of the migration of
the fish around the Endicott causeway could only take place at
that location. All other work, such as data analysis, laboratory
analyses, data tabulation and validation and preparation of the
report was done at the appellant's Sidney, British Columbia
office.
[37] Charts were put in evidence setting out the time and
money spent inside Canada and outside Canada. I reproduce only
the appellant's summary of the totals of time and money
spent. These figures must however be used with caution. In the
Whale Project, for example, in 1991 and 1992 72% and 95.4% of the
direct costs were spent outside of Canada, whereas only 22.4% and
19.8% of the time was spent outside Canada. This was a result of
the high cost of aerial surveillance.
[38] In the case of the Oldsquaw Project 85% of the money
spent in 1993 was spent outside of Canada, yet 0% of the time. I
am sure there is an explanation for this but it is not
apparent.
[39] In the Eider Project, 61.4% and 54.4% of the time was
spent outside Canada in 1991 and 1992 respectively. The moneys
spent inside and outside Canada were roughly equal. However, the
dollar amounts are so small with this project that the
percentages are not meaningful.
[40] In the case of the Endicott Fish Project, about 30% of
the time was spent outside of Canada and roughly 50% of the
money.
[41] On a project by project basis it is obvious that the
figures can be misleading and can result in distorted or
erroneous conclusions. The possibility of distortion is even more
pronounced where all projects are lumped together, as is the case
in the following table.
[42] I do not think that any reliable conclusion can be
reached by totalling up dollars and days and arriving at
unweighted percentages. For what it is worth the following table
sets out the appellant's totals:
LGL LIMITED'S TOTALS OF TIME AND MONEY SPENT (including
allocation of overhead) INSIDE and OUTSIDE CANADA ON THE
PROJECTS IN ISSUE
Time
1991
1992
1993
(excl. Eider)
|
Total Time Spent In Canada (Days)
733.1
1,048.4
408.9
2,190.4
|
Total Time Spent Outside Canada
(Days)
304
387
81
772
(Unweighted
|
Percentage Outside
29.3
27.0
16.5
26.1%
24.3%)
|
DOLLARS (including Overhead at LGL Rate)
1991
1992
1993
|
In Canada and
Overhead
$283,297+$765,210
$42,356+$684,515
$33,186+$299,387
$2,107,951
|
Outside Canada
$360,511
$458,094
$88,717
$907,322
(unweighted
|
Percentage Outside
25.6%
38.7%
21.1%
30.1%
28.5%)
|
[43] The fundamental question is whether the work that was
necessarily done outside of Canada as an essential part of an
SR & ED project was SR & ED carried on in Canada within the
meaning of paragraph 37(1)(a) of the Act. The
question is an important one and the respective positions of the
parties were advanced by both counsel skilfully and
thoroughly.
[44] As a preliminary observation, I accept the factual
conclusions upon which the appellant relies:
(a) the work in question involving the collection of data had
to be done outside of Canada. It could not have been done in
Canada;
(b) the work done outside of Canada, by itself and without
more, was not SR & ED. It only became SR & ED when it was
assimilated to and made part of the overall SR & ED
project;
(c) the assembly of data was an essential and necessary part
of the overall project;
(d) if it is relevant to designate the projects, looked at in
their entirety and not piecemeal as "Canadian" or
"non-Canadian" it would be more accurate to describe
them as Canadian. The work was done by a Canadian company, using
Canadian researchers and personnel and the core scientific work,
that is to say, the analysis of the data, the formulation and
testing of hypotheses, the formation of conclusions and the
preparation of reports were all done in Canada. All that was done
outside of Canada was the collection of data.
[45] The appellant's basic premise is that a project is to
be looked at integrally and not piecemeal. I agree completely if
one is considering the question whether a project is SR & ED
within the meaning given that term in section 2900 of the
Regulations. The principle is not however of any particular
assistance in determining whether SR & ED is carried on in
Canada. Whether an activity is carried on in Canada or elsewhere
has nothing to do with whether it is SR & ED. It is only after
it is determined that it is SR & ED that the second question,
where it is carried on, must be answered. Counsel for the
appellant recognizes this in his written argument where he
says:
Because subsections 37(1) and (2) ITA are drafted to be
mutually exclusive it is respectfully submitted that there must
first be a determination whether a bundle of activities
constitutes SRED within the definition of Regulation 2900 before
deciding whether that SRED, if it is such, is carried on in or
outside Canada; and
[46] From this unassailable point he moves to a proposition
that, in my respectful view, does not logically or necessarily
follow:
Therefore it is respectfully submitted, the language of
paragraph 37(1)(a) ITA is unambiguous and clearly includes
the specific data collection/field work activities that were
conducted by the Appellant outside Canada in direct support of
its prosecution of SRED projects in Canada.
[47] The appellant's position is that if the activities
carried on outside of Canada satisfy the criteria in section 2900
of the Regulations independently of the work that is done in
Canada, then they are carried on outside of Canada; if they
require the work in Canada to be considered SR & ED (i.e. if it
is only by their integration into the project as a whole that
they become SR & ED) then they must form part of an SR & ED
project that is carried on in Canada. Simply put, if a project
qualifies as SR & ED then the project must be looked at
integrally and it must be determined whether as a whole it is
carried on in Canada or outside Canada.
[48] I can see no particular reason for this conclusion,
either as a matter of principle or as a matter of statutory
interpretation.
[49] The appellant argues that the respondent's
interpretation requires that SR & ED as used in paragraph
37(1)(a) be read as "SR & ED activities". As a
matter of fact, in 1994 the French version was changed to
read:
activités de recherches scientifiques et de
développement expérimental exercées au
Canada.
[50] Obviously, "exercées" modifies
"activités". However in 1991, 1992 and 1993, the
wording was "des recherches scientifiques et du
développement expérimental effectués au
Canada" and it is that wording that applies to the years
under appeal.
[51] Counsel refers to two decisions of this court. The first
is Tigney Technology Inc. v. R., [1997] 2 C.T.C. 2333
where Bell J. of this court stated:
13 I agree with Appellant's counsel that these
expenditures were made in Canada by a corporation carrying on
business in Canada. I also agree that the portion of the research
which did not physically take place in Canada was an isolated and
relatively small part of the systematic investigation which was
on-going in Canada. The evidence indicates that the only reason
for the presence of the Appellant's personnel and portable
plant in Kentucky was that the fresh tobacco required for the
experiments conducted was not available in Canada. The
experiments conducted in November, 1992 in Kentucky are not a
separate and distinct "systematic investigation" but
are part of the continuous scientific research on tobacco that
the Appellant had commenced in 1990 and continued until 1993. The
experiments in Kentucky were a small and necessary part of the
research which the Appellant had been conducting. By my reading,
the relevant sections and regulations of the Act are broad
enough to encompass the SRED conducted by the Appellant as
outlined above. It is therefore, my conclusion that these sums
are qualified expenditures for the purposes of ITCs.
[52] That case has been appealed to the Federal Court of
Appeal and accordingly I make no comment on it beyond observing
that the experiments in Kentucky appear to have been a rather
small incident of the SR & ED carried on in Canada. Here the
very basis of the SR & ED that was conducted was the data
collected off the shore of Alaska.
[53] In Data Kinetics Ltd. v. The Queen, 98 DTC 1877,
the only activity outside of Canada was the use of a dedicated
telephone line connected with a mainframe computer in Burmingham,
Alabama used to test software systems that were being developed
in Canada. Lamarre J. held that the costs associated with the
testing on the computer in the U.S. formed part of SR & ED
carried on in Canada. I note that no personnel of that appellant
ever went to the U.S., and on this basis alone I think the case
is distinguishable. Lamarre J. said at page 1884:
[39] The Minister appears to favour the splitting of the
testing expenditures between those in respect of work executed in
Canada and those in respect of work executed outside of Canada. I
do not agree with this approach. Even if I were to accept the
interpretation favouring the Minister that the testing activity
is a SR & ED in itself, the breaking up of the testing activity
is not supported by the language of subsections 37(1) or 37(2).
These provisions refer to "SR & ED carried on in
Canada" and "SR & ED carried on outside Canada".
There is no reference to "that portion of SR & ED" or
similar language that would support the breaking down of
SR & ED activities in applying the provisions. Further, if the
constituent parts of the testing were broken down and allocated
between the provisions, it is uncertain whether each particular
component would continue to constitute SR & ED. Should the
component parts when considered alone fail to meet the
requirements of Regulation 2900, then neither of subsections
37(1) or (2) would apply as the activities would not constitute
SR & ED.
[40] I would also note that there is nothing in the language
or meaning assigned to the relevant provisions to suggest that
the determination of where an activity is carried on should be
made by reference solely to the cost of performing the
activities. It is not the monetary value or cost associated with
the particular elements of SR & ED that is determinative of
whether the SR & ED was carried on in or outside of Canada. The
fact that significant expenditures were made by the Appellant for
testing is not determinative.
[41] From the evidence, there is no doubt that the SR & ED
performed was controlled and directed from Canada. The testing
was performed by the software development team in Canada in
controlled conditions. All instructions and data were directed
from someone in Canada with the results coming back to Canada to
be analysed. The leasing expenditures made in the U.S. merely
facilitate a mechanical testing process that is part and in
support of the whole SR & ED project carried on in Canada. The
mainframe computer was merely a tool that was necessary and that
was used to perform the research that occurred in Canada.
[42] In the present appeal, it was not argued that the
software project as a whole was not carried on in Canada. The
Minister's argument was based on the fact that a component of
the testing involved the use of a computer located outside of
Canada. The testing on the mainframe computer in Alabama,
however, was part of a set of interrelated activities that
collectively were necessary to the advancement of the SR & ED
that was carried on in Canada.
[54] It seems obvious from the facts found by Lamarre J. that
the entire project was carried on in Canada.
[55] Here the inescapable fact is that a substantial part of
the project was performed outside of Canada. What principle of
interpretation would permit or compel me to conclude that the
work forming part of the SR & ED project outside of Canada was
carried on in Canada? Many aids to interpretation are available
and may be invoked where the words of a statute are ambiguous or
difficult to understand, or where a particular interpretation may
lead to an absurdity or is clearly at odds with the apparent
legislative intent. For that reason, principles of statutory
construction have been developed by the courts which permit them
to interpret legislation in a manner that "best ensures the
attainment of its objects" (section 12 Interpretation
Act). I endeavoured in Glaxo Wellcome Inc. v. The
Queen (96 DTC 1159, aff'd Federal Court of Appeal,
October 8, 1998; leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada
denied) to summarize the more salient principles.
[56] It is obvious that the SR & ED legislation is incentive
legislation (Northwest Hydraulic Consultants Limited v. The
Queen, 98 DTC 1839; Consoltex Inc. v. The Queen, 97
DTC 724). That does not however permit a court to strain the
plain meaning of the words to achieve a result that appears to be
desirable. As Fauteux C.J. said in Ville de
Montréal v. ILGWU Center et al., [1974] S.C.R. 59 at
66:
... there is no need to resort to interpretation when the
wording is clear.
[57] Even if the result is absurd, if the words are clear the
court must give effect to them. In Victoria City v. Bishop of
Vancouver Island, [1921] 2 A.C. 384 it was stated at pages
387-8:
In the construction of statutes their words must be
interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense, unless there be
something in the context, or in the object of the statute in
which they occur, or in the circumstances with reference to which
they are used, to show that they were used in a special sense
different from their ordinary grammatical sense. In Grey v.
Pearson (1) Lord Wensleydale said: " I have been long
and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now I believe,
universally adopted, at least in the Courts of Law in Westminster
Hall, that in construing wills, and indeed statutes, and all
written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the
words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some
absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of
the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense
of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and
inconsistency, but no farther." Lord Blackburn quoted this
passage with approval in Caledonian Ry. Co. v. North British
Ry. Co. (1), as did also Jessel M.R. in Ex parte
Walton. (2)
There is another principle in the construction of statutes
specially applicable to this section. It is thus stated by Lord
Esher in Reg. v. Judge of the City of London Court (3) :
"If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them,
even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The Court has
nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has
committed an absurdity. In my opinion, the rule has always been
this :—if the words of an Act admit of two interpretations,
then they are not clear; and if one interpretation leads to an
absurdity, and the other does not, the Court will conclude that
the legislature did not intend to lead to an absurdity, and will
adopt the other interpretation." And Lord Halsbury in
Cooke v. Charles A. Vogeler Co. (4) said : "But a
court of law has nothing to do with the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of a provision, except so far as it may help
them in interpreting what the legislature had said." Which
necessarily means that for this latter purpose it is legitimate
to take into consideration the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of any provision of a statute.
Again a section of a statute should, if possible, be construed
so that there may be no repugnancy or inconsistency between its
different portions or members.
(footnotes omitted)
[58] Here, I find no absurdity or repugnancy and in any event,
even if I did, I think the words "carried on in Canada"
are reasonably clear and comprehensible. Where part of an
SR & ED project is carried on in Canada and part is carried on
elsewhere I foresee very little difficulty in splitting the costs
on a reasonable basis between the two (as was in fact done here).
I find this a more reasonable result than attempting to decide
whether a project that is carried on both inside and outside
Canada is essentially "Canadian" or essentially
"non-Canadian". That approach would mean that the cost
of activities forming part of an SR & ED project that are in
fact carried on in Canada could, if the overall project were held
to be non-Canadian because a predominant part of the activity was
carried on outside of Canada, be denied paragraph 37(1)(a)
treatment.
[59] In the circumstances, I must dismiss the appeals except
to the extent covered by the consent to judgment.
[60] Counsel asked for an opportunity to speak for costs and I
shall therefore withhold signing judgment until counsel have
communicated with the court.
Signed at Toronto, Canada, this 12th day of January 1999.
"D.G.H. Bowman"
J.T.C.C.