Date:
20010525
Docket:
2000-3365-IT-I
BETWEEN:
BENOÎT
BOULIANNE,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY
THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons
for Judgment
Alain
Tardif, J.T.C.C.
[1]
The appellant testified that in 1984, he had taken out a loan for
$30,000, which was secured by a
mortgage on his family residence. The loan proceeds had been used
to purchase an interest in condominium units in Montreal and
shares in a stock savings plan ("S.S.P.") (in French,
known as an "R.E.A.").
[2]
As a result of that loan, the appellant claimed a deduction for
interest based on the following figures:
1987
$12,436
1988
$10,603
1989
$8,476
1990
$7,071
1991
$5,012
1992
$4,020
1993
$5,008
1994
$4,541
1995
$5,090
1996
$2,556
1997
$1,816
[3]
In respect of the 1995, 1996 and 1997 taxation years, the
Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister") questioned whether
the deduction claimed by the appellant was appropriate and could
be allowed. The appellant's reply was that he had always assumed
his tax burden and had indeed paid the interest on the loan in
order to purchase the aforementioned investments, that is, an
interest in a building in Montreal and shares in an
S.S.P.
[4]
He said that these investments had proved to be a total failure
in that he had lost all of the $20,000 invested in Montreal real
estate and had also been hit by the collapse of the stock market,
losing the money from the proceeds of the loan that had been
invested there, too.
[5]
Thus, according to his testimony, he had continued paying
interest on a loan the purpose of which had ceased to exist well
before the interest on the loan, used to achieve that purpose,
had been paid.
[6]
In 1997, again he took out a loan of over $25,000, that is, the
difference between $46,773.44 and $73,272.67, which
was also secured by a mortgage on the family residence. This
time, the loan was used to pay off the appellant's personal line
of credit that had been used in 1991 to purchase shares,
including some from the Société
d'investissements R & D Vivac Inc.
(Exhibit A-4).
[7]
Despite my numerous attempts to have the appellant make a direct
connection with the loans, he was never able to do so. He
continually repeated that he had taken out these loans to make
investments and that the Court should believe him, especially
since he had always been scrupulous in paying his taxes. He also
repeated that because time had elapsed, he was no longer able to
provide proper and satisfactory documentary evidence.
[8]
The Court must render a decision on an issue where actions and
their dates and nature are highly significant. I cannot draw
valid conclusions on the basis of facts that are described in a
vague and even confusing manner.
[9]
I am not saying that the appellant concealed certain facts or
even the truth since I realize that it is very difficult to go so
far back in time and provide specific details. Nonetheless, each
year, every taxpayer must have in his possession the documents
and information pertaining to his tax return. In a
self-assessment system, it is essential that tax returns be
prepared on the basis of a serious analysis of the material facts
of the year in question and that all relevant documents be
available for consultation.
[10] A
taxpayer cannot complete his return on the basis of certain
information he does not have, relying on the fact that he was not
questioned in previous years. While it is perfectly normal and
fully desirable that there be continuity from year to year, each
taxation year is a separate unit and must be supported by all
proper and relevant documents in order that a valid review can be
made.
[11] In the
case at bar, based on the evidence adduced by the appellant, it
was not possible to make an objective and rational analysis from
which it could be concluded that carrying charges to purchase
investments were incurred for the 1995, 1996 and 1997 taxation
years. I would have to rely on the testimonial evidence alone,
which, in the circumstances, is obviously not the best evidence,
especially since the interest paid could have resulted from loans
that might have served many purposes other than to purchase one
or more investments.
[12] This is
not the only issue that must be addressed to dispose of this
appeal. In order for carrying charges to be deductible, it must
be established that they were made or incurred for the purpose of
gaining or producing income from a business or property during
the taxation years for which they are claimed; in the case at
bar, the years are 1995, 1996 and 1997.
[13] The
evidence shows that the property that was apparently purchased
with the proceeds of the 1984 loan simply no longer existed in
1995, 1996 and 1997; something that no longer existed could
obviously no longer produce income. This issue has been dealt
with a number of times by this Court and there is no doubt
whatsoever that carrying charges incurred to purchase a potential
source of income can only be deducted if that source still exists
at the time the deduction for those charges is
claimed.
[14] This is
a fundamental point since property that no longer exists, has
ceased to exist or has since disappeared cannot and never will be
able to produce any income at all. It is worth reproducing
subsection 20(1) of the Income Tax Act.
Deductions permitted in computing income from business or
property
20(1) Notwithstanding
paragraphs 18(1)(a), (b) and (h), in
computing a taxpayer's income for a taxation year from a
business or property, there may be deducted such of the following
amounts as are wholly applicable to that source or
such part of the following amounts as may reasonably be regarded
as applicable thereto:
(Emphasis added.)
[15] On this
point, the appellant acknowledged that the property purchased
with the proceeds of the 1984 loan no longer existed in 1995,
1996 and 1997.
[16] With
respect to the carrying charges that might have been incurred on
the second loan, the evidence shows that the loan proceeds were
not used to purchase any property or business that might
potentially have produced income but to pay off the appellant's
personal line of credit.
[17] The
burden of proof was on the appellant, and it could be discharged
only with clear, consistent and credible evidence showing
unequivocally that the carrying charges had been incurred to
purchase property that might eventually produce income; to
qualify for the deduction for carrying charges, the property or
properties purchased for the purpose of producing income must
still be included among the taxpayer's assets the year during
which the taxpayer claims a deduction for them. The evidence
adduced by the appellant established instead that the property
that might have produced income no longer existed in the years at
issue.
[18] Having
regard to the evidence, the appeals must be dismissed.
Signed at
Ottawa, Canada, this 25th day of May 2001.
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified
true on this 14th day of November
2002.
Sophie Debbané,
Revisor
[OFFICIAL
ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
2000-3365(IT)I
BETWEEN:
BENOÎT
BOULIANNE,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY
THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals
heard on April 30, 2001, at Chicoutimi, Quebec, by
the
Honourable Judge Alain Tardif
Appearances
For the
Appellant:
The Appellant himself
Counsel
for the
Respondent:
Stéphanie Côté
JUDGMENT
The appeals from the assessments made under the Income Tax
Act for the 1995, 1996, and 1997 taxation years are dismissed
in accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at
Ottawa, Canada, this 25th day of May 2001.
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified
true on this 14th day of November
2002.
Sophie Debbané,
Revisor
[OFFICIAL
ENGLISH TRANSLATION]