Date: 20010410
Docket: 2000-602-GST-I
BETWEEN:
FRANCES ROSE PANAR,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Sarchuk J.T.C.C.
[1]
This is an appeal by Frances Rose Panar from an assessment dated
April 26, 1999 by virtue of which the Minister of National
Revenue (Minister) denied the Appellant's application for a
rebate of goods and services tax (GST) on the basis that the
application was not filed within four years after the amount of
tax was paid or remitted as required by subsection 261(3) of the
Excise Tax Act (the Act).
[2]
The following facts are not in dispute. A developer leased a
large area of undeveloped property from the University of British
Columbia and improved the property with residential strata units.
Prior to the construction thereof, the developer converted the
leased area into smaller individual stratified leases. In 1995,
the Appellant purchased residential strata unit 207 in the
Chatham Condominium Complex at 5775 Hampton Place, Vancouver and
in doing so, acquired a lease interest by way of an assignment of
one of the stratified leases converted from the developer's
lease with the University. The transaction was completed on March
17, 1995. The price paid by the Appellant was $344,900. In
addition to the foregoing amount, the Appellant paid GST to the
developer in the amount of $14,882.92 (GST of $23,574.40 less a
GST New Housing Rebate of $8,691.48).
[3] A
General Application for Rebate of GST dated November 24 1998 was
filed by the Appellant and received by the Minister on November
27, 1998. This application was denied on the basis that the
Appellant had failed to file the application for rebate within
the time prescribed by the Act that is on or before June
30, 1998.
[4]
The Appellant was represented at the hearing by Barry Brovender
who advised the Court that he did not intend to call any
witnesses and proposed to submit a statement of facts in lieu
thereof. Counsel for the Respondent accepted the facts set out in
the following two paragraphs:
1.
Mrs. Frances Panar is a 79 year old widow. She purchased her
leasehold condominium, unit #207 in The Chatham condominium
complex at 5775 Hampton Place in Vancouver, on March 17, 1995.
Mrs. Panar paid $23,574.40 GST on the purchase of her leasehold
condominium. On May 18,1995 Mrs. Panar received a new home rebate
(DLN 951360084129P) of $8,691.48. The amount of money in dispute
in this appeal is the balance of $14,882.92.
2.
In 1998, Mrs. Panar, aware of the efforts of the Hampton Place
GST Committee, applied for a full GST rebate on the balance owing
of $14,882.92. She received the April 19, 1999 letter denying her
claim and advising her of subsection 261(3) of the Excise Tax
Act. Under the time limits set by section 261(3) of the
Act, Mrs. Panar had 4 years from the time she purchased
her leasehold condominium to apply for a rebate (Section 261 has
since been amended). During this time Mrs. Panar was discouraged
to learn that other leasehold condominium owners at Hampton
Place, who had successfully completed and filed forms for full
GST rebates, were denied full rebates by Revenue Canada.
Legislative Scheme
[5]
The relevant provisions of the Act in effect on November
27, 1998 when the Appellant filed her General Application for
Rebate read as follows:
261(1) Where a person has paid an
amount
(a)
as or on account of, or
(b)
that was taken into account as,
tax, net tax, penalty, interest or other obligation under this
Part in circumstances where the amount was not payable or
remittable by the person, whether the amount was paid by mistake
or otherwise, the Minister shall, subject to subsections (2) and
(3), pay a rebate of that amount to the person.
...
261(3) A rebate in respect of an
amount shall not be paid under subsection (1) to a person unless
the person files an application for the rebate within two years
after the day the amount was paid or remitted by the person.
Subsection 261(3) as it read at that time reflected an
amendment made in 1997 reducing the prior limitation period from
four years to two years. The amendment further provided that:
71(2) Subsection (1)
applies:
(a)
to amounts that, after June 1996 are paid as or on account of, or
are taken into account as tax or other amount payable or
remittable under Part IX of the Act; and
(b)
to amounts that, on or before the last day of that month, were
paid as or on account of, or were taken into account as tax or
other amount payable or remittable under that Part, other than
amounts that are claimed in an application under section 261 of
the Act filed on or before June 30, 1998.[1]
Appellant's position
[6]
In the material produced by Brovender, the following arguments
were advanced on behalf of the Appellant. First, Revenue Canada
was unjustly enriched by the amount of GST collected in error on
the exempt supply of the Appellant's leasehold condominium
because:
(a)
Revenue Canada does not have authority under the Excise Tax
Act to collect GST on an exempt supply;
(b)
From January of 1995, Revenue Canada had continual notice of the
disputed GST payments on the exempt supply of leasehold
condominiums from the Hampton Place residence;
(c)
Revenue Canada litigated the matter beyond the time period
allowed for this Appellant to claim a rebate for the GST
collected in error; and
(d)
Revenue Canada erred in interpreting section 261 of the
Act to apply to an exempt supply collected in error.
[7]
As well, Brovender, who had been present throughout the hearing
of the appeals in Earnshaw and Throness v. The Queen, Alfred
v. The Queen and May v. The Queen[2] asked the Court to consider the
following arguments advanced in those cases and apply them to
this appeal. There was no objection from counsel for the
Respondent.
[8]
The Appellant relies on the decision in Taylor and Redmond v.
The Queen[3] in
which Garon C.J.T.C.C., in identical circumstances, held that the
Appellants' acquisition of their respective residential units
was exempt from tax under Part IX of the Act and that
accordingly, the Minister's assessment to deny them a rebate
of taxes paid in error was vacated. Since this decision was
handed down on July 27, 1998 the Appellant contends that her
right to file a General Application for Rebate was postponed
effective as of that date. In support of this position, it was
submitted that the appropriate interpretation of subsection
261(1) can be ascertained by reading subsections (1) and (3)
together and utilizing subsection (1) in determining what was
meant by the phrase "within two years after the day the
amount was paid or remitted by the person". It was further
submitted that it is necessary to import into the meaning of
subsection (3) the concept of "was not payable or remittable
by the person" from subsection (1). When read in this
fashion and accepting the fact that the Appellant did not learn
that the amount in issue "was not payable" by her until
such time as the Taylor and Redmond decision was handed
down, at that point i.e. July 27, 1998, if the statutory
limitation did in fact apply, she had two years within which to
make her application. The Appellant contends that interpreting
the words referred to in this fashion does not violate the plain
meaning and intent of the statute but interprets the law in a
creative fashion in order to enable the Court to interpret the
relevant sections in a manner which provides relief for the
Appellant.
[9]
In support of this approach to the interpretation of taxing
statutes, reference was made to the decision in Smith Drugs
Ltd. v. M.N.R.[4] wherein Reed J. stated:
With respect to the statements in Fries v. M.N.R., (1990)
114 N.R. 150; 90 DTC 6662 (S.C.C.) and Johns-Manville Canada
Inc. v. M.N.R., (1985) 60 N.R. 244; 85 DTC 5373 (S.C.C.)
which indicate that in cases of uncertainty the taxpayer must be
given the benefit of the doubt, I do not interpret those comments
as in any way resiling from the principle set out in
Stubart. In my view, those cases merely indicate that if
after one has read the relevant statutory provisions of an
Act and read them in light of the purpose and object of
the statute, there is still doubt as to which alternative
interpretation was intended, then, that doubt should be resolved
in favour of the taxpayer, regardless of whether the provision in
question is a charging section or an exemption or deduction
provision.
[10] This
Appellant also adopts the supplementary submissions filed in
May v. The Queen, supra. In that appeal, it was argued
that a reasonable interpretation of subsection 261(3) of the
Act suggests that a person subject to the provisions of
the Act is, in the usual case, aware of a sale of a
taxable supply that did not go through, remained unpaid or was
consumed outside of Canada. In such circumstances, GST would not
be payable and the person would apply for a rebate of GST
remitted on the sale within the limitation period. On the other
hand, a person would not normally know that a rebate of an exempt
supply collected in error by Revenue Canada is possible until a
Court determines that the supply is exempt. In the case of this
Appellant, the determination that the supply of her leasehold
interest was an exempt supply was not made until the Taylor
and Redmond decision which was handed down after the
limitation period had expired. Relying on a recent decision of
the British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA), Hansen v. The
Queen,[5] it
was argued that subsection 261(3) may be interpreted as a
limitation that is procedural in nature because it determines
that a person make the application for a rebate when the person
becomes aware of circumstances in which the GST would not be
payable. In Hansen, the BCCA held that a limitation that
is procedural in nature can be extended by agreement or estoppel.
Thus, the Appellant says, Revenue Canada by accepting that
purchasers were entitled to rebates but only after the
Taylor decision was handed down, effectively agreed to
extend the commencement of the limitation period to the date of
the decision i.e. July 27, 1998.
[11] The
Appellant also contends that the Minister is estopped from
denying her claim for a rebate by asserting that her application
is statute-barred by reason of being out of time. She says
that if her application is in fact statute-barred, her failure to
file within the requisite time was the result of representations
made by the Minister's servants and agents prior to the
expiration of the limitation period with respect to her right to
a general rebate.
Conclusion
The Limitation Period Argument
[12] I have
concluded that the "creative approach" to the
interpretation of subsections 261(1) and (3) of the Act as
proposed by counsel for Vivian M. May, supra, must
be rejected. The intention of Parliament to limit the time period
for the filing of a rebate application has been set out in clear
and unambiguous language. What is being sought by the Appellant
is to have the Court interpret this particular provision to make
it say what she believed would have been said by the legislators
if this particular situation had been before them. When the
meaning is clear, this Court has no jurisdiction to mitigate a
harsh consequence. While this Court may be entitled to construe
the language of an Act of Parliament, it may not distort
it to make it accord with what the Court may think to be
reasonable.[6]
[13] I am also
of the view that the decision in Hansen is distinguishable
both in fact and in law. The issue in that case was whether she
was barred from pursuing a claim for compensation for land taken
for highway purposes by reason of a one-year limitation in
section 25 of the Expropriation Act.[7] The Expropriation Compensation Board
(the Board) held that the Ministry was estopped from relying on
the limitation period. The appeal was from that determination.
The facts in Hansen are that at a meeting between
solicitors in June 1995 the Ministry's negotiator led
Hansen's solicitor to believe that the one-year limitation
period would run from August 8, the possession date, rather than
from July 21, being one year from the date of payment as
stipulated in the relevant provision. MacKenzie J.A. found that
"the representation was unambiguous. It was a representation
of fact. It was intended to be relied upon, and was relied
upon" and held that the Board was correct in its conclusion
that the elements of promissory estoppel were made out. This
decision is of little assistance to the Appellant since the
estoppel as found involved a representation of fact which was
acted on by Hansen to her detriment. That is not the case
in the present appeal where the representations by Gravelle (and
other Revenue Canada officials) were reflective of the
Department's interpretation of the relevant statutory
provisions of the Act.
[14] Relying
specifically on the following comment of MacKenzie J.A. in
Hansen:
Section 25, as well as barring proceedings after the
expiration of one year, deems the owner to have accepted advanced
payment in full settlement, in the absence of a further claim
within time. In my view, that does not extinguish the claim but
simply deems the claim paid. The distinction may be a subtle one,
but I think that the wording of section 25 lays down a limitation
that is procedural in nature which can be extended by agreement
or estoppel.
it was also argued that the limitation in subsection 261(3) of
the Act is procedural in nature and can be extended by
agreement or estoppel. I am unable to agree. First the Appellant
has not made out a case for estoppel. Second, the limitation
period set out in subsection 261(3) of the Act is
substantive in nature and not merely procedural and cannot be
extended. It provides that "a rebate ... shall not be
paid ... unless the person files an application for the
rebate within two years ... ". As counsel for the
Respondent observed, this provision clearly extinguishes all
rights to the rebate. Furthermore, there is no suggestion the
Appellant was incorrectly informed by any Revenue Canada official
of the limitation period for filing a rebate application. Thus it
is difficult to find any basis for the submission made that
Revenue Canada "effectively agreed to extend the limitation
until after the Court decision" in Taylor and
Redmond. Furthermore, even if the Appellant had been able to
establish that Revenue Canada entered into some form of agreement
with her, it would in effect be an agreement to assess tax
otherwise than in accordance with the law and would be an illegal
agreement.[8]
[15] To the
foregoing, I must add that there is no provision in the
Act granting authority to the Minister or providing the
Federal Court or this Court with jurisdiction to waive, extend or
alter the statutory time periods specified in a subsection such
as 261(3).[9]
Estoppel argument
[16] There is
no evidence that any officer or agent of Revenue Canada provided
the Appellant with erroneous information with respect to her
right to a General Rebate. However, by the latter part of 1995,
it was common knowledge amongst all of the people who had
purchased the strata units in issue that Revenue Canada's
position was that they were not entitled to the rebate.
Furthermore, although there is no direct evidence on point, it is
reasonable to infer that the Appellant was aware of this position
and believed that implicit in Revenue Canada's position was
that she should not make an application because it would not be
successful. It is also a fair inference that, like many others,
she acted on it and concluded that making an application would be
a waste of time. Thus, relying on the correctness of the
expressed Revenue Canada position, she failed to submit her
application within the time period prescribed.
[17] Although
it is clear that the Appellant acted to her detriment as a result
of the representations made by Revenue Canada employees as to the
relevant provisions of the Act, she cannot succeed. Issue
estoppel has been considered in a number of cases and the
principle which can be taken therefrom is that no representation
involving an interpretation of law by a servant or officer of the
Crown can bind it. In The Minister of National Revenue v.
Inland Industries Limited,[10] the Supreme Court of Canada considered
certain sections of the Income Tax Act respecting the
deductibility of past service contributions to a pension plan
initially accepted by the Department of National Revenue for
registration but with respect of which deductions were later
refused. Pigeon J. speaking for the Court effectively disposed of
any question of an estoppel by stating:
... However, it seems clear to me that the Minister
cannot be bound by an approval given when the conditions
prescribed by the law were not met.
This principle was applied in Stickel v. M.N.R.[11] by Cattanach J.
who stated:
In short, estoppel is subject to the one general rule that it
cannot override the law of the land.
[18] The
rationale for the principle expressed in these cases was
succinctly summarized by Bowman J. in Goldstein v. The
Queen:[12]
It is sometimes said that estoppel does not lie against the
Crown. The statement is not accurate and seems to stem from a
misapplication of the term estoppel. The principle of estoppel
binds the Crown, as do other principles of law. Estoppel in
pais, as it applies to the Crown, involves representations of
fact made by officials of the Crown and relied and acted on by
the subject to his or her detriment. The doctrine has no
application where a particular interpretation of a statute has
been communicated to a subject by an official of the government,
relied upon by that subject to his or her detriment and then
withdrawn or changed by the government. In such a case a taxpayer
sometimes seeks to invoke the doctrine of estoppel. It is
inappropriate to do so not because such representations give rise
to an estoppel that does not bind the Crown, but rather, because
no estoppel can arise where such representations are not in
accordance with the law. Although estoppel is now a principle of
substantive law it had its origins in the law of evidence and as
such relates to representations of fact. It has no role to play
where questions of interpretation of the law are involved,
because estoppels cannot override the law.
[19] The
question before me is whether the representations made by
officials of Revenue Canada to various strata unit owners with
respect to the taxability of the supply of their units were
representations of fact or law. These representations were in
essence that the acquisition of the strata units was considered
to be a sale and purchase and did not constitute an exempt supply
and as such was properly subject to the 7% GST. In my view, these
representations were not statements of fact but rather were an
opinion as to the appropriate interpretation of the relevant
statutory provisions of the Act. In such circumstances, it
is not open to the Appellant to set up estoppel to preclude the
Minister from relying on the provisions of subsection 261(3) of
the Act to deny her claim for a rebate.
[20] Several
other grounds were pleaded by the Appellant including unjust
enrichment and negligence by and on the part of the Minister and,
relying on the provisions of the Limitation Act of British
Columbia, asserting that her claim was not statute-barred. These
grounds were not pursued.
[21] On August
23, 2000, judgments in Melton v. The Queen and Setton
v. The Queen[13] were rendered. These cases involved issues
identical to those in the Panar appeal. In both Melton and
Setton, the Court relying on subsection 43(c) of
the Interpretation Act[14] and the Ontario Court of Appeal's
interpretation of a similar section of the Ontario
Interpretation Act in the case of Re Falconbridge
Nickel Mines Ltd. v. Minister of Revenue for Ontario,[15] the Court concluded
that:
... The mere fact that the Appellants had purchased their
condominium units during the time former subsection 261(3) of the
Act was enforced and had erroneously overpaid GST,
entitled them to a right to claim refunds within the four-year
period. The Minister had a duty to refund those amounts even if
the application was considered late pursuant to the amended
subsection 261(3). The Appellants had an accrued right or an
accruing right to the monies held by the Minister until the
four-year period expired.
Parliament has not specifically eliminated the accrued right
of taxpayers who fell within the four-year limitation period of
the former subsection 261(3) of the Act. Immediately after
the amendment came into force each of the Appellants still
possessed an accrued right to file the application for the GST
rebate and to receive the refund. Their right to a refund would
have expired at the end of the four-year period.
Since this issue had not been raised in the course of the
present appeal, both parties were permitted to present further
submissions. The Appellant made no further submissions and is
content to rely on the decision in Melton and
Setton. The Respondent's position is that Parliament
explicitly expressed "a contrary intention" to the
operation of subsection 43(c) of the Interpretation
Act through the amending legislation, i.e. subsection 261(3)
of the Act.
[23] More
specifically, counsel for the Respondent contends that
subsection 261(3) was amended by S.C. 1997, c. 10, s. 71
(the "Amending Statute"). This statute implemented
measures proposed in a Notice of Ways and Means Motion tabled on
April 23, 1996. Subsection 71(1) of the Amending Statute had the
effect of reducing the time period within which one must apply
for a rebate of GST paid in error from four years to two years.
Subsection 71(2) dealt with the application of this amendment.
That provision reads as follows:
71(2) Subsection (1)
applies
to amounts that, after June 1996, are paid as or on account
of, or are taken into account as, tax or other amount payable or
remittable under Part IC of the Act; and
(b)
to amounts that, on or before the last day of that month, were
paid as or on account of, or were taken into account as, tax or
other amount payable or remittable under that Part, other than
amounts that are claimed in an application under section 261 of
the Act filed on or before June 30, 1998.
The Respondent argues that Parliament provided a complete code
for the enactment of the amendment through paragraphs
71(2)(a) and (b). These two paragraphs cover all
possible time periods in which a taxpayer may have paid amounts
as GST in error. Paragraph (a) provides that the Amending
Statute applies where amounts are mistakenly collected as GST
after June 30, 1996. Paragraph (b) addressed the
application of the amendment to amounts that are mistakenly
collected as GST before the end of June 1996. Thus, the
Respondent argues the plain language of paragraph (b)
makes it clear that, under certain circumstances, the amendment
is indeed to apply to amounts paid before the end of June 1996.
Specifically, the amendment is said to apply to these amounts
unless an application for rebate is filed before the end of June
1998. Parliament has expressed an intent to have the amendment
apply to certain amounts even if those amounts were paid prior to
the announcement of the pending amendment as in the case of the
Appellant. It is therefore submitted that Parliament has made an
explicit choice to extinguish any accrued rights which may have
existed under the previous wording of subsection 261(3).
[24] The
Respondent further argued that the fact Parliament has explicitly
set out how each and every transaction involving GST paid in
error is to be handled in light of the amendment, whether the
payment was made before or after June30, 1996, leaves no room for
operation of paragraph 43(c) of the Interpretation
Act. As Parliament has expressed an intent contrary to that
of paragraph 43(c), the Respondent submits that subsection
3(1) operates to exclude the amendment from the effects of
paragraph 43(c). It is further submitted by the Respondent
that to give effect to paragraph 43(c) would be contrary
to the express intent of Parliament and therefore contrary to
subsection 3(1) of the Interpretation Act.
Analysis
[25] The
interaction of paragraph 43(c) and subsection 3(1) of the
Interpretation Act were considered in the case of Esso
Resources Canada Limited v. The Queen.[16] In that case, federal legislation
taxing natural gas and gas liquids allowed for a refund on the
tax paid in certain circumstances. The taxpayer purchased
quantities of natural gas liquids and used it for a permissible
purpose during the period May 24, 1985 to December 31, 1985.
Amending legislation repealed the excise tax on natural gas
liquids as of March 4, 1986. On December 1, 1986, the
taxpayer applied for a refund of the tax which had been paid
pursuant to the Act. The Minister rejected the application
arguing that the relevant sections of the Excise Tax Act
had been repealed. The appeal of the taxpayer was allowed. Reed
J. found that the taxpayer had made an overpayment by virtue of
the fact the tax was paid on a tax-exempt commodity. After
concluding that the Plaintiff in that case had a right accrued or
accruing to the monies held by the Defendant, Reed J. observed at
pages 6476-77:
A more difficult problem, however, is the argument that
Parliament intentionally wiped out that accrued right by enacting
the March 4, 1986 legislation. This argument is based on the fact
that Parliament repealed not only the changing sections of Part V
but also the refund provisions found in paragraph
68(1)(g). While section 43(c) of the
Interpretation Act provides that repealing legislation
does not affect accrued or accruing rights, that provision only
operates where a contrary intention does not appear in the
statute (see subsection 3(1) of that Act). Also, even
if the Members of Parliament and the government did not intend,
in a subjective sense, to make the gas in question taxable, if
the express words of the statute so provide (even though those
words were enacted through inadvertence) then those words must be
given effect. If there is an express repeal of the right which
had accrued to the plaintiff, then it must be left to Parliament
to enact legislation to correct the error if it was his to do
so. I would note that I have been given no rational
explanation as to why Parliament, in repealing the Natural Gas
and Gas Liquids Tax, might intend to turn gas which had
previously been tax exempt into a taxed commodity.
There is no express repeal of the plaintiff's accrued
right, in the sense of a provision stating "after June 1,
1985 no refunds of tax collected . . . will be payable". Can
one say that such repeal occurred, however, as a matter of
necessary implication? I do not think that any conclusion in
this regard can be drawn from the fact that the amendment of
March 4, 1986 was made retroactive to June 1, 1985. I find
nothing in that retroactivity which, by itself, would lead
necessarily to the conclusion that accrued rights existing on
March 4, 1986 were intended to be revoked. This in part
arises from the fact that the tax-exempt status under the terms
of the legislation related back to the date of the imposition of
the tax. Also, as of March 4, 1986, everything had been done by
the plaintiff (except for the filing of an application) to
entitle it to a refund and there was no express repeal of that
right. The argument that Parliament intended as a matter of
necessary implication to repeal the plaintiff's right is
based solely on the fact that the authority in paragraph
68(1)(g) to make a refund in the case of Part V taxes was
repealed. I am not willing to conclude, however, that the repeal
of paragraph 68(1)(g) indicates that Parliament intended,
as a matter of necessary implication, to repeal the
plaintiff's accrued rights. At most it may have inadvertently
repealed the refund mechanism and thereby made the right
unenforceable, although I do not think this is the case.
[26] I am
satisfied that contrary to the situation in Esso
Resources, such a provision does exist in the present
appeal. Subsection 71(1) of the Amending Statute amends
subsection 261(3) of the Act to read: "a rebate
... shall not be paid ... unless the person files an
application for the rebate within two years ...".
Paragraph 71(2)(b) goes on to provide that the
amendment to subsection 261(3) of the Act applies to
situations where GST was paid in error prior to the end of June
1996 and no application was filed by the end of June 1998. These
provisions, in my view, read together constitute in clear and
unambiguous terms the express "contrary intention" that
was found lacking in Esso Resources.
[27] The
decision in Falconbridge Nickel Mines is distinguishable
since the Ontario Court of Appeal made no reference to any
statutory provisions which in any sense could be considered to be
as the expression of a contrary intent by the provincial
legislature. As well, the Ontario Court of Appeal spoke of the
facts in Falconbridge Nickel Mines as being "unusual
circumstances", recognizing that prior to the amendment no
limitation period whatsoever existed in respect of the
application for rebate in question. That Court also recognized
that the amendment allowed for no transitionary period after the
amendment and thus, if a taxpayer was beyond the limitation
period at the time the amendment was brought into force, then it
immediately lost all ability to apply for a rebate. In those
circumstances, the Court found that a right had accrued to make
the application. This situation as well is distinguishable since
the amendment of subsection 261(3) did nothing more than shorten
an existing limitation period. Furthermore, the amendment statute
did in fact provide for a period of transition in that a taxpayer
was entitled to rely upon the previous four-year time limit as
long as the application was submitted by the end of June 1998.
Thus, if at the time of the amendment a person was beyond the two
years but was within the four years of the date GST was paid in
error, that person would still have up to two years within which
the application should be submitted. This not only distinguishes
the situation in Falconbridge but is also evidence of the
fact that Parliament structured the amendment in issue in a
manner intended to address all possible factual scenarios and
leave no room for the continuation of accrued rights. Parliament
is not to be presumed to enact legislation without force and
effect.[17] The
existence of an accrued right to the four-year time limit cannot
be reconciled with the wording of paragraph 71(2)(b) of
the amending statute. Accordingly, in circumstances where no
section 261 application for rebate had been filed prior to the
end of June 1998, as is the case in the present appeal, the
amended two-year time limit must be applied. The appeal is
dismissed.
Signed at Winnipeg, Manitoba, this 10th day of April,
2001.
"A.A. Sarchuk"
J.T.C.C.
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