Date: 20010406
Docket: 98-2448-IT-G
BETWEEN:
JOHN DISBROWE,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Motion heard on February 13, 2001 at Toronto, Ontario by the
Honourable Judge Terrence O'Connor
Counsel for the
Appellant:
Sergio Grillone
Counsel for the
Respondent:
David W. Chodikoff
Order and Reasons for Order
[1]
On February 5, 2001 Counsel for the Appellant filed a Notice of
Motion to have the costs of this appeal awarded to the Appellant
on a solicitor and client basis or alternatively to have the
amounts provided for in Schedule 2 of Tariff B of the Tax
Court of Canada Rules ("Rules") increased.
The grounds for the Motion are as follows:
1.
On or about September 23, 1998, Disbrowe filed a Notice of Appeal
with respect to an assessment of his 1995 Income Tax Return. The
Notice of Assessment would have required Disbrowe to pay capital
gain tax on $150,000.
2.
On or about May 5, 1999, Disbrowe offered to settle the
outstanding appeal in writing on the basis of a 65% and 35% split
of the shares. This offer was not accepted by Revenue Canada.
3.
Disbrowe's offer to settle was reiterated on or about
May 31, 2000 by way of written correspondence.
4.
Disbrowe was entirely successful on the appeal, awarded his costs
and beat his Offer to Settle.
5.
The amounts at issue are substantial to the Appellant.
6.
The amounts at issue are of great importance to the
Appellant's financial situation.
7.
The appeal was complex and led to a great volume of work and
additional expense for the Appellant.
8.
The Department of Justice solicitor Mr. Ghan ("Ghan")
acted in a most unprofessional manner. He was rude and abusive
towards Disbrowe, and acted throughout in a vexatious and
improper manner, which unduly lengthen [sic] the hearing of the
appeal, which caused additional hardship and expense for
Disbrowe.
9.
Sections 147, 150, 151, 153 to 154, 157 and 158 of the Tax
Court of Canada Rules.
[2]
Section 147 of the Rules provides as follows:
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147. (1)
Subject to the provisions of the Act, the Court shall have
full discretionary power over the payment of the costs of
all parties involved in any proceeding, the amount and
allocation of those costs and determining the persons by
whom they are to be paid.
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(2) Costs may be awarded to or against the Crown.
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(3) In exercising its discretionary power pursuant to
subsection (1) the Court may consider,
(a) the result of the proceeding,
(b) the amounts in issue,
(c) the importance of the issues,
(d) any offer of settlement made in writing,
(e) the volume of work,
(f) the complexity of the issues,
(g) the conduct of any party that tended to
shorten or to lengthen unnecessarily the duration of the
proceeding,
(h) the denial or the neglect or refusal of any
party to admit anything that should have been admitted,
(i) whether any stage in the proceedings was,
(i) improper, vexatious, or unnecessary, or
(ii) taken through negligence, mistake or
excessive caution,
(j) any other matter relevant to the question of
costs.
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(4) The Court may fix all or part of the costs with or
without reference to Schedule II, Tariff B and, further, it
may award a lump sum in lieu of or in addition to any taxed
costs.
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(5) Notwithstanding any other provision in these rules,
the Court has the discretionary power,
(a) to award or refuse costs in respect of a
particular issue or part of a proceeding,
(b) to award a percentage of taxed costs or award
taxed costs up to and for a particular stage of a
proceeding, or
(c) to award all or part of the costs on a
solicitor and client basis.
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(6) The Court may give directions to the taxing officer
and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the
Court in any particular proceeding may give directions,
(a) respecting increases over the amounts
specified for the items in Schedule II, Tariff B,
(b) respecting services rendered or disbursements
incurred that are not included in Schedule II,
Tariff B, and
(c) to permit the taxing officer to consider
factors other than those specified in section 154 when the
costs are taxed.
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As a result of the foregoing section, the Court has discretion
with respect to costs.
[3]
Costs on a solicitor and client basis are rarely awarded. In
essence they apply only to extreme cases of misbehaviour of some
sort, either by the litigants or by counsel. Parties to
litigation must recognize that the Tariff costs will not fully
compensate the successful litigant. In my opinion, both counsel
of record in this appeal in essence carried on a "cat
fight" to use the expression used by Judge Bonner in the
hearing of the two Motions mentioned later.
[4] I
have carefully considered the Appellant's Motion Record, the
Respondent's Motion Record and the Respondent's Book of
Authorities. In reaching the conclusion below I have considered
the following factors provided for in section 147(3) of the
Rules, namely:
(a)
the result of the proceeding;
(b)
the amounts in issue;
(c)
the importance of the issues;
(d)
any offer of settlement made in writing;
(e)
the volume of work; and
(f)
the complexity of the issues.
My order is as follows:
1.
Costs are not to be awarded on a solicitor and client basis.
2.
Considering the foregoing factors and in particular the
importance of the issues, the complexity of the issues and most
significantly the offer of settlement made in writing by the
Appellant dated May 5, 1999 and reiterated in writing May 31,
2000 which, if accepted would have avoided this acrimonious
appeal, I consider it reasonable to increase the Appellant's
costs over the Tariff.
[5] I
believe a fair award of costs to the Appellant is to award costs
in accordance with Schedule 2 of Tariff B, plus a flat amount of
$7,000 over and above the Tariff amounts plus all allowable
disbursements.
[6]
Counsel for the Respondent submits that the costs to be awarded
to the Respondent on the Motions dated August 18, 2000 and
September 1, 2000, wherein Bonner, J. granted costs to the
Respondent, should be fixed at $1,000. I agree that that is a
fair and reasonable amount. Therefore the costs awarded above to
the Appellant are to be reduced by $1,000.
[7]
Counsel for the Respondent also made efforts to cross-examine
Michael J. Buccioni on his Affidavit in support of the
Motion for increased costs. Considering that I have based my
decision on the factors cited above, and not on the improper
conduct of any parties or their Counsel, there is no need for the
said cross-examination.
[8]
In conclusion, the Motion for increased costs dated February 5,
2001 is allowed to the foregoing extent with costs on a party and
party basis with respect to that Motion.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 6th day of April,
2001.
"T. O'Connor"
J.T.C.C.