Date:
20010403
Docket:
98-1040-U-I
BETWEEN:
ASHRAF
MIA,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER
OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
Reasons
for Judgment
Charron,
D.J.T.C.C.
[1]
This appeal was heard at Montréal, Quebec, on December 13,
2000, to determine whether the appellant held insurable
employment within the meaning of the Unemployment Insurance
Act ("the Act") from June 18, 1996, to
September 5, 1997, when he worked for Khullar Gourmet Foods Ltd.
("the payer").
[2]
By letter dated August 4, 1998, the respondent informed the
appellant that his employment was not insurable because there was
no employer-employee relationship between the payer and him
during the period at issue.
The
facts
[3]
The facts on which the respondent relied in making his decision
are set out as follows in paragraph 5 of the Reply to the Notice
of Appeal:
[TRANSLATION]
(a)
During the period at issue, the appellant was a citizen of
Bangladesh and a foreign worker in Canada. (admitted)
(b)
The appellant is subject to immigration laws, which require
foreigners to obtain an employment authorization in order to be
allowed to work in Canada. (admitted)
(c)
The appellant obtained an initial open Canadian employment
authorization from Employment and Immigration Canada for the
period from January 17 to June 17, 1996.
(admitted)
(d)
The appellant obtained a second Canadian employment authorization
that was valid for the period from November 21, 1997, to November
20, 1998. (admitted)
(e)
During the period at issue, the appellant worked for the payer
without an employment authorization issued by Employment and
Immigration Canada. (admitted)
(f)
The appellant cannot be considered to have been an
"employee" or to have entered into a valid contract of
service with the payer during the period at issue.
(denied)
[4]
The appellant admitted the truth of
all the subparagraphs of paragraph 5 of the Reply to the
Notice of Appeal except that which he denied, as indicated in
parentheses at the end of each subparagraph.
Ashraf
Mia's testimony
[5]
This individual is an actuary/accountant by profession. He
arrived in Canada in July 1993 as a political Convention refugee
(Exhibit A-1). He claimed political refugee status on April
16, 1996, and the Convention Refugee Determination Division found
him to be a Convention refugee on April 18, 1996. He did not
speak French and was not acquainted with our system. Everything
was new for him, and he knew no one here except a few people from
his community. He thought that, once accepted, foreigners did not
require an employment authorization. He soon learned that he had
to apply for permanent resident status, but he did not know that
he had to renew his employment authorization. He discovered that
this was required but the authorization had been expired for a
year before he made another application. He spent the following
winter in great poverty, since he did not have any work to
support himself nor was he able to draw any unemployment
insurance benefits.
[6]
To cap it all, there was a mail strike at the time, and he did
not receive the employment authorization for the period from
November 21, 1997, to November 20, 1998, until two
months after applying for a new authorization. The appellant
honestly believed that he had such an authorization from January
17 to June 17, 1996, as can be seen from Exhibit I-1. His
close friends told him that, now that he was a plain and simple
refugee, he was [translation] "like
other people: you can work, you don't have any worries like
before when you didn't have any papers and all that".
The document filed as Exhibit I-1, entitled
"Employment Authorization", is illegible in some
places, but its import seems to be: "This document does not
confer any status." The appellant received no letter
informing him that his employment authorization had
expired.
Lyne
St-Jacques's testimony
[7]
Ms. St-Jacques is a customer services officer at Human
Resources Development Canada, Employment Insurance. Her work
involves seeing clients who want to receive employment insurance
benefits. She met the appellant in the course of her work and
asked him why he did not have an employment authorization for the
period at issue. He answered that he had forgotten to take care
of it: [translation] "Even though
he'd just received another employment authorization for the
periods after the periods we needed, and even though for welfare
he needed a letter stating that he could not qualify because of
the missing employment authorization".
Lorraine
Pilon's testimony
[8]
Ms. Pilon was a legislative interpretation officer at Revenue
Canada, Insurability. She contacted the appellant on February 10,
1998, and asked him whether he had worked without an employment
authorization during the period at issue, and he told her that he
had. She asked him why he had no authorization, and he told her:
[translation] "It was an
oversight." The appellant worked without an authorization
for more than a year.
Analysis of the facts in relation to the
Act
[9]
During the period at issue, the appellant was a citizen of
Bangladesh and a foreign worker in Canada. As such, he was
subject to immigration laws and regulations, which require
foreigners to obtain an employment authorization in order to be
allowed to work in Canada. The appellant obtained an initial
authorization for the period from January 17 to June 17, 1996,
and another authorization for the period from November 21, 1997,
to November 20, 1998, but he did not have one from June 18, 1996,
to November 20, 1997, while he was working for the payer.
The respondent decided that the appellant could not be considered
to have been an employee or to have entered into a contract of
employment with the payer. Indeed, section 18 of the
Immigration Regulations, 1978 reads as follows:
18.
(1) Subject to subsection 19(1), no
person, other than a Canadian citizen or permanent resident,
shall engage or continue in employment in Canada without a valid
and subsisting employment authorization.
(2)
No person who is in possession of a valid and subsisting
employment authorization shall continue in employment in Canada
unless he complies with each of the terms and conditions
specified in the authorization.
[10]
Relying on Still v. M.N.R., [1998] 1 F.C. 549, the
appellant argued that he was in good faith. The good faith
principle was laid down by the Federal Court of Appeal in
Still in November 1997. Ms. Still had immigrated to
Ontario, Canada and applied for permanent resident status. On
September 22, 1991, she was provided with the following document
by officials from the Canadian Department of Citizenship and
Immigration:
This will
verify that, for the person(s) named hereunder, a recommendation
has been sent to the Governor-in-Council for Canada for an
exemption pursuant to subsection 114(2) of the Immigration
Act
KATHLEEN
STILL
Pending
Governor-in-Council approval and provided all other requirements
are met, the above-named will be granted permanent resident
status in Canada. The above-named is/are hereby eligible to apply
for employment and/or student authorizations, as
applicable.
[11] Ms.
Still took that document to mean that she was entitled, at that
point and without further action on her part, to work in
Canada.
[12] In the
instant case, the appellant knew or ought to have known that he
needed a valid and subsisting employment authorization to engage
and continue in employment in Canada. As in Polat v.
M.N.R. (December 4, 1997, A-31-97 (F.C.A.) and March 17,
1998, 96-402(UI) (T.C.C.)), the appellant had already obtained an
employment authorization in the past. The fact that he obtained
an initial employment authorization is significant because it
indicates that he knew that when it expired he would have to
obtain a new one before engaging or continuing in employment.
Moreover, he admitted that he neglected to obtain another
authorization during the period at issue.
[13] In
addition, the respondent argued that, under Quebec civil law, the
question of good faith or bad faith is not relevant in
determining whether a contract of employment prohibited by
statute is null in the context of unemployment insurance
proceedings. In Still, supra, the Federal Court of
Appeal issued the following caution: "we cannot lose sight
of the fact that cases originating from Quebec are to be decided
under the illegality provisions found within the Civil Code of
Québec".
[14] The
relevant provisions of the Civil Code are as
follows:
1412
C.C.Q. The object of a contract is the juridical operation
envisaged by the parties at the time of its formation, as it
emerges from all the rights and obligations created by the
contract.
1413
C.C.Q. A contract whose object is prohibited by law or
contrary to public order is null.
1417
C.C.Q. A contract is absolutely null where the condition
of formation sanctioned by its nullity is necessary for the
protection of the general interest.
1418
C.C.Q. The absolute nullity of a contract may be invoked
by any person having a present and actual interest in doing so;
it is invoked by the court of its own motion.
A contract
that is absolutely null may not be confirmed.
1422
C.C.Q. A contract that is null is deemed never to have
existed.
In such a
case, each party is bound to restore to the other the prestations
he has received.
[15] One of
the essential conditions for the validity of a contract is the
existence of an object that is not prohibited by law or contrary
to public order. The Civil Code recognizes that a contract
whose object is prohibited by law or contrary to public order is
null and void. It explicitly provides that a contract is absolutely null where the
condition of formation sanctioned by its nullity is necessary for
the protection of the general interest, and it adds that a
contract that is absolutely null may not be confirmed.
[16] In his
work entitled Les Obligations, Mr. Justice Jean-Louis
Baudouin states that [translation]
"the unlawful nature of the object is penalized by absolute
nullity since public order is at stake". In Saravia v.
101482 Canada inc., [1987] R.J.Q. 2658, the Provincial
Court ruled as follows: "theImmigration Act, 1976 is
a statute of public order, and a contract, knowingly or not, made
in breach of one or many of its sections will be void and
null."
[17] The
Immigration Act is a statute of public order that seeks to
protect the general interest. It is aimed at regulating who may
come into and remain in Canada.
[18] Thus,
under the civil law in force in Quebec, a contract of employment
entered into, whether in good faith or in bad faith, by a person
who is not a Canadian citizen or permanent resident and who does
not have a valid employment authorization is null and void
(Saad v. M.N.R., July 9, 1997, 96-1719(UI) (T.C.C.), and
Kante v. M.N.R., May 23, 1997, 94-1056(UI) and
95-1153(UI) (T.C.C.)).
[19]
Whether under the common law principle laid down in Still,
supra, and applied in Polat, supra, or under
the Civil Code of Québec, the contract of
employment entered into by the appellant and the payer for the
period at issue is null.
[20] It was
up to the appellant to prove that he had a valid employment
authorization, and he failed to do so.
[21]
Therefore, the appeal is
dismissed and the Minister's decision confirmed.
Signed at
Ottawa, Canada, this 3rd day of April 2001.
D.J.T.C.C.
Translation
certified true on this 30th day of September
2002.
Erich Klein,
Revisor
[OFFICIAL
ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
98-1040(UI)
BETWEEN:
ASHRAF
MIA,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER
OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
Appeal heard
on December 13, 2000, at Montréal, Quebec, by
the
Honourable Deputy Judge G. Charron
Appearances
Counsel for
the
Appellant:
Gilbert Nadon
Counsel for
the
Respondent:
Vlad Zolia
JUDGMENT
The appeal is dismissed and the Minister's decision confirmed
in accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at
Ottawa, Canada, this 3rd day of April 2001.
D.J.T.C.C.
Translation
certified true on this 30th day of September
2002.
Erich Klein,
Revisor
[OFFICIAL
ENGLISH TRANSLATION]