Date: 20010222
Docket: 1999-5020-IT-I
BETWEEN:
TERESA, EYNAN
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Lamarre Proulx, J.T.C.C.
[1]
This is an appeal by way of the informal procedure concerning the
1992 to the 1995 taxation years.
[2]
The questions at issue are whether the Appellant is entitled to:
a) an allowable business investment loss regarding an alleged
capital loss incurred in the years 1992 and 1993; and
b) business losses for the years 1992 to 1995 regarding a
work carried on as a hostess at the Dome Stadium.
[3]
The assumptions of fact made by the Minister of National Revenue
(the "Minister") in reassessing the Appellant are
described at paragraph 6 of the Reply to the Notice of
Appeal (the "Reply") as follows:
(a)
the Appellant stated that she invested $40,000 in horses with
Silver Unicorn Inc. and the company was bankrupt;
(b)
the Appellant claimed an allowable business investment loss (the
"ABIL") in the amounts of $20,162 and $7,401 in the
1992 and 1993 taxation years, respectively but the Minister
denied her claim on a basis that the Appellant failed to provide
documentation such as share certificates, contractual agreements
or correspondences from Silver Unicorn to support her claim;
(c)
at all relevant times, the Appellant was not
self-employed;
(d)
the T4 slips were issued by Dome Stadium Hostessing Services Inc.
("Dome") to the Appellant for the years in
question;
(e)
Dome's response on September 1, 1998 to our
questionnaire indicates that the Appellant was hired by them as
an employee only, and she did not earn commission income nor was
she required to incur any business expenses on behalf of her
employer;
(f)
the Appellant was not able to provide a T2200 to support that she
was required to incur expenses on behalf of her employer;
(g)
no contract was provided to support the allegation that the
Appellant was hired on a contract basis with Dome;
(h)
the Appellant was not required to work away from her
employer's place of business;
(i)
the Appellant was not eligible for employment expense deductions
during the 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 taxation years as she was
not required to incur any expenses for her employer;
[4]
In the Notice of Appeal, the only ground of appeal was that the
Minister's agents had not been objective in their review and
had not taken into account the documentation that had been
provided to them. At the time of the hearing, the Appellant's
representative presented to the Court a written statement. I will
quote the last two paragraphs:
The matter before the Court today is one of circumstances and
we will prove to the Court that these expenses were incurred. The
expenses incurred were not personal or living expenses but were
incurred to earn income.
The investments were made on trust. This trust was abused and
created severe financial and emotional hardships, including
marital. As for her part time job, to the best of her knowledge,
it was as and when available - commission basis. Again,
these are matters of circumstances, and in part based on
trust.
[5]
The Appellant testified that on the advice of a person whom she
trusted, Nadir S. Zulqernain, on December 9, 1988,
she borrowed money from a bank to invest in Silver Unicorn Inc.
the amount of $40,000. She produced as Exhibit A-1 a
faded photocopy of a personal cheque made to the order of Silver
Unicorn Inc. There is no document showing the receipt of this
payment. Attached to the cheque, are the advertising sheets of a
few related corporations about the purchase of Egyptian Arabian
horses. (Silver Unicorn Inc. seems to have been a subsidiary of
Smart Financial Services Inc. SMART was an acronym for Save Money
and Reduce Taxes).
[6]
Previously, in 1986, she had made an investment on the advice of
that same person in the amount of $35,000
(Exhibit A-2). This investment appears to have been in
mutual funds. According to the Appellant, this investment
generated good results.
[7]
Documents and letters from SMART to the Appellant were produced
as Exhibit A-4. On reading these documents, it would
appear that the Appellant had purchased horses or rather acquired
partial ownership of them and that the registration of these
horses remained in the name of Silver Unicorn Inc. That same
company was authorized to act on her behalf to monitor the board
and care of the horses and to trade them when appropriate. For
example, Exhibit A-9 is an invoice from Silver Unicorn Inc. for
the insurance and board of a horse, "La Rasmonique."
There is no evidence of purchase of shares.
[8]
Exhibit A-11 is a form filled by Silver Unicorn
International Inc. for the Ontario Securities Commission. This is
Form 20. It is dated January 13, 1992. The person acting as agent
was Nadir S. Zulqernain. The description of the
securities traded are: 16 1/16th interests of a Syndicated
holding of a pool of 19 Straight Egyptian Arabian Horses.
[9]
Schedule A to the form gives the names and addresses of
purchasers. There are nine individuals who have purchased one
unit for $45,000 and the 10th individual is
Nadir S. Zulqernain for 15 units at a cost of $675,000.
The name of the Appellant does not appear. She could not explain
why her name did not appear on the schedule.
[10] There is
a memorandum from Mr. Zulqernain to the Appellant, dated
July 15, 1991. It reads in part as follows:
...
Dear Theresa,
Following our previous conversations, I am now in a position
to provide you with some more specifics. It may be possible to
liquidate your horse ownership for a total amount of $34,000 with
the first payment being $14,000 and two subsequent payments of
$10,000 each commencing from August 15th. Each payment will
be made 45 days apart, i.e. August 15th,
September 30th and November 15th. These payments would
be net to you of any expenses. If this is acceptable to you,
please confirm to me in writing so I may proceed. Please note,
that this is not a confirmed offer but once I have your written
approval, I will then confirm to you upon other requirements
having been completed.
To draw comparison as to the outcome of this investment,
please note that a total of $33,750 was invested at the end of
1988. You have been charged a total of $5,550 in insurance, board
& care, and other related costs, making your total "out
of pocket" cost to be $39,300. You have been paid $2,275
from the proceeds of one of the sales and you have deducted
$23,750 which represents at least $9,500 in tax savings. Thus,
making your net return from this investment of $11,775 which
makes it a return of approximately 30% over a period of 2 years.
In these very difficult times and economic complications, I would
humbly suggest that this is pretty good.
...
[11] This
letter is confirmed by the balance sheet for the years 1989 to
1991 established by Silver Unicorn for the purposes of
determining the losses to be claimed by the Appellant for the
maintenance of the horses.
[12]
Exhibit A-6 is a letter to Nadir S. Zulqernain from
the Appellant asking for a repayment of the amount invested. It
is dated July 25, 1991. She mentioned that she was ready to
accept $34,000 on the total amount of $40,000
(Exhibit A-6). The Appellant also said that, in the
year 1992, Mr. Zulqernain would have told her that he had
changed her investment into shares.
[13] The
Appellant produced as Exhibit A-8 two newspaper
clippings. One of them reads as follows:
Horse dealer fined $50,000 by OSC for illegal
trading
An Ontario horse dealer has been slapped by the Ontario
Securities Commission with one of the largest-ever fines for a
single violation of the Securities Act.
The commission has convicted Nadir Zulqernain of illegally
selling interests in straight Egyptian-Arabian horses in
December, 1988.
His company, Silver Unicorn Inc., pleaded guilty to trading in
securities without being registered to do so and was fined
$50,000.
Zulqernain pleaded guilty to being a Silver Unicorn officer and
director who permitted the illegal trading of securities. He too
was fined $50,000.
David Lang, a lawyer with the OSC, said approximately 85
investors put a total of $4.7 million dollars into the
securities, which enabled them to own a piece of horseflesh.
[14] She
produced as Exhibit A-10 the Certificate of Status of
Silver Unicorn Inc., dated December 5, 2000. It states that
this corporation came into existence April 6, 1988 and had
not been dissolved. It has received a Notice of Intention to
Dissolve and is subject to cancellation.
[15] Regarding
the Appellant's claim for business losses, the Appellant
produced as Exhibit A-13 the agreement between herself
and the Dome Stadium Hostessing Services Inc. dated July 3,
1992. She was paid on an hourly basis and she kept her tips.
Deductions were made at source and a percentage for vacations was
paid. At the time of the hearing, there was no representation
made by the Appellant or her representative that this was not an
employment agreement. The only expense the Appellant thought of
that was related to the work was the uniforms. In the expense
accounts produced as Exhibit A-14, the Appellant could not point
to that item.
[16] The
expenses described for each of the years under appeal, that is
1992 to 1996, the expenses are described in the same manner:
Accounting, Legal and Collections; Adv & Prom. Rd. Ex.;
Meals, Hotel, etc.; Bank charges and interest; Administation,
General & Office; Auto. Exp. Repairs, Rentals, Ins., Fuel;
Telephone.
[17] For the
years under appeal, the Appellant earned the income and claimed
the expenses in the following amounts: 1992, income $2,998,
expenses, $3,456; 1993, income $5,118, expenses $5,321; 1994,
income $4,490, expenses $4,710; and 1995, income $6,335, expenses
$6,604.
[18] The
Appellant's representative submitted that the Appellant had
borrowed money for the purpose of earning income and that she had
incurred expenses for the purpose of her work. The
Appellant's representative did not refer the Court to any
section of the Income Tax Act
(the "Act") pursuant to which he was
claiming the deductions.
[19] Counsel
for the Respondent submitted that what appears to have been
claimed is an allowable business investment loss and that the
conditions attached to such a claim were not fulfilled. She
referred to paragraph 39(1)(c) of the Act:
For the purposes of this Act,
...
(c)
a taxpayer's business investment loss for a taxation year
from the disposition of any property is the amount, if any, by
which the taxpayer's capital loss for the year from a
disposition after 1977
(i)
to which subsection 50(1) applies, or
(ii)
to a person with whom the taxpayer was dealing at arm's
length
of any property that is
(iii) a
share of the capital stock of a small business corporation,
or
(iv) a
debt owing to the taxpayer by a Canadian-controlled private
corporation (other than, where the taxpayer is a corporation, a
debt owing to it by a corporation with which it does not deal at
arm's length) that is
(A) a
small business corporation,
(B) a
bankrupt (within the meaning assigned by subsection 128(3)) that
was a small business corporation at the time it last became a
bankrupt, or
(C) a
corporation referred to in section 6 of the Winding-up Act that
was insolvent (within the meaning of that Act) and was a small
business corporation at the time a winding-up order under that
Act was made in respect of the corporation,
exceeds the total of
[20] With
respect to the expenses claimed against the employment income she
referred to section 8 of the Act. She stated that
this being the only provision of the Act regarding the
deductions allowed against the employment income, the expenses
claimed by the Appellant must come within their scope. She
submitted that none of the expenses came within that
provision.
[21] Counsel
for the Respondent referred to two decisions of this Court,
Gaskell v. R., [2000] 2 C.T.C. 2726 and Kornelow
v. M.N.R., [1991] 1 C.T.C. 2403. From the decision of
Gaskell (supra) she referred to paragraphs 18
to 20 as follows:
18
However, the appellant claimed more than a capital loss. He
claimed the loss he incurred on his advances for the project as
an allowable business investment loss ("ABIL").
19
The appellant had the burden of showing that he had incurred an
ABIL within the meaning of paragraph 39(1)(c) of the
Act, which reads:
...
20
Among other conditions he was required to meet, the appellant had
to show that he incurred a loss from a disposition of a share of
the capital stock of a small business corporation or of a debt
owing to him by a Canadian-controlled private corporation. None
of this was proven by the appellant as there was no evidence
adduced on that particular issue. The appellant put the money
into the project but he has not established that the loan was
made to a corporation of the type described above. The appellant,
therefore, is not entitled to an allowable business investment
loss for 1992.
[22] From the
decision of Kornelow (supra) she referred to
paragraphs 5 and 6:
5
With respect to the deductions for allowable business investment
losses that are still in dispute the onus is on the appellant to
establish that the reassessments in this regard are in error;
Anderson Logging Co. v. The King, [1925] S.C.R. 45;
[1917-27] C.T.C. 198; 52 D.T.C. 1209, and Johnston v.
M.N.R., [1948] S.C.R. 486, [1948] C.T.C. 195, 3 D.T.C. 1182.
This onus can be discharged by the appellant adducing evidence
that satisfies the court on a balance of probabilities of the
existence of such error.
6
I am in agreement with the submissions made by counsel for the
respondent in argument that there was no satisfactory
substantiation of the existence of the alleged allowable business
investment losses. ...
[23] Regarding
the claim for a business investment loss, it is difficult from
the Appellant's testimony to know what in fact and in law
really happened. It is also difficult to comprehend what it is
that she in fact claims. It is unfortunate that the relevant
facts were not, at least in some summary form, described in the
Notice of Appeal prepared by her representative. It would appear
from the balance sheet for the years 1989 to 1991 and from some
other documents, that the Appellant had acquired partial
ownership of horses and that she had claimed business losses in
those years. It is surprising that she now claims a capital loss
on the acquisition of shares. As mentioned in the above
decisions, claims of allowable business investment loss,
regarding a capital loss, have to fulfill the terms and
conditions of paragraph 39(1)(c) of the Act.
It belongs to the Appellant to adduce the accurate and relevant
evidence. This evidence was not adduced.
[24]
Respecting the employment expenses, they were clearly
unreasonable as to their amount and not related to the employment
income. They were not comprised in any of the deductions provided
for by section 8 of the Act.
[25] The
appeals are therefore dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 22nd day of February, 2001.
"Louise Lamarre Proulx"
J.T.C.C.