Date: 2001-08-22
Docket: 2000-1120-IT-I
BETWEEN:
ANTHONY DEL CORE,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
________________________________________________
For the Appellant: The Appellant himself
Counsel for the Respondent: Scott Simser
________________________________________________
Reasons for Judgment
(delivered orally from the Bench on March 15, 2001 at Toronto,
Ontario)
Garon, C.J.T.C.C.
[1]
This is an appeal from a reassessment made by the Minister of
National Revenue for the 1995 taxation year. By this
reassessment, the Minister of National Revenue disallowed the
rental loss claimed by the Appellant in respect of the 1995
taxation year.
[2]
In making this reassessment, the Minister of National Revenue
made the assumptions of fact set out in paragraph 7 of the Reply
to the Notice of Appeal. Paragraph 7 of the said Reply reads as
follows:
7.
In so reassessing the Appellant, the Minister made the following
assumptions of fact:
a)
the facts hereinbefore admitted;
b)
in 1991, the Appellant and Appellant's brother became the
registered owners of the Property;
c)
the Property was acquired via a "power of sale";
d)
at purchase to 1995, the Property was uninhabitable conditions
as:
i)
the heating was turned off before the Appellant acquired the
Property;
ii)
insurance company refused to reimbursed(sic) the Appellant for
any damages caused by vandalism, as the Property was "vacant
at the time of loss".
e)
in the 1995 taxation year, the Appellant reported rental income,
total expenses and losses on the Property as detailed in Schedule
"A" attached hereto;
f)
the Appellant claimed rental losses on other years as follows for
the Property:
Year
Amount
1991
$22,195.
1992
$26,397.
1993
$19,031.
1994
$20,225.
1997
$ 3,498.
g)
expenses incurred by the Appellant in the 1995 taxation year were
not made or incurred, or if made or incurred, were not incurred
or incurred for the purpose of gaining or producing income from a
business or property;
h)
the claimed expenses were personal or living expenses of the
Appellant;
i)
the rental expenses claimed were not reasonable in the
circumstances.
[3]
The relevant portion of the Schedule "A" statement
referred to in subparagraph 7 e) of the Reply to the Notice of
Appeal is hereinafter reproduced:
For the period from 01-01-1995 to 31-12-1995
Number Avenue, boulevard, street, P.O. Box
334
MORRISH ROAD
City,
town
Prov
Postal code
SCARBOROUGH
ONT
#Units
Gross rents
1
0.00
CCA
recapture................................................................................
Other income
________
Gross
income[8124]
0.00
Expenses:
Total
Personal
Deductible
expenses
portion
expenses
Advertising........................[8204]
Insurance...........................[8213]
-
=
Interest..............................[8214]
12,761.00
-
=
12,761.00
Maintenance and repairs........[8215] 0.00
- 0.00
=
0.00
Management and admin.
fees..[8216]
0.00 -
0.00
=
0.00
Motor vehicle expenses
(excluding
CCA)..............[8218]
0.00 -
0.00
=
0.00
Office
expenses...................[8219]
0.00 -
0.00
=
.......0.00
Legal, accounting, other fees
.[8220]
0.00 -
0.00
=
0.00
Property
taxes.....................[8221]
3,411.79 -
=
3,411.79
Salaries, wages and
benefits...[8223]
0.00 -
0.00
=
0.00
Travel...............................[8224]
0.00 -
0.00
=
.......0.00
Utilities..............................[8225]
-
=
Other:
-__________
=
_________
[8242]
0.00
16,172.79
Net income (loss) before
adjustments.....................................[8237]
-16,172.79
If co-ownership other than a partnership (your share)
.
%or
Capital cost allowance (your share)
.....................................[8207]
Less: Other expenses of the co-owner
-
0.00
Terminal
loss........................................................................
-
0.00
Net income (loss) from real estate rentals
[8243]
-16,712.79
[4]
Paragraph 8 of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal reads thus:
8.
He states that for the 1996 taxation year, the Appellant had a
rental loss in the amount of $4,100.74.
[5]
The Appellant, who was the sole witness on the hearing of this
appeal, admitted subparagraphs b), c), e) and f) of paragraph 7.
He denied subparagraphs d) in part, g), h) and i) of paragraph 7
of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal. With respect to that
portion of subparagraph 7 d), which was not admitted, the
Appellant stated that all utilities were turned off because of
the vandalism, which occurred in the middle of the year 1993. He
also admitted paragraph 8 of the Reply to the Notice of
Appeal.
[6]
The Appellant, who is a dentist, and his brother John, purchased
a residential property in January 1991 for $225,000. The building
was on a half-acre lot. The Appellant alone paid the entire
purchase price. An amount of $5,000 was paid cash and the
balance, that is, $220,000 was borrowed by the Appellant from
Central Guaranty Trust; the creditor was later on the
Toronto-Dominion Bank. The Appellant was able to borrow the
latter amount by pledging as a security for the loan term
deposits precisely in the same amount, that is, $220,000. The
Appellant was charged interest on the above loan at the prime
rate plus 2%.
[7]
The Appellant explained that he and his brother had to move
quickly in order to be able to acquire this property, which was
sold by virtue of a power of sale, as mentioned in paragraph 7 of
the Reply to the Notice of Appeal. The loan from the Bank could
be paid off in full at any time.
[8]
The Appellant's brother in return for acquiring the undivided
ownership of this property was to provide various services
relative to this property. Among other things, he was to collect
rents, mow the lawn, and look after the maintenance of his
property, his residence being two doors away from the property in
issue. The Appellant testified that it was contemplated that some
minor renovations and painting were to be carried out on this
property. He mentioned $10,000 as being the estimate of the cost
of the improvements to the property. At the time of the purchase,
the Appellant testified that he does not recall if he enquired if
there were any municipal restrictions regarding the question
whether the property could be divided into two different units.
The work on the property was to be done by him and his brother in
order "to save cost". The Appellant mentioned that at
the relevant time he was not very busy as a dentist. He also
stated that the property was advertised for renting in local
newspapers during an unspecified period of time. The Appellant
testified that it was his intention to rent the property to a
large family. It was a single dwelling.
[9]
The Court also learned from the Appellant that his brother John,
who was a 50% co-owner of the property, ran into financial
difficulties shortly after the purchase of the above property in
1991. More precisely, the Appellant's brother had personal
executions registered in 1992 or 1993 against him totalling about
$80,000. In passing, the Appellant mentioned at one point that he
was no longer on speaking terms with his brother.
[10] The
subject property was vandalized in October 1993. At least $50,000
of damage was caused to the property. The insurance company which
had insured the property refused to pay for any portion of the
damage for the reason that the house was vacant at the time the
vandalism occurred.
[11] The
Appellant decided that the damage to the property was not to be
repaired and no renovation was to be carried on until such time
as the financial situation of the Appellant's brother was
settled. The Appellant also stated that at that time he could not
afford to incur any additional cost, his income from his
profession having plummeted. The collateral loan from the Bank
tied up his money, to use the Appellant's expression.
[12] The
Appellant also disclosed that he reimbursed the Bank for the full
amount of the loan in early September 1995, as appears from the
return by the Toronto-Dominion Bank of the promissory note with a
covering letter.
[13] The
Appellant became the sole owner of the property some time
later.
[14] The
property is still owned at the present time by the Appellant and
at the time of the hearing of this appeal it had not been
rented.
[15] When the
Appellant was asked if he had a business plan with respect to the
property in question, he indicated that he wanted to make money
from this investment. Statements of real estate rentals for the
taxation years ending on December 31, 1994, 1995 and 1996 were
put in evidence. No capital cost allowance was claimed in respect
of this property during the three taxation years hereinbefore
mentioned.
Analysis
[16] The
question in issue is whether the Appellant had a reasonable
expectation of profit from the property in respect of the 1995
taxation year.
[17] In
considering this question, it is useful to bear in mind the
principles laid down by the Supreme Court of Canada in the
leading case of Moldowan v. The Queen, 77 DTC 5213.
The following passage at page 5215 is of particular interest:
There is a vast case literature on what reasonable expectation
of profit means and it is by no means entirely consistent. In my
view, whether a taxpayer has a reasonable expectation of profit
is an objective determination to be made from all of the facts.
The following criteria should be considered: the profit and loss
experience in past years, the taxpayer's training, the
taxpayer's intended course of action, the capability of the
venture as capitalized to show a profit after charging capital
cost allowance. The list is not intended to be exhaustive.
[18] First, it
should be noted that the Appellant sustained large losses in
1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994, the years immediately preceding the
year in issue. These losses range from a high $26, 397 in 1992 to
a low of $19, 031 in 1993. In the year in issue the loss amounted
to $16,172.79. It is true that the situation improved in 1996 and
subsequent years. The property had been vacant since its purchase
in 1991, that is, during a period of about ten years. It is true
that the Appellant was the victim of a number of unfortunate
circumstances beyond his control such as vandalism to the
property, the serious financial difficulties encountered by the
other co-owner. However, I find that as long as the property
acquired by the Appellant and his brother John, was capitalized
the way it was before sometime in September 1995, there was no
realistic prospect that the rental of the property could have
produced a net income. The interest expense was payable on a loan
representing more than 95% of the purchase price of the property.
The interest expense would constitute a most serious hurdle to
overcome before this rental operation could be profitable, quite
apart from the fixed charges and other expenses relating to the
property. In addition, the capital cost allowance factor in
respect of the building should be taken into account.
[19] Secondly,
looking at the Appellant's conduct and his comments relating
to the matter of business plan, I was not persuaded that the
Appellant had during the year in issue and for that matter in
previous years the intention to rent the property within a short
time frame. His subsequent actions after he became the sole owner
of the property tend to confirm this. I find that he has not
established that his real intention was to earn income from
renting this subject property. I am inclined to the view that his
dominant intention was probably to make some renovation work to
the property and to dispose of it reasonably quickly. He probably
wanted, to adopt his terminology, to make a capital gain.
[20] The
Appellant argued that the prospect of a capital gain is a factor
to be taken into account in determining if a taxpayer had a
reasonable expectation of profit. In support of this proposition,
the Appellant relied on the case of Tonn et al.
v. The Queen, 96 DTC 6001. It is true that there is a
reference in the Tonn case at page 6015 in the judgment of
Justice Linden speaking for the Federal Court of Appeal which may
lend support to the Appellant's argument:
... One reason why real estate and securities alike present
good investment possibilities is that they offer the possibility
both of earning income and of obtaining capital gains in the
future. Purchasers usually intend to profit from both the income
and the longer-term capital aspects, and, if they do, they pay
tax on both sources of profit.
[21] This
judgment simply does not say that the prospect of making a
capital gain is a proper matter to be taken into account in
determining if a taxpayer had a reasonable expectation of profit
from a property. This judgment simply states that it is "A
further matter worthy of mention" in the opening sentence of
the paragraph containing the passage to which I have referred in
the preceding paragraph of these Reasons. In any event, the
precise wording of subsections (1) and (3) of section 9 of the
Income Tax Act should not be overlooked. These subsections
read as follows:
(1) Subject to this Part, a taxpayer's income for a
taxation year from a business or property is the taxpayer's
profit from that business or property for the year.
...
(3) In this Act, "income from a property" does not
include any capital gain from the disposition of that property
and "loss from a property" does not include any capital
loss from the disposition of that property.
[22] As a
result of the combined operation of subsections 9(1) and 9(3) of
the Act, it follows that a capital gain is not
"profit" from property for the purposes of Part I of
the Income Tax Act.
[23] In view
of the above, I therefore find that the Appellant had in 1995 no
reasonable expectation of profit from the subject property.
[24]
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 22nd day of August 2001.
"Alban Garon"
C.J.T.C.C.
COURT FILE
NO.:
2000-1120(IT)I
STYLE OF
CAUSE:
Anthony Del Core and
Her Majesty The Queen
PLACE OF
HEARING:
Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF
HEARING:
March 14, 2001
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BY:
The Hon. Alban Garon
Chief Judge
DATE OF
JUDGMENT:
March 20, 2001
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for the
Appellant:
The Appellant himself
Counsel for the
Respondent:
Scott Simser
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the
Appellant:
Name:
Firm:
For the
Respondent:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada