Date:
20010830
Docket:
2000-3399-IT-I
BETWEEN:
RICHARD
GAGNÉ,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE
QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for
Judgment
Tardif,
J.T.C.C.
[1] This is an appeal concerning the 1996 and 1997 taxation
years.
[2] The issue is whether the
expenses claimed each year on a condominium in Burnaby were
incurred by the appellant during the taxation years at issue for
the purpose of gaining or producing income from a property or
business.
[3] In making the assessments at
issue in this appeal, the respondent relied on or assumed the
following facts:
[TRANSLATION]
(a) the appellant
purchased a condominium at 2060 Bellwood Avenue in Burnaby,
British Columbia;
(b) the
condominium had two bedrooms, a living room, a kitchen and a
bathroom; household appliances such as the stove, refrigerator
and dishwasher were included;
(c) the
condominium was in a 100-unit high-rise apartment building
(Vantage Point);
(d) the appellant
purchased the condominium - a Type F unit, number 1105 - for
$167,990 on December 27, 1989;
(e) the
condominium was financed as follows:
(i)
cash
$1,500
(ii)
mortgage
$117,593
(iii) promissory
note
$48,897
$167,990;
(f) the
financing initially represented 99 percent of the total
cost;
(g) the unit was
part of a pooling of condominiums the management of which was
initially entrusted to the North America Land Corporation
and then transferred to Gestion Profissimo in
1995;
(h) the
management of the appellant's condominium always generated
losses:
(i)
1989
$2,112
(ii)
1990
$20,397
(iii)
1991
$18,521
(iv)
1992
$18,222
(v)
1993
$19,603
(vi)
1994
$16,402
(vii)
1995
$8,958
(viii)
1996
$6,567
(ix)
1997
$3,044;
(i) among
other things, for the years at issue, the losses claimed on the
condominium must be increased by $3,094 and $3,294, respectively,
since the interest on the promissory note was claimed on line 221
of the income tax return (expenses to earn investment
income);
(j) the
appellant always claimed rental losses and never claimed any
depreciation expense;
(k) the rental
income from the condominium, which corresponded roughly to the
market price, was as follows:
(i)
1989
nil
(ii)
1990
$9,360
(iii)
1991
$9,828
(iv)
1992
$9,481
(v)
1993
$9,391
(vi)
1994
$9,181
(vii)
1995
$8,577
(viii)
1996
$9,534
(ix)
1997
$9,512;
(l) each
year, the interest expense (see the following table) alone
exceeded the gross rental income, which was stable from year to
year:
(i)
1990
$20,538
(ii)
1991
$18,946
(iii)
1992
$17,600
(iv)
1993
$16,163
(v)
1994
$19,040
(vi)
1995
$13,526
(vii)
1996
$12,589
(viii)
1997
$10,589;
(m) the appellant did
nothing to reduce the amount of his loans during the years at
issue;
(n) the appellant
had no reasonable expectation of profit from the Burnaby
condominium during the 1996 and 1997 taxation years;
(o) the rental
expenses claimed each year on the Burnaby condominium were
personal or living expenses of the appellant and were not
incurred by him for the purpose of gaining or producing
income.
[4] After being sworn, the appellant
admitted the facts alleged in subparagraphs 8(a) to (l) but
denied the content of subparagraphs (m) to (o).
[5] The appellant testified that he
had acquired investment experience and expertise over the years
both on the stock market and in real estate. He explained how he
acquired his practical and theoretical experience; he said that
he had also taken investment courses. Through his studies and
experience he discovered leverage, which consists in taking
advantage of the borrowing power conferred by immovable property
that has increased in value, making it possible to obtain fresh
money to invest in other projects.
[6] The appellant described his
various experiences and the investments that led him to purchase
the condominium in Burnaby, British Columbia, for $167,990 in
December 1989. He filed documentary evidence concerning
financing, projections and planning.
[7] He also described how he went
about ensuring proper control and follow-up with regard to
the factors that might have financial consequences. Thus,
although he never went to Vancouver, he took the management of
his condominium out of the hands of the North America Land
Corporation and entrusted it to an individual in whom he had
complete confidence, which enabled him to exercise better control
and also to reduce expenses.
[8] He explained as well that he
instructed someone who was going to Vancouver to obtain both a
report on the condition of the premises and an overall
assessment. The appellant wanted to know whether everything was
consistent with the various descriptions he had been given, since
he had never visited the condominium he purchased.
Analysis
[9] There is no doubt that the
evidence shows that the appellant had a very keen interest and
wanted very much to make a profit. However, the evidence in no
way indicates that the profit he expected or hoped for was to
come from renting the condominium.
[10] The weight of the evidence shows
instead that the appellant basically wanted to make a profit on
the eventual sale of his condominium. The evidence demonstrates
that he was actually much less concerned about the operating
deficits and much more aware of the development of the real
estate market in Vancouver and area.
[11] Moreover, the appellant admitted,
simply and with a sincerity that does him credit, that his
primary goal was to make a profit on the eventual sale of the
condominium. His rather speculative expectations and hopes
explain how rental viability could be secondary, since it was not
the primary objective.
[12] He certainly made considerable and
commendable efforts to reduce expenses, since for all practical
purposes he had no control over income. When he became aware of
the risk of major losses of income because of potential
dishonesty on the part of the manager, he quickly disposed of the
property.
[13] The distance between the location of
the condominium and the appellant's home, his experience in
the real estate market and his financial constraints are factors
that are all indicative of a more speculative project rather than
of a goal of renting the property purchased. The huge distance
between the appellant and the place where the condominium was
located is a very negative factor from the perspective of
rental-based profitability.
[14] This reality explains and also
justifies the contradiction between the fact that the property
was financed and the reasonable expectation of profit. It is
difficult, not to say impossible, to expect to make a profit from
a project that is 100-percent financed, especially when the
property or business was purchased at market price.
[15] It is possible to hope for viability
with 100-percent financing if the purchase price is below the
market cost and income is comparable to market income. In this
case, the interest expenses alone fluctuated between
219 percent and about 125 percent of the income during the
eight years following the purchase. It is common knowledge that
operating expenses are not limited only to interest expenses;
many other expenses must be added and charged against income
before it can be concluded that there is a profit.
[16] On this subject, in Mohammad
v. The Queen, [1998] 1 F.C. 165, 97 DTC 5503, Robertson
J.A. of the Federal Court of Appeal provided clarification that
is of greater relevance; it is appropriate to reproduce the
following extract from that judgment:
. . . Taxpayers intent on financing the purchase of a rental
property to the extent that there can be no profit,
notwithstanding full realization of anticipated rental revenue,
should not expect favourable tax treatment in the absence of
convincing objective evidence of their intention and financial
ability to pay down a meaningful portion of the purchase-money
indebtedness within a few years of the property's
acquisition. If because of the level of financing a
property is unable to generate sufficient profits which can be
applied against the outstanding indebtedness, then the taxpayer
must look to other sources of income in order to do so. If
a taxpayer's other sources of income, e.g. employment income,
are insufficient to permit him or her to pay down purchase-money
obligations then the taxpayer may well have to bear the full cost
of the rental loss. Certainly, vague expectations that an
infusion of cash was expected from Aunt Beatrice or Uncle Bernie
will not satisfy the taxpayer's burden of proof. In
practice, the taxpayer will discharge that burden by showing that
significant payments were in fact made against the principal
indebtedness in the taxation years closely following the year of
purchase.
. .
.
[17] Even if the significant carrying
charges payable over a five-year period were disregarded,
the interest payable and paid by the appellant during the years
at issue was so high compared with gross income that it
absolutely precluded any profit being made during those years. In
fact, the obligation to pay other expenses such as property
taxes, condo fees and insurance, which were certainly
substantial, cannot be ignored.
[18] In light of the evidence adduced, it
seems to me-given the basically mathematical constraints
involved-that the appellant could not expect to make a profit in
the 1996 and 1997 taxation years. Indeed, the evidence shows that
he received the highest possible income and, in spite of that, he
incurred a loss, most of which resulted from the interest that
was payable because he had made the purchase without laying out
anything at all.
[19] I therefore conclude, on the evidence
adduced, that the appellant could not expect to make any profit
in the years at issue. Accordingly, the appeal must be
dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa,
Canada, this 30th day of August 2001.
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified true
on this 30th
day of May 2002.
Erich Klein,
Revisor
[OFFICIAL
ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
2000-3399(IT)I
BETWEEN:
RICHARD
GAGNÉ,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE
QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeal heard on July
16, 2001, at Québec, Quebec, by
the Honourable Judge
Alain Tardif
Appearances
For the
Appellant:
The Appellant himself
Counsel for the
Respondent: Stéphanie
Côté
JUDGMENT
The appeal from the assessments made under the Income Tax
Act for the 1996 and 1997 taxation years is dismissed in
accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada,
this 30th day of August 2001.
J.T.C.C.
Translation
certified true
on this 30th
day of May 2002.
Erich Klein,
Revisor