Date: 20010827
Docket: 1999-2483-IT-G
BETWEEN:
ANTE ROGIC,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
AND BETWEEN:
1999-2484(IT)G
MARIA ROGIC,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Bell, J.T.C.C.
ISSUES:
[1]
The Appellants made a motion for the determination of questions
of law pursuant to section 58(1)(a) of the Tax Court of
Canada Rules (General Procedure) ("Rule
58(1)(a)"), such questions having been raised by the
pleadings, namely:
A
1.
Does the doctrine of Issue Estoppel, abuse of process, or
election in litigation prevent the Respondent from alleging as a
fact that the Appellants had a beneficial interest in property at
1530 West 59th Avenue, Vancouver, British Columbia
("Property")?
2.
If the answer to question number 1 is in the affirmative, is the
Respondent precluded from pleading, after the expiry of the
normal reassessment period, that although the Appellants had no
beneficial interest in the Property, the Appellants received a
benefit in respect of the personal use of the Property pursuant
to subsection 15(1) of the Income Tax Act
("Act").
B
If the answer to questions 1 and 2 is in the affirmative, an
Order allowing the appeal with costs.
C
If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative and the answer
to question 2 is in the negative, an Order that the trial proceed
with a finding of fact that the Appellants had no beneficial
interest in the Property.
TAX COURT OF CANADA RULES (GENERAL PROCEDURE):
[2]
Section 58(1) of the Rules provides, in part, that:
(1) A
party may apply to the Court,
a)
for the determination, before hearing, of a question of law
raised by a pleading in a proceeding where the determination of
the question may dispose of all or part of the proceeding,
substantially shorten the hearing or result in a substantial
saving of costs ...
FACTS:
[3]
The Appellants, during 1994, the taxation year in question,
resided in British Columbia. They owned a company known as AMI
Construction Ltd. ("Company") which carried on the
business of constructing residential homes for sale. It
constructed a house on the Property, the Property being sold in
October, 1994 for $1,041,000.
[4]
On August 15, 1995, the Company was assessed for goods and
services tax ("GST"), in the amount of $65,420, under
subsection 191(1) of the Excise Tax Act ("ETA")
in respect of the Property. It was so assessed on the basis of
being a builder respecting the Property. It gave possession of
the Property to the Appellants by way of lease, license or
similar arrangement for the purpose of its occupancy as a place
of residence.
[5]
On December 9, 1996, the Appellants were assessed GST in the sum
of $72,870[1].
[6]
Both the Company and the Appellants appealed the assessments and
both appeals were scheduled to be heard on the same day.
[7]
Prior to that date, counsel for the parties in both assessments
executed a letter agreement settlement providing, inter
alia, that:
1.
The assessment against Rogic, Ante and Maria will be vacated.
2.
AMI Construction Ltd. will be reassessed on the following
basis:
a)
the amount assessed with respect to the self supply of the
subject property be reduced to $42,000, with no penalty or
pre-assessment interest to be levied on this amount;
[8]
There followed a judgment issued by this Court dated February 11,
1997 allowing the appeal of Ante and Maria Rogic and a judgment
of the same date respecting the Company, stating, in part,
that:
1.
the Appellant is liable for GST in the amount of $42,000 with
respect to the self-supply of the property located at 1524
- West 59th Street, Vancouver, B.C.;
[9]
By Notice of Assessment dated April 2, 1998, the Respondent
assessed the Appellants income tax in the amount of $92,491 each,
in respect of an alleged income gain on the sale of the property.
It is this assessment in respect of which the Appellants'
motion respecting issue estoppel, et cetera, is made.
[10] The
Respondent, in the Amended Reply[2] respecting Maria Rogic[3], stated that:
In so reassessing the Appellant, the Minister relied on,
inter alia, the following assumptions:
...
(e)
at all material times, the Appellant and her husband equally
owned the beneficial interest in the Property.
[11] The
Amended Reply also included an alternative submission,
namely:
15.
In the further alternative, he submits, that if the Appellant did
not beneficially own the Property, which fact is specifically
denied, the Appellant failed to include in her income a benefit
in respect of the personal use of the Property by the Appellant
and her spouse, and therefore, a benefit in respect of such use
must be included in the Appellant's income pursuant to
subsection 15(1) of the Act.
APPELLANTS' SUBMISSIONS:
[12]
Appellants' counsel submitted that the doctrine of res
judicata prevents re-litigation of a factual matter which was
put in issue in previous court proceedings. He submitted that
when a party attempts to have issues fundamental to an earlier
judgment re-tried, res judicata applies and the party will
be estopped from so doing. He said that the relevant branches of
the doctrine for the purpose of his motion were issue estoppel,
abuse of process and election in litigation. He argued that the
aforesaid judgments issued by this Court were consistent with a
finding of fact that the beneficial owner of the Property was the
Company, not the Appellants, and that the Respondent is,
accordingly, estopped from raising the very same question
relating to the beneficial ownership of the Property. He
submitted, in the alternative, that the equitable doctrine of
abuse of process would apply to prevent re-litigation of that
question of ownership. He further submitted that the Respondent,
having elected to take a position in the previous GST appeals
that was fundamentally based on the Company being the sole
beneficial owner of the Property, the doctrine of election in
litigation applies and it is not now open to the Respondent to
take a contrary position in respect of the current income tax
reassessment appeals.
[13] Counsel
referred to MacIntosh v. Parent, 1924, 55 O.L.R. 552 (CA)
at 555 where Middleton, J.A. said:
When a question is litigated, the judgment of the Court is a
final determination as between the parties and their privies. Any
right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction as a ground of
recovery, or as an answer to a claim set up, cannot be re-tried
in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies,
though for a different cause of action. The right, question, or
fact, once determined, must, as between them, be taken to be
conclusively established so long as the judgment remains.
[14] Counsel
further submitted that Dickson, J. (as he then was) in Angle
v. M.N.R., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 248 at 254, set out the following
conditions required in order to succeed in an issue estoppel
application, namely:
... (1) that the same question has been decided;
(2) that the judicial decision which is said to create the
estoppel was final; and,
(3) that the parties to the judicial decision or their privies
were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which
the estoppel is raised or their privies.
[15] Counsel
submitted that the question out of which the estoppel is said to
arise must have been fundamental to the decision made in the
earlier proceedings and, if it is, a litigant can use issue
estoppel to prevent the same question from being raised in
subsequent proceedings.[4]
[16] Counsel
then quoted the Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. Duhamel
(1982) 33 A.R. 271 at 277 as follows:
The issues sought to be estopped in a subsequent proceeding
must have been clearly and unequivocably decided by the first
court. Essentially one must apply reasoning or logic. It is
not necessary to show that the issue is specifically decided so
long as it can be shown that it was a necessary logical
consequence of the point actually decided. It is pure logic, not
probability, likelihood or speculation.
(emphasis added by Appellants' counsel)
[17] He
further referred to Iron v. Saskatchewan [1993] 6 W.W.R. I
(Sask. C.A.), leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada
refused, (1993) 7 W.W.R. 1 at page 11 as follows:
It is clear from the authorities that for the doctrine to
apply it is not necessary that the matter said to be res judicata
in a subsequent case be the main point or ratio in the first
case. It is necessary only that it be an "essential"
point or "fundamental to the decision" (See:
Fidelitas Shipping Co. v. V/O Exportchleb, [1965] 2 All ER
4 (CA), Winter v. Dewar, [1929] 4 DLR 389), [[1929] 2
W.W.R. 518] (B.C.C.A.); and (particularly in respect of an
earlier chambers' decision ) Mire v. Northwestern Mut.
Ins. Co., supra.) In the present case, because the question
whether the order sought to be appealed was final or
interlocutory went to the very jurisdiction of the Chambers judge
to hear and decide the application and because it was squarely
raised by the parties, the question necessarily became an
"essential" point or a point "fundamental to [the
judge's] decision".
[18] Further,
in Pezzelato v. The Queen, 96 DTC 1285 this Court held
that where a Consent to Judgment is premised on an assumption of
fact, issue estoppel will apply to prevent one part from later
claiming a different fact. The taxpayer was precluded from
alleging as a fact that he had not paid interest on a loan by a
certain date because, in an earlier appeal, the taxpayer had
consented to judgment on the basis that he had in fact paid
interest by that date.
[19]
Respecting the matter of final decision, counsel submitted that
it was settled law that issue estoppel can apply to a judgment
issued on consent.[5]
[20]
Respecting the same parties requirement in both proceedings he
submitted that both the Appellants and the Respondent were
parties in the prior proceedings which was settled by a single
agreement having as a fundamental basis the fact that the
Company, not the Appellants, was the beneficial owner of the
Property.
[21] Finally,
in the matter of abuse of process and election in litigation,
counsel submitted, with a number of authorities, that because
issue estoppel is grounded in considerations of equity, the
courts are always prepared to apply the doctrine flexibly with a
view to reaching a fair result even where the three technical
requirements for the application of issue estoppel have not been
met. In particular, he cited Stephenson v. Bowmac
Construction [1986] 5 W.W.R. 21 at 26 where the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal, said:
There is however concern based on public policy that the same
issue should not be relitigated so that the parties should not be
exposed to the same risk twice and also that there be an end to
the litigation process. The Courts have not only viewed such
matters under the established doctrines of "res
judicata" and "issue estoppel", but also under the
broader heading of the concept of abuse of process. Lord Diplock
in the case of Hunter v. Chief Constable of West Midlands and
another, [1981] 3 All ER 727 at p. 733 made it clear that he
felt entitled to rely on the fact that proceedings constituted an
abuse of process even thought the doctrine of issue estoppel did
not clearly apply.
[22]
Respecting the doctrine of election in litigation, together with
issue estoppel, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal said:
I have grave doubt that an applicant is entitled in law to
maintain the second of these two positions - a position
that it entirely at odds with the essence of its own application.
A species of estoppel as expressed in the principle that a person
may not approbate and reprobate, or that one may not at the same
time blow hot and cold, comes into play and debars an applicant
from doing so. Should the applicant decide to assert these two
inconsistent positions, the judge during the course of the
proceedings ought to put the applicant to an election. Having
made an election the applicant is not entitled to resile from the
position he elects.
[23] Counsel
turned to the Respondent's pleading that if the Appellants
did not beneficially own the Property, they failed to include in
their income a benefit in respect of personal use of the Property
and that, therefore, a benefit in respect of such use must be
included in their income pursuant to subsection 15(1) of the
Act.
[24] He said
that the allegation that the Company was the beneficial owner and
conferred such benefit was not one of the assumptions underlying
the reassessment. He submitted that the attempt to tax the
Appellant under subsection 15(1) was a new basis for assessment
which could not be made when the year was statute barred. In this
regard, he quoted McLachlin, J. (as she then was) in
Continental Bank of Canada v. The Queen, 98 DTC 6501
at 6503:
... The Minister cannot argue that the Bank could not transfer
its partnership interest at this stage. The Minister must accept
that this transfer took place because his assessment of the Bank
was based on the assumption that the Bank disposed of its
partnership interest. I agree with Bastarache, J. that the
Minister's argument ... raised for the first time in this
Court, cannot be entertained. The Minister should not be allowed
to advance a new basis for a reassessment after the limitation
period has expired.
[25] Counsel
then referred to Marina Homes Ltd. and Denver Homes Ltd. v.
The Queen, 2001 DTC 5046 (FCTD) in which the taxpayers
were assessed under sections 224 and 227 of the Income Tax
Act for liability as garnishees. In its Reply, the Minister
asserted for the first time and in the alternative that the
taxpayers' liability might arise under section 160 of that
Act. The Court rejected the Minister's alternative
position, finding that liability pursuant to section 160 would be
based on a different statutory provision and completely different
assumptions of fact than garnishee orders under section 224 and
227.
[26] He quoted
subsection 152(9) of the Act, applicable to appeals
disposed of after June 17, 1999,
The Minister may advance an alternative argument in support of
an assessment at any time after the normal reassessment period
unless, on an appeal under this Act
(a)
there is relevant evidence that the taxpayer is no longer able to
adduce without the leave of the court; and
(b)
it is not appropriate in the circumstances for the court to order
that the evidence be adduced.
saying that while that subsection permitted the Respondent to
advance a new argument subsequent to the expiry of the
normal reassessment period, it did not permit the Respondent to
advance a new basis for an assessment.
[27] Counsel
then said the Respondent may, in the pleadings, advance:
... new conclusions of law (that is, a new statutory
provision in support of the assessment) resulting from the facts
assumed. The Court reached this conclusion in General Motors
Acceptance Corporation of Canada v. The Queen, and
distinguished Continental Bank on the basis that, in
General Motors, the Crown did not make new assumptions of
fact.
General Motors Acceptance Corporation of Canada v. The
Queen, 99 DTC 975 (TCC).
[28] Counsel
then said:
In the Amended Reply, the Respondent asserts an alternative
basis for the Reassessment. That the Appellant and his spouse are
not the beneficial owners of the Property is a new assumption of
fact, and one which suggests the Reassessments are wrong. That
the Appellant and his spouse failed to include in income a
benefit in respect of the use of the Property under subsection
15(1) of the ITA is a new argument as to the applicable statutory
provision.
In this case, the Respondent has not advanced an alternative
argument in support of the Reassessments, as permitted by
subsection 152(9). Rather, the Respondent has advanced, after the
expiry of the normal reassessment period, a new basis for
the Appellant's assessment. This the Respondent is not
permitted to do.
RESPONDENT'S SUBMISSIONS:
[29] Counsel
for the Respondent agreed that the three factors considered in
determining the applicability of issue estoppel were those
presented by Appellants' counsel, namely whether the same
question arose in two different actions, whether the judicial
decision was final and whether the same parties were involved.
She agreed with Appellants' counsel on the same parties and
final judgment questions but stated that the issue was whether
the same question was involved in both assessments. She argued
that the Consent Judgment simply stated that the Company was
"liable for GST" and that the Court should look at what
elements had to be involved. She said that beneficial ownership
was critical and that 100% beneficial ownership was not a
requirement. She referred to Appellants' conclusion that the
Company had a 100% beneficial interest in the Property and said
that that was not clear and that the judgment did not state that
as a basis. She submitted that one would not have to determine a
beneficial interest in order for a third party to be a builder
and liable for GST.
[30] She then
presented authorities showing that there were interests in real
property other than beneficial ownership interests, namely those
created by mechanics lien, et cetera.
[31] With
respect to Respondent's pleaded alternative argument, counsel
submitted that on the authority of Her Majesty the Queen v.
Hollinger Inc., 99 DTC 5500, the Respondent could
present alternative arguments if the amount of an assessment was
not changed in the pleading. At page 5505, the Federal Court of
Appeal said:
It would introduce an unnecessary measure of formalism,
unwarranted by the decision of the Supreme Court and the
consequent amendment to section 152, if we were to require that
proper notification to the taxpayer of an alternative argument in
support of an assessment can only be achieved by the Ministerial
issuance of a new reassessment. This is not to say that the
Minister may change the amount of an assessment in the pleadings,
but only that arguments in support of an assessment can be made
in pleadings, even if not included in a notice of reassessment.
Changing the amount of an assessment in pleadings is tantamount
to the Minister appealing his own assessment, an avenue which has
been clearly rejected by the Courts.
In conclusion, I think the preliminary object of the
respondent grounded on the Continental Bank case has no
merit in this instance and, accordingly, the appellant was
entitled to argue, as it did before the Tax Court, the new basis
advanced in its Reply. The respondent was fully and timely
informed of it and had ample time to prepare as the hearing of
the appeal took place more than three and a half years later. All
the relevant evidence was before the Tax Court judge. ...
[32] Counsel
also referred to Smith Kline Beecham Animal Health Inc. v.
The Queen, 2000 DTC 1526 where Bonner, J. of this Court
said at page 1530:
In my view Continental Bank was never authority for the
proposition that the Minister is, when defending an appeal from
an assessment after the expiry of the subsection 152(4) period,
confined within a conceptual prison called "basis of
assessment" comprising only the facts and statutory
provisions relied upon by the assessor. ...
It is long-settled law that the validity of an assessment
depends on the application of the statute to the facts and not on
the assessor's analysis.
[33] Counsel
then submitted that there were enough facts alleged to support
the alternative argument and that the situation was different
from the circumstances in Continental Bank.
REPLY:
[34] In his
reply, Appellants' counsel referred to the assumption in
Maria Rogic's Amended Reply that:
the Appellant and her husband equally owned the beneficial
interest in the Property
He then stated that if the Appellants were not the beneficial
owners of the Property they could not have received any benefit.
He said that the Minister could not raise contradicting
assumptions of fact to support newly referred to sections of the
Act. He submitted that if the above assumption was
negated, there would be no facts to support a subsection 15(1)
argument.
Finally, he said that in the Appellants' current appealed
assessment there was no assumption in the Respondent's
Amended Reply that the Company owned the Property and that a new
fact suggestion and a new legal basis suggestion, beyond the
statute-barred period for reassessment, would not entitle the
Respondent to succeed in its alternative position.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION:
[35] The
Appellants' motion will succeed. First, respecting the prior
assessments, the Respondent consented to judgment in writing by
agreeing that the assessment of the present Appellants for GST
would be vacated and that the Company would be assessed on the
basis that:
... the amount assessed with respect to the self supply of the
subject property be reduced to $42,000, with no penalty or
pre-assessment interest to be levied on this amount;
[36] There is
only one logical inference to be drawn from that settlement
agreement resulting in the February 1997 judgment of this Court
that:
the Appellant is liable for GST in the amount of $42,000 with
respect to the self-supply of the property located at 1524
- West 59th Street, Vancouver, BC;
That inference is that the Company, to the exclusion of the
Appellants, had the beneficial interest in the Property.
The relevant portions of section 191(1) of the ETA read as
follows:
For the purposes of this Part, where
(a) the construction ... of a residential complex that is a
single unit residential complex, the builder ... gives possession
... to a person under a lease, licence or similar arrangement
...
and
(c) the builder [or] the ... person is the first individual to
occupy the complex,
the builder shall be deemed
(d) to have made and received ... a taxable supply by way of
sale of the complex and
(e) to have paid as a recipient and to have collected as a
supplier ... tax in respect of the supply calculated on the fair
market value of the complex ...
It was agreed that the Company was, in the GST case, assessed
on the basis it was a builder respecting the Property and had
given possession of the Property to the Rogics by way of lease,
licence or similar arrangement for the purpose of its occupancy
as a place of residence. That is consistent with Company
ownership of the Property.
[37] The word
"builder" is defined in section 123 of the ETA, the
relevant portions of that definition being:
"builder" of a residential complex ... means a
person who ... at a time when the person had an interest in the
real property on which the complex is situated, carries on ...
the construction ... of the complex
et cetera.
The Respondent would not have agreed that the Company would be
liable for GST unless it had concluded that the Company was the
builder and could only have done so if it regarded the Company as
having an interest in the real property on which the complex was
situated. At that time the present Appellants' assessments
were vacated, indicating, obviously, that they had no beneficial
interest in the Property.
[38] The issue
in the case in respect of which the motion is brought is whether
the Appellants owned the Property. Although there is no evidence
about the content of the negotiations between the parties leading
to the Consent Judgment, a combination of the logic above
described and the statement in R. v. Duhamel, supra,
that
It is not necessary to show that the issue is specifically
decided so long as it can be shown that it was a necessary
logical consequence of the point actually decided. It is pure
logic, not probability, likelihood or speculation.
in my conclusion, fully satisfies the requirements that are
necessary for the application of the doctrine of issue
estoppel.
[39] Adopting
the submission of Appellants' counsel in that regard, as
supplemented below, I conclude that the Respondent's
alternative position, advanced after the statute-barred period
for reassessment expired, is not available to the Respondent.
[40] While
respecting the views of Bonner, J. of this Court in Smith
Kline and the Federal Court of Appeal in Hollinger,
there are different circumstances in this appeal. In
Hollinger, the matter under dispute was that the
reassessment was based on the assumption that loss shares
acquired by Hollinger were capital property. As the Court
said at page 5504:
The position now taken by the appellant that the loss shares
were not capital property is obviously a revocation of its prior
unsuccessful assumption. From the evidence before us and before
the Tax Court judge, it is impossible, however, to determine
whether the limitation period for reassessing had expired when
this new basis was first raised by the Minister. ...
Because the limitation date is not in evidence, I am of the
view that the Continental Bank principle relied upon by
the respondent, namely that the Crown is not permitted to advance
a new basis for reassessment after the limitation period has
expired, cannot be applied in this instance.
Apart from not knowing the reassessment limitation date,
whether the loss shares were or were not capital property is a
matter of legal determination - not an assumption of fact
basic to the issue of a reassessment.
[41] In
Smith Kline the Respondent sought to amend its pleadings
to add additional statutory provisions to support the assessment.
Counsel pointed out that the Respondent did not seek to appeal
the existing assessment by asserting a claim for more tax than
already assessed. The judgment, at page 1529 says:
Rather, the objective is to ensure that it is open to the
Respondent to defend the existing assessments by relying on
statutory provisions which, when applied to material facts
already pleaded will support the assessments of Part XIII
tax, either in whole or in part.
(emphasis added)
[42] The
instant case differs in that there is a fundamental change in the
fact assumption forming the foundation of Respondent's
alternative submission, namely that "if the Appellant did
not beneficially own the Property" such Appellant failed to
include in income
...a benefit in respect of the personal use of the Property
... and such benefit must be included in the Appellant's
income pursuant to subsection 15(1) of the Act.
This clearly implies ownership of the Property by the Company.
Ownership is substantially a matter of fact. The assumption of
fact upon which the assessment was based was that the Appellants
owned the beneficial interest in the Property equally. The
assessment, based upon that assumption, was that the Appellants
should be taxable on the gain on the sale of the Property, such
gain totalling $184,982. Not only is there a fundamental factual
assumption difference (which was not the case in either
Hollinger or Smith Kline) but there is no
exposition of the amount of the benefit referred to in the
alternative submission arising from the presumed personal use of
the Property. The term "personal use of the property"
connotes possession of same for living purposes. Assuming the
Respondent's allegations in its Reply are factually correct,
the Property having been purchased on April 1, 1993 and sold in
October, 1994, there would, given a reasonable period of several
months for house construction, be a benefit equal to the fair
market rental of the Property for a period slightly in excess of
one year. The amount of such benefit would be minimal relative to
the sum of $184,982 and would have no relation to it.
[43] In
Marina (supra) at page 5052, McKay, J. quoted
Stone, J.A. at page 5662 of Schultz v. The Queen
(1995), 95 DTC 5651:
I do not understand the law as developed in these cases
prevented the Minister from pleading the alternative defence
before the Tax Court of Canada. It is true that in pleading he is
subject to certain constraints. For example, he cannot plead an
alternative assumption when to do so would fundamentally alter
the basis on which his assessment was based as to render it an
entirely new assessment.
At page 5653, the learned Justice said:
The alternative ground for an assessment pursuant to s. 160,
is a matter to be pursued, if at all, by formal action by the
Minister by means of a reassessment under the Act. It is not a
matter for endorsement by the Court at this stage.
[44] The
alternative submission to the effect that the Company, not the
Appellants, owned the Property is a fundamental change in the
basis of the assessment and is not available to the
Respondent.
[45]
Accordingly, the motion will be granted, both questions posed by
the Appellant being answered in the affirmative, and the appeals
will be allowed with costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada this 27th day of August, 2001.
"R.D. Bell"
J.T.C.C.
COURT FILE
NO.:
1999-2483(IT)G and 1999-2484(IT)G
STYLE OF
CAUSE:
Ante Rogic v. The Queen
Maria Rogic v. The Queen
PLACE OF
HEARING:
Vancouver, British Columbia
DATE OF
HEARING:
July 30, 2001
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The
Honourable Judge R.D. Bell
DATE OF
JUDGMENT:
August 27, 2001
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for the Appellant: Thomas M. Boddez
Counsel for the
Respondent:
Linda Bell
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the
Appellant:
Name:
Thomas M. Boddez
Firm:
Thorsteinssons
Vancouver, British Columbia
For the
Respondent:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
1999-2483(IT)G
BETWEEN:
ANTE ROGIC,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Motion heard on common evidence with the motion
of Maria Rogic
(1999-2484(IT)G) on July 30, 2001 at Vancouver,
British Columbia, by
the Honourable Judge R.D. Bell
Appearances
Counsel for the
Appellant:
Thomas M. Boddez
Counsel for the
Respondent:
Linda Bell
JUDGMENT
The
motion for application of the doctrine of issue estoppel is
granted and the appeal from the reassessment made under the
Income Tax Act for the 1994 taxation year is allowed, with
costs, and the reassessment is referred back to the Minister of
National Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment in
accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada this 27th day of August, 2001.
J.T.C.C.
Email this Content