Suchon v. The Queen, docket 2000-3531-IT-I (Informal Procedure)

Date: 20011010

Docket: 2000-3531-IT-I

BETWEEN:

JOHN SUCHON,

Appellant,

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,

Respondent.

Reasonsfor Judgment

Margeson, J.T.C.C.

[1]            In the taxation years 1994, 1995 and 1996, the Minister of National Revenue ("Minister") included in the income of the Appellant, disability benefit payments in the amounts of $68,878, $51,821 and $47,760 respectively. The Minister concluded that these amounts received in those years were in respect of, in the course of, or by virtue of an office or employment with IBM.

[2]            The Appellant, in his Notice of Appeal, took the position that even though the disability payments came from his former employer, they should be included as income under paragraph 56(1)(v) and deducted from taxable income under subparagraph 110(1)(f)(ii) of the Income Tax Act ("Act").

[3]            The Appellant called Brett Putland who was a tax auditor with Canada Customs and Revenue Agency. He was referred to Exhibit A-1, which was a letter directed to John Suchon by this witness, dated March 13, 2000, in reference to the taxation years 1994 to 1996. In essence, this was an explanatory letter by the writer regarding the Notice of Objection filed during those years setting out the basis upon which the Minister assessed the Appellant. It was pointed out to the Appellant that the benefits were required to be included in his income from employment under paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act and that subparagraph 56(1)(a)(i) of the Act did not apply to them. Further, it was indicated that the Minister considered that the disability benefits did not come from "insurance plans" and thus subject to paragraph 6(1)(f) of the Act.

[4]            The Appellant also submitted into evidence, by consent, a letter dated November 29, 1999, directed to the Appellant by the same witness. The witness was asked whether or not he followed the rule of "specificity" and the witness replied that he did not. The witness was asked whether he followed any rule at all and he said that at that point he considered T4 and T4A information that was submitted as prima facie evidence that he had reported the income correctly and that the amounts were correctly included in income. It was a question of fact as to what type of income the amounts represented. Further, paragraphs 6(1)(f) and 56(1)(a) of the Act were considered.

[5]            Exhibit A-3 was admitted by consent, which was a letter dated December 2, 1999. It was a letter to John Suchon from the same witness. The witness was asked what was the point of the letter and he responded that it was a response to the Appellant's letter of November 30, 1999 and in reference to telephone conversations with him. In that letter, he pointed out that the Appellant was claiming that it was disability income and not employment income and the witness advised him that they had a letter from IBM, dated July 27, 1994, which referred to sickness and accident payments. Further, he indicated that if he received sickness and accident payments from IBM between 1994 and 1996, and if those payments were included in the employment income and reported on his T4 slips, then those payments would be required to be included in his income under paragraph 6(1)(f) of the Act as payments from a "wage loss replacement plan". He said that the T4 and T4A slips reported the amounts as other income. The witness said that he pointed out in the letter why payments received in 1994, 1995 and 1996 were required to be reported in income. He was asked what the IBM's T4 and T4A slips told him and he said that they indicated that these amounts were reported as income. The witness was merely advising the Appellant under what provisions of the Act these amounts might be taxable.

[6]            He was again referred to Exhibit A-1 and he said that these amounts were not from an insurance plan.

[7]            The witness indicated that the Appellant was not assessed in accordance with the case of Hepburn v. M.N.R., 77 DTC 29, and that these amounts were required to be included in his income under the Act.

[8]            Again, he was asked what he considered to be the basis for the assessment and he said that it was on the basis of T4 and T4A slips, his contact with IBM and his discussions with individuals of IBM to obtain more information regarding the nature of the benefits. On the basis of the information he received, he concluded that they were not proceeds under a superannuation plan or a benefit plan and had to be included in income under paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act as other income.

[9]            The Appellant testified that he started working with IBM in 1966. He held a number of positions in Market Management and became very successful. In 1982 he had a diving accident at an IBM gathering and was paralyzed from the shoulders down. He was off work for two years before going back to work. He worked for a number of years at IBM. His department was transferred to another building and his work environment changed considerably. The work area was not consistent with his needs and he found that it was difficult to control his chair over carpeting and his hands became numb. He could not move himself in the wheelchair and could not use the keyboard or the telephone as he could before. He could no longer work.

[10]          In 1987, he became eligible for the IBM disability program. It was not clear whether IBM was covered by workers' compensation, it was not important as far as he was concerned. The benefits were not superannuation and they were not received from an insurance plan. All the amounts were paid under the long-term disability plan. The company issued T4 and T4A slips and tax was deducted at source.

[11]          In 1993 he tried to get into a business with a friend developing software and making use of the equipment he had gathered over the years. He brought his equipment into the business and tried to write-off these expenses against his personal income. Three years later, in February 1997, he was assessed. The year was close to being statute barred but he paid $9,000 in tax.

[12]          In the years 1994, 1995 and 1996, he was reassessed and all of his deductions, amounting to $25,000, were disallowed with interest. He said that he was now in a position where he owes $25,000 because of the depreciation that was not allowed and about $10,000 interest. He appealed to Canada Customs and Revenue Agency that he should be allowed depreciation on the equipment, but they refused.

[13]          In 1999 he saw an article in the paper about Hepburn, supra, which was a case in which a fire-fighter was contesting the taxability of his disability benefits and they were declared to be non-taxable. Fire-fighters were not part of Worker's Compensation. Worker's Compensation payments are not taxable and these payments were considered to be made in lieu of Worker's Compensation and consequently were non-taxable. He considered his own payments to be of the same type.

[14]          He wrote to Mr. Putland and told him that his situation was identical to the Hepburn situation. Mr. Putland disagreed that they were not taxable and said that they were taxable under paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act.

[15]          In letters that went back and forth between himself and Mr. Putland he attempted to find out why his case was different from that of Mr. Hepburn. He then concluded that the Minister's position was that Mr. Hepburn was receiving his benefits from a superannuation fund which was subject to subparagraph 56(1)(a)(i) of the Act, that the Appellant was receiving his payments from his employer and that they were subject to paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act. This is what he concluded to be the main difference and the only difference.

[16]          In cross-examination he referred to paragraph 13 of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal and he admitted the facts set out in the following paragraphs:

(b)            the Appellant was an employee of IBM when he was injured away from his workplace in or around August of 1982;

(c)            the Appellant returned to work at IBM in or around late 1983;

(but added that he worked full-time up to 1987);

(d)            during the period from 1983 to 1987, the Appellant developed    physical problems which made it more difficult for him to            complete his duties at IBM;

(e)            from the period commencing December 1987 through to June 1993, the Appellant received benefit payments from IBM's Sickness and Accident ("S & A") plan, which were in the nature of fully-paid sick leave granted by the company to employees who were on "short term disability" status;

(except that he added that he received 100 percent of his salary commencing December 1987 through June 1993 and he added that he received 100 percent of his salary also from the time of the accident to December 1987).

(f)             from June 1993 to the present, the Appellant received long term benefit payments from IBM's Medical Disability Income ("MDI") plan;

(with respect to subparagraph (f) he received the benefit payments from IBM's Medical Disability Income Plan and not from IBM's Medical Disability Insurance Plan).

[17]          He agreed with the allegations set out in paragraphs 13(g), (h) and (i) of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal. He did not agree with the allegations in paragraph (i) that the IBM's "MDI" plan was an unfunded contingency plan financed from the company's operating funds.

[18]          He disagreed with paragraph (j) that the disability benefits received by himself from IBM were not for compensation received under an employees' or workers' compensation law. He did not know whether IBM received any workers' compensation payments in respect of his injury. He agreed with paragraph (l). With respect to paragraph (n) he agreed that the disability benefit payments received by himself in the amount of $68,878, $51,821 and $47,760 in the 1994, 1995 and 1996 taxation years respectively were received in those years but he would not agree that they were received in respect of, in the course of, or by virtue of an office or employment with IBM.

[19]          He indicated that after he developed a sharp pain problem in the new workplace, he did not go back to that location, but he did try occasionally to go into other locations to do some work. He was asked whether or not he took the position with IBM that he did not become disabled until 1993 or 1994. He said that he was trying to get IBM not to reduce his income. He was shown a letter from himself to Mr. Casey at IBM, but he said he did not recall any of the information at page 3. He then said that he was the author of it. It referred to three options but he said he really had none. He was being asked to take a salary decrease. They told him that he was going to a level 52 and he had to work full-time. He had been at level 58. It was suggested to him that he used the words "Keep Working at IBM" but he said that he was not working at IBM at that time. Finally, he said that he was not sure as to whether or not he was the author of this material.

[20]          He admitted that he did not file a claim with workers' compensation, that the company did not initiate one and that no board adjudicated a claim on his behalf.

[21]          He identified his 1994, 1995 and 1996 income tax returns. He also identified the documents at Tab-1 of the Respondent's Book of Documents as his T1 forms for 1994, his T1 and his T1A. He agreed that the return for 1994 showed employment income of $68,878. That was the amount shown on his T4.

[22]          He admitted that the dispute with respect to the IBM disability benefits only arose after he filed a Notice of Objection to the years in question objecting to the disallowance of the total business losses that he was claiming. He also identified the 1995 return at Tab-2 and his 1996 return at Tab-3. He also confirmed that he wrote the letter which is found at Tab-4. The whole Book of Documents was admitted into evidence as Exhibit R-1.

[23]          Between 1987 and 1993 he had received sickness and accident benefits covering up to 100 percent of his salary. After that they were paid under the long term disability plan to the same extent. He had only to show that he was disabled. In 1994 he received more than he did in 1995 because he was reduced from 100 percent to 80 percent to 70 percent then to 60 percent. Then he was asked to apply for Canada Pension Plan benefits. He worked at IBM in and out between 1982 and 1993. He agreed that he received the benefit payments because he was an employee at IBM.

[24]          At this point in time, the matter was adjourned for written submissions.

Argument on behalf of the Appellant

[25]          In argument, the Appellant defined the issue as being whether or not the amounts in question are to be included in income under paragraph 56(1)(v) of the Act and are therefore deductible from income in computing taxable income under paragraph 110(1)(f) of the Act. He argued that this paragraph requires the inclusion in income of compensation received under an employees' or workers' compensation law of Canada or a province in respect of an injury, a disability or death. Further, his position was that paragraph 110(1)(f) permits the deduction in computing taxable income for the year or any amount that is:

(ii) compensation received under an employees' or workers' compensation law of Canada or a province in respect of an injury, disability or death, except any such compensation received by a person as the employer or former employer of the person in respect of whose injury, disability or death the compensation was paid,

[26]          The Appellant characterized the Respondent's position as being that the payments did not fall under either paragraphs 56(1)(v) or 110(1)(f) of the Act but are taxable under paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act as income from employment.

[27]          The Appellant set out various facts in the matter which are really not in dispute and have basically been summarized in the Court's findings of facts.

[28]          In essence, the Appellant pointed out that he received short term disability benefits at 100 percent of his regular pay for 1987 until June 1993. In 1993 he began to receive disability benefits under the IBM's long term disability plan. As indicated, the disability benefits were at a sliding percentage of regular pay and after three years became a fixed amount.

[29]          He pointed out that at the time of his injury neither himself nor IBM reported this to the Workers' Compensation Board ("WCB") since under IBM's plan it does not matter whether you were injured at work as you are eligible for IBM disability benefits in either case. The Appellant was unaware whether IBM was a part of the workers' compensation system in 1987 or whether a worker such as he would be covered by the WCB plan as it existed in 1987. In any event, there was no reason for him to go to that plan since the IBM plan provided benefits higher than workers' compensation.

[30]          During the period when his 1994, 1995 and 1996 income tax returns were being audited by Canada Customs and Revenue Agency he became aware of the Hepburn case through an article he had read. The article indicated that Mr. Hepburn had been successful in having his benefits declared non-taxable. Further inquiry lead him to conclude that:

(1)             workers' compensation payments were not taxable; and

(2)                   although Mr. Hepburn was receiving the disability benefits from his employer, the City of Toronto, these disability benefits were considered in lieu of workers' compensation and therefore were not taxable.

[31]          The Appellant made the same argument to the Appeals Officer who did not share his views and who indicated that he was not entitled to a deduction under subparagraph 110(1)(f)(ii) of the Act for the years in question. Further, the officer indicated to him that the benefits had to be included in his income from an office or employment under paragraph 6(1)(a).

[32]          In his analysis, the Appellant concluded that the Minister had decided that the benefits were excluded from the inclusion/exclusion provisions at paragraphs 56(1)(v) and 110(1)(f) because:

(1)             His disability benefits were in respect of employment and are taxable under paragraph 6(1)(a) as employment income.

(2)             His compensation was not received under an employee's or worker's compensation law of Canada or a province.

(3)             Compensation has to be an award as adjudicated by the WCB.

(4)             Payments have to be made by the WCB.

[33]          The Appellant proposed as follows: Are Mr. Suchon's disability benefits taxable under paragraph 6(1)(a)?

[34]          Since Mr. Suchon was receiving disability benefits that were payable on a periodic basis in respect of loss of income from employment, his disability benefits could be considered a "wage loss replacement plan" subject to paragraph 6(1)(f) of the Act. This was the initial position which the Minister took in his letter to the Appellant dated December 2, 1999. In a final assessment his conclusion was that the long term disability plan would not meet the definition of a "wage loss replacement plan" as outlined in the Interpretation Bulletin IT-428, since the plan was not funded in accordance with insurance principles. Therefore, from the employee's perspective the benefits would be included in his or her income under paragraph 6(1)(a) rather than 6(1)(f) of the Act.

[35]          Even though the IBM disability plan does not meet the requirements of a "wage loss replacement plan", paragraph 6(1)(f) is still a specific paragraph of the Act which deals with amounts that are payable on a periodic basis in respect of the loss of income from employment.

[36]          As stated by Judge Bowman in Landry v. The Queen, 98 DTC 1416, paragraph 6(1)(f) deals specifically and in detail with disability benefits payable on a periodic basis. Further, as stated by Judge Lamarre in Whitehouse v. The Queen, 2000 DTC 1616, paragraph 6(1)(a) is a general provision and is not intended to fill in the gaps left by paragraph 6(1)(f) - expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

[37]          It is well established that a specific rule takes precedence over a more general rule dealing with the same subject matter. Thus, in The Queen v. Albino, (1994) 1 CTC 205, an amount taxable as a "retiring allowance" under subparagraph 56(1)(a)(ii) was not included in the general inclusion for employment income in subsection 6(3). The principle was applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in other tax cases, such as: Symes v. Canada, (1994) 1 CTC 40 at 65, where specific rules for child-care expenses took precedence over the general rules for business income, and Schwartz v. The Queen, (1996) 1 CTC 303 at 330, where the specific rules for retiring allowances took precedence over the general rules for including income from a source.

[38]          As pointed out by Judge Lamarre in Whitehouse and in Schwartz, supra, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the notion that a general provision of the Act would take precedence over a detailed provision of the Act which Parliament had chosen to deal with the taxability of such payments. Since Parliament has enacted paragraph 6(1)(f) to deal with periodic disability payments, it is submitted that the Supreme Court's statement is relevant, and that a more general provision, paragraph 6(1)(a), should not take precedence. Accordingly, the Appellant's disability benefits are not taxable under paragraph 6(1)(a).

[39]          With respect to the compensation not being received under an employee's or workers' compensation law of Canada or a province, the Appellant referred to Whitney v. Canada, 2001 DTC 423 where the Honourable D.G.H. Bowman, Associate Chief Judge, stated at page 428, paragraph 20(b):

The overall scheme of paragraphs 56(1)(v) and 110(1)(f) of the Income Tax Act is that payments of compensation to injured employees who cannot work are not taxable.

[40]          Judge Bowman was concerned that the spirit and intent of paragraphs 56(1)(v) and 110(1)(f) should be followed even though the taxpayer was receiving disability benefits from her employer and not from WCB, and even though the amounts were not an award adjudicated by the WCB.

[41]          Referring again to Hepburn, supra, when explaining his decision to allow Mr. Hepburn's appeal, Chairman Flanigan stated that:

This decision must not be viewed as being in derogation of the principle that taxing statutes must be strictly interpreted, but that they should be so interpreted in the light of social changes.

Chairman Flanigan allowed that Mr. Hepburn's disability benefits were received as compensation under an employees' or worker's compensation law of Canada or Province even though they were paid from a fund which was jointly funded with the employer and the amounts were not an award as adjudicated by a WCB.

[42]          Mr. Suchon was injured in the workplace, which is an essential condition of eligibility under Workplace Law to receive workers' compensation payments. Even though he was receiving disability benefits from his employer and even though his benefits were not an award as adjudicated by the WCB, from Whitney and from Hepburn, supra, these conditions still allow that he received compensation under an employees' or workers' compensation law of Canada or a province. This makes his disability benefits eligible for the inclusion/exclusion provisions of paragraphs 56(1)(v) and 110(1)(f).

[43]          With respect to the argument that compensation has to be an award as adjudicated by the WCB, the Appellant proposed that in Hepburn, supra, and in Tushingham v. M.N.R., 80 DTC 1238 (Tax Review Board), the disability benefits came from the Toronto Fire Department Superannuation and Benefit Fund, which is described as the "Benefit Fund" and which is jointly funded by the employer, the City of Toronto. In Whitney, supra, the worker received her regular pay from her employer in accordance with article 27.01 of the collective agreement and not from the WCB.

[44]          The amounts which Mr. Suchon was receiving as disability benefit payments were a reduced percentage of his regular pay. As with the firemen and Ms. Whitney his eligibility for disability benefits was determined by a board. The IBM Human Resources Board which consisted of the IBM Medical Director, the Vice President of Human Resources and the Director of Human Resources determined that he was eligible, according to Mr. Suchon's evidence.

[45]          In the Whitney, Hepburn and Tushingham, cases, the compensation amounts were not an award as adjudicated by the WCB. Mr. Suchon's compensation amounts were specified as a percentage of salary and were a condition of employment. This method of determining the compensation amount is consistent with the arrangements in the three referenced cases.

[46]          With respect to the argument that payments have to be from the WCB, the Appellant pointed out that in Whitney, supra, the Appellant received her regular pay from her employer and not from the WCB. Further, from Hepburn and Tushingham, supra, their disability benefit payments did not come from the WCB. They were receiving disability benefits paid from a fund which was jointly funded with the employer. The Appellant referred to a compensation procedure (which was not referred to in the evidence) and argued that the benefits were received from his former employer through a contingent liability fund specifically set up for long term disability payments. This method of compensation was consistent with the three referenced cases, according to him.

[47]          Further, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency has acknowledged that payments from an employer can be included under paragraph 56(1)(v).

[48]          In summary, the Appellant argued that his disability benefits should be included/excluded under the provisions of paragraphs 56(1)(v) and 110(1)(f) because:

(1)         Paragraph 6(1)(f) deals specifically and in detail with periodic disability payments and paragraph 6(1)(a) which is a general provision cannot be used as a catch-all to fill in the gaps left by paragraph 6(1)(f).

(2)         The disability benefits have the same characteristics as those in Whitney and in Hepburn, supra, where it was ruled that this is compensation received under an employees' or worker's compensation law of Canada or a province.

(3)         These disability benefits are consistent with those two cases which decided that compensation does not have to be an award as adjudicated by the WCB.

(4)          Payments do not have to come from the WCB in order to be considered as compensation under an employees' or workers' compensation law of Canada or a province. Canada Customs and Revenue Agency acknowledges that payments can come from an employer or former employer and that a methodology exists to tax only amounts in excess of workers' compensation ceilings.

[49]          In Whitney, supra, the Honourable D.G.H. Bowman ruled that workers' compensation payments received from the employer which were equal to the amounts that would have been received directly from the WCB are to be included in the Appellant's income under paragraph 56(1)(v) of the Act and deducted from the Appellant's income under paragraph 110(1)(f) of the Act.

[50]          In Hepburn, supra, the Tax Review Board ruled that even though Mr. Hepburn was not receiving his disability benefit payments from the WCB these payments were compensation for disability on the job and therefore fall under paragraph 56(1)(v) of the Act and are exempt from tax.

[51]          The facts in the case at bar are very similar to both Whitney and Hepburn, supra. These disability benefits should be found to be compensation under an employees' on worker's compensation law of Canada or a province, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 56(1)(v) and 110(1)(f), as in Whitney and Hepburn, supra.

[52]          As the Honourable Judge Bowman stated in Whitney, supra, at page 428, paragraph 20(c):

Moreover, the Crown's interpretation, if adopted, would lead to an absurdity . . . Where the two interpretations are possible and one leads to an absurdity and one does not, the latter must be chosen: Victoria City v. Bishop of Vancouver Island, [1921] 2 A.C. 384 at 388 (P.C.).

This observation applies in the case at bar.

[53]          The Appellant did not have to go through workers' compensation because IBM was obliged to pay him the disability benefits under the IBM plan. It is argued that if he had gone to workers' compensation he would have been found to qualify for benefits. It is absurd that his benefits are taxable just because his employer was obligated to pay him regardless of the cause of the injury. The fact remains, he was paid as a result of an injury at work, so it should be considered worker's compensation.

[54]          Further, as the Honourable Judge Bowman stated in Whitney, supra, at page 428, paragraph 20(d):

If there were any ambiguity or doubt in the application or interpretation of the legislation that doubt must be resolved in favour of the subject. (Fries v. The Queen, 90 DTC 6662, (S.C.C.))

[55]          The appeals should be allowed, with costs.

Argument on behalf of the Respondent

[56]          Counsel took the overall position that the benefit payments in issue were taxable pursuant to paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act as, "a benefit received by the Appellant in respect of, in the course of, or by virtue of his employment" with IBM. He conceded that paragraph 6(1)(f) of the Act does not apply to the benefit payments in issue in this case.

[57]          Counsel noted that in paragraph 16 of the Argument on behalf of the Appellant, the Appellant had referred to four assumptions, which he suggested formed the reasons for the assessment of the benefit payments by the Minister pursuant to paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act. But as counsel pointed out the Appellant was assessed on the basis of the assumptions of fact made by the Minister as set forth in paragraph 13 of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal.

[58]          He said that the Appellant testified that in order for him to be eligible to receive the benefits he had to be an employee of IBM; he had to be disabled; the eligibility did not require that the employee demonstrate the cause of disability. Whether or not the injury occurred 'on the job' was irrelevant in considering his eligibility for benefits.

[59]          There was no evidence that Mr. Suchon's eligibility for the MDI plan was tied to or related in any manner whatsoever to the workers' compensation scheme. Further, the Appellant has never filed a workers' compensation claim; no one else filed a claim for workers' compensation on behalf of the Appellant, such as his doctor or employer; neither the WCB nor an employee's compensation board adjudicated a claim whereby the Appellant was awarded benefits; no one from IBM was on a WCB; the Appellant did not know whether IBM received any worker's compensation payments in respect of his injury; the Appellant did not know whether IBM was registered with the WCB during the relevant period; the Appellant did not even consider claiming workers' compensation with respect to his disability because he believed that the benefits that he would receive under the workers' compensation system would be lower than the IBM benefits that he was receiving. Under the short term disability plan he received 100 percent of his salary from 1987 to 1993. Under the MDI plan, benefits were paid to him on a sliding scale from 80 percent to 60 percent of his salary.

[60]          Counsel disputed any statement or suggestion in the Appellant's Argument that his disability was work-related. It may very well be that the Appellant believed that his disability was work-related but the evidence did not support such a finding and the benefits were paid regardless of whether or not his disability was work-related. There was no evidence that IBM ever concluded that the disability was work-related, such a determination was not required. Counsel took issue with the Appellant's reference in his Argument to the "IBM Human Resources Board". The existence of such a board was not supported by the evidence. There was no evidentiary basis for the Appellant's statement that the "IBM Human Resources Board . . . determined that he was eligible" for benefits.

[61]          Further, he disputed that there was any evidentiary basis for statements contained in paragraph 11 of the Argument for the Appellant. There was no evidence as to the reason why IBM did not report the injury to the WCB. There was only Mr. Suchon's explanation as to why he did not report it.

[62]          The Appellant stated that it was not clear whether IBM was part of the workers' compensation system in 1987. However, Mr. Suchon could have called a representative from IBM or the WCB to give evidence on this point. Since he did not he cannot rely on his failure to lead sufficient evidence to advance his case.

[63]          With respect to the Appellant's statement that the IBM plan provided benefits higher than workers' compensation during the 1987 to 1993 period, when Mr. Suchon was receiving 100 percent of his salary, this was only the personal belief of Mr. Suchon concerning the differential between the two and there was no evidence corroborating his position in that regard from either IBM or the WCB. Further, there was no suggestion that Mr. Suchon has taken into account that the IBM benefits were taxable and the workers' compensation benefits were not.

[64]          Counsel further objected to multiple references in the Argument of the Appellant to documents and information which were not placed into evidence, particularly the attachments 1 through 6. It was his position that the Appellant was attempting to enter as evidence in his written argument material to which the Respondent could not reply. Counsel asked that all reference to these documents, and information contained therein, ought to be disregarded by this Court in reaching its decision.

[65]          Counsel also took issue with the reference by the Appellant in his Argument to a document referred to as "EXHIBIT NO. A-1, NOTES" and pointed out that the additional six pages attached to copy of the March 13th letter were not identified nor was the Appellant examined on the content of these pages. He did not consent to admitting the additional six pages into evidence and the Court should give no weight to these additional six pages as they were never identified. In any event, they constituted hearsay.

[66]          He pointed out that the wording of paragraph 6(1)(a) is very broad and includes as income from an office or employment the value of:

"benefits of any kind whatever received or enjoyed by him in the year in respect, in the course of, or by virtue of an office or employment . . ."

[67]          In Nowegijick v. The Queen, 83 DTC 5041 at 5045, Justice Dickson of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the phrase "in respect of" (in that case found in section 87 of the Act) is "probably the widest of any expression intended to convey some connection between two related subject matters".

[68]          In The Queen v. Savage, 83 DTC 5409, Mr. Justice Dickson, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the Crown that an amount received as a reward for passing a course examination was a benefit received by the taxpayer from employment within the meaning of paragraph 6(1)(a), and therefore taxable unless excluded as a "prize" by paragraph 56(1)(n). Mr. Justice Dickson noted that the meaning of "benefit of whatever kind" is "clearly quite broad". A payment can come within section 6 without necessarily being remuneration for services, as the words "in respect of" are words of "the widest possible scope". Any material acquisition which confers an economic benefit on the taxpayer and does not constitute an exemption falls within "the all-embracing definition" of paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act.

[69]          Counsel took the position that the benefit payments received by the Appellant in this case were not payments made pursuant to an "insurance plan" and were therefore not included in income under paragraph 6(1)(f) of the Act. The Appellant's situation was distinguishable from cases such as Landry and Whitehouse, supra, where lump-sum settlements received from an insurance company, even if they did not fall within the "periodic" payment requirement of paragraph 6(1)(f), would in any event be viewed as payments received qua insured, not qua employee. (See Landry, Whitehouse at paragraph 9; Dumas v. The Queen, (2000) DTC 2603; and Cook v. The Queen, (1994) 95 DTC 853.

[70]          Some meaning must be given to paragraph 6(1)(a). If the Court accepted the interpretation proposed by the Appellant, the Court could be required to treat paragraph 6(1)(a) as ineffectual. This offends the rule of statutory interpretation requiring that each part of an enactment be given meaning. (See Trans World Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Canada, 95 DTC 260 (T.C.C.); appeal dismissed 95 DTC 6060 (F.C.A.), at page 9; and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3^rd ed., Ruth Sullivan, pages 159-160.)

[71]          Counsel was prepared to admit that there appeared to be some divergence of opinions by the Judges of the Tax Court of Canada concerning the application of paragraphs 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(f) of the Act in situations where an insurer makes a lump sum payment. In addition to the cases of Landry and Whitehouse, supra, cited by the Appellant, there are other recent decisions that have instead followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in Savage to hold that the words of paragraph 6(1)(a) are to be given the widest possible scope. In Dumas, supra, the Honourable Judge Mogan declined to apply Landry by distinguishing it on its facts and commenting that it was only an informal appeal. (See Dumas, supra, at paragraphs 26 and 15; Cook, supra, at paragraph 11; and Cave v. The Queen, [1999] T.C.J. No. 735 (Q.L.).

[72]          Furthermore, the Courts have held that one must be wary of the indiscriminate use of maxims such as expressio unius est exclusio alterius, particularly where it is sought to apply it to two different paragraphs within the same section. (See Trans World Oil & Gas Ltd., supra, at pages 9-10.)

[73]          It was the position of Counsel for the Respondent that the Supreme Court of Canada, in Savage, supra, has specified that the meaning of paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act is broad and of wide scope. Uninsured benefit payments, such as the MDI plan benefits, received in respect of or by virtue of employment fall within the broad ambit of paragraph 6(1)(a) and not within paragraph 6(1)(f). The benefit payments in this case were clearly received qua employee and not qua insured.

[74]          The benefit payments received by the Appellant should not be included in income as workers' compensation payments within the meaning of paragraph 56(1)(v) of the Act, and are therefore not deductible under subparagraph 110(1)(f)(ii) of the Act.

[75]          The payments in question do not fall within the plain meaning of paragraph 56(1)(v) which refers to:

"compensation received under an employees' or workers' compensation law of Canada or a province in respect of an injury, a disability or death."

[76]          Counsel opined that the Supreme Court of Canada has adopted a plain meaning approach in recent cases such as, Shell Canada Ltd. v. The Queen, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 622 (S.C.C.), at paragraph 40; 65302 B.C. Ltd. v. The Queen, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 804; and Will-Kare Paving & Contracting Ltd. v. The Queen, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 915.

[77]          The phrase "employees' or workers' compensation law" has a well-settled legal meaning which is well-understood. If the province chooses to import a phrase which is well-understood and well-defined in law outside of the Act, it would not be appropriate to apply a different interpretation. (See Will-Kare Paving & Contracting Ltd., supra; Interpretation Bulletin IT-202R2, paragraph 1; and Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 539, as amended to December, 1987, Government Employees Compensation Act, R.S. c.G-8.; and Whitney, supra, at page 1, 10 (appeal by the Crown to the Federal Court of Appeal now pending.)

[78]          The Appellant's characterization of the IBM benefit payments as such compensation is contestable. See Vincent v. M.N.R., 1988 CarswellNat 416, T.C.C., where Judge Sarchuk held that the reference "in paragraph 56(1)(v) of the Act to an employees' or workers' compensation law of Canada or a province is a reference to specific enactments which are intended to provide compensation, medical assistance and services and pensions for employees injured on the job which are funded for the most part by compulsory employer contributions". Mr. Suchon did not receive such payments.

[79]          The case of Whitney, supra, does not aid the Appellant as it can be distinguished on the facts as the benefits were paid as a result of a work-related accident and the basis for the claim was accepted by the provincial workplace Health and Safety Commission and the procedures for claiming benefits complied with the Workers Compensation Act of New Brunswick.

[80]          Hepburn, supra, is distinguishable from the case at bar because Mr. Hepburn was entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits in that case. He was paid for four years under the workmen's compensation scheme, and only thereafter started receiving the benefits under the Fire Department's Superannuation and Benefit Fund. In such circumstances, the Tax Review Board viewed the fund benefits as a "substitution" for workers' compensation. In the case at bar however, Mr. Suchon never received such a workers' compensation award. Counsel distinguished Tushingham, supra, on the same basis.

[81]          Counsel also referred to the 1997 subsequent and unreported decision of the Tax Court of Canada in Hepburn, supra, rendered orally on September 17, 1997, where counsel concluded that Judge Bonner stated that the Minister was wrong in finding that the compensation received by the Appellant for an injury sustained in his accident was income by virtue of paragraph 56(1)(v). Judge Bonner noted that the compensation was paid under a municipal by-law and not under any law of Canada or province as contemplated by paragraph 56(1)(v) of the Act.

[82]          Counsel argued that the Respondent's position in the case at bar was consistent with the administrative practice of the Minister in his application of these provisions. The Respondent's position with respect to the inapplicability of paragraph 56(1)(v) is consistent with Interpretation Bulletin IT-202R2.

[83]          However, in either scenario as recognized in the Bulletin, a claim is filed with the WCB and the WCB makes a determination as to entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. In the case at bar, the Appellant did not receive workers' compensation, nor did he receive payments from the employer in substitution for workers' compensation. No claim was filed with the WCB and no determination of entitlement to workers' compensation benefits was made.

[84]          Counsel pointed out that the interpretation bulletins and administrative policy, do not bind the Court, the taxpayer, nor the Minister. These extrinsic aids might be a factor in some cases of doubt about the meaning of the legislation. However, in the case of the language of the legislation, here, the language is clear and there is no doubt as to its proper interpretation.

[85]          Further, the Minister's interpretation is consistent with the position taken by the Respondent in this appeal. On the other hand, the Appellant is selectively reading isolated portions of the interpretation bulletins and other documents out of context. When read as a whole, it is clear that the Minister's policy, as set out in Interpretation Bulletin IT-202R2 and elsewhere, to include certain amounts received from employers in income under paragraph 56(1)(v) of the Act, only applies to situations where the employee receives workers' compensation, and not to any and all amounts received by an employee from an employer.

[86]          There is a fatal flaw in the Appellant's case as stated in paragraph 38 of his Argument. In that paragraph, the Appellant stated that "if he had gone to workers' compensation he would have been found to qualify for benefits". The Appellant did not prove that he received the MDI plan benefits as a result of a work-related injury, despite his personal and perhaps even genuine belief that it was so.

[87]          Further, the Appellant's statement that he would have qualified for benefits had he applied for benefits underscores the practical importance of the requirement in the provisions that the compensation be received under an employees' or workers' compensation law of Canada or a province. There is certainty with respect to the application of paragraphs 56(1)(v) and 110(1)(f) of the Act where the Minister can point to an adjudication of a provincial or federal employees' or WCB. There will be uncertainty in the application of these provisions if the Court allows the Appellant's appeal on the basis of what the WCB might have adjudicated in the event that the Appellant had applied for the benefits.

[88]          In summation, counsel argued that benefit payments received by the Appellant from IBM were not received under an employees' or workers' compensation law of Canada or a province. There has been no adjudication by the WCB or any similar board, that Mr. Suchon's disability was work-related. The benefits were payable to Mr. Suchon regardless of the cause of his disability. There is no evidence that eligibility for the benefits was tied to or in any way related to workers' compensation law.

[89]          The appeal should be dismissed.

Reply to Respondent's Submissions

[90]          In the Reply to Respondent's submission, the Appellant took issue with the Respondent's position that Mr. Suchon's injury was not work-related, that the cases of Whitney, Hepburn and Tushingham are distinguishable from the facts in the present case, that Mr. Suchon's disability payments do not fall within the plain meaning of paragraph 56(1)(v) and that paragraph 6(1)(a) applies because it has such broad meaning.

[91]          Further, the position of the Appellant was that there was evidence that Mr. Suchon's injury happened at work, that it was not a requirement of paragraph 56(1)(v) that there must be adjudication of the WCB that his injury was work-related. He also took issue with the reasons that the Respondent gave for distinguishing the Whitney, Hepburn and Tushingham cases and argued that the meaning of paragraph 56(1)(v) does not play in favour of the Minister's position and finally opined that paragraph 6(1)(a) does not apply since the more specific paragraph, 56(1)(v) applies.

[92]          The Appellant relies heavily upon the decision of Judge Bowman in Whitney, supra. He says that this case cannot be distinguished from the facts in the present case as Judge Bowman's ruling was based upon the purposes of paragraphs 56(1)(v) and 110(1)(f) of the Act and this ruling should apply to Mr. Suchon's payments.

[93]          The Appellant, referring again to Hepburn, supra, argued that it could not be distinguished from the facts in the present case and that Chairman Flanigan could not have been relying on workman's compensation payments which might have happened 19 years earlier as a basis for the statement that the Toronto Fire Department's Plan was a "substitution" for workers' compensation. He opined that a more likely, realistic interpretation would be that "substitution" means that the Toronto Fire Department Plan was in fact a substitute for workers' compensation, not that it means that the Toronto Fire Department Plan was identical to the Workmen's Compensation Plan. Likewise, the IBM Plan is also a substitution for workers' compensation.

[94]          Finally, the Appellant relied upon a non-legal argument, which he said was rooted in common sense and equitable treatment, in stating that Mr. Suchon is being penalized for not accepting government handouts from an already overburdened welfare system. By not applying to the WCB he is saving the government a considerable amount of money each year which is the equivalent of the workers' compensation ceiling for 1994.

[95]          He further opined that if the Court accepted Mr. Suchon's position, there would be a loss in provincial and federal taxes, but there would be an overall saving to the government since he is not receiving workers' compensation payments. (It is to be noted that no evidence was introduced to support this argument even if it could be considered by the Court).

[96]          The Appellant took the position that in this case, there may remain a reasonable doubt as to the correct interpretation of the legislation. This doubt should be settled by recourse to the residual presumption in favour of the taxpayer, and no tax should be applied.

[97]          The Appellant took issue with statements made by Counsel for the Respondent in his written submission with respect to whether or not the Court should give any weight to information which he considered to be hearsay such as that referred to in "Exhibit A-1, Memo for file". The Appellant argued that these notes could not be considered hearsay since the statements only referred to factual items and the statements were made by IBM experts in their areas. Further, Mr. Putman was fully examined on the "Memo for file", which comments were made by him in official investigative format and it must be considered as valid evidence.

Analysis and Decision

[98]          In this particular case the Appellant was not represented by counsel. This matter was discussed at the opening of the hearing and the Court is satisfied that the Appellant was given every reasonable opportunity to avail himself of counsel. He chose not to do so. If his failure to obtain counsel results in a shortfall in the elicitation of necessary or cogent facts upon which he intends to rely, then that shortfall cannot be corrected by the Court and the Court cannot rely upon facts which are attempted to be placed into evidence at the time of argument.

[99]          During the course of this trial questions arose as to the admissibility of certain evidence and the Court made its rulings at that time. The parties well understood what the result of the Court's rulings were at that time and that the Court could not rely upon any facts which were not placed into evidence in the course of the trial. This decision has to be made on the basis of evidence which was admitted by the Court during the trial.

[100]        That being said, one could surmise that had the Appellant been represented by counsel, in light of the arguments made in written submissions, he probably would have desired to present evidence in detail with respect to the nature of his claim, how it was made, whether or not it was adjudicated upon by any board, whether or not IBM was a part of the Workmen's Compensation Plan scheme of Ontario, what was required under the Workmen's Compensation Plan scheme of Ontario in order for them to have been considered eligible to receive compensation benefits or how his factual situation brought him within the purview of the various sections of the Act upon which he relied for his relief.

[101]        Such a course of action by the Appellant may or may not have been crucial to his cause but in any event, presentation of such evidence may have placed the case in a different perspective.

[102]        However, subject to that limitation, the Court is satisfied that it has before it sufficient evidence of the factual situation which gives rise to the present case. Indeed the factual situation is neither complicated nor confusing.

[103]        The evidence makes it clear that in 1982, while the Appellant was employed by IBM, he had a diving accident at a gathering organized by his employers and was paralysed from the shoulders down. Surely that is the injury which ultimately gave rise to his claim for disability benefits, which is now the subject matter of this case, and it was not the transfer from one department to another building and the change of his work environment. This was found to be inconsistent with his needs and his ability to perform the functions required of him. This ultimately gave rise to the disability payments. These conditions were merely subsequent manifestations of the earlier injury that he had received at the IBM gathering.

[104]        There was no evidence adduced with respect to the IBM gathering from which the Court could conclude that this was "work-related" or not. Certainly, if the active factor that gave rise to the disability payments were the subsequent difficulties which he developed sometime after the accident, then there could be no doubt that such an event was work-related.

[105]        Counsel for the Respondent contended that the accident in this case which gave rise to the claim for benefits was not work-related but this was only one of the factors which he illicited in his argument that these benefits had to be claimed as income under paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act, as other income.

[106]        On the other hand, the Appellant contended that there was no issue about whether or not the accident that gave rise to his claim for benefits was "work-related" and he assumed that the Respondent had accepted that it was. This was certainly an area that would have been more completely explored had the Appellant been represented by counsel. However, this is not a determinative factor in the Court's decision in this case.

[107]        To put it in a nutshell, the Appellant basically claims that the factual situation in this case is identical to the factual situation found in Hepburn, Tushingham and Whitney, supra. Particularly, the Appellant submits that the Court should find in his favour, on the most important point, which is that his payments are compensation received under an employee's or workers' compensation law of Canada or a province (or a substitute for same) in accordance with paragraph 56(1)(v). The Appellant in his submission referred to the case of Corporation Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours v. CommunautéUrbaine de Quebec and City of Quebec et al., 95 DTC 5017, which was a statement by the Supreme Court with respect to the principles that should apply when interpreting tax legislation. It is referred to as the "teleological" approach.

[108]        The Appellant submits that on the basis of these principles this Court should find that a specific rule overrides a general rule and thus, paragraph 56(1)(v) takes precedence over paragraph 6(1)(a), a general provision, where both can apply.

[109]        The Appellant argues that the purposes of paragraphs 56(1)(v) and 110(1)(f), which are the so-called inclusion/exclusion provisions are there to exempt compensation for work-caused injury, that the purpose is liberal. It is a tax-related provision and the provision should be given a liberal rather than a strict interpretation.

[110]        Further, the Appellant argues that the Federal Court of Appeal has ruled that the Court should apply a "humane and compassionate" approach to parallel section 118.3, dealing with disability tax credits, and that there is an obvious parallel between that section and the sections involving the disability payment as presented in this case.

[111]        On the other hand, in his written submission, counsel for the Respondent submits that the provisions that the Appellant seeks to rely upon to avoid the tax implications do not apply to the present factual situation. The Appellant was not injured in a work-related accident, there was no adjudication by any board or any authority which might be similar to an authority set up under an employee or workers' compensation law of Canada or province, that the disability payments received by the Appellant are taxable and are required to be included in income from employment, as other income, under paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act.

[112]        Counsel for the Respondent further submitted that the legislation is clear and unequivocal, there is no ambiguity in the excepting provisions of paragraph 56(1)(v) or subparagraph 110(1)(f)(ii). To be deducted under this subparagraph the compensation must be received under an employee or the workers' compensation law of Canada or a province in respect of an injury, disability or death. This is not the factual situation in the case at bar. Counsel did not find any difficulty in allowing a specific section and a general section to co-exist in the same statute. However, in this case the Appellant's payments were not deductible under this specific section and they fell in to taxable income under the so-called general provisions of paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act.

[113]        Both counsel referred to a number of cases in support of their position and were able to find solace in the pronouncements in those cases even though the end result of the cases may not have been in support of their ultimate position. The cases referred to, as in all cases, turn on the individual facts and none of them can be said to have been completely on all fours with the facts in the present case. Consequently, the Court must apply the specific facts in this case to the law as it interprets it in order to reach its decision.

[114]        It is the Court's position that the role of Parliament is supreme in the institution of legislation. This Court does not see its purpose as that of substituting its opinion for the intention of Parliament where that intention is clear. Neither does this Court see its purpose as attempting to interpret a piece of legislation in such a way that the result would produce something which was clearly different from that which was intended by Parliament.

[115]        The only time that a Court should have to decide whether to give a strict or liberal interpretation to a statute, conclude that a specific rule overrides a general rule or to go further as the Appellant suggests and apply "a humane and compassionate" approach is when there is some ambiguity in the statute and the intention of Parliament is not clear on the face of the statute.

[116]        The principles of interpretation of tax legislation as set out in Bon-Secours, supra, are applicable in the case at bar and they must be followed. That case makes it clear that the interpretation of tax legislation should follow the ordinary rules of interpretation. This Court interprets that to mean that it should only go beyond the ordinary rules of interpretation when the intention of Parliament is not clear. The teleological approach may favour the taxpayer or the tax department depending solely on the legislative provision in question and not on the existence of predetermined presumptions. The Court must prefer substance over form to the extent that this is consistent with the wording and objective of the statute.

[117]        In the case at bar the Court finds that the purpose and intent of the statute is clear from a reading of the various sections which are in issue here.

[118]        Paragraph 6(1)(a) makes it clear that "the value of board, lodging and other benefits of any kind whatever received or enjoyed by a taxpayer in the year in respect of, in the course of, or by virtue of an office or employment," must be included in income. This may commonly be referred to as a general section but surely it is of equal importance and significance with a so-called "specific section" except where there is an ambiguity in the Statute. Paragraph 56(1)(v) and subparagraph 110(1)(f)(ii) have been referred to as specific sections and the argument is that where both a specific section and a general section may apply, the Court should apply the specific section. However, surely this is only so where the so-called specific section acts to exempt from taxable income a payment or receipt such as that received as in the case at bar. If the specific section does not apply to the payment in question then the Court must apply the general section even though it may be very broad in its application and of wide scope. See Savage, supra.

[119]        From a clear reading of the sections referred to, there is no doubt in the Court's mind that what the Appellant received in the case at bar was not "compensation received under an employee's or workers' compensation law of Canada or a province in respect of an injury, a disability or death as set out in paragraph 56(1)(v) and subparagraph 110(1)(f)(ii). Therefore, the Court has to decide whether they would fall under the provisions of paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act. The Court is satisfied that they can.

[120]        The only other way that the Appellant can receive the relief that he requests in this case is if the Court should find that the payments that he received were a substitute for compensation received under an employee's or workers' compensation law of Canada or province and that Parliament must have intended that such a substitution was meant to be included in the exempting provisions under subparagraph 110(1)(f)(ii).

[121]        The Appellant, in essence, is asking the Court to conclude that any scheme which has some of the attributes of a Workmens' Compensation Plan scheme, no matter how many of the attributes are missing, should be considered to be the equivalent of or a substitution for such a scheme and should be included under this exempting provision. In other words, if something has one of the attributes of a duck, such as walking like a duck or appearing like a duck then it must be a duck, even though it does not possess the other requisite attributes. This Court can find no basis for such a conclusion in this legislation, which it finds to be quite clear.

[122]        In the end result, the Court is satisfied that the scheme under which the Appellant received the disability payments in question here were not "compensation received under an employees' or workers' compensation law of Canada or a province in respect of an injury, a disability or a death;" nor were these benefits received under any plan or arrangement which was a substitution for such a workers' compensation scheme of Canada or a province.

[123]        The Court is satisfied that such benefits are not intended to be included in this exempting provision and if Parliament had intended that it be so, it could very easily have stated that in the legislation. However, it did not. It specifically exempted a certain type of payment, did not include the payment in question in the exemption, and the payment is caught by the provisions of paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act.

[124]        This Court has taken into account the very able submissions put forward on the basis of Hepburn, Tushingham and Whitney and other cases offered by the Appellant in his submission. But to find that the benefits received in this case were made as compensation under an employees' or workers' compensation law as required by paragraph 56(1)(v) would be stretching the interpretation of the section beyond recognition.

[125]        It may very well be that, "the overall scheme of paragraphs 56(1)(v) and 110(1)(f) of the Act is that payments of compensation to injured employees who cannot work are not taxable but in order to be non-taxable, they must meet the specific requirements of that section and the payments in question here do not. These payments were made on the basis of a disability plan put in place by the company itself and even though they may have some attributes of a compensation scheme, payable under the federal or provincial legislation, they were not the same thing and they do not meet the requirements of the definition set out in the sections referred to.

[126]        Further, the Court finds that the benefit payments received by the Appellant were not payments made pursuant to an "insurance plan" and therefore are not to be included as income under paragraph 6(1)(f) of the Act.

[127]        Counsel for the Respondent opined that "there appears to be somewhat of a divergence of opinions under this subject among the judges of this honorable Court concerning the application of paragraphs 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(f) of the Act in situations where an insurer makes a lump sum payment, but in this case as in any other, this Court must be bound by the particular facts of the case. In the case of Whitney, supra, the facts are quite similar to the facts in the case at bar, however, they are not on all fours with the case at bar. Findings of other cases referred to by both counsel are not inconsistent with the findings of this Court.

[128]        In the end result, the appeals are dismissed and the Minister's assessment is confirmed.

Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 10th day of October 2001.

"T.E. Margeson"

J.T.C.C.

COURT FILE NO.:                                                 2000-3531(IT)I

STYLE OF CAUSE:                                               John Suchon and Her Majesty the Queen

PLACE OF HEARING:                                         Toronto, Ontario

DATE OF HEARING:                                           March 27, 2001

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:      The Hon. Judge T. Margeson

DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                       October 10, 2001

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:                                                 The Appellant himself

Counsels for the Respondent:            Livia Singer

                                                                                Kelly Smith-Wayland

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For the Appellant:                

Name:                               

Firm:                 

For the Respondent:                             Morris Rosenberg

                                                                                Deputy Attorney General of Canada

                                                                                                Ottawa, Canada

2000-3531(IT)I

BETWEEN:

JOHN SUCHON,

Appellant,

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,

Respondent.

Appeals heard on March 27, 2001 at Toronto, Ontario, by

the Honourable Judge T. Margeson

Appearances

For the Appellant:                                         The Appellant himself

Counsels for the Respondent:                        Livia Singer

                                                                   Kelly Smith-Wayland

JUDGMENT

          The appeals from the assessments made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994, 1995 and 1996 taxation years are dismissed and the Minister's assessment is confirmed.

Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 10th day of October 2001.

"T.E. Margeson"

J.T.C.C.