Date: 20011112
Docket: 2001-2212-IT-I
BETWEEN:
BJORN FRIBERG,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasonsfor
Judgment
Porter, D.J.T.C.C.
Introduction
[1]
This appeal was heard at Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, on October 1,
2001.
[2]
The Appellant, the taxpayer, seeks to deduct from his
professional income as a professor of mathematics at the
University of Saskatchewan, the full amount of farming losses
sustained in 1996 and 1997. In computing his income for those
years, the Appellant deducted the amounts of $33,790.92 and
$25,955.33 respectively as farming losses, setting those losses
off against his University income of $70,826.88 and $67,750.08
respectively.
[3]
By Notices of Reassessment dated July 26, 1999, the Minister of
National Revenue (the "Minister") inter alia
restricted the farming losses in accordance with subsection 31(1)
of the Income Tax Act (the "Act"), R.S.C.
1985 c.1 (5th Supp.) to $8,750.00 with respect to each
year.
[4]
The Appellant filed Notices of Objection to the reassessment and
the Minister confirmed those reassessments on March 20, 2001 in
the following terms:
Your chief source of income in the 1996 and 1997 taxation
years was neither farming nor a combination of farming and some
other source of income. Accordingly, under subsection 31(1), your
loss for each year from the farming business you carried on was
$8,750.00 in 1996 and $8,750.00 in 1997, for the purposes of
sections 3 and 111.
[5]
It is from that decision that the Appellant brings this
appeal.
The Law
[6]
The most recent jurisprudence on this section of the Act
is contained in the decision of the Federal Court of appeal in
R. v. Donnelly, 220 N.R. 392. The Appellant has expressed
his disapproval of this decision. Nonetheless, it is binding on
this Court and I must take my guidance from it. It is perhaps
somewhat ironic that the Donnelly case, as in the case
before me, involved a farm income loss for a horse breeding
operation.
[7]
Robertson, J.A. speaking for the Court, said this:
According to Moldowan (Moldowan v. R. 77 DTC 5213), the
taxpayer must satisfy two testes in order to succeed. First, he
must establish that the farming operation gave rise to a
"reasonable expectation of profit" and, second, that
his "chief source of income" is farming (the so-called
"full-time" farmer). If the taxpayer is unable to
satisfy the first test no losses are deductible (the so-called
"hobby" farmer). If he satisfies the first test but not
the second then a restricted farm loss of $5,000 (now $8,500) is
imposed under section 31 of the Income Tax Act (the
so-called "part-time" farmer).
[8] I
think it can fairly be said that the Minister, as in
Donnelly, has in the case at hand, conceded that the
farming operation gave rise to a reasonable expectation of
profit, or else he would have disallowed the losses
completely.
[9]
Robertson, J.A. went on as follows:
...The Minister now argues that the court below was in error
in making that determination. I agree. In my respectful view, the
Tax Court Judge failed to appreciate the distinction between the
test to be applied when determining whether farming is a
taxpayer's chief source of income and that which is
applicable when assessing whether a taxpayer has a reasonable
expectation of profit. When the issue is placed in this
perspective it is not difficult to understand why the Minister
was willing to concede the latter point. As is explained below,
the legal test for establishing farming as a chief source of
income is, on an evidential level, a more onerous one.
And
...A determination as to whether farming is a taxpayer's
chief source of income requires a favourable comparison of that
occupational endeavour with the taxpayer's other income
source in terms of capital committed, time spent and
profitability, actual or potential. The test is both a relative
and objective one. It is not a pure quantum measurement. All
three factors must be weighed with no one factor being decisive.
Yet there can be no doubt that the profitability factor poses the
greatest obstacle to taxpayers seeking to persuade the courts
that farming in their chief source of income. This is so because
the evidential burden is on taxpayers to establish that the net
income that could reasonably be expected to be earned from
farming is substantial in relation to their other income source:
invariably, employment or professional income. Were the law
otherwise there would be no basis on which the Tax Court could
make a comparison between the relative amounts expected to be
earned from farming and the other income source, as required by
section 31 of the Act. The extent to which the evidential
burden regarding the profitability factor or test differs from
the one governing the reasonable expectation of profit
requirement is a matter which I will address more fully
below.
In summary, the cumulative factors of capital committed, time
spent and profitability will determine whether farming will be
regarded as a "sideline business" to which the
restricted farm loss provisions apply. These guiding principles
flow from the following decisions: Moldowan (supra), Timpson
v. Minister of National Revenue (1993), 93 D.T.C. 5281 (Fed.
C.A.), Poirier (Trustee of) v. Canada (1992, 92 D.T.C.
6335 (Fed. C.A.), Connell v. Minister of National Revenue
(1992), 92 D.T.C. 6134 (Fed. C.A.), Roney v. Minister of
National Revenue (1991), 91 D.T.C. 5148 (Fed. C.A.),
Morrissey v. R. (1988), 89 D.T.C. 5080 (Fed. C.A.),
Gordon v. R. (1986), 86 D.T.C. 6426 (Fed. T.D.), Mott v.
R. (1988), 88 D.T.C. 6359 (Fed T.D.) and Mohl v. R.
(1989), 89 D.T.C. 5236 (Fed. T.D.).
[10] He
continued:
This leads inexorably to my third point: the taxpayer
acknowledged that he required his medical income to live off and
fund the purchase of new horses and other aspects of the horse
operations... Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see
how he can be described as having changed his occupational
direction. It cannot be denied that the time devoted to horse
farming was significant, but this quantitative factor alone does
not accurately reflect the reality that the taxpayer was
financially dependent upon his medical practice and primary
income-earning occupation.
Any doubt as to whether the taxpayer's chief source of
income is farming is resolved once consideration is given to the
element of profitability. There is a difference between the type
of evidence the taxpayer must adduce concerning profitability
under section 31 of the Act, as opposed to that relevant
to the reasonable expectation of profit test. In the latter case
the taxpayer need only show that there is or was an expectation
of profit, be it $1 or $1 million. It is well recognized in tax
law that a "reasonable expectation of profit" is not
synonymous with an "expectation of reasonable profits".
With respect to the section 31 profitability factor,
however, quantum is relevant because it provides a basis on which
to compare potential farm income with that actually received by
the taxpayer from the competing occupation. In other words, we
are looking for evidence to support a finding of reasonable
expectation of "substantial" profits from farming.
[11] He went
on:
While there is no doubt that the loss of Mr. Rankin, and the
changes in American tax law had a negative and unexpected impact
on the business, no evidence was presented to show what profit
the taxpayer might have earned had these events not occurred and
whether the amount would have been considered substantial when
compared to his professional income. It was not enough for the
taxpayer to claim that he might have earned a profit. He should
have provided sufficient evidence to enable the Tax Court Judge
to estimate quantitatively what that profit might have been.
[12] Finally,
he said this:
As is well known, section 31 of the Act is aimed at
preventing "gentlemen" farmers who enjoy substantial
income from claiming full farming losses: see Morrisey v. R,
supra at 5081-82. More often then not it is invoked in
circumstances where farmers are prepared to carry on with a
blatant indifference toward the losses being incurred. The
practical and legal reality is that these farmers are hobby
farmers but the Minister allows them the limited deduction under
section 31 of the Act. Such cases almost always involve
horse-farmers who are engaged in purchasing or breeding horses
for racing. In truth, there is rarely even a reasonable
expectation of profit in such endeavours much less the makings of
a chief source of income.
It may well be that in tax law a distinction is to be drawn
between the country person who goes to the city and the city
person who goes to the country. In future, those insisting on
obtaining tax relief in circumstances approaching those under
consideration should do so through legislative channels and not
through the Tax Court of Canada. The judicial system can no
longer afford to encourage taxpayers or their counsel to pursue
such litigation in the expectation that hope will triumph over
experience.
To summarize, a determination as to whether farming is the
chief source of income is dependent upon the cumulative effect of
three key factors: capital committed, time spent and
profitability. In my respectful opinion, the Tax Court Judge
erred in his assessment of the evidence (inferences drawn from
accepted facts) presented both in terms of the taxpayer's
occupational direction and the potential profitability of the
horse-farming business. Having regard to the fact that no one
factor is decisive and to the primary findings of fact made by
the Tax Court Judge, I conclude that the taxpayer's chief
source of income for the years in question came from his medical
practice. The horse-farming activity was merely a sideline
business. Accordingly, I would allow the appeal with costs here,
and in the court below, set aside the judgment of the Tax Court
Judge and affirm the Minister's reassessments for the
taxation years in question.
[13] In
summary, I must apply my mind to the "capital committed,
time spent and profitability". To some extent, I might say
that it is a matter of common sense, when taking all of the
factors into account and standing back and looking at the
situation, where one detaches oneself from the individual trees
and looks at the forest as a whole, whether one can say the chief
source of income is the farm income or the professional
income.
[14] One final
point; the Appellant argued that the gross income of the farm
operation should be compared to the gross professional income. It
is clear that this is not so and it is the net farm income that
has to be considered.
The Facts
[15] The
Minister, in arriving at his decision, relied on the following
assumptions of fact:
(a)
at all material times the Appellant was employed full time with
the University of Saskatchewan as a Professor of Mathematics;
(b)
the Appellant teaches 9 hours per week and, including the
teaching time, spends 15-20 hours per week performing employment
activities;
(c)
the Appellant earned the following amounts from employment during
the 1996 and 1997 Taxation Years respectively:
Taxation
Year
Employment Income
1996
$70,826.88
1997
67,750.08
(d)
at all material times, the Appellant's income has been
substantially from employment income;
(e)
the Appellant is in a cow/horse operation (the "Farming
Activity");
(f)
the Farm Activity commenced in 1977;
(g)
the Appellant has resided on the farm since 1981;
(h)
the farm consists of:
(i)
376 acres of land of which 60 acres are cultivated for wheat
and hay and the remainder is pasture; and
(ii)
131 acres of leased land;
(i)
the year end values of livestock for the 1995, 1996 and 1997
Taxation Years for the Farming Activity are as follows:
1995
1996
1997
#
Value
#
Value
#
Value
Horses
($2,000)
16
$32,000
19
$38,000
19
$38,000
Bulls
($1,500)
1
1,500
1
1,500
1
1,500
Cows
($1,000)
16
16,000
12
12,000
0
0
Feeders
($700)
12
8,400
11
7,000
12
8,400
Foals
($3,000)
0
0
0
0
3
9,000
$57,900
$59,200
$56,900
(j)
since the commencement of the Farming Activity in 1977 the
Appellant has claimed restricted farm losses up to and including
the 1994 Taxation Year;
(k)
the Appellant reported farm losses during the 1987 through 1995
Taxation Years as follows:
Taxation
Gross
Net
Allowable
Restricted
Year
Income Loss
Farm Loss Farm Loss
1987
$24,150
( 6,610)
( 4,555)
(2,055)
1988
no farm loss reported
1989
no farm loss reported
1990
23,809
(14,483)
( 8,491)
(5,992)
1991
35,514
(13,615)
( 8,057)
(5,558)
1992
32,361
(14,980)
( 8,740)
(6,240)
1993
51,550
( 6,267)
( 4,383)
(1,884)
1994
55,279
(18,304)
( 8,750)
(9,554)
1995
74,091
(17,824)
(17,824)
0
(l)
the Appellant reported farming losses during the 1996 and 1997
Taxation Years as follows (as detailed in Schedule A attached to
the Reply to the Notice of Appeal):
Taxation
Gross
Net
Year
Income
Expenses
Loss
1996
$86,058.22
$119,849.14
(33,790.92)
1997
87,642.98
113,598.31
(25,955.33)
(m)
included in the Gross Income and Expenses of the farm losses were
amounts for optional value of livestock and for the value of
deceased livestock as follows:
Taxation Optional Value
of Livestock Deceased Livestock
Year
Income
Expense
Income
Expense
1996
$59,200
$57,900
$4,000
$4,000
1997
56,900
59,200
4,000
4,000
(n)
the Appellant's Farming Activity did not provide and may not
reasonably be expected to provide the bulk of income or
livelihood for the Appellant;
(o)
the Appellant's Farming Activity was not the central focus,
major preoccupation or center of the Appellant's life or work
routine;
(p)
the Appellant's Farming Activity, since its commencement in
1977, has been in a net loss situation; and
(q)
the Appellant's chief source of income during the 1996 and
1997 Taxation Years was neither farming nor a combination of
farming and some other source of income.
[16] On the
whole, the Appellant agreed with the majority of these
assumptions of fact, except as follows:
(a)
Items (a) and (b): He thought it was misleading to say that he
was employed full-time as a professor of the University of
Saskatchewan. Whilst he held some tenure, he explained that he
did not carry a full professorial load and worked some 15 to 20
hours per week for 6 ½ months of the year. The
rest of the time, he devoted to his farm.
There is no doubt in my mind that the Appellant "lived and
breathed" his life for his farm and spent far more time on
his farming operation than he did in his teaching duties. If it
was time and effort alone, which were the criteria, he would have
no difficulty in succeeding in this appeal.
(b)
Item (e): In 1996, the operation changed from substantially a
cattle operation to substantially a horse breeding operation.
(c)
Item (j): The Appellant took issue with this item to the extent
that he had not claimed such losses in each and every year. It is
clear from the evidence that he had not done so in every year and
I read the assumptions of fact accordingly.
(d)
Item (n): The Appellant took issue with this assumption as he
felt that in a few years he would be retiring and would have
expected to live on a modest income of about $20,000.00 to be
generated from the farm. At that time, the farm income would be
his sole income and means of livelihood. There was no clear
evidence before me as to how this would be, and in fact, due to
intervening events it is now unlikely to occur.
(e)
Item (o): The Appellant took issue with this assumption of the
Minister that the farming activity was not the central focus of
his life. It is clear to me from the evidence that it was in fact
so in terms of effort and time expended. As I say, he "lived
and breathed" for his farm and there is no doubt about this.
It is clear that the Minister is incorrect in this
assumption.
(f)
Item (p): There were losses claimed in 1988 or 1989.
(g)
Item (q): This, of course, was the issue for decision in this
appeal.
[17] The
Appellant is undoubtedly a hardworking individual. He presented
himself as a respectful hardworking person with many fine
qualities. I have no doubt as to his effort to make this farm
work. However, he seemed to experience one setback or difficulty
after the next. The only constant was that his income from the
University remained intact over the years and was used to support
himself and the farm. The farm revenue remained constantly in a
loss situation, save for 1988 and 1989.
[18] In 1996
when he changed from a cattle operation to a horse breeding
operation, the Appellant incurred further capital costs, both in
relation to the farm immovable assets, which had to be built and
developed, and his breeding stock. In particular, he purchased a
stallion for $20,000.00 upon which he placed great stock. The
stallion produced three foals for the ensuing year 1997 and seven
foals during 1998 before it was injured. It also produced a few
more foals for his own breeding stock before it died in 1999.
Thus, any anticipated or hoped-for revenue in the future died
with the stallion. There have been no profits since and the
Appellant is now winding down his operation in view of the
difficulties which he has encountered.
[19] I must,
however, look at this situation from the perspective of 1996 and
1997. The Appellant explained to me his optimism in those years
for future profits. He felt the stallion could produce stud fees
of $19,000.00 per year, which it did not, and that he would have
had a gross income of $129,000.00 and $149,000.00 for each of the
years in question, mostly arising from stock he would breed and
raise himself. He produced no data to show how that gross income
would be generated and nothing to show what the expenses would
be. In my mind, it was pure conjecture and wishful thinking on
his part. There was, with the greatest respect to him, nothing in
the evidence which he presented which could reasonably lead me to
the conclusion, that his figures would ever have become reality.
As we know, in fact, they never did.
[20] Whilst it
is clear that from the points of view of capital committed and
time and effort expended, the major focus of the life of the
Appellant over the years in question was his farm operation, and
whilst the Minister has accepted that there was a reasonable
expectation of profit by allowing the restricted losses and thus
not placing the Appellant into the category of a hobby-farmer,
the factor with regard to profitability, in my view, is lacking.
The "reasonable expectation of profit" test is not the
same as "expectation of reasonable profits" that I must
consider under subsection 31(1) of the Act. There was, in
my view, nothing in the evidence, however earnestly the Appellant
argued his case, which would enable me to objectively compare any
potential farm income with the income he was actually receiving
from the University. As the Federal Court of Appeal said, I must
find evidence to support a finding of reasonable expectation of
"substantial" profits from the farming operation, such
that I might say that they had become the chief source of income
of the Appellant. Such was not forthcoming in my view, and I am
unable to make that finding. The whole history is of his needing
his University income to support the farm operation.
Conclusion
[21] In my
view, the "chief source of income" of the Appellant for
the years in question, 1996 and 1997, was his University income
and not his farming income, or a combination of farming or other
income. The Minister, in my opinion, was correct in restricting
the losses under section 31(1) of the Act and the appeals
are accordingly dismissed.
Signed at Calgary, Alberta, this 12th day of November
2001.
"Michael H. Porter"
D.J.T.C.C.
COURT FILE
NO.:
2001-2212(IT)I
STYLE OF
CAUSE:
Bjorn Friberg and Her Majesty the Queen
PLACE OF
HEARING:
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
DATE OF
HEARING:
October 1, 2001
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BY:
the Honourable Deputy Judge
Michael H. Porter
DATE OF
JUDGMENT:
November 12, 2001
APPEARANCES:
For the
Appellant:
The Appellant himself
For the
Respondent:
Raj Sharma (Student-at-Law)
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the
Appellant:
Name:
Firm:
For the
Respondent:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
2001-2212(IT)I
BETWEEN:
BJORN FRIBERG,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeal heard on October 1, 2001 at Saskatoon
Saskatchewan, by
the Honourable Deputy Judge Michael H.
Porter
Appearances
For the
Appellant:
The Appellant himself
For the
Respondent:
Raj Sharma (Student-at-Law)
JUDGMENT
The
appeal from the assessments made under the Income Tax Act
for the 1996 and 1997 taxation years is dismissed in accordance
with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Calgary, Alberta, this 12th day of November
2001.
D.J.T.C.C.