Date: 19991215
Docket: 1999-1827-IT-I
BETWEEN:
NICHOLAS VUCUREVICH,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Teskey, J.T.C.C.
[1] The Appellant, in his Notice of Appeal wherein he appealed
his income tax assessment for 1997, elected the Informal
Procedure.
Issue
[2] The sole issue before the Court is whether $4,589, spent
by the Appellant in 1997, qualify as medical expenses.
Facts
[3] The Respondent admitted that:
(1) The Appellant has been a paraplegic in a wheelchair for
over 40 years;
(2) That due to the aging process and his diminishing body
strength, the Appellant needs additional medical aides or devices
to keep him living at home.
[4] The Appellant, who is 51 years of age, has enjoyed a
very productive career, notwithstanding the fracture of his 2nd
and 3rd thoracic vertebra, which placed him in the
wheelchair for almost all his entire life.
[5] He was a hospital administrator for 30 some years, as well
as being a consultant businessman. He oversaw the building and
equipping of a 50-bed facility.
[6] Due to the loss of strength in his arms and as he has no
use whatsoever of his legs, all unassisted movement has to be
from one object to another at the same level, such as his bed to
a wheelchair, to a sofa, to a bathtub.
[7] The expenses in question are:
(a) expenses disallowed in the amount of $700 were in respect
of rebuilding his bed;
(b) expenses disallowed in the amount of $2,100 were in
respect of rebuilding and reupholstering one sofa and one
chair;
(c) expenses disallowed in the amount of $1,780 were in
respect of rebuilding and reupholstering another sofa and chair
and one footstool;
[8] The amount of the expenses were not in issue, only if they
qualified as medical expenses.
[9] Dealing with each separately:
(A) The Appellant, because of his knowledge, rather than
purchasing a hospital bed for several thousand dollars, arranged
to have his own bed modified so that it could do what a standard
hospital bed can do. That is electronically, he can raise and
lower the bed, raise the head position so that a sitting position
can be obtained or lower and raise the bottom area of the bed.
These electronic adjustments mean he can get from the bed into
the wheelchair and vice versa, without help as well as rest and
read or sleep in the bed in many different positions.
(B) The one sofa and one chair that the amount of $2,100 was
spent on to modify are in his living room. They were modified as
to height so that again, he can go from the wheelchair onto the
sofa and back himself, and also from the wheelchair into the
upholstered chair and back to the wheelchair by himself, all
unassisted. Thus, these two pieces of furniture are at an unusual
height being much higher and harder than normal living room
furniture. Although people without this disability can use these
two items, they are not particularly comfortable and would be the
last choice of a place to sit.
(C) The second sofa, chair and footstool that were
reupholstered and rebuilt are in the dining-family room. The
Appellant said that the footstool claimed was by inadvertence and
should be deleted. The costs being $50 and thus, his claim under
this heading should be reduced to $1,739. The same comments made
above for the living room sofa and chair apply to those in the
dining-family room.
[10] The Appellant has also had his bathtub modified so that
he again can move unaided from his wheelchair into the bath and
back. This expense was fully allowed.
[11] The Appellant explained that sitting in a wheelchair all
day would put the occupant into a hospital with what is called
"bed sores". He stated that the cost of medical care to
treat patients with bed sores is enormous.
[12] Without these rebuilding and renovation expenses to his
bed and the two sofas and chairs, one of the following would have
occured:
(1) home care so that he could be moved about so that bed
sores would not occur; or
(2) he would have to be institutionalised.
[13] These modifications allow him to be unattended all day
long and at the same time, allow his wife the freedom to be
employed.
[14] These modifications all came about because of several
conversations with several doctors. There were several medical
concurrances that advised him and prescribed these
modifications.
[15] As a result of his reassessment,
Dr. Mark C. Musk, the Appellant's family
doctor, wrote a letter to Revenue Canada which, on consent, was
accepted as Exhibit A-2. The Respondent also consented
to giving full weight to this document, which reads:
...
"Mr. Vucurevich is a paraplegic, in a wheelchair for
over forty years; and due to the aging process and his
diminishing strength, he requires adjustments made to his bed and
sofas. The adjustments are basically re-enforced springs in the
sofas and rising the height level of same. The bedroom suite
required similar adjustments. These provisions will provide
Mr. Vucurevich an improved quality of lifestyle and will
enable him to remain in his own home for a longer period of
time.
In closing, these are medical adaptations for aides in daily
living.
[16] Unfortunately, the Appellant chose to limit his medical
evidence solely to this letter and his own testimony. However, I
am satisfied Dr. Musk's testimony, if called as a
witness, would have backed the Appellant's testimony
completely.
[17] I accept the Appellant's evidence completely and
without any reservation. Fortunately for him, because of his 30
years in the hospital administration field, I can accept his
testimony that, to a large extent, was medical testimony.
The Law
[18] Medical expenses are dealt with in section 118 of
the Income Tax Act (the "Act") and
Regulation 5700 of the Income Tax Act Regulations
(the "Regulations"), the pertinent portion
thereof read:
118.2(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a medical expense
of an individual is an amount paid
...
(l.2) for reasonable expenses relating to renovations
or alterations to a dwelling of the patient who lacks normal
physical development or has a severe and prolonged mobility
impairment, to enable the patient to gain access to, or to be
mobile or functional within, the dwelling;
...
(m) for any device or equipment for use by the patient
that
(i) is of a prescribed kind,
(ii) is prescribed by a medical practitioner,
(iii) is not described in any other paragraph of this
subsection, and
(iv) meets such conditions as are prescribed as to its use or
the reason for its acquisition;
5700 For the purposes of paragraph 118.2(2)(m) of the
Act, a device or equipment is prescribed if it is a
...
(h) hospital bed including such attachments thereto as
may have been included in a prescription therefor;
[19] I am satisfied that these provisions should be
interpreted in the same manner as the medical disability tax
credit provisions. My colleague Bowman, J.T.C., in
Radage v. The Queen, 96 DTC 1615, said that the
medical disability section should be construed liberally, humanly
and compassionately and not narrowly and technically.
[20] He also said that if there is doubt on which side of the
line a claimant falls, that doubt should be resolved in favour of
the claimant.
[21] His comments in Radage were approved by the
Federal Court of Appeal in Johnston v. The Queen,
98 DTC 6169.
[22] My colleague Rip, T.C.J., in Williams v. The
Queen, [1998] 1 C.T.C. 2813, allowed as medical expenses
the cost of a chemical free mattress and for removing carpets and
replacing the same with hardwood flooring. He said at
paragraph 8:
8 The English version of paragraph 118.2(2)(l.2) of the
Act provides that a medical expense of an individual is an
amount paid for reasonable expenses relating to renovations or
alterations to the dwelling of an individual who lacks normal
physical development or who has a severe and prolonged mobility.
In order for these expenses to qualify they must be paid to
enable the individual to gain access to the dwelling or be mobile
and functional within it. There have been very few reported cases
dealing with paragraph 118.2(2)(l.2). In Brown v.
Minister of National Revenue (1994), 95 DTC 5126 (Fed. T.D.),
an air conditioner was found to have been “designed to
assist a crippled individual in walking” within the meaning
of subsection 5700(i) of the Regulations and its
cost was therefore deductible as a medical expense when it had
been developed in a medical context in order to lower body
temperature and thereby assist in the restoration of mobility.
...
Then, he went on and said in paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and
12:
9 The French and English versions of
paragraph 118.2(2)(l.2) are not identical. In the
French version of that provision the concluding words are
“de s'y déplacer ou d'y accomplir les
tâches de la vie quotidienne”. The “Robert
& Collins” English French dictionary* defines the word
“quotidienne” as:
De chaque jour; qui se fait, qui revient tous les jours.
The word “quotidienne” refers to something that is
done daily, or daily activity. The French version provides for
the renovations to enable the patient to gain access to and be
mobile or to perform “daily activities” within the
dwelling. The provision is not concerned with a “basic
activity of daily living”, as set out in paragraphs
118.4(1)(c) and (d). The renovations or alterations
are to enable the patient to be functional in the home so that
she or he may perform daily activities. A daily activity includes
a wide range of movement, not only a basic activity of daily
living. An activity of daily living includes, but is not limited
to, those activities set out in subparagraph 118.4(1)(d),
that is, working, housekeeping, and social and recreational
activities. The French version of paragraph 118.2(2)(l.2)
adds an element to be considered when determining whether or not
the renovations undertaken by Ms. Williams are eligible for the
medical expense credit. The additional words “d'y
accomplir les tâches de la vie quotidienne” in
paragraph 118.2(2)(l.1), in my view, enlarge the
application of that provision to include a renovation to permit a
person who has a severe and prolonged mobility impairment to be
mobile or functional within the dwelling in such manner that she
or he may perform daily activities in the home
10 In the appeal at bar it is clear to me that Ms.
Williams' mobility permitting her to perform daily activities
in her home in 1994 was severely restricted and that the
installation of hardwood flooring was necessary to enable her to
be mobile and functional within her home as to perform a daily
activity within that dwelling, that is to walk from room to room
with relative ease within the house; she should be able to live
in the house. Accordingly, in my view, the expenses relating to
the acquisition and installation of the hardwood flooring ought
to be allowed.
11 Paragraph 118.2(2)(m) provides that a medical
expense is an amount paid for any device or equipment which meets
the conditions prescribed in paragraph 5700(h) of the
Regulations. The Regulation stipulates that a
prescribed device or equipment includes a hospital bed with
attachments thereto. I agree with the Minister that the special
mattress prescribed by a physician for Ms. Williams is not a
hospital bed, as prescribed in the Regulations. However, Ms.
Williams was suffering from a “severe chronic immune
disregulation”.* May one consider the prescribed and
specially constructed mattress a “device or equipment ...
designed exclusively for (her) use ...” within the meaning
of paragraph 5700(c) of the Regulations? The word
“equipment” includes furniture.* The mattress was
designed for the appellant's exclusive use due to her severe
chronic immune disregulation and therefore the cost ought to be a
medical expense. This is a teleological interpretation of the
provision.
12 I also refer to the decision of Léger, T.C.J. in
Côté c. R. (1996), [1997] 3 C.T.C. 2607
(T.C.C.) in which he allowed a taxpayer's appeal from a
disallowance of medical expenses on the basis that “while
there are provisions specifying what medical expenses are, the
Court is required to give the most equitable and large
interpretation possible to this legislation that is compatible
with the attainment of its object”. He held that
notwithstanding there was no doctor's prescription for a
water softener or for costs associated with the energy needed to
operate a whirlpool bath, the expenses for such equipment and
supplies were deductible in computing taxable income. I believe
Ms. Williams' position with respect to the mattress in the
appeal at bar is stronger than that of the appellant in
Côté.
[23] My colleague Bowie, T.C.J., in Crockart v. The
Queen, [1999] 2 C.T.C. 2409, when dealing with a bed
claimed as medical expenses, purchased by the husband of a woman
afflicted by multiple sclerosis, said at paragraph 6:
... either Parliament, when enacting section 118.2, or
the Governor-in-Council, when enacting Regulation 5700, to so
limit the availability of the credit as to deny it to Mr.
Crockart because he bought a bed having the desirable attributes
of a “classic hospital bed”, but one more beneficial
to his wife than such a “classic hospital bed” would
be. Nor, I am sure would Parliament or the Governor-in-Council
have intended the provision to be construed in such a way as to
preclude its application to a bed which could be shared by
husband and wife. I find that the bed in question here has
sufficient of the attributes of a “classic hospital
bed” as to bring it with the Regulation.V
[24] I see no difference in purchasing a bed similar to a
hospital bed or modifying an existing bed so that it has the same
attributes as a "classic hospital bed" and therefore,
find that those expenses are proper medical expenses.
[25] In regards to the expenses for the modifications of the
two sofas and the two chairs, the fact that there are two of
each, one set for the living room and one set for the
dining-family room, is immaterial. If one set is allowable,
both are.
[26] I believe the operative words of
paragraph 118.2(2)(l.2) that I have to consider are
"or to be mobile or functional within the dwelling". I
see no difference between what is normally considered as a
fixture in a dwelling such as a bathtub, which is raised and
modified or kitchen cupboards that are lowered to allow a
paraplegic access thereto or customary normal furniture found in
a dwelling being modified to allow a paraplegic's unassisted
use and access thereto and mobility from one chattel to another
via a wheelchair.
[27] I do not believe it was the intention of Parliament, when
enacting section 118.2, to so limit the availability of
these types of medical expenses as to deny the Appellant herein
the availability of using these expenses as medical expenses as
they allowed him to be independent during the daytime and to keep
him from requiring home care or to be institutionalised.
[28] The appeal is allowed, with costs, and the assessment is
referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for
reconsideration and reassessment on the basis that, in 1997, the
Appellant's claim for medical expenses is to be increased by
$4,539, being all the expenses claimed, except for the $50 for
the footstool.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 15th day of December, 1999.
"Gordon Teskey"
J.T.C.C.