Date: 20020207
Docket: 2001-300-IT-I
BETWEEN:
WILLIAM J. TROUPE,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Lamarre, J.T.C.C.
[1] This is an appeal
under the informal procedure from an assessment made by the
Minister of National Revenue ("Minister") under the
Income Tax Act ("Act") with respect to
the appellant's 1999 taxation year. In computing his tax
payable for that year, the appellant claimed, under
non-refundable tax credits, a tuition credit in the amount of
$888 and an education tax credit in the amount of $240 that were
transferred to him in his capacity as a supporting person by his
daughter, Amanda Christine Troupe, pursuant to section
118.9 of the Act.
[2] In assessing the
appellant, the Minister disallowed both the tuition and the
education tax credits, which totalled $1,128. The Minister's
reasons for denying the tuition and education tax credits are set
out in paragraph 10 of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal as
follows:
a) at all material
times, the Appellant had a daughter, Amanda Christine Troupe,
born January 6, 1987 (the "Child");
b) during the period
September, 1999 to December, 1999, the Child was enrolled as a
student at the School of Dance (the "Institution") and
undertook a course entitled Professional Program in Ballet (the
"Course");
c) the Institution is
listed as a certified educational institution within the meaning
of subparagraph 118.5(1)(a)(ii) of the Income Tax Act (the
"Act");
d) an amount of $888.00
was paid for the Child's enrollment at the Institution with
respect to the Course and the said amount was indicated on form
T-2202A (Tuition and Education Amounts Certificate) issued
by the Institution;
e) a total of $240.00
representing part time attendance for the four month period from
September, 1999 to December, 1999 was also indicated on
form T-2202A and the said amount represented an
education amount for the said period;
f) the amounts of
$888.00 and $240.00 referred to in subparagraphs 10(d) and 10(e)
herein respectively represent the total of $1,128.00 claimed by
the Appellant as tuition and education amount transferred from a
child and referred to in paragraphs 7 and 9 herein;
g) the Child had not
attained the age of 16 years before the end of the 1999 taxation
year;
h) it has not been
shown that the Child was working towards an occupation or
improving her skills in an occupation by taking the Course;
and
i) the purpose of
the Child's enrollment at the Institution cannot reasonably
be regarded as being to provide the Child with skills, or to
improve the Child's skills, in an occupation.
[3] The transfer to a
parent of the tuition and education tax credits is dealt with in
sections 118.5, 118.6 and 118.9 of the Act, the relevant
portions of which, as applicable for the taxation year at issue,
are reproduced below:
SECTION 118.5: Tuition
credit.
(1) For the
purpose of computing the tax payable under this Part by an
individual for a taxation year, there may be deducted,
(a) where the individual was during the year a
student enrolled at an educational institution in Canada that
is
(i) a university, college or
other educational institution providing courses at a
post-secondary school level, or
(ii) certified by the Minister of Human Resources
Development to be an educational institution providing courses,
other than courses designed for university credit, that furnish a
person with skills for, or improve a person's skills in, an
occupation,
an amount equal to the product obtained when the appropriate
percentage for the year is multiplied by the amount of any fees
for the individual's tuition paid in respect of the year to
the educational institution if the total of those fees exceeds
$100, except to the extent that those fees
(ii.1) are paid to
an educational institution described in subparagraph (i) in
respect of courses that are not at the post-secondary school
level,
(ii.2) are paid to
an educational institution described in subparagraph (ii) if
(A) the individual had not attained the age of 16 years
before the end of the year, or
(B) the purpose of the individual's enrolment at the
institution cannot reasonably be regarded as being to provide the
individual with skills, or to improve the individual's
skills, in an occupation,
. . .
4118.6(2)3
(2) Education
credit. There may
be deducted in computing an individual's tax payable under
this Part for a taxation year the amount determined by the
formula
A X B
where
A is the appropriate percentage for
the year; and
B is the total of the products
obtained when
(a) $200 is multiplied by the number of months in the
year during which the individual is enrolled in a qualifying
educational program as a full-time student at a designated
educational institution, and
(b) $60 is multiplied by the number of months in the
year (other than months described in paragraph (a)), each
of which is a month during which the individual is enrolled at a
designated educational institution in a specified educational
program that provides that each student in the program spend not
less than 12 hours in the month on courses in the program,
if the enrolment is proven by filing with the Minister a
certificate in prescribed form issued by the designated
educational institution and containing prescribed information
and, in respect of a designated educational institution described
in subparagraph (a)(ii) of the definition "designated
educational institution" in subsection (1), the individual
has attained the age of 16 years before the end of the year and
is enrolled in the program to obtain skills for, or improve the
individual's skills in, an occupation.
SECTION 118.9: Transfer to parent or
grandparent.
Where for a taxation year a
parent or grandparent of an individual (other than an individual
in respect of whom the individual's spouse deducts an amount
under section 118 or 118.8 for the year) is the only person
designated in writing by the individual for the year for the
purpose of this section, there may be deducted in computing the
tax payable under this Part for the year by the parent or
grandparent, as the case may be, the tuition and education tax
credits transferred for the year by the individual to the parent
or grandparent, as the case may be.
[4] The Minister assessed
the appellant on the basis that he was not entitled to a transfer
of the tuition and education tax credits from his daughter Amanda
because she did not meet the two requirements imposed by
subparagraph 118.5(1)(a)(ii.2) and subsection
118.6(2). The first requirement is that the appellant's
daughter have attained the age of 16 years before the end of the
1999 taxation year. The second is that the purpose of her
enrolment at The School of Dance can reasonably be regarded as
having been to provide her with skills, or to improve her skills,
in an occupation.
[5] The appellant
submitted evidence to try to establish that his daughter met the
second condition. He admits that his daughter was only 12 years
old in 1999 but he is of the view that the age requirement in
sections 118.5 and 118.6 of the Act is discriminatory
within the meaning of subsection 15(1) of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter").
[6] The respondent is of
the view that the appellant has not demonstrated that the purpose
of his daughter Amanda's enrolment at The School of Dance was
to furnish her with skills in an occupation. Counsel argued that
a reasonable person would see that Amanda's enrolment in the
dance course was more for the purpose of carrying on a hobby or
extra-curricular activity than acquiring or improving skills in
an occupation within the meaning of the Act. The
respondent further submits that clause
118.5(1)(a)(ii.2)(A), subsection 118.6(2) and
section 118.9 of the Act do not violate subsection
15(1) of the Charter. In the alternative, counsel submits
that, should this Court find the impugned sections of the
Act to be discriminatory under section 15 of the
Charter, the infringement is justifiable in a free and
democratic society under section 1 of the Charter.
[7] Section 1 and
subsection 15(1) of the Charter read as follows:
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the
law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit
of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
A - Purpose of daughter's enrolment at the School of
Dance
[8] I will first address
the question of whether the purpose of Amanda's enrolment at
The School of Dance was to provide her with skills in an
occupation. The appellant asked Ms. Merrilee Worsfold-Hodgins,
known as Merrilee Hodgins, who has been co-artistic director
at The School of Dance for 23 years, to testify. She explained
that her school is certified by the Minister of Human Resources
Development as an educational institution that provides courses
that furnish its students with skills for, or improve their
skills in, an occupation. The school offers three distinct
programs: a recreational program, a professional training program
(divided into three components: classical ballet, modern dance
and teacher training) and a public, subsidized program for the
betterment of the community. The School of Dance is certified for
the purposes of the Act only with respect to the
professional training program, in which Amanda is taking courses
in classical ballet.
[9] According to
Ms. Hodgins, unlike many other professions, in the case of
dance, training cannot begin when a student graduates from high
school and is ready for university entrance. She explained that
the training process of a classical ballet dancer normally begins
at the age of 10 and lasts for approximately eight or nine years.
At 17 to 19 years of age, the students normally cross over into
their professional career, which may extend until the age of 30.
After that point, many dancers move into university training or
retrain for new careers that are more academically based (see
Exhibit A-3).
[10] All students who apply for
entrance to the professional training programs at The School of
Dance must pass stringent auditions, which are one month in
length, in order to be accepted for training, and they are
evaluated yearly before reacceptance is confirmed (see Exhibit
A-3). The recreational program does not have any of those
requirements: anyone can attend courses offered through the
recreational ballet program.
[11] In the professional program, at
the age of 10, it is appropriate for students to study
approximately four hours per week. By the time the students have
reached 14 years of age, classes are daily and may last from 1.5
to 2 hours or so (approximately 14 to 16 hours per week). In
addition to the year-long program, which generally runs from
September through June, dance students are expected to attend a
four-week training program during the summer. Recreational
students attend the school for only one hour per week and do not
have to take part in the summer program. There are fewer students
per class in the professional program (between 7 and 15) than in
the recreational program (25 per class).
[12] Amanda was in the professional
program, year 3 ("PP3") at The School of Dance in 1999,
and at the time of the hearing in 2001 she was in the
professional program, year 5 ("PP5") (see Exhibit A-4).
She had previously taken her grades 2, 3 and 4 Royal Academy of
Dance examinations. In 1999, she was practising 10 hours per
week. In the summer of 1998 and 1999, she participated in the
Royal Winnipeg Ballet's professional division summer program,
which accepted students by audition only. Amanda explained that
only 120 students (including herself) were accepted in that
program out of a total of 1,500 who were auditioned. That summer
program involved intensive ballet training. She also appeared in
the ballet The Nutcracker with the Royal Winnipeg Ballet
in 1999 and then with Les Grands Ballets Canadiens in 2000. She
had many rehearsals in preparation for those performances. She
now dances 15 or 16 hours per week. She stated very clearly that
she is dedicated to dance and that she is focusing most of her
energies on becoming a professional dancer. Amanda is also in
full-time attendance at a secondary school that provides the
support necessary to enable high-level performers in the arts or
athletics to pursue successfully their educational and artistic
or athletic goals.
[13] In view of the evidence presented
before me, I conclude that the appellant has demonstrated that
the purpose of Amanda's enrolment in The School of Dance can
reasonably be regarded as being to provide her with skills, or to
improve her skills, in an occupation.
[14] Counsel for the respondent has
submitted that a 12-year-old child's involvement in
activities such as ballet lessons is more likely to be a hobby
than an occupation leading to employability, taking into account
the fact that in such a case "the period of employment is
not within a reasonable reach".
[15] Based on the evidence adduced, it
does not appear that Amanda was enrolled in the professional
ballet program as merely a hobby or extra-curricular activity.
Ms. Hodgins made a clear distinction between the
recreational program and the professional training program. At
the professional PP3 level (the level at which Amanda was
training in 1999), approximately 10-12 hours of training a
week is required. As regards eligibility for tuition and
education tax credits under sections 118.5 and 118.6, I do
not see any requirement that the individual eventually produce
income from the occupation for which that individual is receiving
training, or at least there is no requirement that earning such
income be "within a reasonable reach" as argued by the
respondent. It is obvious from the evidence that a person cannot
become a ballet dancer without taking courses in ballet, and
these courses must be started at an early age (10 years old), as
stated by Ms. Hodgins in her testimony. Without early
professional training, the appellant's daughter could not
become a professional ballet dancer.
[16] Furthermore, there is an audition
process for the professional program and not everyone is accepted
(unlike the recreational program). Therefore, the children who
are selected for the professional program are those that The
School of Dance determines to have a good chance at becoming
professional dancers. In my view, the objective requirement that
the purpose of the appellant's daughter's enrolment at
The School of Dance can be reasonably regarded as being to
provide her with skills, or to improve her skills, in an
occupation has been met, based on the evidence of
Ms. Hodgins. I would also point out that this is a point
that seems to have been accepted without question in the case of
Sandford v. Canada, [1998] T.C.J. No. 934 (Q.L.).
B - The Charter Issue
[17] Although the appellant's
daughter meets one of the conditions required by
sections 118.5 and 118.6 of the Act, she does not
meet the other condition, which is that she have attained 16
years of age at the end of 1999. The appellant has raised the
point that clause 118.5(1)(a)(ii.2)(A), subsection
118.6(2) and section 118.9 of the Act are
discriminatory within the meaning of subsection 15(1) of the
Charter.
[18] The purpose of subsection 15(1)
was summarized by Iacobucci J. in the following terms in Law
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1
S.C.R. 497, at p. 549:
Purpose
(4) In general
terms, the purpose of s. 15(1) is to prevent the violation of
essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of
disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and
to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition
at law as human beings or as members of Canadian society, equally
capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and
consideration.
(5) The existence of
a conflict between the purpose or effect of an impugned law and
the purpose of s. 15(1) is essential in order to found a
discrimination claim. The determination of whether such a
conflict exists is to be made through an analysis of the full
context surrounding the claim and the claimant.
[19] The Supreme Court of Canada has
stated some of the main guidelines for an analysis under
subsection 15(1). These guidelines are provided as points of
reference for a court that is called upon to decide whether a
claimant's Charter right to equality without
discrimination has been infringed.
[20] The approach adopted and
regularly applied by the Supreme Court of Canada with respect to
the interpretation of subsection 15(1) focuses upon three central
issues, as stated in Law, supra, at p. 548:
(A) whether a law imposes
differential treatment between the claimant and others, in
purpose or effect;
(B) whether one or more
enumerated or analogous grounds of discrimination are the basis
for the differential treatment; and
(C) whether the law in
question has a purpose or effect that is discriminatory within
the meaning of the equality guarantee.
[21] Accordingly, a court that is
called upon to rule on a discrimination claim under subsection
15(1) should make the following three inquiries, as set out in
Law, supra, at pp. 548-549:
(A) Does the impugned law
(a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant and others on
the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to
take into account the claimant's already disadvantaged
position within Canadian society resulting in substantively
differential treatment between the claimant and others on the
basis of one or more personal characteristics?
(B) Is the claimant
subject to differential treatment based on one or more enumerated
and analogous grounds?
and
(C) Does the differential
treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden upon or withholding
a benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the
stereotypical application of presumed group or personal
characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of
perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less
capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as
a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern,
respect, and consideration?
1. Differential Treatment
[22] The preliminary issue, as stated
by Iacobucci J. in Law, supra, is to determine
whether the impugned provisions -- clause
118.5(1)(a)(ii.2)(A), subsection 118.6(2) and section
118.9 of the Act -- draw a distinction, on the basis of
one or more personal characteristics, between the appellant as
the claimant and some other person or group of persons, resulting
in unequal treatment. This stage of the inquiry is not concerned
with whether the distinction in treatment constitutes
discrimination (Law, supra, at p. 552).
[23] In order to answer that question,
it is necessary to find the appropriate comparator in identifying
differential treatment and the grounds of the distinction. When
identifying the relevant comparator, the Supreme Court states,
the natural starting point is to consider the claimant's
view. It is the claimant who generally chooses the person, group
or groups with whom he or she wishes to be compared for the
purpose of the discrimination inquiry, thus setting the
parameters of the alleged differential treatment that he or she
wishes to challenge (Law, at p. 532).
[24] In the present case, the
appellant did not indicate any comparator groups. However, as
this is an informal proceeding and the appellant is a layperson,
it is likely a case where it may be appropriate for a court to
provide assistance in defining a comparator group. In Law,
Iacobucci J. stated at p. 532:
. . . Clearly a court cannot, ex proprio motu, evaluate
a ground of discrimination not pleaded by the parties and in
relation to which no evidence has been adduced: see Symes,
[[1993] 4 S.C.R. 695] at p. 762. However, within the scope of the
ground or grounds pleaded, I would not close the door on the
power of a court to refine the comparison presented by the
claimant where warranted.
[25] Counsel for the respondent
expressed the view in his written submissions that the appellant
is challenging clause 118.5(1)(a)(ii.2)(A) and subsection
118.6(2) through section 118.9 of the Act. As the
appellant chose to make a claim on his own behalf, the relevant
comparator group must thus include those to whom the credit is
transferred. In this case, the credit is transferred to the
parent. In the respondent's view, the appropriate comparator
groups would therefore be, on the one hand, parents who have
children under 16 years of age enrolled in a school referred to
in sections 118.5 and 118.6 of the Act and who are denied
the tuition and education tax credits transferred from their
child, and on the other hand, parents who have children over the
age of 16 enrolled in such a school and to whom the tax credits
are allowed.
[26] This basis of comparison seems
reasonable to me.
[27] The respondent admits that the
operation of clause 118.5(1)(a)(ii.2)(A) and subsection
118.6(2) creates a differential treatment between those two
comparator groups, which could constitute a denial of equal
benefit of the law under the first step of the equality
analysis.
2. Enumerated or Analogous Grounds
[28] Age is one of the enumerated
grounds of discrimination in subsection 15(1) of the
Charter. The appellant alleges that he was rendered
ineligible for the tuition and education tax credits by virtue of
his daughter's age and that the use of age as a
distinguishing criterion was discriminatory. The appellant does
not base his discrimination claim upon any ground other than
age.
[29] The respondent raises the point
that being a parent of a child under 16 years of age is not an
enumerated ground in subsection 15(1) of the Charter.
However, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's reasoning in
Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R.
358, at p. 397, where it was accepted that an individual
possesses the necessary standing to raise an issue of
discrimination based on the gender of his Canadian parent if his
own rights are made dependent on that parent's gender, the
respondent is ready to admit that the appellant's claim can
reasonably be found to stem from a distinction whose basis is the
enumerated ground of age.
[30] In the present case, the
appellant claims a credit that has been transferred to him by his
daughter through the application of section 118.9 of the
Act. As the appellant is the only person designated by his
daughter, he becomes the person entitled to claim the credits
under sections 118.5 and 118.6 and he is therefore directly
concerned by a denial of those credits founded on a distinction
made on the basis of age. In other words, the appellant's
daughter is involved only insofar as the extent of the
appellant's rights is made dependent on the age of his
daughter.
[31] It can therefore be said here
that the impugned sections of the Act draw a distinction
on the basis of age, which is an enumerated ground of
discrimination in subsection 15(1) of the Charter.
3. Discrimination
[32] Having found that the appellant
was subject to differential treatment based on an enumerated
ground, the last issue is to determine whether the impugned
provisions of the Act have a purpose or effect that is
discriminatory within the meaning of the equality guarantee. In
the present case, the question raised is whether the age
distinctions drawn by sections 118.5 and 118.6 of the Act
impose a disadvantage upon the appellant as the parent of a child
of less than 16 years of age in a manner that constitutes
discrimination under subsection 15(1) of the Charter.
[33] Iacobucci J. stated in
Law, supra, a case dealing with the denial of
survivor's benefits under the Canada Pension Plan to a
widow under the age of 45, that, relatively speaking, adults
under the age of 45 have not been consistently and routinely
subjected to the sorts of discrimination faced by some of
Canada's discrete and insular minorities (Law,
at p. 555). I think the same can be said of parents of
children of less than 16 years of age. For this reason, it will
be more difficult for the appellant to show that the legislative
distinction at issue violates his human dignity. As a matter of
fact, the appellant did not bring forward any evidence to that
effect. The appellant has not demonstrated that either the
purpose or the effect of the impugned legislative provisions
violates his human dignity so as to constitute
discrimination.
[34] It was said in Thibaudeau v.
Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627, that it is of the very essence
of the Income Tax Act to make distinctions so as to
generate revenue for the government while equitably reconciling a
range of necessarily divergent interests (pp. 676 and 702).
Gonthier J. went on to say at p. 676:
. . . In view of this, the right to the equal benefit of the
law cannot mean that each taxpayer has an equal right to receive
the same amounts, deductions or benefits, but merely a right to
be equally governed by the law.
. . .
. . . one should not confuse the concept of fiscal equity,
which is concerned with the best distribution of the tax burden
in light of the need for revenue, the taxpayers' ability to
pay and the economic and social policies of the government, with
the concept of the right to equality, which as I shall explain in
detail later means that a member of a group shall not be
disadvantaged on account of an irrelevant personal characteristic
shared by that group.
[35] The tuition and education tax
credits concerned in sections 118.5, 118.6 and 118.9 are intended
to provide tax relief to students (or to a supporting person) by
recognizing the tuition and non-tuition costs they need to incur
in order to receive post-secondary education or employability
training through a certified institution that teaches
occupational skills (see paragraph 7 of the affidavit signed by
Donald Phillip Wilson, who holds a position as an economist
in the Personal Income Tax Division of the Tax Policy Branch of
the Department of Finance, Exhibit R-1).
[36] According to Mr. Wilson, the age
16 criterion is a clear and effective way to limit tax assistance
to post-secondary education and occupational training
(Exhibit R-1, paragraphs 9 and 15). Indeed, the age of 16
was used in the Act as a cut-off for the tuition and
education tax credits in order to be consistent with provincial
requirements that every individual receive secondary schooling up
to a certain mandatory age (16 in most of Canada's provinces)
before continuing on to occupational training or post-secondary
education (see Exhibit R-1, paragraphs 10 and 11). In Mr.
Wilson's view, the choice of age 16 is therefore reasonable
in the context of a broad-based national tax system. (Exhibit
R-1, paragraph 21).
[37] It may be that the legislative
provisions at issue impose a disadvantage on parents of children
of less than 16 years of age who are training to become
professional dancers. But it is unlikely to be a substantive
disadvantage, viewed in the context of the legislation. In
Thibaudeau, supra, Gonthier J. said in relation to
the inclusion/deduction system that existed at the time for child
support payments (at p. 696):
. . . In the first place, legislation must be assessed in
terms of the majority of cases to which it applies. The fact that
it may create a disadvantage in certain exceptional cases while
benefiting a legitimate group as a whole does not justify the
conclusion that it is prejudicial.
I think the same reasoning can apply here.
[38] As Binnie J. said in Granovsky
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1
S.C.R. 703 at p. 734:
The question therefore is not just whether the
appellant has suffered the deprivation of a financial benefit,
which he has, but whether the deprivation promotes the view that
persons with temporary disabilities are "less capable, or
less worthy of recognition or value as human beings or as
members of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern,
respect, and consideration" (emphasis added).
[39] The differential treatment
imposed by the Act does not promote the notion that
parents of children under 16 years old are less deserving of
concern, respect and consideration. Indeed, as soon as the child
attains the age of 16, the tax credits will be available either
to the child or to his or her parent, as long as all the other
conditions are met. That temporary differential treatment does
not foster the view that people in this class are less capable or
less worthy of recognition or value as human beings or as members
of Canadian society. Given the contemporary and historical
context of the differential treatment and those affected by it,
the legislation does not stereotype, exclude or devalue parents
of children under 16 years of age. The legislation only postpones
the right to a tax credit until the child has attained 16 years
of age and it does so for the economic purpose of providing tax
relief to individuals pursuing post-secondary or occupational
training, and for the social purpose of requiring individuals
under age 16 to attend primary or secondary school full-time (see
Exhibit R-1, paragraphs 20 and 21).
[40] It is appropriate here to cite La
Forest J. who, in McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990]
3 S.C.R. 229, said in relation to age and the allocation of
benefits (at p. 297):
The truth is that, while
we must guard against laws having an unnecessary deleterious
impact on the aged based on inaccurate assumptions about the
effects of age on ability, there are often solid grounds for
importing benefits on one age group over another in the
development of broad social schemes and in allocating
benefits.
[41] In such circumstances, where
legislation does not demean the dignity of those it excludes in
either its purpose or its effects, it is open to the legislature
to use age as a "proxy" for long-term need (Law,
at p. 560) or, as in the present case, for broad social
schemes.
[42] In the circumstances of the
present case, recalling the purposes of subsection 15(1) of the
Charter, I do not see any violation of human dignity. The
impugned distinctions here do not involve the withholding of a
government benefit on the basis of stereotypical assumptions
about the demographic group of which the appellant happens to be
a member. I must therefore conclude that, when considered in the
social, political and legal context of the claim, the age
distinctions in sections 118.5 and 118.6 of the Act
are not discriminatory.
[43] Given the finding that the
impugned legislative provisions do not infringe subsection 15(1)
of the Charter, it is not necessary to turn to section 1
of the Charter.
[44] In the circumstances, I must
therefore dismiss the appeal.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 7th day of February 2002.
J.T.C.C.
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