Date: 20020417
Docket: 1999-489-IT-G
BETWEEN:
GENERAL MOTORS OF CANADA LIMITED,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasonsfor
judgment
BOWIE J.
[1]
This appeal is from an assessment for income tax for the taxation
year 1989. The point in issue is a narrow one, and turns entirely
on the meaning to be given to a transitional provision found in
P.C. 1989-2464 (SOR/90-22), which amended subsection 1100(2) of
the Income Tax Regulations. That amendment extended the
so-called half-year rule to property in class 12, for taxation
years ending after 1987. However, it included a transitional
provision by which certain property was grandfathered. The
Appellant claims the benefit of that grandfathering provision. It
reads:
24(2) Subsection
1(6) is applicable in respect of property acquired by a
taxpayer after 1987 other than property acquired by the
taxpayer before 1990
(a)
pursuant to an obligation in writing entered into by the
taxpayer before June 18, 1987,
(b)
that was under construction by or on behalf of the taxpayer
on June 18, 1987, or
(c)
that is a fixed and integral part of property under
construction by or on behalf of the taxpayer on
June 18, 1987.
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24(2) Le
paragraphe 1(6) s'applique aux biens acquis par un
contribuable après 1987, à l'exclusion de
ceux qu'il a acquis avant 1990 et, selon le cas:
a) qui ont été acquis
conformément à une obligation écrite
contractée par le contribuable avant le 18 juin
1987;
b) dont la
construction par le contribuable ou pour son compte
était commencée le 18 juin 1987;
c) qui sont une
partie fixe et intégrante d'un bien dont la
construction par le contribuable ou pour son compte
était commencée le 18 juin 1987.
|
[2]
The facts giving rise to the appeal are not in dispute. The
Appellant (GMCL) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of General Motors
Corporation (GMC), a public company incorporated in the United
States of America. GMC is a vast company, organized into various
divisions, each with its separate product lines. Although GMCL is
a separate corporate entity, it is treated for internal
management purposes as though it were a division of GMC. GMC,
through various divisions, and GMCL are in the business of
manufacturing and selling motor vehicles. For many years Canada
and the U.S.A. have formed a common market for automobiles. The
varied product line of the companies is manufactured at a number
of different plants throughout Canada and the U.S.A., with the
production of each plant being distributed in both countries. In
this way GMC and GMCL achieve economies of scale and uniformity
in production.
[3]
The manufacture of automobiles requires that numerous parts be
fabricated and delivered to the factories for incorporation into
the automobiles being assembled there. Some parts are
manufactured at GMCL and GMC factories throughout Canada and the
United States. Many of them are made by arm's length
suppliers and sold to GMCL and GMC. In either case the
manufacturing process involves the use of dies and moulds for the
forming of metal and plastic parts. These dies and moulds are
collectively referred to as "special tooling". The
special tooling is bought or manufactured by GMC or one of its
subsidiaries, and the ownership of it invariably remains within
the General Motors organization, even though in many cases it is
physically located and used at the plant of an independent
supplier of parts. Before 1987, GMCL used some parts manufactured
using special tooling owned by GMC in its assembly plants, and it
paid GMC for the use of the special tooling on a pro rata
basis. Similarly, GMC paid GMCL for the use of tooling owned by
it and used to produce parts for GMC plants. In December 1987,
GMC and GMCL replaced this arrangement with an agreement whereby
each would sell to the other an undivided interest in its special
tooling, the proportional interests to be based upon the
proportion of the parts to be produced for each of them by the
use of that tooling. It is the interest owned by GMCL of special
tooling first acquired by GMC for which the Appellant claims the
exemption provided by the grandfather clause.
[4]
In the early 1980s, the decision was taken by GMC to replace its
"A" cars with a new line of mid-size cars to be
produced beginning with the 1988 model year. The first vehicles
were to be produced in the latter part of 1987. The design and
development of that new line was known as the GM-10 Project. The
evidence as to the capital expenditure review and approval
process for this project within the GMC organization, and the
arrangements made between GMC and GMCL concerning ownership of,
and access to, the special tooling is well summarized in
paragraphs 4 to 30 of the Appellant's written submissions.
None of that evidence was challenged, and so I reproduce those
paragraphs in their entirety here.
(a) Origins of GM-10 Project
4.
The GM-10 Project was conceived in the early 1980's.
General Motors Corporation ("GMC") recognised that the
mid-size automobiles that it was then producing, known as
"A" cars, were coming to the end of their life cycle.
Thus it was necessary to design and develop a new generation of
mid-size vehicles to replace the "A" cars. That
was the mission of the GM-10 Project.
5.
The lead time for production of a new model of vehicle is
substantial. In the case of the GM-10 Project, design and
development began in the early 1980's for the new vehicles
which were scheduled to, and did, begin to roll out of the
assembly plants in the latter part of 1987 for the 1988 model
year.
6.
The capital expenditures required for the design and development
of the new vehicles, for renovating and constructing assembly and
fabrication facilities and for acquisition of the necessary
assembly and component tooling were on the order of the US $8
billion.
7.
The GM-10 Project itself, and the major capital
expenditures which it entailed, were authorised at the highest
levels of the General Motors organisation, namely by the GMC
Board of Directors and/or by its two key standing committees, the
Executive Committee and the Finance Committee.
8.
From at least as early as 1984, it was determined that two of the
four models to come out of the GM-10 Project were to be
assembled at the Oshawa #1 and Oshawa #2 Assembly Plants of
General Motors of Canada Limited ("GMCL).
(b)General Motors' Capital
Expenditure Authorization Process
9.
Substantial capital expenditures by any operating entity within
the General Motors organisation must be reviewed and approved at
senior governance levels within General Motors. Final approval of
substantial capital expenditures comes from the Finance Committee
of the Board of Directors of GMC. The membership of the Finance
Committee includes the Chairman of GMC, the Executive Vice
President/Chief Financial Officer and other directors, both
inside (i.e. members of senior GMC management) and outside.
10.
Approval of a capital expenditure by the Finance Committee means
that GMC is committed to making the necessary funds available and
the operating entity, which sought and obtained the approval, is
committed to carrying out the project as approved.
11.
The capital expenditure review and approval process is initiated
by the operating entity within General Motors which is seeking
the approval. That operating entity prepares an Appropriation
Request which sets out, in some detail, the nature, purpose and
elements of the proposed expenditure with appropriate backup
information and documentation. The Appropriation Request then
goes through a series of levels of review and approval, the
extent of which depends upon the amount being requested. The
Appropriation Requests in evidence at this proceeding all
received final approval at the Finance Committee of GMC's
Board of Directors.
12. A
particular Appropriation Request from a particular operating
entity within the General Motors organisation is not initiated,
reviewed or approved in isolation. It represents part of the
implementation of a corporate strategy previously approved by the
Board of Directors or Executive Committee of GMC. Thus the person
in charge of the operating entity would face serious
consequences, including dismissal, for failure to carry out a
project in accordance with an approved Appropriation Request.
Cancellation of or significant change to a project which is the
subject of an approved Appropriation Request must itself be
approved at the appropriate level in the General Motors
organisation. Such a cancellation or significant change would be
reflected in a further Appropriation Request which would be
subject to review and approval in a similar fashion, and at
similar levels in the organisation, as was the case with the
original request.
(c) Capital Expenditure Commitments for
GMCL's Participation in the GM-10 Project
13.
The capital expenditure approval process, as described in the
following paragraphs, demonstrates that GMCL was committed to
participating in the GM10 Project from at least 1984. By
1985, at the latest, GMCL was committed to renovating,
reconfiguring and re-equipping the Oshawa #2 and Oshawa #1
Assembly Plants so that they would be in a position to assemble
GM-10 automobiles at those plants beginning in the 1988
and 1989 model years respectively.
14.
On February 17, 1984, GMCL initiated an Appropriation
Request for US $185.7 million to construct a new stamping
plant to produce sheet metal parts (e.g. door panels, hoods) to
serve the two Oshawa Assembly Plants. That Appropriation Request
was approved by the GMC Finance Committee on July 2,
1984.
15.
In a report to the Finance Committee dated August 17,
1984, the Chairman of GMC outlined the anticipated capital
expenditures for the GM-10 Project, then expected to be on
the order of US $6.9 billion. Of that amount,
approximately US $1 billion was to be spent in 1985, and
US $2.8 billion in each of 1986 and 1987.
16.
On November 26, 1984, GMC's Executive Vice President/Chief
Financial Officer prepared a report to the Finance Committee
seeking approval of an expenditure of US $444 million to produce
stamping dies, a type of tooling, for production of GM-10
car bodies in all of the assembly plants participating in the
GM-10 Project. That request was approved by the Finance
Committee on December 3, 1984.
17.
In October and December, 1984 and January, 1985, GMCL and the
Chevrolet-Pontiac-Canada operating division, of which
GMCL was a part, initiated four Appropriation Requests with
respect to the GM-10 Project:
a)
Appropriation Request for US $132.4 million in respect of the
establishment of sheet metal fabrication facilities in the Oshawa
Car Body plants;
b)
Appropriation Request for US $437.7 million to convert the Oshawa
#2 Assembly Plant from the "A" cars then being
assembled there to the GM-10 cars to be assembled beginning
in 1987 for the 1988 model year;
c)
Appropriation Request for US $351.6 million to convert the Oshawa
#1 Assembly Plant from the "A" cars then being
assembled there to the GM-10 cars to be assembled beginning
in 1988 for the 1989 model year; and
d)
Appropriation Request for US $455.7 million for body and chassis
assembly tooling to produce GM-10 cars at a number of
assembly plants including Oshawa #2.
18.
These four Appropriation Requests, totalling almost US $1.4
billion, were forwarded to the Finance Committee with a report of
GMC's Executive Vice President/Chief Financial Officer dated
January 28, 1985. They were approved by the Finance Committee on
February 4, 1985.
19.
On April 26, 1985, GMC's Executive Vice President/Chief
Financial Officer reported to the Finance Committee on an
Appropriation Request from the
Chevrolet-Pontiac-Canada Division for US $186 million
for equipment and tooling required to fabricate body panels for
certain 1988 models of the GM-10 vehicles and for tooling
to be provided to outside suppliers of body and chassis
components. The Appropriation Request was approved by the Finance
Committee on May 6, 1985. Tooling comprised US $131.2 million of
the request.
20.
On August 21, 1985, the Chevrolet-Pontiac-Canada
Division initiated an Appropriation Request in the amount of US
$266.2 million for facilities and tooling required to produce one
of the 1989 GM-10 models to be assembled in Oshawa. US
$191.6 million of this request was for tooling. The request was
reported to the Finance Committee by GMC's Executive Vice
President/Chief Financial Officer on September 30, 1985 and
approved by the Finance Committee on October 7, 1985.
21.
On January 24, 1986, GMC's Executive Vice President/Chief
Financial Officer reported to the Finance Committee on
Appropriation Requests from the Fisher Guide Division of GMC and
from the Chevrolet-Pontiac-Canada Division, both
relating to the GM-10 Project. The requests totalled US
$850.3 million of which US $671.3 million was for tooling, both
at General Motors facilities and at the facilities of outside
component suppliers. Both requests were approved by the Finance
Committee on February 3, 1986.
(d) GMCL's Commitment to Assemble GM-10
Vehicles
22.
By early February, 1985 (following approval of the Appropriation
Requests referred to in paragraphs 17 to 21, above), GMCL and the
Chevrolet-Pontiac-Canada Division had sought and
obtained approval from GMC, and had received corresponding
funding commitments, to strip the interiors of the Oshawa #1 and
Oshawa #2 Assembly Plants completely, to renovate, reconfigure
and re-equip them, and to construct and equip related
facilities in Oshawa, notably a new stamping plant and sheet
metal fabrication facilities, for the purpose of assembling the
particular models of GM-10 vehicles which were assigned to
the Oshawa Assembly Plants.
23.
By that point in time, it was not open to GMCL to decide that it
did not wish to proceed with assembly of the new models at the
Oshawa Assembly Plants. Had GMCL not secured from GMC the mandate
to assemble the Buick Regal and Chevrolet Lumina at Oshawa, and
had it failed to carry out that mandate, the Oshawa Assembly
Plants and related fabrication facilities would have stood idle,
following the introduction of the new mid-size vehicles
coming out of the GM-10 Project, and the employees working
at those operations would have been laid off.
24.
Thus, no later than February, 1985, as a result of the approval
by GMC's Finance Committee of the Appropriation Requests
initiated by GMCL and the Chevrolet-Pontiac-Canada
Division, GMCL was unequivocally committed to the assembly of the
Chevrolet Lurnina and Buick Regal models at the Oshawa #2 and
Oshawa #1 Assembly Plants, respectively, beginning with the 1988
and 1989 model years, respectively, with production beginning in
the latter part of 1987 and 1988, respectively.
25.
The construction, renovation, reconfiguration and
re-equipping of the facilities comprising the GMCL Autoplex
commenced in 1984 and proceeded, in accordance with the schedules
appended to the corresponding Appropriation Requests, until
1988.
(e) Implications for GMCL Access to Component
Tooling
26.
For GMCL to carry out the mandate assigned to it of assembling
the Chevrolet Lumina and Buick Regal models, it needed to be
assured of supplies of the components and sub-assemblies
which would be inputs to the assembly operations at the Oshawa
Assembly Plants to produce finished vehicles in Canada.
27.
General Motor's sourcing of components and
sub-assemblies was and is integrated across North America,
as are its vehicle assembly operations. Thus, particular
components used in some or all GM-10 models might be
manufactured by only one or two component suppliers located
anywhere in North America. Those component suppliers might be
General Motors operations, in Canada or in the US, or they might
be outside suppliers unrelated to the General Motors
organisation. In either case, the tooling required to produce the
components is always owned by a General Motors entity.
28.
Thus, GMCL required access to the component tooling, wherever
located, such that it was entitled to have the tooling used to
produce the components and sub-assemblies required as inputs to
the assembly process at the Oshawa #1 and Oshawa #2 Assembly
Plants. Without such entitlement, GMCL could not have fulfilled
its commitment to assemble the Chevrolet Lumina and Buick Regal
models of the new GM-10 vehicles in Canada.
29.
From the inception of the GM-10 Project, the required
tooling was designed and manufactured to meet the needs of GMCL,
as well as the needs of the US assembly and fabrication
facilities involved in the manufacture of the vehicle models
coming out of the GM-10 Project.
30.
By letter agreement, executed by GMCL on December 11, 1987 and by
GMC on December 23, 1987, GMCL and GMC agreed that each would
acquire from the other an undivided interest in special tools
initially purchased by the other, such undivided interest to be
in proportion to the number of parts produced by the particular
tool expected to be purchased by the party acquiring the
undivided interest. GMCL and GMC further agreed that each would
be entitled to use the other's undivided interest in such
special tools.
[5]
The assumptions of fact underlying the assessment are found in
paragraph 8 of the Reply. Of the 27 subparagraphs found there,
some are redundant, and many are either entirely or substantially
conclusions of law. The following, however, are assumptions of
fact that have not been displaced by the evidence:
8.
In so assessing the Appellant, the Minister made, inter
alia, the following assumptions:
a)
the Appellant is a Canadian based subsidiary of GMC, a U.S. based
corporation;
b)
the two corporations were not dealing at arms length;
c)
prior to December 11, 1987, GMC acquired, developed and owned its
own special tooling located in the U.S. ("GMC Tooling")
and the Appellant acquired, developed and owned its own special
tooling located in Canada ("GM Canada Tooling");
d)
special tooling is the cutting or shaping parts in a machine;
e)
as the Appellant did not own GMC's U.S. based tooling, GMC
allocated a portion of the cost to the Appellant based on the
projected usage of the tooling located in the U.S. and calculated
on the basis of the number of pieces the tooling would produce
for the Appellant relative to the total number of parts to be
produced by that tooling over its life;
f)
GMC allocated a portion of the cost of its 1987 tooling to the
Appellant in 1987 based on the formula described in subparagraph
9(e) supra;
g)
for accounting purposes, the allocation for tooling supplied to
the Appellant was treated as a ongoing cost and was amortized
over the model life based on production from that tooling each
year (usually about 4 years);
h)
similarly for tax purposes, the Appellant deducted these amounts
in its computation of income as incurred, resulting in a
deduction of its share of expense over the life of the tooling
(generally 4 years). This method was consistently followed by the
Appellant and its parent until December 11, 1987;
i)
this method, for both accounting and tax purposes, was reflected
in the GM 10 Project which began in early 1984 in which GMC
and the Appellant participated;
j)
in the GM 10 project, it was agreed that GMC would manufacture
the Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme and the Pontiac Grand Prix and the
Appellant would manufacture the Buick Regal and the Chevrolet
Lumina, each corporation to own its own tooling and allocate the
cost to the other based on the method described in subparagraph
8(e) supra;
k)
prior to December 11, 1987, GMC continued to acquire, develop and
own GMC Tooling and the Appellant continued to acquire, develop
and own GM Canada Tooling;
l)
prior to December 11, 1987, GMC did not acquire an interest in
the GM Canada Tooling and the Appellant did not acquire an
interest in the GMC tooling;
m)
as a participant in the GM 10 project as structured, the
Appellant had no obligation to acquire and did not acquire an
interest in GMC tooling or any specific property, no items were
identified or itemized as being subject to purchase, there were
no agreements of purchase and sale regarding the property in
question and the Appellant had no registered interest in the
property in question or liability as an owner;
n)
in the GM 10 project as structured, the Appellant was not
required to enter and did not enter into any obligation, in
writing or otherwise, which obliged it to acquire an interest in
GMC tooling or any particular asset or property that GMC
owned;
...
p)
by letter dated December 11, 1987, the Appellant and its parent
agreed that each party who initially purchased a special tool
would sell to the other party "an undivided interest in that
tool determined by the percentage that the number of parts to be
manufactured using that tool and sold to the other party is of
the total number of parts to be manufactured using that
tool";
...
r)
commencing with the 1988 and future model years, the Appellant
agreed to purchase an undivided interest in the GMC tooling
located in the U.S. and GMC agreed to purchase an undivided
interest in the GM Canada Tooling located in Canada;
s)
after December 11, 1987, the purchase agreement allocated special
tooling purchased in a similar fashion to the cost allocation
method which previously governed the Appellant and its parent:
what GMC Tooling the Appellant would purchase after December 11,
1987 from GMC would be based on the number of parts that the GMC
Tooling would produce for the Appellant as a percentage of the
total production on a projected basis from that tooling over its
expected life (i.e. if total expected production was 100 pieces,
and production for Canada was anticipated to be 10 pieces, then
10% of the GMC Tooling would be purchased by the Appellant from
GMC);
t)
the December 11, 1987 agreement was made and entered into after
the amendments to the Act regarding capital cost allowance
had already been proclaimed in force and was not part of or
pursuant to an obligation in writing or any pre-existing
agreement or arrangement between the Appellant and its parent
regarding special tooling;
...
x)
tooling acquired by GMC Tooling prior to December 11, 1987, was
for its exclusive ownership and the GMC Tooling acquired by the
Appellant before 1990 was not under construction by or on behalf
of the Appellant on June 18, 1987;
The reference in subparagraph 8 (t) to the Act should
be to the Regulations.
[6]
The question before me is whether GMCL is entitled to the benefit
of subsection 24(2) of SOR/90-22 in respect of its undivided
interest in special tooling acquired from GMC as described in the
December 11, 1987 letter. If it is, then the half-year rule does
not apply to that special tooling for the year 1989, and the
appeal succeeds; if it is not, then the appeal must fail. For
convenience, the subsection is reproduced again.
24(2) Subsection
1(6) is applicable in respect of property acquired by a
taxpayer after 1987 other than property acquired by the
taxpayer before 1990
(a)
pursuant to an obligation in writing entered into by the
taxpayer before June 18, 1987,
(b)
that was under construction by or on behalf of the taxpayer
on June 18, 1987, or
(c)
that is a fixed and integral part of property under
construction by or on behalf of the taxpayer on
June 18, 1987.
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24(2) Le
paragraphe 1(6) s'applique aux biens acquis par un
contribuable après 1987, à l'exclusion de
ceux qu'il a acquis avant 1990 et, selon le cas:
a) qui ont été acquis
conformément à une obligation écrite
contractée par le contribuable avant le 18 juin
1987;
b) dont la
construction par le contribuable ou pour son compte
était commencée le 18 juin 1987;
c) qui sont une
partie fixe et intégrante d'un bien dont la
construction par le contribuable ou pour son compte
était commencée le 18 juin 1987.
|
[7]
It is quite clear from the evidence that long before June 18,
1987, and probably as early as February 1985, GMCL was committed,
as a practical matter, to fulfil its assigned role in the GM-10
Project. There is written evidence of that commitment before me.
However, it was not until December 1987 that it became obligated
to acquire an ownership interest in the special tooling that is
in issue here.
[8]
The Appellant takes the position that it is not required to show
that it had a legal obligation to acquire ownership of the
special tooling before June 18, 1987. It argues that it only need
show that before that date it had obliged itself, in writing, to
do what was necessary to enable it to assemble the Chevrolet
Lumina and Buick Regal models, and that it purchased its interest
in the tooling, prior to 1990, in order to fulfil that
obligation. In other words, the expression "acquired by the
taxpayer ... pursuant to an obligation in writing
..." should be interpreted to mean "acquired by
the taxpayer ... in the course of fulfilling an obligation
in writing". It is important to note at this point that
nothing in the evidence establishes that the taxpayer could not
have fulfilled its obligation to assemble Luminas and Regals
without ever acquiring any ownership interest in the tooling, had
it chosen to follow that course. It had been assembling vehicles
for many years using tooling owned by GMC, and simply paying GMC
on a pro rata basis for the use of it to manufacture parts
to be used by GMCL in its assembly plants. The Appellant's
evidence did nothing to disprove the Minister's assumption
8(m) to the effect that participation in the GM-10 Project did
not require the Appellant to acquire an ownership interest in
GMC-owned tooling.
[9]
In support of its position the Appellant relies on a letter
written to it by an official of Revenue Canada on October 17,
1988 in relation to an agreement between the federal government
and the Appellant, whereby the government agreed to lend the
Appellant $110 million upon a number of conditions as to
expenditures to be made by the Appellant. Those expenditures
included certain machinery and equipment to be acquired by it as
part of its assembly plant at Ste. Thérèse,
Québec. In that letter it was said that this machinery and
equipment would be considered by Revenue Canada to have been
acquired "... pursuant to an obligation in writing
entered into by the taxpayer before June 18, 1987." This
letter, it is argued, shows that the Appellant's
interpretation of the transitional provision must be correct.
[10] The
Appellant also argues, in the alternative, that it is entitled to
the benefit of paragraph 24(2)(c) of the amended
Regulations, on the basis that the special tooling became
a fixed and integral part of the GMCL Autoplex, which was
effectively reconstructed between 1984 and 1988. Counsel for the
Appellant concedes that the special tooling was not physically
incorporated into the Autoplex, but argues that all that is
required to satisfy paragraph 24(2)(c) is a direct
operational nexus between the tooling and the plant. This
argument is developed in the following paragraphs of the
Appellant's Memorandum:
67.
The Autoplex was constructed, renovated, reconfigured and
re-equipped specifically to produce the Buick Regals and
Chevrolet Luminas. The evidence establishes that, while the
tooling was not physically part of the Autoplex, it was a
permanent and constant part of the operation of the Autoplex and
that it was essential to the operation of the Autoplex facility.
Without the tooling, the Autoplex could not serve the very
purpose for which it was constructed.
68.
The issue is the nature of the nexus between the Autoplex and the
tooling that is contemplated by the phrase "fixed and
integral part of the ...[Autoplex]". The Appellant submits
that the phrase is capable of two different meanings. The first
is to connote physical attachment of the tooling to the Autoplex.
The second, and alternative, meaning is to connote a direct,
operational (as opposed to physical) nexus to the Autoplex. As
such, GMCL submits that the interpretation which advances the
object and spirit of the provision ought to be preferred. In
Glaxo Wellcome Inc. v. The Queen, 96 DTC 1160 (T.C.C.),
Bowman T.C.C.J. (as he then was) stated at p. 1161:
Obviously one starts with the plain words of the statute. If
the words of the legislation are clear and unambiguous and admit
of but one interpretation one need look no further. If they
are not and are susceptible of more than one interpretation one
must look to the scheme of the act and its object and spirit.
It is only when recourse to all of the other tools of statutory
interpretation fails to yield a clear answer that one is entitled
to invoke the principle that in case of ambiguity the benefit of
the doubt must go to the taxpayer.
69.
GMCL submits that the object and spirit of the transitional
provision argues for the latter interpretation. It is submitted
that the first interpretation (that the nexus must be physical)
would frustrate the legislative intention in that it would leave
a taxpayer, like GMCL, who commenced construction of the Autoplex
well before the transitional date on the understanding that the
Autoplex could not possibly function with the tooling, without
any transitional relief with respect to an essential element of
the facility. What possible tax policy objective is served by
providing transitional relief only to that equipment that is
brought to the Autoplex and bolted to the floor while excluding
equipment whose significance to the functioning of the Autoplex
is the same but which happens to be located away from the
physical facility? Looked at this way, it is submitted that the
tooling is "fixed" because it has the "necessary
degree of constancy and permanency in the day to day
operations" of the Autoplex and it is "integral"
because it is essential (and not ancillary) to the operation of
the Autoplex.
[11] The
Appellant's position, as I understand it, is that the
expression "pursuant to" should be taken, in the
context of this enactment, to mean only "in order to
fulfil". It does not, therefore, connote an obligation to
acquire property, but only that there be some nexus between the
obligation and the acquisition. To interpret this provision
otherwise, it is argued, requires the addition of the words
"to acquire the property" after the word
"obligation". This argument is bolstered by reference
to a number of examples of similar language in the Act and
the Regulations wherein the word "obligation"
is followed by a more specific statement of the nature of that
obligation.
[12] The
primary meaning of the expression "acquired ¼
pursuant to an obligation in writing entered into" in
English, and its French equivalent "qui ont
été acquis conformément à une
obligation écrite contractée", refers to a
situation in which the taxpayer was under a legal obligation to
purchase the property in question. This may be derived from
dictionaries,[1]
and from common usage. Were it not for the decision of this
Court,[2] affirmed
by the Federal Court of Appeal,[3] in Bow River Pipe Lines v. The Queen, I
would have said that there is no ambiguity in either the English
or French version of paragraph 24(2)(a), and that it is
only operative where the taxpayer had, before June 18, 1987,
entered into a legally binding commitment to acquire the
property.
[13] Much of
the Appellant's argument was founded on that decision. The
Federal Court of Appeal observed that "[T]he Tax Court
Judge did not err in concluding that the words "...
agreement in writing ..." [une convention
écrite] in a grandfathering provision did not require that
the agreement be one that created contractual rights and
obligations ...",[4] but could extend also to instruments of
negotiation. However, the four letters which were held in that
case to amount to an agreement in writing set out all the
essential terms of the contract that was ultimately executed.
Indeed, all that remained following the last of these was
satisfaction of two conditions. One of these was to obtain the
necessary regulatory approval from the appropriate government
agency; the other was to obtain a satisfactory advance tax
ruling. In finding that these letters were sufficient to satisfy
the requirement in the transitional provision in that case that
there be an agreement in writing entered into by December 4,
1985, Christie A.C.J. said:[5]
What, then, is the object or purpose of subsection 26(5) of
the 1986 statute? To my mind the answer is that if a
taxpayer has expended time or money or both with the intention of
relying on paragraph 98(5)(d) of the Act in
conducting its affairs the repeal of the paragraph is not
applicable where that intention is evinced by agreements in
writing, not necessarily contractual in nature, entered into
prior to December 4, 1985. But those agreements must set in
motion the taking of steps that lead directly to the making of
agreements of the kind described in paragraphs 26(5)(a),
(b) and (c) after that date that do give rise to
contractual obligations. I do not think that reference to an
agreement in legislation or in some other context means that the
agreement must create contractual rights and obligations.
[14] The
present case is entirely different. The "obligation in
writing" that is relied on by the Appellant as having been
entered into prior to June 18, 1987 does not speak at all to the
acquisition by the Appellant of an ownership interest in the
special tooling. I was not referred to anything in record that
shows an intention on the part of the Appellant to purchase, or
of GMC to sell to it, an ownership interest in the U.S. special
tooling. There is in fact no nexus between the GM-10 Project and
the December 11, 1987 letter to be found either in the letter
itself, or elsewhere in the evidence.
[15] Even if
the language of this Regulation is ambiguous, I would
nevertheless find that the benefit of the grandfather provision
is only available to a taxpayer who had entered into a binding
commitment to acquire depreciable property of class 12
before June 17, 1987. The correct approach to resolving any such
ambiguity is found in the judgment of Noël J., as he then
was, in The Queen v. Trade Investments Shopping Centre
Ltd.[6]
While it may be useful to compare various transitional
provisions used by Parliament in tax legislation in order to
determine their meaning, this must be done with great care. This
is particularly true when one is trying to compare transitional
provisions emanating from different budgets, as is the case
here.
Transitional provisions do not lend themselves to the scrutiny
of an overly strict interpretation. It should be borne in mind
that transitional provisions are secondary and incidental to the
provisions of substantive law which they accompany. Unlike taxing
provisions, they are not adopted as part of a coherent
legislative plan in which the provisions must interrelate with
one another in a logical scheme. They are ad hoc provisions the
sole purpose of which is to ensure that the particular provision
of substantive law which they accompany is introduced in an
equitable manner. By their very nature, therefore, they are
likely to create discrepancies, and a review of the wording of
these provisions in recent years indicates that each budget
produces transitional provisions peculiar to it and designed
without reference, or at least with little reference, to
preceding in pari materia provisions. While a comparative
analysis of such provisions remains useful, I do not think it can
be conclusive in the case at bar.
In my view, when a question of interpretation arises as to the
scope of a transitional provision, it must be answered by
reference to the provision of substantive law it accompanies and
the specific situation which Parliament sought to alleviate by
introducing it.
[16] The
substantive enactment in question here has the effect of
deferring the taxpayer's entitlement to deduct an amount of
capital cost allowance for a period of one year. The purpose of
subsection 24(2) is to provide relief from this to taxpayers who
have committed themselves to a purchase of depreciable property
of the class prior to the date on which the government announced
that the Regulation would be changed. Taxpayers in that
position are to be protected, because they made their business
decisions on the basis of the law as it stood before the
amendment, with no knowledge that the amendment would take place,
and they have no alternative but to complete the purchases for
which they contracted. Taxpayers who had not entered into a
binding commitment to acquire property prior to the announcement
of the proposed amendment are not included within the
grandfathering provision, because they made their contractual
commitments after the forthcoming amendment to the
Regulation had been announced to the public. The Appellant
had committed itself to the assembly of Luminas and Regals prior
to June 17, 1987, but it had not committed itself to the purchase
of an interest in the U.S. special tooling. The Appellant is
correct to say that it required access to the tooling to carry
out its commitment; it is not correct, however, to say that it
needed to have an ownership interest in the tooling. In fact, it
had been assembling vehicles in the past without any ownership
interest in the GMC tooling that was used to produce parts for
it. It simply paid GMC for its use according to the agreed
formula. Nothing in the evidence suggests that the Appellant
could not have carried out the assembly of Luminas and Regals
under a similar arrangement. The agreement which the Appellant
and GMC entered into with respect to the ownership of special
tooling did not, on the evidence before me, come about as an
operational requirement of the GM-10 Project, but for other
reasons which were not elucidated.
[17] The
Appellant's argument based on the letter written to it in
respect of the Ste. Thérèse plant has no
merit. The plant at Ste. Thérèse involves a
different factual situation, and not all the facts relating to it
are before me, so it is not possible for me to conclude that the
Minister's officials have applied the Regulation
inconsistently in respect of the Appellant's two different
situations, as counsel alleges. More to the point, however, the
Minister is not bound, when he makes an error in the
interpretation of the Act or the Regulations, to
perpetuate that error. Nor is the Court bound to do so.[7] It is true that where
an administrative practice has been applied by the Minister
consistently over a period of time, it may be of assistance in
resolving ambiguity,[8] but a letter of the kind relied upon by the Appellant
here would have no persuasive value as to the meaning to be given
to the Regulation, even if the context were shown to be
the same in both cases.
[18] Nor do I
see any merit in the argument based upon paragraph
24(2)(c) of the Regulation. To qualify under that
provision, the Appellant would have to show that the special
tooling became a fixed and integral part of the Autoplex. It is
common ground that the tooling was never physically a fixed and
integral part of the Autoplex. The Appellant argues that it is
sufficient to show that the tooling was necessary in order to use
the Autoplex for the assembly of vehicles, and that it was used
permanently for that purpose. It is quite clear from the words of
the Regulation that no such metaphysical sense is
intended. Only equipment which has become a part of the building
in a physical sense can qualify for grandfathering under
paragraph 24(2)(c). In any event, this argument also
founders on the absence of any evidence that the operation of the
assembly plants in Oshawa required parts produced by U.S. tooling
in which the Appellant had an ownership interest. As I have
already said above, the Oshawa plants could have operated
perfectly well with access to parts made with tooling wholly
owned by GMC.
[19] The
appeal is dismissed, with costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 17th day of April, 2002.
"E.A. Bowie"
J.T.C.C.
COURT FILE
NO.:
General Motors of Canada Limited
and Her Majesty the Queen
STYLE OF
CAUSE:
1999-489(IT)G
PLACE OF
HEARING:
Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF
HEARING:
March 21 and 22, 2001
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The
Honourable Judge E.A. Bowie
DATE OF
JUDGMENT:
April 17, 2002
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for the
Appellant:
Joseph Steiner and Al Meghji
Counsel for the
Respondent:
Kathryn Philpott and Jag Gill
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the
Appellant:
Name:
Joseph Steiner
Firm:
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP
Name:
Al Meghji
Firm:
Donahue Ernst & Young LLP
For the
Respondent:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
1999-489(IT)G
BETWEEN:
GENERAL MOTORS OF CANADA LIMITED,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeal heard on March 21 and 22, 2001 at
Toronto, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge E.A. Bowie
Appearances
Counsel for the
Appellant: Joseph
Steiner and Al Meghji
Counsel for the Respondent: Kathryn
Philpott and Jag Gill
JUDGMENT
The
appeal from the assessment of tax made under the Income Tax
Act for the 1989 taxation year is dismissed, with costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 17th day of April, 2002.
J.T.C.C.