Date:
20020706
Docket: 2000-4195-EI,
2000-4199-CPP,
2001-323-EI,
2001-324-CPP,
2001-1035-EI,
2001-1036-CPP
BETWEEN:
JACQUELINE
CASTONGUAY,
THE DEPARTMENT OF
FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES AND GEORGE
MAZEROLLE,
AND BERNADETTE
FERRON,
Appellants,
and
THE MINISTER OF
NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
Reasons for
Judgment
Angers,
J.T.C.C.
[1] These are six appeals heard on
common evidence in Fredericton, New Brunswick. The appellants
appealed from decisions by the Minister of National Revenue (the
"Minister"), who determined, in the first case, that
Nadia Landry held insurable employment within the meaning of the
Employment Insurance Act (the "Act") and
pensionable employment under the Canada Pension Plan (the
"CPP") with the appellant Jacqueline Castonguay during
the period from January 4, 1999 to June 14, 1999. The New
Brunswick Department of Family and Community Services (the
"Department"), for its part, appealed from the
Minister's decision that the Department is deemed to be the
employer under subsection 10(1) of the Insurable Earnings and
Collection of Premiums Regulations (the
"Regulations") and subsection 8.1(1) of the Canada
Pension Plan Regulations (the "CPPR").
[2] In the second case, the Minister
determined that Germaine Chiasson held insurable employment
within the meaning of the Act and pensionable employment
under the CPP with the appellant George Mazerolle during the
period from July 11, 1999 to November 17, 1999. The Department,
for its part, appealed from the decision that it is deemed to be
the employer under the above-mentioned regulations.
[3] In the third case, the Minister
determined that Francine Doiron held insurable employment within
the meaning of the Act and pensionable employment under
the CPP with the appellant Bernadette Ferron during the period
from July 1, 1999 to December 31, 1999. The Department, for
its part, asked that the style of cause of this third case be
amended to include the Department as an appellant, which request
was objected to by the respondent.
[4] The burden is on the appellants
to establish on a balance of probabilities that the
Minister's decision is wrong in fact and in law. The Minister
relied on the following assumptions of fact in concluding that
the employment in question was insurable and pensionable in each
of the cases.
In the
Bernadette Ferron appeals - 2001-1035(EI) and
2001-1036(CPP), the assumptions of fact are as
follows:
[TRANSLATION]
(a)
the Appellant needs continual personal care and domestic help to
enable her to live at home,
(b)
the Department of Family and Community Services
("DFCS") provided financial assistance to the Appellant
in the form of subsidies to enable her to employ a personal care
attendant;
(c)
the Worker's duties consisted of helping the Appellant in her
daily activities and with her personal care, which included
preparing meals, washing and dressing, as well as housework, such
as cleaning, washing the dishes, changing the bed linen and doing
the laundry and ironing;
(d)
the Worker was not a registered nurse and did not have the
training to provide medical care;
(e)
the Worker worked from 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. six days a week,
from Monday to Saturday;
(f) the Worker received $35.00 a day;
(g)
DFCS issued a cheque to the Appellant;
(h)
the Worker was under the Appellant's direct supervision and
control;
(i) the Appellant controlled the Worker's
hours;
(j) the Appellant controlled the Worker's
duties;
(k)
the Worker was not required to incur expenses in the performance
of her duties;
(l) the Worker was hired personally to take care
of the Appellant;
(m) the
Worker was not in the business of offering personal care to
various clients;
(n)
there was a contract of service between the Worker and the
Payer.
In The
Department of Family and Community Services and George Mazerolle
appeals - 2001-323(EI) and 2001-324(CPP), the assumptions
of fact are as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
(a)
the Payer lived permanently at Mireille Gagnon's
home;
(b)
because of her advanced age, the Payer needs continual care to
enable him to live at home;
(c)
DFCS provided financial assistance to the Payer in the form of
subsidies to enable her to employ a personal care
attendant;
(d)
the Worker's duties consisted of helping the Payer in his
daily activities and with his personal care, which included
preparing meals, washing and dressing;
(e)
the Worker was not a registered nurse and did not have the
training to provide medical care;
(f) the Worker worked seven days a week for a
weekly total of 80 to 90 hours;
(g)
the Worker received $5.50 an hour;
(h)
the Payer was not totally subsidized by DFCS: for the period in
issue DFCS paid the Worker a total of $3,091.10 and the Payer
paid her a total of $192.40;
(i) DFCS gave its portion of her pay directly to
the Worker, without going through the Payer;
(j) the Worker was under the Payer's direct
supervision and control or under the supervision and control of
Mireille Gagnon exercised on behalf of the Payer;
(k)
the Payer and Mireille Gagnon controlled the Worker's
hours;
(l) the Payer and Mireille Gagnon controlled the
Worker's duties;
(m) the
Payer and Mireille Gagnon controlled the Worker's hourly rate
of pay;
(n)
the Worker was not required to incur expenses in the performance
of her duties;
(o)
the Worker was hired personally to take care of the
Payer;
(p)
the Worker was not in the business of offering personal care to
various clients;
(q)
there was a contract of service between the Worker and the
Payer;
(r) DFCS was deemed to be the employer with
respect to the remuneration it paid directly to the
Worker.
In The
Department of Family and Community Services and Jacqueline
Castonguay appeals - 2000-4195(EI) and 2000-4199(CPP), the
assumptions of fact are as follows:
(a)
DFCS provided financial assistance to Jacqueline Castonguay to
enable her to hire help for the care of her handicapped
son;
(b)
the Worker's duties consisted of doing general house cleaning
and helping with the general care of Jacqueline Castonguay's
son;
(c)
the Worker did not have the training to administer medication or
any of the special care required by Jacqueline Castonguay's
son;
(d)
the Worker worked every second week, alternating with another
Worker;
(e)
the Worker worked Monday to Sunday inclusive, for a total of 48.5
hours for the week;
(f) Jacqueline Castonguay offered the Worker
$7.00 per hour, totalling $339.50 per pay period;
(g)
DFCS controlled the total amount of assistance Jacqueline
Castonguay would receive;
(h)
Jacqueline Castonguay controlled the Worker's
duties;
(i) Jacqueline Castonguay controlled the hourly
rate of pay given to the Worker;
(j) Jacqueline Castonguay controlled the number
of hours worked by the Worker;
(k)
the Worker was required to provide the services
personally;
(l) Jacqueline Castonguay had first call on the
Worker's time;
(m) the
Worker was not required to incur expenses in the performance of
her duties;
(n)
the Worker accepted the work as a response to a job offer made by
Jacqueline Castonguay;
(o)
the Worker was not in the business of offering personal care to
clients;
(p)
there was a contract of service between Jacqueline Castonguay and
the Worker;
(q)
Jaccqueline Castonguay did not pay the Worker herself;
(r) the Worker was paid directly by DFCS
according to the hours submitted by the Worker and confirmed by
Jacqueline Castonguay;
(s) DFCS is the deemed employer.
[5] The Appellants called
André Lépine, Director, Adults with Disabilities
and Senior Services, with the New Brunswick Department of Health
and Community Services. Exhibit A-1 gives us not only
the organization chart for that department but also a description
of the home support program for persons no longer able to perform
the activities of daily living on their own. Once the needs of
such persons have been assessed, the Department attempts to
address them through multidisciplinary services established for
that purpose. The Department provides such care to some 9,000
people throughout the province. The care is managed by about a
hundred social workers, each of whom handles approximately 150
cases.
[6] According to Mr. Lépine,
the funding for this program comes from the budget allocated to
his department by the New Brunswick government. The amounts
earmarked for the program are indicated in Exhibits A-3,
A-4 and A-5.
[7] Lisa Doucette, Director, Human
Resources, at the Department, confirmed that the number of
employees assigned to that department was as shown in Exhibits
A-3 and A-5. She also confirmed that Nadia Landry,
Francine Doiron and Germaine Chiasson are not Department
employees and thus do not come under its direction in any way.
The Department's employees are governed by the New Brunswick
Civil Service Act and they must be hired through a
competition process. She was not familiar with the workers'
mode of remuneration.
[8] In the first case under appeal,
Joanne Poirier, a Department social worker, testified that the
Appellant's son, Steve Castonguay, was one of her clients
during the period from February 1997 to November 1999. Mr.
Castonguay had been in an automobile accident and became eligible
for the home care program because of the permanent neurological
after-effects from which he suffered. His mother, the appellant
Jacqueline Castonguay, had been designated to look after her son
and to find people able to provide care to him. She informed
Ms. Poirier that she had found Nadia Landry to take care of
Steve.
[9] According to Ms. Poirier,
Nadia Landry started providing care to Steve Castonguay on
January 4, 1999. Ms. Poirier had met with Nadia Landry to
explain to her the care to be given to Steve Castonguay, which
included, inter alia, feeding, dressing and bathing him.
It was Ms. Poirier who assessed Steve Castonguay's needs
after reviewing his file. She explained to the appellant
Jacqueline Castonguay how to do the billing and informed her that
she had to submit her invoices to the Department. Ms. Landry
was required to work 48.5 hours a week and was paid $7 an
hour. At their meeting Ms. Poirier told Ms. Landry that the
Department was not her employer.
[10] In cross-examination Ms. Poirier
admitted that she was not aware of the discussions that had taken
place between Ms. Landry and Ms. Castonguay. Their
above-mentioned meeting had lasted close to an hour and it had
been the only one. Subsequently, she just received the invoices
for the hours worked by Ms. Landry, that is, seven hours a day
six days a week and six and a half hours on Sunday. If
Ms. Landry had asked for more than $7 an hour, the appellant
Ms. Castonguay would have had to pay the difference.
Ms. Poirier testified that Steve Castonguay's parents
had purchased equipment and had adapted their car to enable Steve
to get in. The appellant sometimes took care of her son on her
own for a day.
[11] Ms. Poirier also summarized the
eligibility criteria for the home care program, which essentially
covered the activities of daily living, such as bathing, hygiene
and meals. The subsidy received was determined by the
recipient's income, and in Steve's case, the Department
paid for all of this care. She concluded her testimony by saying
that there had never been any question of paying Ms. Landry for
her overtime and that, if Ms. Landry had any concerns, she had to
make them known to Ms. Castonguay.
[12] Jean-Claude Robichaud testified for
the appellants in the case of the estate of
George Mazerolle. Mr. Robichaud is a social worker and
became involved in the case when he assessed
Mr. Mazerolle's needs for the purposes of the home care
program. Mr. Mazerolle was 92 years and 6 months old at the
time and was unable to live on his own. Mr. Robichaud
therefore recommended that he be given four hours of care a day
to supplement those already being provided by a
Ms. Robichaud, who was living with Mr. Mazerolle. The
person hired was Germaine Chiasson. Mr. Robichaud
acknowledged he had met Ms. Chiasson only once, at his
office.
[13] In 1999, Mr. Mazerolle's
niece, Mireille Gagnon, offered to keep Mr. Mazerolle
at her home. Ms. Chiasson nonetheless continued providing
care for Mr. Mazerolle, who still insisted that his niece
take care of all aspects of his care, including his diet. That
information was communicated to Ms. Chiasson.
[14] The invoice for
Ms. Chiasson's work was submitted to the Department
after being verified by Ms. Gagnon. Mr. Mazerolle
contributed $92 a month toward the payment for his care and the
Department paid the difference. Ms. Chiasson was not the
only person caring for Mr. Mazerolle. She worked 44 hours a
week and occasionally worked overtime without asking for any
additional pay. Although Ms. Chiasson had been hired by
Ms. Gagnon, Mr. Mazerolle had verbally authorized the
latter to act on his behalf.
[15] One of the invoices sent to the
Department was adduced in evidence as Exhibit I-1. It
identifies the contribution paid by the Department as $1,987 and
that of Mr. Mazerolle as $96.21 for the approved
hours, that is, 12 hours a day at $5.50 an hour for one month. A
portion of that money was used to pay Ms. Chiasson for her
work.
[16] Social worker Carolle Larocque Ferron
testified in the case of the appellant Bernadette Ferron. The two
are not related. This witness testified that the appellant
suffered from Friedreich's ataxia and as a consequence was
eligible to receive home care offered through the program. The
appellant Bernadette Ferron used a wheelchair. She had nerve
impairment and experienced difficulty expressing herself.
Francine Doiron cared for her during the period from June 1999 to
December 1999, providing personal care, including housework, meal
preparation, bathing, hygiene and assistance in getting around.
Ms. Doiron worked six days a week from Monday to Saturday,
nine or ten hours a day. The Department contributed $35 a day, or
$910 a month, and paid that contribution directly to Bernadette
Ferron, who then paid Ms. Doiron each week.
[17] In cross-examination
Ms. Larocque Ferron explained that the appellant managed her
care herself and was able to communicate with the assistance of
an intermediary. Ms. Larocque Ferron testified that the
appellant had taken care of the hiring of Ms. Doiron and she
confirmed that the Department sent its contribution directly to
the appellant. That, she testified, is an acceptable practice
where there is a climate of trust between the Department and the
client (that is, the appellant). She closed her testimony by
indicating that, in terms of specialized equipment, the appellant
had a wheelchair and a lift available to her, the lift having
been purchased by the Department.
[18] Paulette Boudreau Clark testified in
the case of the appellant George Mazerolle. This witness has
been employed by the Department for 20 years and works in
financial services. She testified that, in the appellant George
Mazerolle's case, Germaine Chiasson sometimes worked over 44
hours a week but received no additional pay in that event.
Ms. Chiasson was paid $5.50 an hour. She and
George Mazerolle signed the invoices before they were
submitted to the Department for payment.
[19] For its part, the respondent called
Joanne Robichaud, an appeals officer. As regards the case of the
appellant Jacqueline Castonguay, Ms. Robichaud had met with
Nadia Landry as well as Lily Fraser, a Department employee.
Ms. Robichaud had been informed of Ms. Landry's
working conditions, her pay and the mode of payment. She had not
met with the appellant Jacqueline Castonguay. On the basis of the
information she had received, stated Ms. Robichaud, she
concluded that the appellant was entitled to hire and dismiss
Nadia Landry and that the appellant determined
Ms. Landry's hours of work. Ms. Landry had no
chance of profit or risk of loss and did not supply any tools.
Ms. Robichaud concluded that Ms. Landry was not
self-employed and that her work was an integral part of that of
the appellant Jacqueline Castonguay. There was therefore a
contract of service. According to the witness, since her salary
was paid to her directly by the Department, the latter became the
deemed employer under the Regulations.
[20] As regards the case of the appellant
George Mazerolle, Ms. Robichaud had met with the worker
Germaine Chiasson, Lily Fraser and
Edith Thériault of the Department, and the
appellant's niece, Mireille Gagnon.
Germaine Chiasson, who provided care to Mr. Mazerolle,
worked 80 to 90 hours a week at an hourly rate set by the
Department and her paycheque was issued to her by the Department
and was in her name only. The Department and the appellant paid
her her salary in the proportions with which we are familiar.
According to Ms. Robichaud, Mireille Gagnon had the power to
hire and dismiss Ms. Chiasson. Ms. Chiasson had no
possibility of making a profit and no risk of suffering a loss.
The tools were provided by Ms. Gagnon. Ms. Chiasson was
an integral part of meeting the appellant's needs. The
employment was thus held under a contract of service.
[21] As regards the case of the appellant
Bernadette Ferron, Ms. Robichaud had met the worker Francine
Doiron as well as the Department social worker responsible for
the case. Ms. Doiron started providing care to the
appellant on July 1, 1999. She worked from 9:00 a.m. to
6:00 p.m. every day and her rate of pay was $35 a day. To
obtain payment for those services the worker and the appellant
signed a form that was then sent to the Department. The
Department subsequently sent a cheque to the appellant, who
endorsed it and handed it over to Ms. Doiron.
[22] Ms. Robichaud concluded that the
instructions for the performance of Francine Doiron's duties
came from the Department, that Francine Doiron was paid by
the appellant Bernadette Ferron, that Ms. Doiron had no
risk of loss or chance of profit and that she was not in business
for herself in the home care field. The employment was therefore
held under a contract of service.
[23] In cross-examination,
Ms. Robichaud confirmed that the tests used are those set
out in the case law, namely: control, ownership of tools, chance
of profit and risk of loss, and integration. Control is
determined based mainly on the working conditions, payroll
journal, work schedule and supervision. In the case concerning
the appellant Jacqueline Castonguay, the worker Nadia Landry
worked from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. each day. According to
Ms. Robichaud, that was one of the conditions the appellant
had insisted upon, but she acknowledged that this indicated
nothing in particular in this instance. The worker
Nadia Landry worked at the appellant's home one week and
at another person's home the following week.
Ms. Robichaud admitted she had not checked with
Nadia Landry to see whether she had chosen that arrangement.
Nor had she ascertained whether Nadia Landry was working 48
hours a week when the New Brunswick Employment Standards
Act provides for a maximum 44-hour work week. In
Ms. Robichaud's opinion, this was not relevant to her
analysis here. She added that she had conducted other analyses
regarding domestic work, such as child care, and that each case
is determined on the basis of the facts.
[24] The criteria used by
Ms. Robichaud were reviewed in cross-examination. She
acknowledged that the fact that the appellant had approached the
worker Nadia Landry was not in itself sufficient to allow
her to conclude that there was a contract of service. According
to her testimony, the chance-of-profit-or-risk-of-loss test did
not apply here since the worker did not incur any expenses. There
were no tools that could lead one to the conclusion that there
was a contract of service. However, the integration that existed
by virtue of the fact that the appellant needed the worker's
services meant that those services were integrated with the
appellant's needs, particularly if the services were to be
provided over a long period. Ms. Robichaud ended her
testimony by stating that the appellant dictated the work to be
done and set the hours of work. However, she could not explain
why the worker alternated from week to week with another worker.
The Department, she stated, was the deemed employer because it
provided the necessary funds.
[25] As regards the case of the appellant
George Mazerolle, Ms. Robichaud confirmed that she had done
the same analysis. According to that analysis, the Department was
the deemed employer because it provided the major portion of
Ms. Chiasson's salary, and the appellant was the real
employer because he paid the other portion thereof. She admitted
she had not spoken with the appellant during her investigation.
She testified that the appellant's niece,
Mireille Gagnon, had contacted the volunteer centre for her
area herself to obtain the names of people who offered the type
of assistance in question. It was apparently suggested that she
contact the worker, in this instance Germaine Chiasson.
Ms. Chiasson had previously worked for the volunteer centre
but in 1999 she offered her services on a personal basis.
According to Ms. Robichaud, Mireille Gagnon had
negotiated with Ms. Chiasson to obtain those services.
Ms. Chiasson worked from 80 to 90 hours a week for $5.50 an
hour. Ms. Robichaud admitted that in her analysis she had
not taken into account the provisions of the Employment
Standards Act that govern the maximum number of hours an
employee can work per week. With regard to ownership of tools,
chance of profit, risk of loss and integration, she drew the same
conclusions as in the case previously referred to.
[26] As regards the case of the appellant
Bernadette Ferron, Ms. Robichaud obtained her information from
the Department. She also contacted Francine Doiron and a person
named Rosalie, both of whom had worked for this appellant.
Bernadette Ferron signed a form which the worker likewise signed
and the former received a cheque from the Department payable to
her at the end of the month. According to Ms. Robichaud,
there was a contract of service here, the employer being the
appellant Bernadette Ferron. Ms. Robichaud did not
consider the Department to be the deemed employer in this
instance because the appellant received the cheque directly from
the Department. Ms. Robichaud stated that, if the appellants
in the other two cases had received the cheque directly, as in
Bernadette Ferron's case, she would not have considered the
Department to be the deemed employer.
[27] In Wiebe Door Services Ltd. v.
M.N.R., [1986] 3 F.C. 553, the Federal Court of Appeal
applied a four-in-one test. In 671122 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz
Industries Canada Inc., 274 N.R. 367, the Supreme Court of
Canada upheld the application of that test in determining whether
a person is considered to be self-employed or an employee. These
cases also remind us that no single element is decisive and that
all of the elements, namely: control, integration, chance of
profit and risk of loss, and ownership of tools, must be applied
to the relationship that exists between the parties. Since the
four elements are not necessarily interrelated, it sometimes
becomes necessary to consider them individually while looking at
the whole of the relationship between the parties.
[28] In the instant cases, most of the
statements of fact were proven, but I do not think that they
necessarily support the Minister's decision. Taking as a
whole the tests that must be considered, I have concluded that
the relationship between the parties in these three cases was
governed by a contract for services and not a contract of
service. The three care recipients had called on the
Department's services for an assessment of their needs. The
assessment served to determine whether they could obtain
assistance in meeting their day-to-day needs. Such assistance
varied according to their level of autonomy and primarily
involved housework, personal care related to hygiene and health,
and assistance with daily activities. Through the assessment, the
Department also determined the recipient's ability to pay for
such services. In the instant cases, the Department was paying
for the services either in whole or in part, and either the
recipient or the worker was paid directly, depending on the
relationship of trust that existed. It is obvious that the aim of
the program is to enable recipients to obtain essential care in
their own homes rather than in a nursing home and thereby enjoy a
better quality of life.
[29] Once the recipient's needs have
been identified, it is necessary to obtain the services of people
qualified to meet those needs. Some recipients need more care
than others and the number of hours needed to deliver the care
can vary. Obviously, the Department and the recipient of the care
determine the number of hours needed to meet the recipient's
needs. However, in the present cases, it was the workers who
decided how many hours they would be working. In the first case,
the worker gave 48.5 hours of her time per week without asking to
be paid for overtime, and she worked seven days a week. In the
second case, the worker put in over 80 hours of work over a
seven-day workweek: the recipient needed care 12 hours a day and
the number of hours given by that worker was not imposed on her.
In the third case, the Department paid the recipient $35 a day
for six days a week for the care she needed.
[30] Once they had explained to the
workers the nature of the care required by the recipient, the
recipient and the Department exercised very little control over
those workers in the performance of their work. They were aware
of the duties to be carried out and themselves chose to put in
more time than prescribed by the employment standards. Some of
them signed, along with the recipient, a payment form, a type of
invoice. Some alternated from week to week and were free to offer
their services to other people. The recipients thus did not have
exclusive enjoyment of a worker's services, unless the worker
chose to work additional hours.
[31] Chance of profit and risk of loss as
well as ownership of tools are not important factors in these
cases, which involve basic personal care that does not require
any special tools for the performance of the duties. The
equipment mentioned was for the recipients' well-being and
was not a work tool for the workers.
[32] Degree of integration is a test that
is more readily applicable in the context of a commercial
enterprise than in that of personal care at home. It cannot be
concluded that the workers were integrated into the
recipients' business because the services provided enabled
the recipients to attain a certain level of autonomy. The
services were thus accessory in nature and were not integrated
into the recipients' needs. This leads to the conclusion that
there was a contract for services rather than a contract of
service.
[33] Counsel for the respondent asked this
Court to draw a negative inference from the fact that the
appellants did not call the workers and the recipients or their
representatives. She invoked the rule, adopted by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Lévesque v. Comeau, [1970]
S.C.R. 1010, that the failure of a party or a witness to produce
evidence that the party or the witness was able to produce and
that could have served to clarify the facts constitutes grounds
for a court to infer that the evidence of the party or the
witness in question would have been unfavourable to the party to
whom the failure was attributed.
[34] In the three appeals here, the
appeals officer contacted the workers and obtained sufficient
facts from them to be able to draw conclusions and make
recommendations to the Minister. I do not believe that the
workers and the recipients or their representatives did not
testify because they wanted to hide evidence that was
unfavourable to them. I believe rather that their testimony would
not have shed any more light on the contractual relationship
between the parties. Evidence concerning the operation of the
support program, the services provided and the information
collected by the appeals officer was presented by witnesses who
were all highly credible. Like Judge Bowman (now Associate Chief
Judge) did in Alemu v. The Queen, 99 DTC 714, I
refuse to draw any inference unfavourable to the
appellants.
[35] The appellants' counsel raised
the question of the validity of the regulations made under the
Act and the CPP, specifically the provisions regarding a
person's being deemed to be the employer. As I have decided
that the relationship between the parties was governed by a
contract for services, it is not necessary that I address that
question.
[36] Counsel for the appellants asked this
court to amend the style of cause for the third case, that of
Bernadette Ferron, to include the name of the Department. It is
obvious from the Notice of Appeal that the Department filed the
two appeals in the name of Bernadette Ferron and not in the name
of the Department. If the Department wanted to appeal, this
should have been done within the time prescribed. The discussion
as to whether the Department has the right to appeal as a party
affected by the decision would be appropriate if the Court were
dealing with an appeal file by the Department. The Court would in
that case be able to rule on the question under the authority
conferred on it by subsection 104(1) of the Act, which
reads as follows:
The Tax
Court of Canada and the Minister have authority to decide any
question of fact or law necessary to be decided in the course of
an appeal under section 91 or 103 or to reconsider an assessment
under section 92 and to decide whether a person may be or is
affected by the decision or assessment.
[Emphasis added.]
[37] For these reasons, I conclude that
the contractual relationship between the parties during the
periods in issue was a relationship governed by a contract for
services. The appeals are allowed and the Minister's
decisions that the workers held insurable and pensionable
employment are vacated.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada,
this 6th day of July 2002.
J.T.C.C.
Translation
certified true
on this 19th
day of August 2002.
Erich Klein,
Revisor
[OFFICIAL
ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
2001-1035(EI)
2001-1036(CPP)
BETWEEN:
BERNADETTE
FERRON,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER OF
NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
Appeal heard on common
evidence with the appeals of Jacqueline Castonguay
(2000-4195(EI)), (2000-4199(CPP)) and The Department of Family
and Community Services and George Mazerolle (2001-323(EI)),
(2001-324(CPP))
on January 17, 2002, at
Fredericton, New Brunswick, by
the Honourable Judge
François Angers
Appearances
Counsel for the
Appellant:
Cedric L. Haines, Q.C.
Michèle Hébert
Counsel for the
Respondent:
Dominique Gallant
Christa MacKennon
JUDGMENT
The
appeal is allowed and the Minister's decision is vacated in
accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada,
this 6th day of July 2002.
J.T.C.C.
Translation
certified true
on this 19th
day of August 2002.
Erich Klein,
Revisor
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