Date: 19980210
Docket: 96-4833-GST-I
BETWEEN:
TECHNOGOLD IMPORTS INC.,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Bowman, J.T.C.C.
[1] This is an appeal from an assessment made pursuant to the
provisions of the Excise Tax Act, by which the Minister of
National Revenue refused to allow the appellant an input tax
credit amounting to $965.27 on the purchase of a Honda car. The
principal reason given for the refusal was that the appellant was
not the owner of the car.
[2] It is clear that the appellant paid the price of the car.
The appellant's president, Abraham Benlezrah, testified
and entered in evidence two cheques from the appellant which
indicated that the money to purchase the car was withdrawn from
the appellant's and not Mr. Benlezrah’s bank
account.
[3] Mr. Benlezrah was the appellant's president and
the owner of half of the company's shares. His
brother-in-law, Prosper Trojman, owned the other half of the
shares. It appears that Mr. Benlezrah is now the owner of
all the shares.
[4] The car was registered in Mr. Benlezrah's name.
He had it registered in his name on the assumption that he was in
fact the company. Since he was the person who would be driving
the car, he thought it should be registered in his name on the
registration certificate. Additionally, the insurance on the car
was in his name, that is, he and not the company was the insured
under the insurance policy.
[5] Further, the car was not mentioned either in the
company's balance sheet or in the appendix "Deduction
for Depreciation" which was part of the company's tax
return. In the "Vehicle Purchase Agreement" it was
Mr. Benlezrah who was named as the purchaser.
[6] In light of all these documents, can I conclude that the
appellant was the real owner of the car as it paid the price for
it?
[7] Under the provisions of the Act, the "beneficial
owner" is the person who is entitled to claim an input tax
credit.
[8] I am not persuaded that a person is owner simply because
he pays the purchase price of a good.
[9] There are two judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada
which have dealt with the question as to who is the owner of a
car for the purposes of the Highway Traffic Act. In
Honan v. Gerhold et al., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 866,
Spence J. said at 872-3:
With every respect for the learned justice on appeal, I am not
so persuaded. What had moved Chester Doman was to protect
the vehicle from seizure in execution of the judgment held by his
wife. That end could not be accomplished unless he transferred
the automobile. He, therefore, did transfer the automobile. The
transfer gave Gerhold the legal title and it was intended to have
that exact effect. The form of application for register of the
transfer does, in my view, contain words which show that there
has been a conveyance. Such a form appears in Ex. 19 and it
should be noted that the form is signed both by the transferor
and the transferee and it contains the words: "I hereby give
notice of the change of ownership of the vehicle described hereon
and make application for transfer of the permit". Of course,
under the circumstances, the late Chester Doman continued to
have the exclusive possession of the automobile and have it under
his dominion and control. That was part of the transaction. In
fact exclusive dominion and control was present in both
Haberl v. Richardson and Hayduk v.
Pidoborozny. Despite this, however, Gerhold did manifest his
ownership in several important actions. Firstly, he placed the
vehicle under his insurance policy, and so certified to the
insurance company that the vehicle was his. Secondly, he applied
for the registration, in the first place in 1966 and again in
1968 and 1969, and he took great objection to Doman having done
so in Gerhold's name in the year 1967. Finally, and in my
view most important, he disposed of the wrecked car and took the
proceeds for his own use with evidently no intention of
accounting to the estate of the late Chester Doman. This
latter action could only be consistent with an assertion of his
ownership of the vehicle.
[10] In Hayduk v. Pidoborozny, [1972]
S.C.R. 879, Ritchie J. said at 885-6:
There is a logical reason why the registered owner should be
treated as "owner" within the meaning of the Act
because the very purpose of the registration is to give notice to
all users of the highway of the identity of an individual to whom
they may look as owner in the event of an accident. In the
present case, however, the contention that the father was the
owner within the meaning of s. 130 does not rest upon
registration alone. Here the father was the purchaser of the
motor vehicle in conformity with the terms of a conditional sales
contract which he had signed and the son had not. It is true that
the son made all the payments under this contract from his own
resources, but the contract was obtained on the credit of the
father and the payments thereunder were not fully discharged
until after the accident had occurred. With all respect to the
members of the Appellate Division, I agree with the learned trial
judge that a valid sale of this motor vehicle had been made to
the defendant Peter Pidoborozny (the father) and that he was
the owner at common law notwithstanding the fact that his son had
made the payments under the conditional sales contract and had
had exclusive possession of the vehicle from the date of its
purchase.
[11] I recognize that these two cases interpreted the word
"owner" within the meaning of the provincial
legislation and that other things may have to be considered in
deciding the meaning of the words "acquire",
"supply" or "import". Nonetheless, those
words convey the idea of a right of ownership.
[12] In M.N.R. v. Wardean Drilling Ltd.,
69 DTC 5194, Cattanach J. said at 5197:
In my opinion the proper test as to when property is acquired
must relate to the title to the property in question or to the
normal incidents of title, either actual or constructive, such as
possession, use and risk.
[13] Also, in the Nouveau Petit Robert dictionary, the
following definition is found of the word
"acquérir" (to acquire):
[TRANSLATION]
Become owner of (property, right) by purchase, exchange,
inheritance.
[14] In the circumstances of the instant case I am persuaded
that the true owner of the car was Mr. Benlezrah, not the
company.
[15] The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, February 10, 1998.
"D. G. H. Bowman"
J.T.C.C.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Translation certified true on this 19th day of March 1998.
Mario Lagacé, Revisor